THE WINDHAM PAPERS

WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE EARL OF ROSEBERY
K.G., K.T.

ISAAC FOOT

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THE WINDHAM PAPERS

WHY MAY NOT THE LIFE OF WINDHAM
BE WRITTEN BY HIS LETTERS?

New Monthly Magazine, Dec. 1831

The Rt. Hon. William Windham

from an unsigned Mezzotint in the British Museum

THE WINDHAM PAPERS

THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE RT. HON. WILLIAM WINDHAM 1750 - 1810 A MEMBER OF PITT'S FIRST CABINET AND THE MINISTRY OF "ALL THE TALENTS" INCLUDING HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED LETTERS FROM GEORGE III THE DUKES OF YORK AND GLOUCESTER PITT FOX BURKE CANNING LORDS GRENVILLE MINTO CASTLEREAGH AND NELSON MALONE COBBETT DR. JOHNSON DR. BURNEY ETC.

WITH
AN INTRODUCTION BY THE RT. HON.
THE EARL OF ROSEBERY
K.G. K.T.

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME TWO

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THE struggle between France and Austria continued throughout 1796. The Archduke Charles drove Jourdan from the Palatinate and compelled Moreau to retreat from Wurtemberg and Bavaria through the defiles of the Black Forest. In Italy, however, Bonaparte was sweeping all opposition before him. Naples and Parma made peace with the Republic. The English evacuated Corsica and the inhabitants declared for France. In October Lord Malmesbury was sent upon his " despicable embassy " to Paris. The mission found no favour with Windham, who regarded peace made with the Jacobins as little less than a stain upon the national honour.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* EDMUND BURKE

January 17, 1796

I send you another Pamphlet, which I took at first to be a twin-Brother of the one that you

have lately been considering, but which I find has no relation to it in the line of its descent; though it has a complete one in its character and lineaments, as well as in the favour of those who become its Parents by adopting it. I thought at first it had been Lord Auckland,[1] but I have understood since that it is the work of another hand. They both work however to the same end; and I am sorry to find that their work is approved and sanctioned by the same authorities. When you have read to about the middle, you will see of what kidney the writer is, and you will judge before that, that if the work is spoken of as a production of considerable ability by the persons that I have alluded to, it must be from approbation of the sentiments, and not from their being led away by any unusual merit in the composition. In that respect its character might be contented to stand at Par between praise and blame. Its general tendency is that which is the most material; which becomes more so from the approbation it seems to meet with; and which makes me desirous that you should have it at this time under your consideration; though I don't know that it can add to, or alter anything in what you are at present about.

The moment of Peace is yet, I hope, so far distant, that chance may still do much to save us from so dreadful a catastrophe: I mean, of course, Peace with a Jacobin Republick; yet everything has a dreadful tendency that way: and the great impediment is wanting; a conviction of the extent of the danger which from that moment will begin to operate against the Country. It really does not appear to me that, from the moment that such a Peace is made, the shame and degradation of this country will be any longer supportable. I cannot but imagine to myself the circumstance of one of the Regicides and Septembrizers opening his house in London as

[1] William Eden, first Baron Auckland (1744–1814).

Ambassador of the Republick and finding it crowded (as he certainly will) by the Wives and Daughters of the first nobility and Gentry of the Country; who will be initiated there in the doctrines of Revolutionary Morality; and be ready to take lessons in the practice from the numberless able and agreeable professors, who will attend there for that purpose. It might be a curious question of propriety, if any such were worth attending to, on what footing the ambassadress was to be; and how the case of a Wife, removable upon four days' notice, should be distinguished from that of a Mistress. But it would be in vain to make any bones of such distinctions; and there is no doubt that Mdlle. de Fontenaye, should Tallien be our Ambassador, will be as well received, and as much in fashion as Mme. de Polignac; or the Princesse de Lamballe, or any foreign Woman of distinction that we have known in our time. I daresay there will be a Fontenaye-Cap that will prevail amongst the Women, as we may remember the Nivernois-hat to have done among the men. You know probably from Woodford in what a manner a Mr. Bird who was sent over to endeavour to save the Duc de Choiseul [1] was received by La Croix,[2] the Minister for foreign affairs; I mean in what dress he found him; and how lodged. He was in a magnificent Hotel, approaching to the character of a Palace; and was dressed in a black velvet cloak, lined with scarlet, a scarlet vest, scarlet Pantaloons; wore a Gold-hilted sword and a Hat *à la* Henri IV., with a Panache of Tricolor feathers. I have not heard that they dress their ambassadors in any particular manner; but I daresay that it will happen so before long; and that when the Party shall be a little more established in this Country we shall find that dress, whatever it shall be, beginning to make its appearance here in the same manner as the cropped-heads.

[1] Claude Antoine Gabriel, Duc de Choiseul.
[2] Charles la Croix, Foreign Minister under the Directory.

Those who are desirous of Peace, and yet are not friends to the French System, ground their hopes on the misery and dissension likely to continue in that Country, and the effect which that will have, both in disabling them in any attacks against us by open force, and by furnishing an antidote against the progress of their Principles. This is the point which it will be necessary most to labour. I fear that that security will not turn out to be what it is expected; though it will be very likely to secure this country against any immediate shock; and to enable it to hold out during the lives of the present possessors of power, whether King or Ministers. It seems to me that the Country will then have contracted its death's disease, and have imbibed a Jacobin taint which will never leave it till it has effected its destruction. It is very probable that the disorder may not show itself in any alarming way for a considerable time; and that, during the interval, the Country may seem to enjoy an unusual degree of health and prosperity; but the complaint will, I apprehend, be in the blood, not to be expelled but by some such violent courses as will endanger the existence of the whole frame; and as, after all, will never suffer us to recover that state of strength and vigour which we once enjoyed.

I had intended; instead of sending you the pamphlet, to have been the bearer of it myself; but the necessity of returning on Monday to the Birthday, and some engagements, that detained me late yesterday, have made me defer my hopes till another opportunity, which I hope however to be able to meet with before long.[1]

Edmund Burke *to* William Windham

Beaconsfield : March 6, 1796

What I was given to understand, but what I could not believe, nor could you, has happened. The House

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 94.

of Commons is condemned in Costs and Damages by the East India Company.[1] We have charged Hastings with Robbery of the people of India. Instead of punishing him we reward him with a Second Robbery. No account demanded of him. No reason asked, why with an immense salary, when he might have been honestly rich; he is, as he says, miserably poor. Why no account of the Bribes? The lords may say they will not convict him of them. But they have not said, nor can they say, that he has accounted for the money, tho' their Judgement has the infamy to say that Bribery and forgery of Bonds to cover it, is a proper way of getting a Revenue —but no Account! No account of any kind! My dear Sir, I must not have it said that we have compromised the matter by a Pension to the accuser and another to the accused. The House of Lords may say we have made a false charge. So may the Bystanders. Are we to say it ourselves?

I hope to have my Petition ready by the End of the Week. Your poor friend, Mrs. Burke, is still very ill and cannot quit her room and her Couch. I have suspended the work on the peace. It is not fit that any good should happen to this enormous Mass of corruption, peculation, oppression, Robbery, prevarication in Judgment, and direct perversion of Judgment. God's ways are unsearchable. But I think the Bolt will fall, and it is fit that it should fall on me amongst the rest. Adieu. Adieu.[2]

William Windham *to* William Pitt

April 27, 1796

What was mentioned cursorily the other day, when I had the pleasure of seeing you in Downing Street, has certainly a great deal that is deserving of consideration,

[1] The East India Company voted Warren Hastings a handsome annuity.

[2] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 99.

and contributes to fix me in the opinion, that the Business respecting the Royalists, though in some respects usefully placed in my hands, may upon the whole be better conducted, if left to follow the course of the other military service, and confined to those departments to which alone it can officially belong.

Two causes obstruct the success of these Measures in my Hands—the necessity, which is unavoidable, of recurring in every instance to other departments, even for the very Power by which any Measure is originally to be put in motion; and secondly the jealousy entertained, that I am at times acting rather according to my own Ideas, than in conformity to those which the Cabinet have finally adopted. The fact is really not so: whatever my own Ideas may be, I have never allowed myself to transgress that line, which the Cabinet have thought it right to prescribe: but as long as the ground of suspicion remains, the apprehension may from time to time operate, and is, therefore, among the reasons which may induce the opinion above mentioned, namely, that the Business respecting the Royalists may go on better, if left exclusively to the regular official Channels. I, for one, shall be perfectly willing to place it there, having originally only accepted this office as a sort of a Chapel of Ease to Mr. Dundas, and because it seemed to me that no one else was so likely to attend to the duties of it.

One consideration only I wish to be strongly impressed —that the Business in Question, by whomever conducted, must be altogether a work of detail, requiring constant and minute attention, and incapable of being carried on to any useful purpose under the mere effect of general Orders, however large and liberal those orders may be. Great Expeditions must in general owe their success to their force: and may dispense, therefore, with any attention to detail, except in those who are to follow up the execution of them in their last and lowest stages.

But all the assistance that we can at present give to the Royalists, or have the immediate prospect of giving, must be the effect of Contrivance and Combination, and can be prepared in the first instance by those only who will submit to the pains of conversing with the persons who come from the country; of communicating by every opportunity with those who remain there; of examining their Plans; of comparing their accounts; of informing himself minutely of the State of their Affairs; of concerting with them the means of adopting the Measures to be taken here, to the corresponding Movements to be made in the Interior.—All this neither Mr. Dundas nor Huskisson[1] can have time to go through. I should recommend, therefore, earnestly to him to appoint some one or two Persons—if military men, the better—who may be entrusted with the care of this Department, and report the results of their communications and opinions, upon which he and the Cabinet may afterwards decide.

In this way things will go on more regularly and, possibly, more advantageously. I am afraid, I must say, that they are not likely to go on less so. I much question; indeed, whether we are not now too late, and whether the next news will not be that the Army of Scepeau is gone the same way as those of Stofflet Sapinaud, and Charette. We must determine, however, upon the State of things, such as it now remains.

I have no wish, but that the Cause may prosper, by whatever means that end may be brought about; and, if more is likely to be done in the way that I have now proposed, I shall have an additional Reason that I did not sooner free myself from a charge of infinite Trouble, Anxiety and Vexation, in which I fear I have done but little good, and in which I have for ever felt myself in the painful situation of pressing importunately upon others' attention what they did not at least feel to be of the same importance that I did.

[1] William Huskisson (1770–1830).

The enjoyment that I have been feeling since yesterday in the Country, does not dispose one less to the divesting oneself of any Employment which makes the necessity of closer Residence in London. I should not, however, be influenced by this Consideration, if I saw the possibility of being in any degree useful to my Friends the Chouans. I shall take care to return in time for the Debate to-morrow.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* HENRY DUNDAS

May 1, 1796

Mr. Pitt will, I hope, have communicated to you an opinion, founded on Reasons which I have explained to him and in which, I think, you will agree with me, that, as the only chance of realising what I believe to be the intentions of Cabinet on that part of the War that relates to the Royalists, it will be better that their affairs should no longer remain in my hands, but be restored to the departments to which, regularly, they belong.

It is absolutely necessary that something should be done: we must either follow up the Service better than we have done hitherto, or we must fairly tell these unfortunate people that they must no longer look to us for help: that whatever they get from us here will be so much to the good: but they must not rely on that succour, or neglect any opportunity of making in time the best Terms they can for themselves.

My Ideas with respect to the whole of this subject, do not differ perhaps so much from yours, as you have sometimes supposed. I differ, no doubt, inasmuch as I would, from the beginning, have made this the principal object of the War, and considered all others, unless I am to except the Cape-of-Good-Hope, as subordinate; but that point once decided, in all the rest, I flatter myself, our ideas are very little dissimilar.

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 122.

Sir Thomas Lawrence, pinxt.

HENRY DUNDAS, FIRST VISCOUNT MELVILLE

What I complain of is not that we are following a wrong system, but that we do not act up to the system that we profess; that all our proceedings languish under the fatal influence of neglect and inattention; that nobody shows any interest in the successs of the Royalists; nobody will take the trouble to understand their affairs; no one will willingly hear any mention of them; no one, except by compulsion; will take any step in their behalf. There is not the slightest want of the most subordinate department of service that does not take place of their most pressing demands; they cannot get the Crumbs even, that fall from any of the rich Tables that are spread around them.

Above all things what they want is attention. Whatever is to be done in support of this Cause, more especially upon the limited plan to which we have confined ourselves, must be a work of contrivance and combination, partaking at every step of the nature of military service, and requiring therefore all the punctuality and dispatch necessary to such operations. It cannot go on under mere general orders; and still less under universal neglect. Those who are to conduct this business must have the correspondence constantly before them and see that it is regularly maintained; must converse with all those that come of their own accord or are deputed from the interior; must collate their accounts; must know their characters; must concert with them the means to be taken here, correspondent to those to be pursued at the same time within the Country.

It is impossible, I know, for you to follow all these details; nor can they either be consistent with the innumerable avocations of Huskisson. It was for that reason that I was willing, as you know, even before I came into office, to take upon myself a part of that business, knowing that I should at least not be wanting in that Species of Qualification that would result from good-will.

The business, however, has not prospered in my hands, so that after struggling with it longer than I ought, and losing a precious time, which I fear we shall never recover, I must now give it up in despair, and request that it may be tried in some other mode, in which, if its success is not greater, as I hope it will be, it must at least, I fear, be said that it is not likely to be less. I have, therefore, suggested to Mr. Pitt how I think the reduction of the Business to a more official course may be more consistent with the sort of attention, under which alone it can come to any good.

If, as an occasional assessor on the Bench, and by the means of such acquaintance as I have formed with the cause and the parties, I can be of any use, I shall always be happy to be at your Service ; but it is in vain for me to attempt any longer to conduct the business, to which, at the same time that I am tormenting myself, I feel myself wholly incapable of rendering any effectual service.[1]

THE MARQUIS TOWNSHEND[2] *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Weymouth Street : May 25, 1796

I have written to my Steward to make all the interest he can for you, and also to the Commanding Officer of my Regiment, which has raised many Recruits at Norwich, and that, if he hears there is any opposition to you, he will send such Men as have Votes to you. With best wishes for your Success.[3]

[1] Add. MSS. 37876 f. 89.

[2] The Marquis Townshend was Lord-Lieutenant of Norfolk and Colonel of the 2nd (Queen's) Regiment of Dragoons. This letter is in reference to Windham's election at Norfolk. Windham, by his support of the war, and his opposition to various popular reforms, had lost much of his popularity in his constituency. He was opposed by Bartlett Gurney, a local banker, but was returned by a majority of 83.

[3] Add. MSS. 37908 f. 232.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* B. G. DILLINGHAM

Felbrigg: May 31, 1796

My connection with Mr. Coke [1] was so strong, that no political Reasons, even tho' assisted in a great Measure by his own Example, can induce me to break through it. My Intention, therefore, at present is to proceed no further than what I understand to have been his own line respecting me, and to take no part against him. I have so much respect for personal connections as opposed to political ones, where there is nothing to impeach the motives on either side, that I cannot prevail upon myself to trespass upon them sooner or further than others, by their example, have imposed upon me the necessity of doing.

There is one Person, who, as well as yourself, would have placed me, if he had been brought forward, in a more difficult Situation, I mean my friend and Relation Mr. Windham of Earsham.—If a candidate is to be set up, to which purpose, as you know, I have hitherto contributed nothing, I should certainly have been happy that Mr. Windham had been the person chosen. —It is now probably much too late: particularly as I am far from certain what his wishes would be. I cannot, however, speak upon this subject without mentioning his name, and the opinion I entertain of him, though in doing so I suggest nothing that must not already have occurred to yourself and others.

You will have the goodness to consider this Letter as private, except so far as the General Description of my Situation respecting Mr. Coke, viz., that, knowing no more than I do at present of his Conduct towards me in the late Contest for Norwich, nor of the present prospect of the Contest for the County, I shall take no part either on one side or the other.[2]

[1] Thomas William Coke, of Holkham (1754–1842), created Earl of Leicester, 1837. Coke represented the county of Norfolk in Parliament from 1776 until 1832. [2] Add. MSS. 37908 f. 265.

GEORGE STRAHAN[1] *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Islington: June 13, 1796

I enclose with this a Copy of the new edition of Dr. Johnson's Prayers and Meditations. Tho', in the Publication of these Prayers, I acted merely ministerially in compliance with the injunctions of our dying friend, and consequently could deserve no blame,—nor any praise, except for my fidelity, yet the Book no sooner appeared than I was assailed with invectives on all sides. The monthly and daily Criticks long made merry at my expense; Dr. Adams growled in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, and Mr. Courtenay complimented me by name in his *Poetical Review* of the literary and moral Character of Dr. Johnson. If these publick Censors were so severe upon no ground of reason, what may I now expect, when even friends may think I have given them something like a provocation by concurring with my Author in asserting the reality of Apparitions?—I can only expect them to say that my Author, with all his transcendent talents, had some share of superstition, and that his miserable editor is distinguished for nothing else;—in other words, that superstition was *his frailty*, and is *my forte*. But it is easier to laugh than reason; and (maugre the forebodings of some sarcastick friends) I am not afraid of any obloquy that can be induced by ridicule not founded in argument. *No man*, said Bentley, *was ever written out of date but by himself;* and to that disaster how should I be liable, who wisely have never yet written myself into date?

So far I have the advantage of Bentley and all great Men; nor am I without hope that you will think there is some weight, not only in what our illustrious friend has said, but in the arguments I have added in favour

[1] George Strahan (1744–1824), the second son of William Strahan, the Scottish printer and publisher. He first published in 1785 the volume "Prayers and Meditations composed by Samuel Johnson, LL.D."

of his Opinion. But my tremendous arguments, tho' they have been the fruit of pains, might, I confess, be comprised in a Nutshell. I, therefore, insist no further on their efficacy, lest you should think that I talk too pompously, like Punch in a Puppet-show of the feats of his wooden Pygmies. Would you believe that Scott Senr. has been so blind to evidence as to pronounce my Author and me a pair of Dreamers? But, I trust; there are Gentlemen who will conceive and express more reverence for our Shades. In this hope I enclose a second Copy of the Prayers, which, if it be not intruding too far on your kindness, I will thank you to present at some convenient time to your friend, Mr. Burke. His veneration for the Author will give a degree of value even to these (as Criticks think) his dotages; And should it induce him (thro' you, or in any manner most agreeable to himself) to communicate a ray of his intelligence on the subject to the poor editor, who expects no mercy, it would be accepted with an emotion of gratitude—mixed with regret that that gratitude can be of no use where it has been so excited.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

London: August 20, 1796

All applications for raising new Corps are referred by the Secretary of State to the person who is at the head of the Army, and the Secretary of State has from that time no more concern in the business, until he acquaints the person who makes the proposal with the King's determination upon it, which is signified to the Secretary of State by the Commander in Chief. Through this process had Mr. Pelham's application completely passed some time before I received yours of the 15th, and though, as you see, I had nothing to do with the decision, I have no difficulty in saying that I most entirely approve it, as I cannot well conceive an institu-

[1] Add. MSS. 37914 f. 246.

tion more prejudicial to the service and more inconsistent with one of the first principles of a military establishment than that of the fencible Corps which have been raised in this country.

I am very glad to find, by a note which Mr. Hussey has been so good as to leave here this morning, that Burke's health has received so much more amendment than either you or Mrs. Crewe gave me a right to expect. I hope he will continue where he is and attend to his physician who, by Mrs. Crewe's report, pays him that attention which cannot but be highly satisfactory to all his Friends. . . .

All my hopes from Marshal Wurmser are entirely ruined by a visit from the Duc D'Harcourt, who says that, notwithstanding his success of the 2nd, he was defeated and routed by Bonaparte on the 3d, 4th and 5th, an event I, notwithstanding, know not how to credit, considering the Bulletin of yesterday morning [1]

My warmest affection attends the Burkes.[2]

William Windham *to* William Pitt

Park Street : August 29, 1796

It is a sad office that I am obliged to perform so often (I mean that of Dunning) and one that is not less ungracious I fear, at this time, than at any other. But the object is too important and urgent and concerns us in too many points to admit of my declining the task, however unwillingly I may undertake it.

You have seen M. de la Jaille and know what he says, both of the want that Puisaye has of money, and of the means that exist for conveying it to him. In fact the want has never been of means of sending the money, if the money had been forthcoming. I have not only seen

[1] Dagobert Sigismund, Count von Wurmser (1724–1797), Austrian general, was defeated by Napoleon at Lonato, Castiglione, Rovenedo, and on the Brenta, during the first week in August.

[2] Add. MSS. 37845 f. 73.

M. de la Jaille, but have had a long conversation with the Abbé Guillo, a plain and simple young Breton Priest, and who has been the faithful companion and adherent of Puisaye in all his most trying scenes.

After having been kept in Jersey, I know not how many weeks, in consequence of the Order prohibiting the forwarding any of those who might arrive from the Continent, he has at length, by my desire, been sent over ; and is ready to take charge of any sum of money that you may be willing to entrust to him. He is confident of his means of conveying it ; and there is not an Idea of his not being perfectly to be relied on.

The moon is at this moment in the state most favourable for such attempts : but will not continue fit for the purpose above 8 or 10 days longer, so that, taking in the passage from France and the chance of delay from contrary or high winds after arriving in Jersey, you will see that there is not a moment to be lost.

The uses that Puisaye has for money are very clearly made out—the discharging debts that he has contracted —the supporting those who have refused to avail themselves of the Peace, and those who, tho' included in the Peace, have no means of subsistance in the Province, of which sort are Persons who come from other Provinces, together with a large number of sailors—the affording some compensation or gratification to those who have sacrificed every thing and been ruined by the Cause— the maintaining an Establishment of couriers, Spies, &c. For these and many other purposes, money to the extent that he asks may well be conceived to be wanted and to be capable of being usefully employed.

After all, it is Money that is his Due : and it will not much become us to dispute the application, when he, in Circumstances like the Present, is willing to stay and apply for it.

By the way, I wish that a letter was to be sent him with something of an Official character enjoining; or advising at

least, his Return from the Country, and stating that, with respect to the Commission which we had given him and any duties which he might consider that as imposing, we thought he had done enough. I have written that to him as my own private opinion, long since, and I have taken measures for procuring a similar Letter to be written to him from Monsieur. It is hard to leave a man to sacrifice himself unnecessarily from point of Honor: and that point of Honor created in great measure by the Calumnies of his Enemies, the source of which is to be found in great measure in the correctness of his conduct towards us. One of the charges against him was the having sold himself to us; and one of the things which they never forgive in him, his having preserved so faithfully whatever secrets we entrusted to him. It will be cruel treatment, if, on one side we are to abuse the Emigrants for their Loquacity, and on the other not to protect them against the Enmity which they excite by their secrecy.

In the Abbé Guillo's opinion, the messages which I have sent him will not be sufficient to bring him over, and overcome his determination to stay to the last moment, by which is meant the last moment of his Life.

In this situation and state of mind, it is impossible to refuse a man the payment of what is owing to him, especially when the delay of that payment may possibly have been the cause of his difficulties.

As much as can possibly be got ready should be sent by the Abbé Guillo: and the rest follow, to be lodged with the Prince de Bouillon,[1] who has at present, I have a notion, not a farthing: to be sent over, as opportunities may offer.

The two officers sent by M. de Frotté, one of them very lately, have both effected their purpose, and are both returned. One of them, who left the coast either the

[1] Jacques Léopold Charles Godefroy de la Tour d'Auvergne, Duc de Bouillon, a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire (1746-1802).

21st or 22nd brings, as the report of the country, that 25,000 were actually embarked at Brest, and as many about to embark at Cherbourgh. As these, however, come by the way of St. Marcon, you may possibly have, with respect to Brest, later and more authentick intelligence. £500, which one of these was charged with for Puisaye, could not be conveyed to him, but was left at a deposit for his use. The rest of the money which they took was, part, money due to make up his account: and for which, as I have mentioned, he has given me a receipt: and a £1000 more, advanced for the future support of the party.

Our expenses on this side are certainly not ruinous, whether considered in themselves, or in the effect which they have produced in furnishing employment for such a portion of the Troops of the Enemy.

[P.S.] I should observe that the bringer of the intelligence mentioned above was not in a state of concealment, but moved freely about the country in virtue of the present peace.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* A FRIEND

Park Street, Westminster
September 21, 1796

I receive with more grief than surprize the account you send me of the fate of your poor nephew whose return to his friends and country I never allowed myself to count upon, any more than upon that of many other brave and promising men, employed in the same fatal climate. To the losses that happen in the field of battle one can, in some measure, reconcile one's self, and they are comparatively small; but the ravages of these fatal climates are so extensive and so unceasing, that one cannot bear to look to that side of the war. I will not fail to return you his letter the moment I have time to turn to it, but I cannot forbear, in the meanwhile, to offer my condolence

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 132.

to yourself and his other relations, on the loss of a youth in whose success and safety I had myself contracted a very lively interest.

The calamities of war are undoubtedly very great: but it does not follow that every transaction that may call itself Peace will ultimately be the means of diminishing them, even if it should not bring on calamities of a worse kind. Suppose, for instance, that peace should be made upon terms so advantageous to the republick, as to give them the command of all the coasts of Europe; and, by enabling them, in consequence, to shut against us, in a great measure, all the ports of Europe, to set them up as our rivals in trade, in such circumstances as may give them a decided superiority in that respect. The jealousy of other countries, the connexion of France with America, the rapid increase of their marine, supported by that of Spain and Holland, and supplied and pushed forward by those resources which are now expended in the maintenance of immense armies, may well give such a turn to trade and manufactures, as in a very short time to begin the operation of sinking the commercial consequence of this country, and that operation once begun, will not fail to go on very rapidly.

You have already a proof of the effect that empire will have on trade, in the stopping up of the port of Leghorn, and the termination of all intercourse with Spain. Spain is now, and has long been, a country devoted to France, and it remains to be seen how long Portugal will be otherwise than in the same state. All these are consequences resulting from military and political ascendancy, yet I fear we may happen to find that they have a close connexion with national and commercial prosperity: so little true it is, as many are led to think, that war and commerce must always be adverse to one another.

I will not fail to bear in mind your wishes on the

different objects to which they point, should any opportunity offer of promoting them. Let me beg you to believe me, dear Sir, in the meantime, with sincere concern for the loss which you and Mrs. —— have sustained.

At this time there was a strong peace party in the country, and Pitt, who had never desired war, thought this a good moment in which to endeavour to end it. The majority of the Cabinet acquiesced in his views, and Lord Malmesbury left for Paris to make terms. The Government, so far as most of its members were concerned, were willing to accept peace at almost any price. Windham continued strongly to oppose any concession to the enemy, and steadfastly urged the continuance of the war, until such time as a satisfactory conclusion could be secured. It was because of his constant opposition to the negotiations (which proved abortive) that the King addressed to him early in the next year the words, "I honour you for your firmness."

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

Fulham, September 30, 1796

. . . Where can Pelham have got the notions which you describe, and which are at once so false and contrary to what I conceived him to have entertained? There can be no doubt about the matter. Peace made, and the Republick established, there is an end of the power, independence, government, morals, of this country, as well as of every other throughout Europe. It is another Roman Republic that is coming into existence, equally fatal to the independence of other nations and infinitely more so to their virtue and happiness. Yet this is the consummation,—a consummation from which nothing

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 42.

but new wars can save us,—that the booby politicians in this country are all wishing for, and holding out as the only means by which our ruin is to be averted. It is really such a state of stupid infatuation and desperate baseness, as destroys all interest in the country, and puts one, for one's relief, and as the only means of escaping from the pain of one's own reflections, upon the fatal expedient of locking oneself up in insensibility and seeking one's satisfactions only from private and personal gratifications.

The language to be talked, while it is not supposed to come directly from me, though I would not be thought to entertain any other sentiments, is, that the ruin of this country is never properly begun till peace is made, and that the steps taken to obtain it—whether proper or not, compared with the circumstances in which the country finds itself—are such humiliations as the nation has never before submitted to. This at least is certainly the fact ; and there is no reason why those who are at liberty to declare their opinion should not say so. The use to be made of it is to rouse the nation, in case the Directory should not vouchsafe to grant us peace, to something like a proper spirit in the prosecution of war.

One fact let me set you right in. There has been nothing amiss in the appointment of Lord Chatham to the presidency. Mr. Pitt would have been perfectly willing and desirous to give it to the Duke of Devonshire ; nor has the Duke of Devonshire refused it, I believe, from any opinion that it was not fitting and becoming of him to accept it.

Who is right upon the subject of Irish politics I am not competent to say. Mr. B[urke] is wrong, by excess and exaggeration, I dare say ; but whether he is so in the main, I should much doubt.

The Austrian victories stand, at present, as favourably as at any period and are a strong proof of what is to be done by magnanimity and perseverance. We must not holla,

however, even in that quarter, before we are out of the wood.

Farewell! and count upon me as your Redde-crosse Knight to the end of the adventure.

For knights in knightly deed should persevere,
And still continue what at first they were;
Continue and persist in honour's fair career.[1]

ADMIRAL SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH[2] *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Tower of the Temple, Paris
October 6, 1796

My letter of July 23 was written, I confess, without much hope of its reaching you. Judge then of my surprise and satisfaction at receiving an acknowledgement of it in your letter of September 9. How a letter of that nature can have passed the jaws of all the cerberuses and the Eyes of all the Arguses by which I am surrounded, so as to arrive into the innermost recess of this Tomb *with the seal unbroken* is matter of mystery to me. It is useless and would be impolitic to enquire into that too much. Your ability in contriving to find such able and faithfull agents calls forth my admiration, at the same time that the warmth of your expressions respecting the interest that is taken in my situation, commands my most lively gratitude. May I beg of you to convey these sentiments likewise to those you allude to as taking part in the general wish for my safety and welfare.

[1] The Crewe Papers: Windham Section, p. 35 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

[2] Admiral Sir William Sidney Smith, better known as Sir Sidney Smith (1764–1840), had been captured off Havre, while conducting in person a cutting-out expedition on April 18, 1796. He was sent to Paris, and imprisoned in the Temple. The French Government declined to exchange him on the grounds that they could not recognise him as a prisoner of war, he having held no commission from the British Government when he had burnt the French ships at Toulon. He remained in the Temple for two years, and in May 1798 contrived to escape to England.

I cannot do better towards giving you an idea of my present situation than to send you enclosed the letter I received from the minister of war in answer to one from me complaining of my being transferred from his jurisdiction to that of the minister of the *interior* and confined with even more rigour than Baboeuf[1] and his gang. In consequence of the permission therein contained, I wrote him another on September 7; of this I likewise send you a copy in which you will see I am not yet humiliated by their ill-treatment, and if they imprison me till then, I am afraid my bondage will last longer than my friends wish. Yet they cannot wish me to assume any other tone or attitude than becomes an innocent victim towards his oppressors. Cowards or culprits may whine or rave as my fellow prisoners above alluded to do unceasingly in turns, but I am happy to be able to say that nothing has escaped me yet to weaken the force of dignified remonstrance such as makes these three mountebanks afraid to encounter the discussion: they are ashamed to be thought (individually) willing instruments in the disgraceful treatment I complain of. The eloquent shrug comes to their aid and I see no more of them or their pity for ten days till the "decadary" visit is officially repeated.

The very strictness of the orders given regarding me has at least this good effect that it procures me the respectfull attentions of all who are about me and every service within the letter of those orders, so that I have nothing to complain of personally but the constraint of the confinement. My solitude was much more bearable when I had the advantage of tranquillity and good air but since the arrival of the prisoners taken in the fraternising party at Grenelle, noise and noxious effluvia have taken away my chief consolation, and impaired my health. All this I have represented. I have had an answer from the minister of war since the date of that

[1] François Noel Baboeuf (1764–1797), French Republican politician.

Maria Cosway, sculpt., 1797

SIR SIDNEY SMITH IN PRISON

From original drawing made by Hennequin in the Temple Prison

which I likewise send you. Military men are indignant to a degree at this mode of treatment to which I am subjected, being "*détenu au* SECRET" in a way that is no longer allowable for a prisoner of State or any man who can claim the effect of the constitution. I have however occasionally had a sly conversation with the officers who compose my guard in succession, some of whom, having been prisoners in England and under obligations to the hospitable inhabitants of Hampshire made it a point to testify their gratitude to me and to mark their disapprobation of the difference that has been shown in my case. One of *these* as an advocate does me much more good in fact than the complaints of those who might become objects of retaliation in the way you speak of would do, by rendering such a system odious, as it ought to be. The interdiction I am under to speak to *any body* and the agreement in sentiment which I find when I have an opportunity to break through this injunction points out sufficiently that my persecutors are more afraid of me than I am of them. *Verbum sat sapienti.*[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

October 31, 1796

Your letter is so good, such a genuine effusion of pure, virtuous feeling and native sense, that, after taking away the last page in which there is something about Irish politicks, which in the intolerance of Beaconsfield might not pass, I shall send thither the remainder, as the most gratifying praise that Mr. B[urke] can receive. . . . To what depths of meanness have we sunk!' on what brink of ruin do we stand! what dishonour to all eternity is brought upon the character and counsels of this country! The stain will remain upon our annals for ever. I feel, with you, perfectly restless and miserable, under the sense of dishonour which I carry about with me. I know

[1] Add MSS. 37852 *f.* 61.

not to which side to turn for comfort, to whom to point my resentments, in this universal conspiracy to vilify and undo the country.

Do not imagine that in such a state of things I shall be induced to take a new lease of my connection with the Ministry, or do more than drag on in my present situation till I see what turn things take. If I could have been sure that Lord Malmesbury's despicable embassy would succeed and that peace must be the immediate consequence, I should have been out long since. It does not appear to me at present—though in that one must be regulated by circumstances—that I shall ever outlive ministerially the arrival of a French ambassador in London. It is enough to outlive the knowledge of an English minister in Paris. But that alone, though conclusive as to honour, is not quite so as to ruin. When the other event takes place, from that moment we go sinking, lower and lower, into Jacobinism; Mr. Pitt, however, remaining astride of the country, unless—

> *by some* good *chance*
> *The strong rebuff of a tempestuous cloud,*
> *Instinct with fire and nitre, hurries us,*

either aloft or sideways, as it may happen, but with some violent concussion that may throw Mr. Pitt out of his seat and substitute Mr. Fox in his place, to be succeeded by Sheridan, by Horne Tooke, and so on, through the long dynasty of murderous democrats and proconsuls of France.

My mind gets so soured by all that passes and that has long passed, that I can image to myself no pleasure but in the prospect of the vengeance that will be taken on all those who, by their baseness, their selfishness, their wickedness, or their folly, have contributed to bring on the ruin that awaits us. We abuse the emigrants for their hostility to one another. What sort of charity shall I feel for the Dukes of Bedford, the Plumbers, the Cokes, and other large lists that I could name, when we

meet in exile and beggary in some town on the Continent ? My only consolation will be, that their wretchedness, from the greater indulgences which they have always required and enjoyed, will be something sharper than my own. Let them be well drenched with the ingredients of their own cup. My only satisfaction for the draught of this beverage which I shall have to take myself, will be the wry faces which I shall see them make at it.

Farewell. When England becomes too vile or too dangerous to live in, and we meet in Siberia, we shall at least have the satisfaction of thinking that we are not the authors of our own calamities.[1]

EDMUND BURKE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

November 1, 1796

I was most unfortunately detained when you waited here two hours for me. I proposed to go to the Country directly ; But when you have staid so long for me, it is fit, that I should wait your leisure. So here I continue this day—and am at your service to go to you or to receive you here, when you please. The more I think of it the more I feel astonished that the Ministry can think of putting the whole affairs of Europe blindfold into the hands of Lord Malmesbury : and is [it] at this time they are mad enough to evacuate Corsica ? And is it now that they are to look for a fleet to confront that of Spain ? [2] My head and heart are ready to split, at once. Adieu.[3]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* ADMIRAL SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH

Park Street, Westminster

November 5, 1796

I hope you will feel assured that I have never lost sight of your situation, nor of the reproach that rests

[1] The Crewe Papers : Windham Section, p. 39 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

[2] War had been declared between Great Britain and Spain in October. Sir John Jervis defeated the Spanish fleet off St. Vincent, Feb. 14, 1797.

[3] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 115.

upon this country during every moment that it continues, though I have missed the opportunity very foolishly of the occasions that have occurred lately of writing to you, in consequence of an Ambassador sent from hence to treat with the Republick in Paris. You know already that I have not been wholly inattentive to your unmerited, and most scandalous treatment. I had tried also another method of making known my anxieties to you, though without other success than that of hearing that your confinement had at least not proved fatal to you.

As it makes a part of Lord Malmesbury's instructions, and not the part least enforced, that he should insist upon an explanation of the causes of your detention, and take the proper means of obtaining redress for an outrage so unwarranted and so contrary to the laws of war established between civilised nations, I cannot entertain a doubt that your present close confinement must soon end, and that before long you may even be restored to that service which has suffered very sensibly by your absence.

As it is possible that this may be delivered to you (though I hope not very likely) before any free communication may be allowed, I will just mention that the successes of the Austrians on the Rhine are such as to have changed the whole tide of the war in that quarter ; and that we have latterly had a very fortunate piece of success, in the entire capture of the Dutch Squadron, consisting in all of 8 or 9 vessels, that had got to Suldanha Bay, with a view to an attack on the Cape : that Spain has declared war, though we have yet felt no other proofs of it than in the capture of some of their rich merchantmen : But that it has, notwithstanding, been thought right, in proof of the moderation of the counsels of this country, to send Lord Malmesbury as Ambassador to Paris, by means of whose messenger I now have the opportunity of writing to you.—The Austrians have, as yet, had no opportunity of shewing whether they are willing to go the same lengths.

Whatever may be their conduct on this occasion, they have shewn themselves a highminded and magnanimous people, and have fully merited by their conduct the success that has attended it.

It is not necessary to do more than to give you this general view of the state of things. I hope you will soon be in a situation not to want such information.[1]

WILLIAM ELLIOT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Dublin Castle: November 22, 1796

If I were conscious of having had an hour's leisure, since your letter came into my hands, I should not be able to forgive myself for having still to thank you for it; but the arrangement of the new Corps has brought me all on a sudden into a state of communication with half the Country Gentlemen of Ireland, and has so much increased the business of my Office, that, for the last five or six weeks I have had little time left for private correspondence.

I have not, however, been so entirely engrossed as not to have looked with great anxiety and with great *grief* and *shame* at what has been doing in England. You will believe how sincerely I sympathise with you in your sentiments respecting the humiliating mission to Paris, by which we have abandoned the true principle of the War and have recognized the usurpation, which it was our object to suppress. I have nevertheless considerable hopes that the pride and ambition of France will avert from us the ruin of a Peace, but if we should be saved, we shall owe our preservation to the vices of our Enemy, and not to our own virtue.

I had been led to fear by some paragraphs in the Papers, and also by some reports which I had from private quarters, that this course of evil measures was likely to drive you from Office, but I am glad to have from your own authority that my intelligence on this point was

[1] Add. MSS. 37852 f. 66.

erroneous. If you were to quit your present connexions and were to stand alone, the situation would certainly be dignified, but I much doubt its utility. Whilst you remain in the Cabinet, you may, perhaps, have opportunities of correcting in some degree the spirit of Errour which seems to predominate in our Councils. At least this appears to be *the only chance;* and I am sure it is the only motive which can induce your Friends to wish that you should continue to expose yourself to such vexation as you must have lately endured.

The "Letters on the Regicide Peace"[1] have been published most opportunely. I have observed with great triumph and exaltation the effect which they have produced here. When they were first announced in the papers, certain *wise* and *cautious* Statesmen were much shocked at the *imprudence* of the title. The fame of the author, however, compelled them to read the work, and its eloquence forced them to admire it, and now I perceive they begin, though rather reluctantly, to confess their acquiescence in the doctrine of it. I am very anxious and impatient for the sequel of it, as I am sure it will make a great impression on the publick mind, and may perhaps rouse the nation to a right sense of its moral and political Salvation.

I shall not enter into a detail of the condition of things in the Country. You see the dispatches, and by them you perceive that the North is in a state little short of Rebellion. With regard to my own situation I shall only say that it accords very much with the idea you seem to entertain of it. It is not suitable either to my tastes, my habits, or my principles, and I shall endeavour to extricate myself from it after the conclusion of the Session of Parliament. *All this,* however, I have very particular reasons for wishing may not go *farther* than yourself and *Burke.*[2]

[1] Written by Burke, and published in this year.
[2] Add. MSS. 37876 f. 251.

EDMUND BURKE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

November 25, 1796

I have not been very well for which reason I have written most of my Letters by Nagle's hand. But the little I shall say now, though from a very full heart, full near to bursting, shall be with my own—not because I distrust Nagle's prudence, nor care a farthing whether my own Sentiments are known or not but when one tells one's private thoughts to a friend, by being the mere object of communication and passive in it, does become in some sort involved in the fault of the matter that is communicated. You know, what I think of the surrender of the Kingdom of Ireland to Luttrel.[1] Portugal is now given, as publick report will have it, to General Stuart.[2] What his military Capacity may be, whether equal to that of the General we formerly gave to that Kingdom, the Count of Lippe, I know not. It may be so—but whilst I lived in the world I had never heard of the military abilities of General Stuart. Of his civil disposition his late proceedings in our quondam Kingdom of Corsica afford a sufficient indication. This I am quite certain of that there is something redolent of madness in that family, which marks (in a general) a mischievous and malignant turn. There is great pride, great impracticability, a propensity to obscure, dark, and puzzled Politicks. I look on Portugal as lost by this appointment. He certainly will not be long well with that Court and that Nation. He will despise and will quarrel with the emigrant Corps, and in their discussions, it is not difficult to foresee on which side the decision of all controversies will be. We have abandoned Italy, politically, commercially, morally. Spain is become our Enemy. Our Negotiation at Paris will serve us no purpose, but to discover the limits

[1] Henry Lawes Luttrell, second Earl of Carhampton (1743–1821), appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Ireland, 1796.

[2] General Sir Charles Stuart (1753–1801).

of what it is we propose for the Emperor,—for the accomodation of the Regicides (much abler politicians than we are) in their scheme of opening a separate treaty with him; and now our last hold of the Continent General Stuart is to secure to us. It is all over. No experience of the fatal Effects of Jobbs—will hinder Jobbers from Jobbing to the last. I say there is a manifest recognized ability in the world and in our power, both at home and abroad —if we were not resolved to throw it away. I know how delicate an affair this must be to you; Both as the person doing the Jobb, and the person for whom it is done. They will say truly that all this is personal. So it is. Every question of fitness for employment is personal. But then the use and effect of that employment depend wholly on the aptitude or unfitness of the Person. I commit this delicate Business to your thoughts. But I say both nations are betrayed if this man is sent. I fear you can do nothing. God direct you. I can write no more. I am a good deal worse this day or two past.

[P.S.] Wherefore write? One day's Jobb defeats the Labour of a year.[1]

ADMIRAL SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Tower of the Temple, Paris
December 8, 1796

Since writing a few days ago a second acknowledgement of your letter dated September 9th, I have the satisfaction of learning by your letter of the 5th November that you had then received my first, sent by the return of the same conveyance which brought it to me.

I cannot sufficiently express the grateful sense I entertain of the lively interest which is manifested in my situation. I feel myself under the greatest obligations to Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Swinburne[2] for the zealous

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 119.

[2] Henry Swinburne (1743–1803), at this time in Paris on a Government mission for the exchange of prisoners.

manner in which they have undertaken the affair committed to their charge by the instructions which have been given them ; their strenuous representations have not, however, as yet produced the smallest amelioration in my situation. On the contrary, I am subjected to a greater degree of rigour as to external communication, which, as they are persuaded of its impossibility, I find by so much more easy, although I have no confederate within these walls. I hope some day or other to entertain you with an account of the manner in which we contrive this, each day producing a real comedy. It is no small consolation to me to know by this means that I am not forgotten by those in whose remembrance I wish to live and to whose exertions I must look for deliverance. My patience is not yet exhausted.[1]

Edmund Burke *to* William Windham

December 18, 1796

Though writing, my dear Sir, is not to me the pleasantest of all operations, I should deny myself a very great pleasure, well purchased by more pain than I have in writing a few lines, if I failed to thank you, in the name of *true* humanity, for what you have done to expose the *false and spurious*. The whole drift of this motion [2] is subservient to the general plan of making every power in alliance with this Country odious. If Mr. Fox were a cheerful supporter of this alliance, and a person earnest in voting to the Emperor the amplest supplies for the assertion of the Common Cause, then it might possibly be supposed, that this interposition arose from an earnest Zeal for the Emperor's honour, and the Interests of humanity. Nothing less. This alliance is, and has been from the beginning the object of his execration. As I should have expected, even from the report of your speech

[1] Add. MSS. 37852 f. 68.

[2] The debate upon General Fitzpatrick's motion, relative to the detention of General Lafayette by the Emperor.

in the *Sun*, the impression it made on the House was great and decisive. Laurence told me, that this impression did honour both to the Speaker and to the feelings of the House, which he states to have been on both sides, just what they ought to have been. Nothing can exceed the Ability of that Speech, and it was necessary it should be so ; as no over abundant Zeal was shewn for the general Cause of sovereign powers by those who had spoken before you. I do not think it was necessary to be over earnest in disclaiming any part that our Court was guessed to have had in that transaction. For the sake of truth it might be disclaimed ; but not as an imputation which would have reflected disgrace on our Court if it had been true. Some Philosopher (not of modern Paris) on hearing a Hymn of some Poet to Diana, wished that the Poet should be rewarded with a Daughter, resembling the Diana he had described. I am sure, that any Prince taking an Interest in Citizen La Fayette, well deserves that he should find so loyal a subject and so faithful a commander of his Guards, and such an active protector of himself and his family, as Citizen La Fayette ! What a folly was the Precedent of Asgill.[1] Was Asgill a person who had rebelled against any Sovereign ? Had Asgill imprisoned, and delivered over to Hangman, any of the Queen of France's relations ? He was an innocent Gentleman without a pretence of Crime, taken out by Ballot from some English Prisoners by General Washington to be made a subject of retaliation. Compare the Cases. Nothing but Mr. Fox's wild Enthusiasm for the Revolution in France could make him think of the Case as a precedent. As to the pair of Wretches taken with this La Fayette they are (if possible) more detestable Ruffians than he.

The fact is, that the minority here must consider the *mere fact of Rebellion* to be the most transcendent of all merit. Be it so, with them, if they please : But is that

[1] General Sir Charles Asgill (1762 ?–1823).

a plea that is likely to be prevalent with sovereigns? However I shall always take it as an infallible criterion of the principles and dispositions of any men of our time, that they think a rebellion against such a Prince as Louis the 16th, and at the moment too when he was making immense sacrifices of his power to the establishment of order and Liberty, to be the most meritorious of all actions, or an action of any merit at all. God save me from falling into the merciful hands of those who think the Business of Foulon and Bertier no act of cruelty. God save you from their humanity and compassion.—This has been a very bad day with me. But I have begun to work. I see I must fortifye myself on the point of the Nation's ability to prosecute the War. I would not wish, however, to call much attention to the collection of materials I wish you to procure for me. I think they may easily be had at the Excise and Customs.—I don't at all like the way in which I left poor Woodford. I confess I feel alarmed for him. His cure seems more dangerous even than the distemper. Again and again I congratulate you on your manliness.[1]

William Windham *to* Edmund Burke

Park Street, Westminster
December 20, 1796

I hope, in future, and so long as writing shall continue painful, you will never abate my satisfaction in the receipt of your letters, by the reflection of their not being written in your own hand.

Expressions so kind, and approbation so flattering, can never fail to be welcome, in whatever hand they may be conveyed.

The speech[2] which you so obligingly commend, is a

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 123.

[2] The speech delivered by Windham on December 16, in the debate upon General Fitzpatrick's motion.

source to me of satisfaction, from better considerations than any opinion that I entertain of its merit. In that respect, it is of as little consequence as need be. But its effect has been beyond both its merit and any expectation that I could have formed from it ; and is a strong proof of what may be done with the public mind, and how easily men may be made to think and feel rightly, in innumerable cases where at present they do not; were reason fairly applied to them. You cannot conceive how many people I have had, who have thanked me for speaking their sentiments ; and what a quantity of right disposition there has appeared upon this question, which would have absolutely languished and died, and been lost, both now and for ever, if it had not been revived, and animated, and sustained in life by this seasonable encouragement and protection. All that I have to regret is, that, out of respect to others' cold caution, and from fear of meddling with a subject not absolutely my own, I abstained from saying anything on the situation of Sir Sydney Smith, whose case seemed created for the purpose of confounding those, who, being wholly indifferent about him, were thus anxious for the fate of a stranger [1] known only by his treason to his own sovereign.[2]

William Windham *to* Edmund Burke

December 24, 1796

I cannot refuse myself the satisfaction of informing you, that the news you will see in the papers is true, and that Lord Malmesbury is about to spend a happy Christmas with his friends in London ; having received, *pour toute réponse* to his terms, a declaration that the republic could enter into no treaty for countries attached by the constitution to France, and an order to quit France in eight-and-forty hours. His exit will be as splendid as his entry. He affords a brilliant example of the manner,

[1] Lafayette. [2] Burke, "Correspondence," iv. 401.

in which the ambassadors of suppliant kings should be treated by a high minded republic.

So should desert in arms be crowned!

I fear, however, this new humiliation will only animate us to persevere with new expedients and contrivances of meanness. At present, to be sure, every avenue seems to be shut. We must go on with the war, perforce. But I much doubt whether even this necessity, and the privation of all other means, will put us upon making any use of the good dispositions of the interior. I have much to say to you upon that: but I have already, perhaps, said more than I ought, considering how ardently I ought to be supposed to wish for peace, even with the power, with which we thought it necessary that every country ought to be at war.[1]

Edmund Burke *to* William Windham

December 25, 1796

I received your kind Letter. The return of Lord Malmesbury is just in all its circumstances what it ought to be, and indeed just what might be expected. This Mongrel has been whipped back to the Kennel yelping and with his tail between his Legs. This will be a great triumph of Ministry, of Opposition, and of the Nation at large. The Opposition only will be true to its principles. The rest will certainly fail on the tryal. Indeed they have so much relyed on the certainty of Peace, and have provided, if for any War, only a War at Home, that I do not see how they can carry on any other with energy and effect. However, anything is better than a Jacobin Peace. In every other posture of things there are at least chances. I am quite sure that notwithstanding all that Lord Malmesbury has suffered, both as a Negotiator and as a Gentleman, that in order to justify

[1] Burke, "Correspondence," iv. 412.

himself in his first step, kicked in as he has been and kicked out, he will still in the House of Lords hold out some sort of Hopes. He will endeavour to keep open to himself a road to some such infamous employment in future. You know better than I do, who know nothing of the subject, what is to be done with the Interior of France, but of this I am sure, if nothing can be done there, nothing can be done with effect anywhere. Unfortunately we have disabled ourselves of our best means by sending the French Royalists to Portugal, but that is no fault of yours who advised that measure to save these unhappy Corps from being broke as Criminals with every sort of disgrace and with every sort of other ill consequence to the West Indies. God Almighty bless you and support you in the endeavours which yet you will make use of for the Salvation of your Country and of betrayed Europe. For two Days I had recovered (except in my flesh, which continues under a uniform decay,) to my astonishment, so that I hoped to resume my task with vigour, but last Night my disorder returned on me with violence and to-Day I am as ill as ever.

By the way, is it quite sure that the French Squadron and force are going at all to Portugal, and may not the Brazils be their object ; or something in America or the West Indies? I hope your Intelligence is good. Once more, adieu. The cordial wishes of this Season from all at this House to you and the accomplished Ladies of your Family, of whose partiality to us we are more proud than of a whole Academy of Letters.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 125.

CHAPTER IV

1797

The Brest Armament : Lazare Hoche : Burke's failing health : A false report of his death circulated : The projected restoration of Louis XVIII : Henry Addington : The war with France : Windham still opposed to peace : Erskine's "Causes and Consequences of the War in France" : Burke's comments on it : The reduction of the foreign corps in the pay of Great Britain : Burke denounces any proposal for peace : The mutiny at Spithead : Lord Spencer goes there to investigate the sailors' grievances : Windham offers to join him : The report of the Commissioners on the mutiny : Report of intended mutiny of the Guards : Burke on the pamphlet, "Reasons against National Despondency" : Canning's verses on the mutiny : Burke's last letter to Windham : The death of Burke : Windham's letter of condolence to Mrs. Burke : A suggestion for the rescue of Pichegru : Arthur Young's application for a pension : Windham on state of the country in relation to the war.

"THE crisis," wrote Windham (Feb. 6), "by the last, dreadful accounts, becomes more and more alarming." The precipitator of the "crisis" was Bonaparte, who had defeated Alvinzi at Rivoli (Jan. 14), and to whom Mantua had capitulated (Feb. 2). A few days later he defeated the Papal army on the Senio, and on Feb. 25 took prisoners 20,000 Austrians. Malmesbury was once more sent to Paris and again returned without having accomplished anything. The general sense of gloom that pervaded the country was augmented by the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore.

EDMUND BURKE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

January 5, 1797

If Ireland was the Object of the Brest Armament; (and it now looks not improbable) what handsome provision has been made for its defence![1] No Depot of Force in any Central point. No preconcerted arrangement. Agamemnon General in the South, with Cooks for his Aide de Camps; and so corpulent that, I am told, he cannot go on Horseback. Had Hoche landed in Bantry Bay, or in any Bay more commodious for his purposes, as many there are on that Coast, nothing would have hindered him from making himself Master of Cork; of putting that place under Contribution of Money, and provisions: and having routed the weak force in that part, from Marching forward and beating all the rest in detail. The apparent want of intelligence of the Enemy's design was truly deplorable, but if intelligence was received and credited; that the Enemy's design pointed at Ireland, in the Name of God, how did it happen, that no Fleet was off Ireland to oppose the Enemy on his approach, or on failure to intercept him on his return? While the Jacobin Fleet was at Anchor in Bantry Bay, Lord Bridport[2] was at Portsmouth, and Colpoys,[3] after going God knows where, returns himself into harbour. The French leave Bantry on the 27th of December, and Lord Bridport Sails from Portsmouth to look for them on the 3rd of this month; if he meets any of them it is a miracle, and it must be owing to the terrible condition which they are in. So much for Intelligence, Foresight, Precaution.

[1] A French fleet, commanded by Hoche, sailed from Brest on December 15, and arrived on the 21st at the mouth of Bantry Bay. A gale arose and the ships set out to return to Brest. Five ships were lost, and six captured by a British squadron off Cork.

[2] Alexander Hood, Lord Bridport (d. 1814); brother of Admiral Viscount Hood.

[3] Admiral John Colpoys (1742 ?–1821), knighted 1798.

For my own part I never believed; that the French could have thought of Ireland, equipped as they were; in such a Tempestuous Season ; because I could have no intelligence, and only grounded myself upon conjecture of what it would have been rational for them to do. I therefore concluded that they would get into the Ocean as soon and as deep as they could, and make their way for Nova Scotia, an Object infinitely important for them to possess. The Season of the Year is, I know; adverse also for this : but nothing could be worse for them than the Coast of Ireland, where they could not remain long without being a Prey to the English Naval force; let their successes on land be what they would. But the fate of that expedition is, I trust, now decided by an Arm stronger than ours, and by a Wisdom capable of counteracting our Folly. Yet, My dear Friend, I do tremble, lest the boldness of these Men in everything; and our negligence or Misfortune in not providing for anything, may not always find the Heavens so propitious. I confess I tremble at the danger, whilst I am rejoicing in the escape. However, I sincerely congratulate you upon it. I consider you so much as a Friend to whom I am used to disburthen myself, that I forget I am writing to a Minister with whom I ought to have managements when I discuss anything relative to the Conduct of his Colleagues. The want of a steady intelligence both from Paris; and from Brest, is a thing I cannot comprehend : because I am sure it might have been obtained. God bless you. I am very faint, and perhaps peevish, but ever most truly yours,

E. B.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

Park Street, Westminster
January 21, 1797

I would not have suffered you to have remained a moment, if I could have helped it; under such a dreadful

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 127.

impression, as you must have received from a paragraph in the papers of yesterday, who chose to insert, with all the air of authenticity, the death of our venerable friend of Beaconsfield.[1] I can not only tell you that it is not true, but that I have better hopes than I have had for a long while, much as he is reduced, and delicate as his situation is, that it will not be true. In consequence of the accounts, which a friend in the family had very properly transmitted to me, I wrote on Tuesday the strongest letter I could, at the risk of urging some parts in a manner that might not be quite palatable; and on Thursday, the day after the birthday, went down with Dr. King for the purpose of bringing him up to town, whatever resistance might be made. This, by dint of good management and strong effort, we happily accomplished, and the result of a Conference last night with Warren is that he is to go immediately to Bath; and that, with such conformity to rule as he is now pretty much disposed to practice, we may entertain reasonable hopes of his recovery.

This is so much the most material part of what I had to say to you, that I should hardly feel disposed to add anything else, even if I did not recollect what just now occurs to me, that you will be upon the road before this reaches Crewe Hall, and that my information will come too late to answer its purpose. I have only, therefore, to hope that you may have missed this wicked and alarming piece of intelligence till circumstances shall have satisfied you that it must be false.[2]

Lord Grenville *to* William Windham

Dropmore: February 5, 1797

I return you Puisaye's Letters. It seems to me that they are reckoning very much without their host when

[1] This letter, a very long one, dated January 17, is printed in Burke's "Correspondence," iv. 424.

[2] The Crewe Papers: Windham Section, p. 44 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

these People dispute in what manner the King [Louis XVIII] shall be restored. I have no doubt that Puisaye's opinion is best for the Provinces, and particularly for Brittany where the Gentry and Clergy are so numerous and powerful, while on the other hand it appears equally probable that the other plan is best suited to Paris, where Gentry and Clergy exist not; and where those who have shared their spoils naturally look for some security against their just and natural resentment.

But it is surely being very short-sighted to suppose that the turn or course of such an event can be regulated beforehand by agreement between the King and this or that chief or leader of a party or a province.

If the King is restored at all, the nature and extent of his Power and situation must depend on circumstances which no human foresight can anticipate, nor any previous concert pretend to controul. The great point is, therefore, to prepare the way for that restoration *quoquo modo*, and to leave the rest to that course which the temper and state of the Country may give to it. With a view to that Restoration, tho' both points are important, I should not hesitate to say that the disposition of Paris is more important to be attended to than that of the Provinces. Experience in this War has proved it, and indeed the nature of the Revolution; and of the new Government which has been founded upon it, demonstrates that it must be so. Revolt and Civil War in the Provinces will embarrass the measures of that Government and will diminish its resources, but a decided success in Paris would subvert the Government itself.

It is with this view that I have wished to destine so large a proportion of our assistance to Paris. I wish the agents there were more capable than I fear they are, but in this as in all other things, we must work with the instruments we have. Whatever can be given in addition to this to Puisaye and Frotté will, I think, be

well bestowed, but of that I cannot judge singly, because this must be combined with other demands on our financial resources which we have found not to be unlimited or inexhaustible as at first sight they would appear to be.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* HENRY ADDINGTON[2]

Bath : February 6, 1797

I had actually written a letter to you, proposing, in case of your being at home and disengaged; to have the pleasure of dining with you ; but the fear of being detained in London; by some unforeseen accident, made me forbear to send it, and unwillingness afterwards to call upon you on a sudden, so late in the day as the time at which I found myself opposite to Woodley, made me turn the unwilling steeds another way, and resign an opportunity which I had much counted upon, and which, I fear, it will be difficult to replace on my return to London. Mr. Burke, to whom I shall deliver your obliging message, is as well as I had any reason to expect; and so far better, that his physician does not appear to think so ill of him as most of those whom he had consulted, or who had been consulted about him, in London. It is, however, a very ambiguous and a very doubtful case ; and cannot fail to cause much anxiety to all who, like yourself, feel the respect due to his virtue and talents; and the value of his life, at a crisis of human affairs such as the present.

This crisis, by the last; dreadful accounts, becomes more and more alarming. It is plain that as long as the enemy *can* go on they will never abandon their scheme of universal empire, and, as part of that scheme; their views for the destruction of this country. If the republic subsists, this country must, in my opinion, be

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 53.

[2] Henry Addington (1757–1844); afterwards first Viscount Sidmouth ; Speaker of the House of Commons in four Parliaments, 1789–1801 ; Prime Minister, 1801–1804.

T. C. Thompson, pinxt *S. W. Reynolds and S. Cousins, sculpt.*

HENRY ADDINGTON, VISCOUNT SIDMOUTH

ultimately destroyed. The existence of a republic in France; on the principles on which this has been established; and will continue to act; does not seem to me to be compatible with the continuance of monarchies in countries adjoining, but they wish the destruction of this country beyond that of all others; and upon motives that apply to every feeling of their minds, old and new.

I do not say that it is impossible that peace may be made with the republic; and yet this country not be undone; because peace and the continuance of the republic may not be the same thing. It is the final compatibility of the two—that is; of a republic in France and a monarchy here—that seems to me so impossible. The inference to be drawn from this opinion, supposing the opinion itself to be omitted, may be disputable. It may be said that the prospect of destroying the republic by war is less than of its falling to pieces of itself in peace, or that, at all events, our own chance of preservation by peace is better than by attempting longer to maintain the war. My opinions are not yet altered upon that subject, even if peace, on the best terms on which we have ever hoped to have it, were in our power : but; in fact, all discussion seems likely to be spared upon that point, for the enemy will not give us peace. It is a *bellum internecinum*, whether we will or no ; and since it now appears, as it might have done always, that a fleet cannot protect us against invasion ; and as the rampart formerly established for our protection in the royalist armies is now levelled with the ground, they will transfer this war, whenever a separate peace with the Emperor; or great success against his armies, shall leave them at liberty, to be carried on upon our own shores. Fatal would seem to be that error which supposed that there could be any compromise with this power, and that we could at any time purchase a peace by the sacrifice of part of our possessions. In this

hope we pursued conquests with the sacrifice of our army; but the conquests, so far as they were made; having failed to effect the purpose intended by them; we now find ourselves in the deplorable state of being obliged to fight after our weapons are gone: the war continues, but we have no longer an army. If all this would animate us to right sentiments, and inspire us with what I cannot but think right opinions; if it would be the means of putting the war upon its proper footing; and make us join hand and heart in co-operating with those of the interior of France to overturn this system; then indeed, I should think that good might grow out of this evil; but as I have no expectation, I can only view the present state of things with very despondent feelings, and yield myself up with a sort of blind insensibility to the fate that seems to await us.[1]

EDMUND BURKE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Bath: February 12, 1797

How can I find thanks any way proportioned to your unwearied kindness? I must be silent and restrain my bursts of Gratitude as you desire me to restrain the bursts of my stomach. In the latter I will do what I can. I received your letter when I was half the channel over in Mr. Erskine's Pamphlet,[2] which would have landed me safely in a good harbour of the Republick one and indivisible, and that too, as Mr. Erskine says; upon my own principles. The Pamphlet is better written and less full of Variety than I expected to find it; but it is the old matter new hashed up—France would have been very good if she had not been provoked by the wickedness of Great Britain and other Powers, who are confederates not against her ambition but against her Liberty—that she was right in every point

[1] Add. MSS. 37876 f. 298.

[2] Erskine's pamphlet, "Causes and Consequences of the War in France."

and at all times and with all Nations—that the cure for all disorders consists in your making your Representation at home as like hers as possible—In making Peace with her by giving her all that you offer and all that she demands—that by excluding her from all the Continental powers she will become well disposed to you : and that you and she will become Guardians of Liberty throughout the world. And as to our safety, it will be perfect, provided we do nothing to provoke that irresistable power. And lastly, in which alone I think with him, that for making such a peace it is proper that Mr. Fox and his friends should come into power. I think this is a just analysis of Mr. Erskine's pamphlet, which he says he has formed on my opinions, not with relation to France, but with relation to America.

I am to observe once for all, that these Gentlemen put the case of France and America exactly upon a Par, and always have done so. I leave them to rejoice in that discovery and in my inconsistency, and the antidote they have found in one part of my writings against the poison that exists in another. You will observe that *their* alliance with France, and a change in this Constitution are things that always go hand in hand, and I think, consistently enough. The only point upon which he is strong, but on which I don't think he makes the most, is Mr. Pitt's having refused to make proffers of Peace whilst our affairs were in a prosperous condition, when [alone] he allows that any Peace at all can be made with the Regicide powers that is likely to be safe and lasting. But Mr. Pitt unfortunately is in the condition of *paulo purgante*. He cannot make peace and he will not make war. *Deus dabit his quoque finem*, which I believe I will not live to see. I wish I may live to make my final protest against the proceedings of both factions. God bless you and reserve you to better times, for which bettering of the times your preservation may be very essential. I continue

just as I was, with the difference of a bad Night. Doctor Parry has just given me a purgative Medicine, and I assure you I implicitly obey his directions. I cannot yet walk or stand firm, but I can read upon my back and dictate as I do now, whilst all the great hunters are driving their spears into a dead Boar. Once more God bless you, and for the few moments I have to live, believe me devotedly yours,

EDMUND BURKE.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* WILLIAM PITT

March 18, 1797

I hear from the Duke of Gloucester[2] that you are going to reduce all the Foreign Corps, except a certain number of those that are serving in the West Indies.

I don't know what sort of a War you mean to carry on: except that it cannot be one in which troops are wanted of the first quality, and capable of being employed offensively. But if the complaints lately made against Colonel Dillon have any share in this determination, let me assure you that, so far forth, it rests upon very bad ground: for that all those complaints, so far as I am hitherto acquainted with them, or have reason to believe, will turn out to be wholly without foundation, and to be the result only of misrepresentation or error.[3]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* —— COBB

Park Street, Westminster

March 28, 1797

You must be sensible, that your conduct has made it impossible to serve you, at the same time that it gives but too much reason to think that you must have

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 135.

[2] William Frederick, second Duke of Gloucester (1776–1834), a nephew of the King. He served in the Army, and in this year, as Major-General, was in the Helder expedition.

[3] Add. MSS. 37844 f 144.

been at all times undeserving of the favour that has been shewn you.

It was not that accusations were wanting against you, during the time, that you were in my service; or that instances enough of unfairness and injustice, did not come to my own knowledge, to make me distrust that Character of inflexible honesty, with which you came to me from Mr. Kent. But having nothing but distrust, and fearing to sacrifice you to enmities, which you might represent as contracted on my account, I continued to act towards you to the last, as to a person whose services I had most approved.

The return you make is to abuse in the grossest manner, and in the face of every possible caution, the place of trust, in which I had provided for you; from which you are now displaced, with consequences to yourself that I may contemplate with concern, but know not how to help, nor can describe as undeserved.

Your plea of poverty can be as little attended to as any other: For it is difficult to conceive how a man can be poor, who will not scruple such means, as you have taken, to become rich.

I can give you no help, and am sorry that I cannot offer you even much pity.[1]

On April 15 the sailors at Spithead, their very reasonable demands not having been conceded, mutinied and declined to go to sea. Lord Spencer, who had succeeded Lord Chatham as First Lord of the Admiralty in December, 1794, at once went down to make enquiries on the spot.

LADY SPENCER *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Wimbledon: April 20, 1797

Lord Spencer, in a note I have just received, bids me tell you that to his heart he feels your friendship and

[1] Add. MSS. 37915 f. 18.

affection in the offer you have made to him of going to Portsmouth to share with him the difficulties of the sad sad situation he is involved in at that alarming port. So hurried is he, that he has not a moment to express to you the thanks he owes you, but has desired *me* to convey them to you. He thinks you need not distress yourself by coming to him and being a witness to the terrifying scene now passing under his eyes, for that you could do no good as to the quieting the men, that as to himself he is so taken up by business that he knows not if a moment of his time could be passed in so pleasant a way as it would be were you to go to him. Alas ! my dear Sir, we none of us know the end of this awful affair. Lord Spencer writes in very low spirits but "Hope travels through, nor leaves us till the last," as he says—and let us hold her fast while we may. Dundas, whom I have just seen, seems full as serious on the business as I am, and truly there is food for thought in the present prospect of things. The quietness of the men, tho' comfortable in some respects, yet in others is most alarming—it proves a steadiness in them to accomplish their object which overpowers *me*, whatever it may do other people. They at first agreed to be satisfied with Lord Spencer's concessions, and then got off again by insisting on including the Marines —a most artful subterfuge ! making this hitherto useful body of men a party in their demands, they ensure *them* concurrence in all of them. Thus situated, what can be done to reduce this rebellious Spirit I cannot foresee. Of course their demands have gone on increasing, and Lord Spencer tells Dundas he can grant no more than he has done already, as he *now* feels responsible for more than he shall feel comfortable under untill he is sanctioned by parliament. That a mutiny of this extent should have been brewing for 3 months and not one word of it to have transpired is most wonderful. Surely, surely, it implies a strange want of knowledge amongst the

M. A. Shee, R.A., pinxt. *C. Turner, sculpt.*

LAVINIA, COUNTESS SPENCER

officers. Sir Andrew Douglas's illness has been the cause of the whole I do believe. An acting Captain was put into the *Queen Charlotte* in the meanwhile, and *they* never have the influence or the wish to act as the real Captain would do in cases of this sort. Then the *Queen's* is a most dreadful crew—owing to the childish fondness for his men of Sir Alan Gardner[1]—he excuses all faults no other man would do from a culpable wish not to do harm to any one belonging to him or his ship—foolish man!—And then the *Queen Charlotte* was *Lord Howe's* Ship.

I dare say no more even to you—but indeed Benevolence is a hard virtue to practice nowadays. I know not if you will understand me or my letter, but I am just now a good deal agitated and unfit to write coherently. God alone is to be looked to as our refuge. May He in His mercy, and for His blessed Son's sake, give us help and assistance. Alas! we pray to Him in our adversities—do we acknowledge Him sufficiently in our prosperities? My dear Mr. Windham, *mon cœur est sur mes lèvres* when I write or speak to you, and you are good enough to excuse me—but I only write to *you*—adieu.[2]

Ten days later, on April 25, the Commissioners who had been sent down to investigate their grievances expressed themselves as convinced that they did exist, gave an undertaking that they should be removed, and that, until this had been done and a general pardon granted, the fleet should not be sent to sea. The men expressed themselves satisfied. Nothing was done, however, by the Government, and the men, believing they had been fooled, mutinied again on May 7. Windham wrote in his "Diary," May 9, 1797: "Council on

[1] Admiral Sir Alan Gardner (1742–1808), created Baron Gardner, 1800.

[2] Add. MSS. 37845 f. 155.

Mutiny. My opinion as before, that Parliament should set forth the fact of the proceeding or fulfil the promises of the Admiralty, and declare those outlaws who would not return to their duty, either immediately or within a certain time. Pitt had originally intended this, but yielded to the other opinion." On May 8, Pitt, in the House of Commons, proposed an increase of pay for the sailors, and two days later Lord Howe went to Spithead to make this announcement to the mutineers, and to state that the King had granted them a general pardon. Windham wrote in his "Diary," May 11, 1797: "Council on Report of intended Mutiny in the Guards to-morrow morning. Though, I think, the whole thing most unlikely, the consequences, if they should take place, too dreadful not to be more provided against. There does not seem anything to prevent their being masters of the Tower, the Mint, the Palace, and the Cabinet. It is many months since I urged to Lord Cornwallis the not leaving all the arms of the Country at the Tower."

Edmund Burke *to* William Windham

Bath: April 26, 1797

I have not been so ill since you left me as not to have been able to make a beginning, if not a progress, in the execution of your Commands; but to do anything without raising a Spirit (I mean a National Spirit) with all the energy and much of the conduct of a Party Spirit, I hold to be a thing absolutely impossible; and I hold it to be impossible to raise that Spirit whilst the Minister who ought to excite it and direct it, and to employ it for the purposes of his own existence, as well as that of his Master and his Country, is the very person who opposes it; and who, with double the expense and double the apparatus of every sort with which our most

vigorous Wars were ever carried on; is resolved to make no War at all. Our only hope is in a submission to the Enemy by taking up the principles of that Enemy at home, and by submitting to any terms which the directing body of that Enemy abroad shall think fit to prescribe. If they demand Portsmouth as a cautionary town it will be yielded to them ; and, as to our Navy, that has already perished with its discipline for ever. I have my thoughts upon a modification without a departure from the terms of our late unhappy Submission, but they are of no moment because no attention will be paid to them. What cure for all this ? What but in that Spirit " which might create a Soul under the ribs of Death." But to this end it is absolutely necessary that no terms within or without doors should be kept with the French party in our Parliament, who must be treated as publick Enemies, else they and the Head of the Republick abroad will infallibly overpower all the feeble force of a flying resistance. But can such a Creature as I undertake the task, when the very Ministers, whom *I must by the necessity of the case support,* will the very next day, tho' without anything reciprocal on the part of their Enemies; calmly discuss with them the merits of the publick measures, as if they were Members of the same Cabinet, differing not in principle but upon some points more or less ? Despairing as I do of anything that can be executed under this prevalence of no Spirit, I should not at all despair of the people if they were roused.

A Pamphlet has been sent to me called " Reasons against National Despondency." It is ably written, and with regard to myself personally, it is in one part very flattering, but it is all written upon the false principle of decorum and management with the persons whose Politics it opposes. This is the only tone which I suspect that those who support Ministry will bear, because the conduct of Ministers makes them look hourly for a change or for a compromise. Yet with all this before

me, I will endeavour to execute what you desire, tho', as disjoined from the rest of my plan, it will lose something of its feeble effect. Another great difficulty there is, which consists in this, that the Ministers must overthrow the whole legal establishment of this Army, and that speedily, else nothing can be done agreeably to our plans. I am clearly of Opinion that as we stand at present we are not in a posture, any more than a disposition, to take the only active measure of defence which remains to us, mainly, to make an active War in the territory of France. But I wish you would take a real view of our applicable strength, which I am not in a condition to do, and particularly with regard to what Cavalry could be got together here or in Ireland, after the fatal measure of disbanding several of the Corps of that kind which had been raised. Will you be so good as to furnish me with the details of the killed and wounded in this War, on the Continent, as well as the List, if the Office contains it, of the killed and wounded in the Seven Years War, both on the Continent of Europe, in North America, and in the West Indies, including ours and the Provincial troops at the Havannah. I hope I am not over immersed in details, but I cannot well go on without them. Unfortunately I cannot find that Quiberon Paper, but Nagle and I have hunted for it in vain. God bless you and preserve you to better times.

Mrs. Burke always remembers you with affection and gratitude, and I can never think of my miserable health without a proper sensibility to your uncommon solicitude about it. Excepting the difficulty of opening my body, I am otherwise better, and have no bad night since you left us. Adieu, once more God bless you.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 174

GEORGE CANNING[1] *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Most private *Spring Gardens: May* 12, 1797

Windham! whene'er thy fervent mind
Some thought, uncommon, just, refined,
In happiest phrase expresses;
Thy vulgar audience stare and gape,
And shout, and chuckle, at the *scrape*
Of "*Negative Successes.*"

2

Oh tell me! does to-day's Event
Serve to illustrate what you meant?
—Or will the Soldiers riot?
Oh! if the Guards have not rebell'd,—
And if the naval fray is quell'd
If Portsmouth yet is quiet;—

3

Come, Windham! celebrate with me
This day of joy and jubilee,
This day of *no* disaster!
Our Government is *not* o'erturn'd—
Huzza!—Our Fleet has *not* been burn'd,
Our Army's *not* our Master.[2]

EDMUND BURKE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Park Street, Westminster, London
May 16, 1797

You cannot be very much at a loss for the cause of my not answering your last letter before this time, though its kindness well deserved my most early attention

[1] George Canning (1770–1827), was at this time Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

[2] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 267.

but grief, shame, indignation, and utter despair, have so fermented in my mind, as to produce there a disorder, as strong, as the fermentation which my food undergoes in my miserable stomach. What could I give you but one of my mental eructations? There is an end of us. The Revolution is accomplished, even before the Jacobin Peace. It has happened, as I long feared it would, that the danger has commenced in the very foundations of our false security. We have paid nearly £600,000 a year for the destruction of our Naval discipline and Naval fidelity for ever; and this unfortunate measure of buying mutiny and insubordination in the Navy, has been followed by a beginning in the Army, which will run through the whole, and as most certainly it will be the measure, on such a peace as they will make, to keep up a great Military and Naval establishment, the expense will be enormous. Among the people it will be a perpetual source of discontent; and in proportion as Troops and Seamen are idle and unemployed, in that proportion will be their disposition to every species of insubordination. But among all the parts of this fatal measure the Mission of my Lord Howe has been by far the most mischievous. Had a great Naval Commander been sent down, *Gravem pietate et meritis virum quem*, to awe the seditious into obedience, it would have been the best thing that could be thought of; but to send the first name in the Navy, and who had been but lately a Cabinet Minister and first Lord of the Admiralty, at upwards of 70 years of Age, to hunt amongst mutineers for grievances, to take the Law from Joice, a seditious Clubist of Belfast, and to remove by his orders some of the principal Officers of the Navy, puts an end to all hopes for ever. Such mischief need not to have been attended with so much degradation. There is an amnesty for rebellion, but none for Officers who do their duty. They, and they only, are punished and degraded. The Mutineers now choose their own

Officers, or have at least a Negative on them, and all officers who go to sea are apprised of the tenures by which they hold, and must, in future, comport themselves, not as Naval commanders, but as Candidates at an election. All this is the fruit of the snug system of our plan in a Home defence.

I see by the Irish Government Newspapers that 8000 Men have been either sent, or are sending, to Ireland to support a military Government there under the auspices of that Junto to which both Kingdoms are sacrificed. Do you really believe, or does anyone believe, that such a military Government can be supported by the joint finances of both Nations? I am sure Ireland can contribute little or nothing towards it. I see they are making a run, through the most contemptible wretch on Earth, Lord Dillon, and another, not much less so, a Mr. Day, at my friend, Doctor Hussey,[1] upon account of his zeal in strengthening his flock according to his principles, against the religious persecution, which under pretence of military discipline, has been exercised against the Roman Catholic Soldiery. Excuse me if I speak my mind freely. These people have perfidiously quarreled upon this very head, with one of the worthiest, most disinterested, most able and most zealous friends that Government ever had. When the Duke of Portland sent him to Ireland, he declared to His Grace in the fullest manner, that if it was intended that he should go over for the purpose of deluding any of those his own communion, and particularly the Catholic Military, to whom he was appointed Chaplain General, into an acquiescence under oppression or persecution, that he never would act that part; and he explained himself in the same manner to Mr. Pelham. But I see that the plan is to remove, and if possible to destroy, any of that religion, who will not be their tools in establishing

[1] Thomas Hussey, Roman Catholic Bishop of Waterford and Lismore (1741–1803).

a Jacobin indifference to all religion; and a hatred to the ruling one among the common people who are altogether composed of Catholics, and, who, if they have not that religion, will have no other. It is all over with the Peace and property of that Kingdom. Adieu, my dear friend.

[P.S.] There is nothing that gives me so much consolation as that I have opened my mind very fully on Irish affairs to Mr. Dundas, in two conversations which lasted for four hours. I entered into the minutest details concerning Ireland to make him sensible of the consequences of what was then doing, and I must do him the justice to say, that he heard me not only with great patience, but with the utmost humanity and kindness, though I very soon found, that neither my laborious remonstrance, nor his indulgent hearing, produced any effect whatsoever for the purpose I had so much at heart, the peace of Ireland, its consolidation with this Kingdom, and a direction of our common force against our common Enemy.[1]

E. Woodford *to* William Windham

Beaconsfield: July 7, 1797

The Melancholy Event is over,[2] and every Consolation that can be derived under such an affliction from a Death without pain or Struggle is ours. Mrs. Burke, too is, calm beyond all hope. Her pious Resignation, her tender Care, her fortitude in waiting his last Moments, administering

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 187.

[2] Burke died on July 9. Windham had visited him at Beaconsfield on July 6, on which day he was twice admitted to his friend's bedchamber. "In both conversations he was either absent, or less quick of hearing, not always answering to what was said," Windham noted in his Diary. "When, in my last conversation, I talked of coming to him again on Sunday, he smiled in a marked manner, expressive, as I thought then, of satisfaction, but, as I now rather think, of belief that he should not last so long. He took my hand at parting, closing his eyes, and keeping them shut till I quitted him."

(when all Relief was vain) every little assistance he was capable of receiving to make Death less hideous, was done with such a patient suffering tenderness as show her worthy of the Friend we have lost.

I join the letter I had just sealed when I was called upstairs. In moving from the couch to the bed he fainted, some short time after he threw up a Bason full of his usual vomiting, while he was yet unsensible, and after that gave scarce any sign of life, no groans, no Convulsion. His breath grew weaker and weaker till about a quarter before one, and then we only knew he ceased to be probably some minutes after life was wholly ended. Mrs. Burke had desired the Service of the Sick to be read some time before. When I perceived he was gone, I read the two last prayers of the Burial Service, and then she of her own accord arose to be carried away, but saying, I do not take my leave of him. I scarce know what to say to you about coming. Mrs. Burke seemed to say, I should stop you, and I believe that is best. I presume you will write immediately to her. Do state any Circumstance which prevented your Coming to-day. My Head, as you may suppose, my Dear Sir, is not the clearest. I have lost the Patron to whom I owed everything, to whom I owed that you deigned to accept my Services. I must now prove my gratitude to him, by my faithful attachment to you.[1]

William Windham *to* Mrs. Burke

Park Street, Westminster
July 9, 1797

What I learn from Woodford, as well as what I knew beforehand, of your resignation and fortitude, makes me feel that I may write to you, though nothing certainly that I can say, can either mitigate your grief, or enforce the necessity of endeavouring to bear up against it. You

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 207.

know the full value of your loss ; and it is, in fact, from this very knowledge that you may derive in some sort a source of consolation.

You have for your associates in affliction, the wise and virtuous of every nation in Europe : It is the whole world, and not you alone, My Dear Madam, that is in a state of Widowhood : Never was a man so born for the Service of Mankind ; and never possibly was there one, whose death will be heard [of] with more universal affliction and dismay.

Your share in this general sorrow admits, to be sure, of no comparison with that of any other person ; it is singular in its kind, and far exceeding in degree whatever can be felt by others. Yet it has received every alleviation of which its nature was capable : and such as, in conjunction with your own piety—the best and only resource in calamities of this kind, will enable you, I hope, to maintain that composure, which you have already preserved, under afflictions only less trying, because you were not left at that time to bear them alone.

Such support as you can receive at present, must come from those less qualified in every respect to afford it ; but who are not debarred from tendering their services, either as not being deeply involved in the common affliction, or as being wanting in that regard, which would seek to render the sense of it less acute.

I am doubtful what course to take, whether to be stopped by the fatal account which I have now received, or to proceed and join myself to those friends, by whom you are at present surrounded.

Be assured that I have no consideration in this but of the way in which I may best contribute, immediately or ultimately, to your relief and satisfaction. If I forbear to come, it will be from unwillingness to add to a scene of unavailing sorrow, and from not foreseeing any occasion in which I could be of any use, even with all the confidence that I may flatter myself you would repose

in me, in any question connected with the respect due to the memory of him we have lost, or with the interests and feelings of those whom he has left behind. At whatever moment I could hope to be of the smallest use or comfort, you will feel assured I trust that I should not wait to be called upon. There is nothing, that could afford in the present state of my own mind so much relief, as to be enabled to mark my respect and reverence for Him whose loss you deplore, or the regard and affection with which I am, My dearest Madam

Your most Faithful,
and affectionate Humble Servant
W. WINDHAM.[1]

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Stowe: July 11, 1797

Sir E. Nagle has just informed me of the irreparable loss which the world has suffered by the release of our valued friend Mr. Burke: I know your sentiments on this event, and how much every thing I can say upon it falls short of what we both feel: But I conceive myself called upon by those sentiments to draw your particular attention to the school at Penn, in which he permitted me to act under his directions: Perhaps he explained himself upon it to you; if so, it is well; and I only desire to know whether I can be useful in acting under your orders as his representative in a function so dear to him: And I will beg you to believe me most eager to follow any ideas which can best mark my honour and reverence for the character of our dead friend, and my affectionate esteem for one who so well deserved his love and confidence.[2]

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 209.

[2] Add. MSS. 37877 f. 120

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* SIR HORATIO NELSON

Park Street, Westminster
August 1, 1797

I must throw myself entirely upon your mercy for forgiveness of a neglect which it would be impossible for me to justify, and which I could not, without a long detail, succeed in any degree in excusing. I hope, at least, you will not suppose that I was indifferent to the commission with which you were so good as to entrust me, or that I employed in the execution of it the same negligence that I have apparently in making my acknowledgment for it.

The letter accompanying this will speak, I presume, the sense which the city of Norwich entertains, both of the compliment you pay them, and of the honour that you reflect upon them : and I beg you to feel assured that I am not behindhand in that respect, but to the full as true a representative of their feelings on this subject as I can be on any other whatever.

It would be impossible for me to plead, could such a plea be admitted, that forgetfulness had been the cause of the delay, as you have taken too good care to keep yourself present to the recollection of the Publick.

I congratulate you most sincerely both upon your exploits and upon your escapes, which latter will, I hope, continue, so as to afford me hereafter the satisfaction of congratulating you in person upon the glory which you have so justly acquired.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Hill Street : September 12, 1797

I don't trouble you with any reflexions upon the late events in France, of which in our present position we must be content, I fear, to remain idle though not un-

[1] Add. MSS. 34906 f. 230.

concerned spectators. It is the effect of bad play to forfeit the benefit of those occasions which chance from time to time may cause to arise. But there is one attempt that may be made at so little expense that it may be worth the trial, however doubtful or inconsiderable the advantage may be resulting from it. The merits and value of Pichegru appear to be such, as well as of some of his companions, as may make it desirable that he should be saved from exile in Guiana ; and I should think that, with good management, we might obtain sufficient information of the time of their sailing, to have a chance of rendering to them the same service that the French attempted for their friends, Muir and Gerald and the rest of them. Should Pichegru's intentions be as good as they have sometimes appeared, it is to be wished that he should owe such an obligation to this country. But, at all events, the capture of a French vessel will do us no harm, nor the turning loose into Europe such an enemy of the present French Government.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* WILLIAM PITT

Fulham : October 10, 1797

I send you, because I am bound to do so; an extract of a letter from M. de Puisaye, tho' with no very sanguine expectation that you will be disposed to give to the contents the same attention that I should. You are of opinion, at least so I should collect, that amidst the endless changes of things in France, some Government may be found, willing to listen to our vows for Peace, and grant us terms not utterly destructive, in the first instance, of the independence or commerce of the Country. Such an event may certainly happen : and if we go lower and lower in our terms, at least within certain limits, the probability may very likely be increased.

Yet you must admit that such an event may not happen;

[1] Fortescue MSS. iii, 374.

and in fact, unless our terms should fall faster than our means, is hardly more likely at any future period than at present. My own Idea of the probability is that this will not happen ; but that we shall go on and on, in this tiding system, till at last we shall be utterly aground, and lye, without resistance, at the mercy of the Enemy, to be disposed of as they shall think fit.

It seems to me that what are called safe and prudent Counsels are often the most replete with danger, and lead to Risks, the most dreadful of any that men can resort to. When we threw the desperate cast of risking the last Army of the Country in a Conflict with the Yellow Fever, we did it under the notion of playing a safe game, and not committing ourselves in such perilous enterprises, as those of attempting to cooperate with the Royalists of France. It is not necessary to point out the consequences : we are in the whimsical situation of being condemned to a period of indefinite War, without any means of annoying the Enemy. Let us take care that by the same line of prudent conduct, we do not find ourselves in a similar and worse situation a year or two hence.

What I have to say upon the immediate subject of the Letter is that the Names there mentioned are not persons that I now hear of for the first time. They have been known to me long since, as Persons with whom Puisaye was in correspondence for the Object in question, and by whom, probably, but for the risks that must always attend such enterprises, it should long ago have been delivered into our hands, if the fatal determination had not been taken to recall our Fleet at any price, from the Station at Quiberon ; a Station which I have good authority for believing the best that could be taken, even independent of any views as to the internal State of France.

At all events, let me beg your attention, before the Business of Parliament shall call it off, to the several

points mentioned in my Letter of a month or two. If you think it wise and fitting wholly to abandon the Royalists, at least let us do it in a way not to leave upon our Name the reproach of false dealing in pecuniary concerns. At least, let us pay the debts which are strictly, and all but legally due, if not those which are equitably so.

With respect to cooperation with the Interior, I shall agree with you, perhaps, that unless this is done upon System, it can hardly be done with effect, or be done at all: and that such a change of System cannot be made without great Effort. But are we not in a Situation in which nothing but great efforts can save the Country; and are we not acting like Persons who prefer to die of a Mortification, rather than submit to the immediate Pain and Hazard of an Operation?[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* ARTHUR YOUNG[2]

Park Street, Westminster
October 11, 1797

I did not fail, immediately upon the receipt of your letter, to make the application which you wished, and shall be extremely happy if, either on the present or some future occasion, it should prove successful. I urged, what I could say with great truth, that I thought your publick services such (I mean particularly in respect of Political writings) as fairly to entitle you to the consideration of those, who, being charged with the publick interests, are the natural patrons and guardians of persons by whom those interests have been essentially served: and certainly, according to my opinions and views of things, there are few by whom that task has been undertaken on better principles, and with better effect than by yourself. I have no doubt; that the same

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 157.

[2] In reply to an application for a Government grant or pension by Arthur Young (1741–1820), the well-known writer on agriculture.

opinions will be entertained, the same dispositions felt, in the quarter, to which I addressed myself.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street: Westminster
October 24, 1797

I am really quite in despair at this impossibility of exciting any attention to a subject which certainly merits a careful consideration, whatever may be the decision ultimately taken upon it.

Can Mr. Pitt think it a matter of no consequence whether we continue our connection with five great Provinces on this side of France, all of them ready to rise in arms against the Directory, the moment any assurance should be given them of an effectual support from this country, or any prospect arise of general cooperation from the Interior; or whether we cast them off in a manner to leave them with the most rooted hatred to this Government, and the most well-founded complaints against us, even in the article of pecuniary good faith? As the matter now stands, we are leaving a hundred or two people to starve here, and as many more to execrate and revile us upon the Continent, for want of a sum of £7000, which is as much due as any man's bills can be, drawn by his own consent, and accepted by himself.

A person arrived here last night, one of the two who were sent over previous to the Expedition to Quiberon, for the purpose of preparing those in the Interior,—who confirms all that Puisaye says of the resort thither of those who had been driven from Paris, and particularly the arrival of the persons whom he mentions as having been expected. He says that at present there are hardly any troops in Brittany, and that the Country in consequence is left pretty quiet; but that he expects, as soon as the forces sent against the Insurgents in the South

[1] Add. MSS. 35127 f. 455.

shall have completed their business, they will then turn towards the Coast and begin a persecution similar to that which took place under Robespierre.

What they want, therefore, is such advances upon money either actually due to them, or due in Equity and liberality (these are of both descriptions), as may enable those who are exposed to the rigours of this search either to escape from the Country, or to remain in it with less danger. The life of those, who have either refused to make their Peace with the Republicans, or, having made it, find no security in it, requires for their preservation a continued, though small, expence. They find in general a ready means of subsistence in the good-will of the Farmers and Peasants throughout the Country. But they want money for cloaths, they want money for Intelligence, for Messengers, for arms occasionally, for bribes to secrecy; and must now and then be in places, where they cannot find a ready welcome without some means of paying for their reception. The further purpose of keeping the party in a state of organization, in which it is at present, with a view both to the safety of those who compose it, and to any future occasion of employing it, which time produces, would require some additional expences, but none that could be felt, even upon a scale of far less expence than that to which we must be subject.

I really do not at all understand the principle of the Policy, which Mr. Pitt marks out to himself. He conceives, I presume, that, in some of the endless changes of French affairs, some conjuncture may arise in which an opening shall be given, good or bad, for peace. Such a thing may happen. I give up entirely the enquiry, what it may be worth, when it does; and whether the peace, when made in this way, may not involve more certain ruin than any War. But it must be admitted that such a thing may not happen—I should say, was most likely not to happen; and still more likely not to do so, in the

way in which we are going on. What will then be our situation, when in a Country broken in spirit, as well as sunk in finances, we shall find ourselves in the utter impossibility of raising supplies for the service of the year? Between us and that state there is now nothing but the chance that the Directory, or some succeeding power, may be willing to afford us the opportunity of getting, by some means or other, into peace; a chance which, as I said before, becomes less and less in proportion as it is known to be our only one. But if our opinion is, that, when brought to that state, we should still, notwithstanding what is called an impossibility, find some means of going on, sooner than absolutely submitting to a French Government, is it not better that we should try to raise the country to something like such exertions now, and have the benefit of what they may do for us in the mean time? I know it may be said that what the necessity may enforce, when it actually arrives, cannot be done under the mere supposition of it; that we cannot suppose ourselves pursued by a wild beast, and take the jump that we might in that case be equal to. But something of this sort it is the business of reasonable creatures to be able to do; and more certainly in this way might be done, than we have hitherto attempted. I cannot conceive, for instance, but that at this instant the country might be made to understand that, for years to come, Peace, even upon the worst terms, may not be given us; that the only way both to accelerate that Event, I mean of peace such as we are likely to have from the Republick, and likewise to have the chance of something better, is to put ourselves in the way of being able to annoy the Enemy; that to carry on a War upon the Terms of *Ubi pulsas, ego vapulo tantum,* and with establishments equally expensive with those of the most offensive war, can never be good, either for the purposes of War or Peace—That the only rational hope, either of overturning this monstrous power, or of preventing its

accomplishing the subjugation of what remains of Europe, is to put yourself in a state of cooperating with the universal discontent of the Country, and some of those formidable insurrections in it, which have arisen, and may probably again arise—That unless this can be done, which in the mean while hardly lessens any chance which otherwise you could have, there is nothing but that very slender chance that remains; and that failing, it hardly appears how the fate of this Country can be any longer problematical.

Surely little more is necessary than to call upon people to consider for themselves how they purpose to get out of the scrape and to prevent themselves from becoming, possibly before many years, a province of France.

Such certainty is the course which I think the present crisis points out and loudly demands. The circumstances are all favourable. We have the late Revolution to teach us despair; and the defeat of the Dutch fleet to give us spirits.

If something of this sort is not done upon a large scale, I agree that any communications that we can have with the Royalists, are of little consequence. But still the chances are better to those who in their former transactions shall have discharged their engagements with fidelity than to those who shall have left their friends with just cause of complaint and with dispositions wholly averse from any future renewal of connection.

[P.S.] In the letters which Puisaye has received by this conveyance, there is much information, which might be worth attending to if the whole subject were taken up. There are, I understand, about 40 deputies and others who are supposed to have taken refuge in Brittany.[1]

William Windham *to* Captain Lukin

December 16, 1797

Your letters of the 27th and 31st of October have both reached me to-day; and are the first, as far as I recollect,

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 55.

that have come directly to me, or that I have heard of at all, since your letter to Robert [1] from Madeira, or whatever the island was, where you were so near being surprised by the mutineers. I showed your letter upon that occasion to Admiral Gambier,[2] who had made some civil enquiries after you, and he thought so well of your conduct as to have communicated the account, as he told me, to some of his colleagues. Before I have an occasion of sending this, I shall know, probably, what orders Lord Spencer has [sent], or purposes to send out. I flatter myself that positive orders for your return are already on their way. Robert, who will probably write by this opportunity, will tell you all that relates to the Parsonage, which is going on very well; and the current news of the day. I can only state to you in general that my opinion of the state of things is not more favourable than at the worst period of any at which you have ever heard it. I do not reckon it among the least calamities of the time—certainly not among those that affect me least—that the world has now lost Mr. Burke. Oh! how much we rue that his counsels were not followed! Oh! how exactly do we see verified all that he has predicted!—though I do not think that, in the course of a few months, perhaps not in many months, any dangerous attacks will be made upon this country. I do not, on that account, see our fate less certain and at no very distant period, if some unlooked-for chance, such as we can now hardly form an imagination of, does not come to supply the utter insufficiency of our own talents and means. Unless some fortunate shift of wind should happen, we are so beset with dangers on all sides, so completely embayed, that it is impossible we can weather the breakers upon either tack.

You will have heard of our rejoicings here and the im-

[1] Captain Lukin's brother.

[2] Admiral James Gambier (1756–1833), at this time a Lord of the Admiralty; created in 1807, for services at Copenhagen, Baron Gambier.

pression made by Lord Duncan's victory.[1] It was a good work and as well done, I believe, as was possible ; but we should not have heard so much of it had it not been *Duncan*. For Lord St. Vincent's victory,[2] the greatest beyond all example in naval annals, not a candle burnt. For the same reason, hardly anything said of Admiral Onslow,[3] though, had Duncan been Onslow, and, *vice versâ*, the whole honour of the victory would have been ascribed to him.

Farewell ! I wish you may meet with an enemy's frigate, properly above the *Thames*[4] match, in coming home.[5]

[1] The Battle of Camperdown, October 11, 1797.
[2] The Battle of Cape St. Vincent, February 14, 1797.
[3] Admiral Richard Onslow (1741–1817), created Baronet in this year for his services at Camperdown.
[4] Lukin was Captain of the *Thames*.
[5] Windham's "Diary," p. 383.

CHAPTER V

1798

Negotiations with the Royalists : Escape of Sir Sidney Smith from the Prison of the Temple at Paris : Lord Cornwallis succeeds Lord Camden as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland : Death of Lord Edward Fitzgerald : Malone's opinion of the Irish : Windham marries Cecilia Forrest : Malone's eulogy of the lady : Windham's account of the marriage-day : Malone's congratulatory letter to the bridegroom : The honeymoon spent at Reigate : Nelson created a Baron after the Battle of Aboukir Bay : A letter from the Duke of Gloucester to Windham : Sir John Warren's victory over Hoche : The Duke on international politics : His fear lest the United States should become a maritime power : His views on recruiting : His plan of campaign : He offers himself for a command on active service : Cazalès : The office of Writer of the *Gazette*.

THE early part of 1798 was full of anxiety for the Cabinet. Bonaparte was pushing on his preparation for the invasion of England, and the Wexford Rebellion broke out. In May Bonaparte diverted his attention to Egypt, and later General Hoche sailed to relieve Ireland from " that monster Pitt." The latter half of the year was less gloomy, being relieved by Nelson's victory at the Nile, surrender of the French in Ireland, and the collapse of the rebellion. During this year Windham interests us in a more romantic capacity, the event being nothing less than his marriage with Cecilia Forrest, a lady whose name has already been mentioned several times in these volumes.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street, Westminster
February 22, 1798

I was about to write to you, at the moment when your letter was brought to me, on the subject of our negotiations with the representatives of the southern armies of Royalists. It is of great consequence that they should not have the hope of playing off one department against another; the efforts of which hope I have already felt in the conversations which have lately been held with them. At first, I am persuaded, they would have taken as a boon anything that had been offered them, without an idea of any claim of right. Their pretensions afterwards rose to a very high pitch. But they are now subsiding again; and they will be willing to take whatever sum shall appear to be reasonable; less than which I would not wish to propose to them. My unwillingness, on the other hand, to exceed in any considerable degree what is reasonable is founded, not merely on my regard to the public money, but upon a view to the future difficulty of obtaining any money for services of this sort, should such occasions ever again arise.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street, Westminster
May 17, 1798

The state of the Royalists in the interior is, as Sir Sidney[2] will have explained to you, dreadful to think of; I mean for want of such small assistance as it is so abundantly in our power, and would be so much to our interest, to give. Less than 500,000*l.* a year, which the charge for maintaining that valuable corps, the provisional

[1] Fortescue MSS. iv. 101.

[2] Sir Sidney Smith had escaped in May from the prison of the Temple.

cavalry, amounts to, would have sustained the war in Brittany and La Vendée in a manner at least to have saved us the necessity of standing on the defensive here. My own opinion remains unaltered that, whatever coalitions may be formed in Europe, unless the parties shall learn to take for their allies the Royalists in France, meaning by that, in a larger sense, all that are willing to combine against a Jacobin Government, the present monstrous system will never be overturned, nor Europe be restored to peace and safety. A radical cure of the disorder can, in my opinion, never be effected but in France itself.[1]

William Pitt *to* William Windham

Private *Hollwood, June* 12, 1798

In consequence of repeated Representations from Lord Camden,[2] recently and very strongly renewed, it has been thought right to propose to Lord Cornwallis to undertake the Situation both of Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief, which his Zeal for the Public Service has induced him to accept; and the appointment will take place immediately. I hope the arrangement will appear to you likely to be attended with good consequences.[3]

Edmund Malone *to* William Windham

June 12, 1798

If you should have time, pray run your eye over the enclosed letters (the last of which I got this morning). They contain some circumstances that may not perhaps have reach'd you, and particularly will show that the

[1] Fortescue MSS. iv. 207.

[2] John Jeffreys Pratt, second Earl (and afterwards first Marquis) of Camden (1759–1840), at this time Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, desired, owing to the dangerous state of the country, to be superseded by a military man.

[3] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 171.

account of Lord Edward Fitzgerald,[1] inserted in the papers and paid for by one of his relations, in which they boast what a *pious end* this traitor and murderer made, is perfectly false, and that in his last delirious moments his inquiries were whether the city was on fire, agreable to the plan he had formed.

I hope you were not acquainted with poor dear Mountjoy.[2] He was one of my oldest and dearest friends, and from midday yesterday he has never been out of my thoughts. I begin to think I shall see every one I ever loved drop into the grave. Never was there a more brave, noble, disinterested, generous spirit: polished, humane, gentle, literate and accomplished: the pride and boast and ornament of Ireland.—O this accursed, ten times accursed French Revolution.—It is doomed, I begin to think, to rob us of everything that is dear to us. Does not the fall of this gallant and most amiable man remind you of the death of Lord Falkland? Who ever thought that we should live to see the events of the last century parallel'd in our own time!

I wish much to have an opportunity of saying a word or two to you on the subject of Ireland. I was much concerned to have it communicated to me from thence, that some things you have dropped here have given—what I am sure was the farthest from your thoughts—countenance and heart to that party there, who have halloed on the papists to this bloody year, the principal of whom, after having set the kingdom in a blaze, is now lodging in London. I do not know a single subject in which I would venture to set my judgment against yours, except this; but be assured that we know our own countrymen best, and that all measures grounded on a supposition that the lower Irish are to be treated and

[1] Lord Edward Fitzgerald (1763–1798) was shot while resisting an attempt to take him prisoner on a charge of high treason, and died in prison in Dublin from the effects of his wound, on June 4.

[2] Luke Gardner, first Viscount Mountjoy, born 1745, was killed at the Battle of Ross, in Ireland, June 5, 1798.

operated upon, like the lower English, will lead to delusion and ruin. To suppose that gratitude, or sentiment, or regard to truth or even oaths, will have any influence on a people at least in a semi-barbarous state, is a most fatal error. They are a cunning, false, perjured, ferocious and sanguinary people; all these characters they had 200 years ago, and it is astonishing how little change there has been in their manners in that period, as you would see, if you had but time to read Spenser's *View of Ireland*, an admirable tract, written in 1596. What then can be done with such a savage race, but to bind them up from the power of doing mischief? Our ancestors wisely, and from necessity, made these laws against which, within these 20 years, it has been so common to declaim; and these declaimers entirely forgot all the savage atrocities, the burnings, the tortures, and the massacres, that gave birth to them. The same scenes have recurred with even redoubled horror, by the adoption of an infernal scheme of secret conspiracy and assassination, copied, I believe, minutely from the mysterious and most dangerous system of Loyola;—and in the end we shall find that our only safety will be to re-enact all that has been repealed.

Pray return the letters.[1]

Windham had long been in love with Cecilia Frederica Marina, a daughter of Commodore Forrest,[2] a lady, "whose virtues" (to quote Malone) "are above all praise, and whose attainments, joined with amiable manners, and sweetest disposition, rendered her a suitable companion for one of the most distinguished characters of the day."[3] The marriage took place on July 10, and as only the King had been informed of it, the news created a sensation in society.

[1] Add. MSS. 37854 f. 144.

[2] *See* vol. i. p. 15 of this work.

[3] *Gentleman's Magazine*, June 1810, lxxx. 593.

Extract from Windham's Diary

July 10, 1798. At Binfield, by about half-past ten. Between eleven and twelve went with Cecy and Mrs. Byng in chaise to Mr. Wilson's; Mrs. Forrest, Mr. Arthur, Margaret and Harriet following in Mr. Wilson's coach. Byng and I walked from Mr. Wilson's to church, whither Cecy came in the chaise. The solemn ceremony performed, the impression of which, and the vows made during the time, will never, I hope, be effaced from my mind, we went back to the house, from whence about two o'clock we set out for Reigate. It was twelve, or near, before we arrived.

William Windham *to* Miss Lukin [1]

Binfield, July 10, 1798

I cannot bear, that with the friendship which you are so good as to feel for me, you should know by the papers only, an event in which I am so materially concerned, and which relates in fact to all those with whom I have been in the habit of living on terms of cordial and confidential intercourse. You know my long and intimate acquaintance with Miss Cecilia Forrest: you know her merits too: you will not be surprised, nor sorry, I hope, at hearing that, before you receive this, she will have honoured me by giving me her hand, and bearing the same name with myself. I write this from Binfield, whither I came last night: and whence I shall remove after the ceremony has taken place to Reigate. I shall be happy to avail myself of the opportunity, which that will probably give me, of calling upon you at Clapham, the first time that I go to town, and bringing Miss Forrest, Mrs. Windham as she will then be, with me. She has already, I think, the pleasure of being acquainted with

[1] A connection of Windham's. His mother's first husband was Robert Lukin, of Dunmow, Essex.

you ; and will feel, I am sure, if I am right in presuming a conformity in our opinions, a desire of becoming more so.

Let me hope that you will not in my new state abate any of that kindness, which you hitherto had the goodness to feel for me, nor believe me to be, my dear Madam, with less truth and regard,

Your faithful and affectionate, humble servant

W. WINDHAM [1]

EDMUND MALONE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

London, July 11, 1798

Your letter, my dear Windham, which this moment came to my hands, is one of the most agreable I have ever received ; not only as it is very flattering to me that at this time you should think of an absent friend, but as it brings an account of an event having taken place of such great importance to you, and in which, therefore, I am not a little interested. To have heard that you were united to any woman that you thought worthy of your hand and likely to contribute to the comfort of your future life, would of itself have given me very great pleasure. You may easily judge then, how much that pleasure is heightened by learning that the object of your choice is one of the most amiable and engaging of women, and whom, ever since I first knew her, I have admired as the most perfect and attractive of her sex : one, with whom you have not merely a *prospect*, but a *certainty* of the greatest happiness this world has to bestow. You have often heard me, in speaking of her, perhaps with too much familiarity, call her *my dear Cecy*. I trust she will have the goodness to excuse my *once more* taking that freedom, while with the most perfect sincerity I wish her a long, long continuance of that felicity which awaits you both.

A thousand thanks for your good wishes, which I fear

[1] Add. MSS. 37061 f. 4.

my hard fate will never suffer to be accomplished ; but Fortune, however wayward, cannot deprive us of the pleasure which we derive from participating in the happiness of those we love. The prospect therefore of a more frequent intercourse, which you are so kind as to present to me, in consequence of this change in your situation, is full of delight, for among all your numerous friends, be assured, my dear Windham, there is not one, who more ardently wishes you every good than

Your most affectionate and faithful

EDMUND MALONE.[1]

SIR GILBERT ELLIOT *to* LADY ELLIOT

July 12, 1798

Windham's marriage is actually true, and done two days ago. It seems that there is an etiquette which requires that Cabinet Ministers should acquaint the King with their intention to marry, and the King appears to have been his only confidant. He mentioned her age, which is forty,[2] and said she was twenty years older than when their attachment commenced ; but, he added, that ought not to prevent the marriage, as it *was no fault of hers* that the match had not been earlier. He is as odd, I think, as most people : However, I have great hopes of the marriage improving him, for he will not now be dodging with the world and playing at whoop with all his friends. I will not condole with you upon the occasion; as you have only to strike up a great friendship with Miss Forrest that was, and get him to take a house near Roehampton. I hear she is brown, with dark eyes, good teeth, and past forty—my idea of perfect beauty.[3]

[1] Add. MSS. 37854 f. 146.

[2] Mrs. Windham was born on October 7, 1750, and was, consequently, in her forty-eighth year at the time of her marriage. She survived her husband, and died on May 5, 1824. She was buried in Felbrigg Church.

[3] " Life of Lord Minto," iii. p. 12.

SIR GILBERT ELLIOT *to* LADY ELLIOT

July 26, 1798

I have seen Windham and his bride, and am quite delighted with her. She is a tall, showy woman, something in the Siddons style of figure and dimensions, with a remarkably sensible as well as pleasing countenance and an engaging manner. He seems the most delighted bridegroom that ever was. I met them yesterday evening, taking a conjugal walk round St. James's Park after dinner, just as the inhabitants of Park Street have done before. I dine with them to-morrow.

The Speaker [1] is very full of a good story which he and Mr. Pitt have got against Windham: how on the day of marriage he not only forgot the wedding-ring, but forgot the way to Reigate. Whether he arrived there at all or not, I do not know, as we could not press for particulars, which he reserves for the first interview with Windham himself; he assured us they drove about most of the night in search of a habitation, and I rather think did *not* get to Reigate.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* CAPTAIN LUKIN

Felbrigg: October 9, 1798

Lord Spencer, in his answer to my letter, says: "Lukin's destination remains still open; and if you like it, he shall be attached to the Channel Fleet, which, I believe, in the present state of things, is as well as anything." My application was, as you described, to be attached to some of the western squadrons. What are your wishes upon this?

So Nelson is only to be a Baron.[3] I am not sure that

[1] Henry Addington, after first Viscount Sidmouth.

[2] "Life of Lord Minto," iii. 16. The extract from Windham's Diary shows that the bridal pair did get to Reigate, though belatedly.

[3] Nelson was created Baron Nelson of the Nile, after his victory at Aboukir Bay.

the decision is not right, on the principle of considering, not merely the merit and importance of the action, but the rank of the commander; but I doubt whether it would have been so, had he been *David* Nelson, instead of *Horatio*.

Was there any history as to the *Culloden's* getting on shore, more than the necessary risk from her being the leading ship? I am supposing the possibility of some want of skill in the *Mutine;* supposing, what may not have been the fact, that the *Mutine* was commanded by Capell.[1]

H.R.H. William Frederick, Duke of Gloucester, *to* William Windham

Secret *Ashford, October* 31, 1798

I am much obliged to you for the Letter of the 17th Inst. I had the pleasure some days since, to receive from you, and I am very thankful to you for your kind Intention of putting the three unfortunate children of Captain Mence (?) upon the Compassionate List, and I wish to know whether it will not be necessary for me to procure for you their Christian names and ages? and whether you will object to my informing the Friends of the Children of your kind Intention towards them? I congratulate you upon Sir John Warren's Victory,[2] which, whilst it adds a glorious Victory to the annals of our Naval History, is at the same time an event of the greatest moment, as I trust it will ensure the Tranquillity of Ireland, open the Eyes of the deluded Wretches that are still in Arms, and by showing the Enemy the Impossibility of their reaching in safety the Irish Coast prevent all future expeditions against that Country. I perfectly coincide with you in opinion that nothing but the Joint Efforts of the different Powers of Europe

[1] Windham's "Diary," p. 403.

[2] Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren (1753–1822) intercepted and defeated Hoche's expedition to Ireland earlier in this month.

combined with the Discontented in France can bring about a change in that Country and, by overturning a Government (whose only object is the Destruction of every Regular System), and by crushing a Set of Ruffians (who live by the Plunder of the World) establish an order of Things in France that will allow Europe to be quiet and safe and permit the different Powers to enjoy a lasting Peace and disarm.

Until such an order of Things is established I cannot wish to see this country disarm, and I should be heartily grieved and consider it as far the most fatal blow to this Country was I to hear that, Intimidated by our Naval Successes, the Directory had sued for Peace and this Country had granted them Peace, even were we permitted to retain most of our Conquests—But that I trust will never be the case, and I hope we know the Perfidy of *the Great Nation* too well to allow ourselves to be caught in such a Trap. I own I see things in a much brighter point of view. I look upon the Alliance between Russia and the Porte as the most fortunate event; and [believe] that it will lead to a Quintuple Alliance, between these two Powers, Austria and Naples. But whilst I am rejoicing at this event let me likewise say that I perceive a Circumstance connected with it that appears to me very alarming, and one that if not guarded against will be the source of future misfortunes, namely, the Russians taking either Malta or Corfu. For God's sake never allow them to have possessions in the Mediterranean. Turkey is lost as an Independent nation, your Levant Trade is gone, as well as your Influence in Italy and the Mediterranean. I likewise foresee another event in another Part of the Globe that will be attended with better Consequences to this Country, namely, the Formation of a Navy by America. Should she ever become a Maritime Power, all the West Indies will be hers, and I should not be surprised to live to see South America under her Dominion. What a Power! What immense

J. W. Chandler, pinxt. *E. Bell, sculpt.*

PRINCE WILLIAM FREDERICK, DUKE OF GLOUCESTER

inexhaustible Resources! What a length of Coast! and what fine Harbours! Then, indeed, the Commerce of this Country will be gone, and then indeed India will be lost, not by a Don Quixote attempting to march thro' the Deserts of Arabia and to join the Red and Mediterranean Seas, but by America sending an Army by the Pacific Ocean, where we cannot prevent her. I own I foresee the most melancholy Consequences will attend the Americans becoming a Maritime Power, which I think we could prevent, by assigning her (for her Protection) a Fleet of as many Sail-of-the-Line, Frigates, &c.; as she may require, provided she will pay us a subsidy, furnish us so many sailors during the War annually, and promise to build no more Ships. Such a treaty would intimidate France, by proving the strong Friendship that exists between the two Countries, would please America by saving her the Expense of building ships, and by proving the Interest this Country takes in her Welfare, and to this Country it would be no expense in Men or Money (Ships we have enough) and would prevent what I think may lead to the Destruction of our Commerce.

I must now turn to another Subject, namely, the Distress this Country labours under from the want of Regular Troops—and I think it my Duty (considering the opportunities I have from my present Situation to witness it) to state to you the absolute necessity of bringing some measure before Parliament for recruiting our Army. Having had so many Militia Regiments under me in the course of the four years I have been on the Home Staff, I am a tolerable Judge of the Militia, and, as I know you will not repeat what I write to you in confidence, I must express my fears that, should they ever be tried, the more melancholy consequences will attend the Trial, not from the men being bad, but from the Ignorance of the Officers, and as they are well aware of their own incapacity to command they will be diffident of themselves, and

Confusion will be constant. I must hope you will never mention this as my opinion, which I think it my Duty to give you under the Seal of Friendship. I must likewise remark to you that all the Regiments of Militia are incompleat, as you will see by the enclosed State of my present Force. Now I conceive that the object of the Militia is always to be compleat and ought to be so. But that will never be the case whilst Bounties are allowed to be given by the Militia (which at the same time hinders the Recruiting of the Army)—15*l.* is now permitted. In my opinion an Act should be passed to oblige the ballotted man either to appear himself or to find a proper Substitute and I should recommend one or two officers from each Regiment being stationed in the County to oblige the Deputy Lieutenant to call meetings when men are wanted by the Regment, to attend the meetings and to approve of the Recruits.

There is another thing which prevents the Militia and Army being compleat, which is the Provisional Cavalry being allowed to give such immense Bounties. In this County they give 28 Guineas a man. I own (if I may be allowed to say so) that I think the best thing to be done, would be to abolish that bounty, as it is an enormous expense to Government and to Individuals, and I despair of anything ever being made of it. It also is particularly disliked in the Country, as every individual feels the burthen of it. Was the whole or part abolished I think it might encourage the Country to consent more willingly to raising Regulars—and I think we shall be much at a loss unless Ministers call upon the Country to compleat 20 old Infantry Regiments to 1000 men each by Ballot and Substitutes, from the Counties. I am sure if it was stated fairly in Parliament the Difficulties we labour under from the want of Troops and that either the Provisional Cavalry or Part of the Militia was given up, that the country would cheerfully consent to such a measure. The men should not serve out of Europe;

should only serve a limited time, and should be disbanded at the Peace, and never *be drafted.*

Many Persons will tell you that there is a Scarcity of Men in the Country, and that there would not be men sufficient to till the land was such a measure (as I propose) to take place. I assure you that is by no means true, and Persons asserting it assert it from a bad motive, as I have enquired fully into it, and I find that even without the Assistance of the Troops there were sufficient hands in some parts of the Country to get in the last Harvest. Many Farmers did not make use of the permission given to have Soldiers to gather in the Harvest—the Price of Labour is extremely high, and in travelling thro' the different large towns (particularly manufacturing Towns) I have remarked a prodigious number of idle able bodied men. In the Acts of Parliament for the raising of the Militia I do not think that the large towns have been equally called upon with the smaller ones, as the Acts usually oblige the Counties, and not the Towns, to furnish men : I think if a clause was put into the next Act to oblige the large Towns to furnish so many men from each Parish, it would be attended with a good effect. Before I leave this subject I must remark that I apprehend great Danger from permitting the United Irish and the Discontented in that Country to inlist into the Army, and that I fear in our Profession we may dread (if that is allowed) the same Confusion that there was last year in the Navy. It is not numbers that are formidable, but well Disciplined Troops. I must now say that altho' I see the absolute necessity of an alteration in our present Establishment, and of collecting what you very properly call a Disposable Army (which I have attempted to point out the means of procuring), yet I think that we ought not to lay upon our arms that Force is raised. This is the moment to strike, and this moment once lost may never be recovered. I find that there are 2000 Foot Guards in Ireland besides 7000 Regular Infantry. Why

not employ them and garrison Ireland with the 12,000 Militia that are allowed to go from England, the Irish Militia, the Fencible Cavalry and Infantry and the Regular Cavalry ?—That Force would be sufficient to protect Ireland until the Force I above mentioned should be raised; particularly if the Navy do their Duty and particularly after the repeated Defeats the Enemy have experienced at Sea, which I have reason to know has intimidated them, and will in all probability make them postpone for some time (if not for ever) an attack upon that Country. Add to the 9000 men above mentioned 3000, or only 2000 more guards out of the 5000 now doing nothing in London (3000 being fully sufficient for all that is wanted of them there), add to that the 3000 Emigrants left by General Stuart in Portugal, the 2000 Regular Infantry in Jersey and Germany (that Duty might be taken by the Fencibles), and the Infantry now in England amounting to about 4000 men—making in all 20,000 men. I should likewise wish to have two or three compleat good Regiments of Dragoons dismounted, and then I should not require all the above mentioned Infantry, but should conceive 18,000 effective men sufficient. With such an Army, assisted by Lord St. Vincent's Fleet and properly officer'd, I should think Cadiz an easy conquest. The Spanish Fleet to be brought away, the Port to be destroyed as well as the Docks, Arsenals and whatever Shipping could not be taken off. The English Army then should proceed against Minorca, then Malta (which should be blockaded by our Fleet in the meanwhile), and from Malta to Corfu. I suppose that, after leaving garrisons in these three Different Islands and allowing for men dead by the Sword and by Sickness, the Army might be reduced to 8000 men. It should then proceed to act in concert with the Austrians in Italy by embarking on board our Fleet Neapolitans and Austrians, and with them proceeding against Civita Vecchia, Genoa and Nice—which would be rendering the Emperor and the Italian Powers a wonderful

assistance—as you would prevent all succours and Provisions, &c., coming to the French Army by Sea, and oblige them at a great Expense to bring every thing by land, which must weaken their Army considerably by obliging them to make great Detachments to protect their Convoys which must frequently be Taken. You would feed and carry the different necessaries at small expense for the Allies, and you would render yourselves masters of the most important Ports in the Mediterranean, which would greatly distress the Enemy, and by the Possession of which, you would be enabled to act upon their communications; upon their Flanks and in their Rear, whilst your Allies acted in their Front. I am convinced that such an Army immediately sent to the Mediterranean would at once determine the Emperor and Naples to declare War, would encourage the Discontented in Italy to rise and give a general turn to the affairs of Europe. The Destruction of Cadiz and the Possession of Minorca would inevitably oblige Spain to make Peace with you, and the Possession of the Islands in the Mediterranean would enable your Fleet to prevent corn, &c., being sent to the South of France from the Barbary States and make the discontented in those Provinces rise in Arms. I own I think this moment is favourable. We have the Force. There must be a risk, but without a Risk what can be done; even in private Life? I hope to God the moment will not be lost!

Such an Army as I mentioned I do not think could be better commanded than by Sir Charles Grey, whose experience; Military knowledge; abilities and Zeal for the Service make him the fittest man for such a Command. But whoever commands it (should such an Army be formed) or whatever Service offers—I hope you will remember that my wish is to improve myself in my Profession by Service, to make myself useful to my Country, by practice to render myself better qualified to serve my Country, and to prove to the nation that my life, and my all, I

would willingly Sacrifice for the Good of my Country, and that I am truly devoted to her and for her would give up everything.

One thing more and then I will conclude this endless Epistle. If the Continental Powers come forward, the only way (as it strikes me), to make them really act together is to establish a Congress in some Centrical Town in Europe to which every Allied Power should send Ministers. Every Proclamation should be published from thence; every act whatsoever proceed from thence, and all the Plans of Campaign should be there arranged, there digested and there formed.

I forgot to say that this Country does not suffer much by the number of men now in Arms, as all the expense is in the Country and the money spent is spent at home, and that by allowing the troops in England to gather in the Harvest, the Farmers can never want for assistance. I must likewise say that the use of the dismounted Cavalry with "*The Mediterranean Army*" would be that, besides acting as Infantry, they would act also as Cavalry; as they should be provided with Infantry Firelocks and also take Saddles, Bridles, Swords, &c., &c., that nothing would be wanted but Horses which you could procure any where—Supposing, for Instance, you were to take Genoa; you would put all Horses in requisition and mount three Regiments on good horses and completely in three hours! It would be the same in any part of Italy.

I have now to apologise for having taken up so much of your time, most likely in a very useless manner. But if you should find any one idea worth notice it will be very satisfactory to me. I fear I have written in such haste that you will have difficulty in reading my letter, as I have put down my ideas as they came across me; without Form or Arrangement. I intended in beginning merely to write a few Lines and I find I have written four sheets, or rather have scrawled

four sheets; which I hope you will take as the rough undigested Thoughts of one who can say with great truth that he is with very true Regard, Esteem, and Attachment,

Yours very sincerely,
WILLIAM FREDERICK.

P.S. Since I wrote the above I have recollected that the number of Militia Men that pay bounties instead of coming forward or finding substitutes is so great that the 3rd Kent Militia now under me have alone upward [of] 2000*l.* in their hands, collected from the different Fines, which they now apply to give any sum [you] please [for] inlisting Money.

STATE OF THE TROOPS IN THE ASHFORD DISTRICT THE 26TH OCTOBER 1796[1]

Stations	Regiments	Effective Rank and File	Wanting to Complete
On the coast	Hants F Cavalry	144	—
Ashford Barracks	3rd Kent	282	131
do do	Glamorgan	609	96
do do	1st W. York	893	56
Hythe and Dungeness	East Suffolk	844	272
Shorncliffe and adjacents	South Middlesex	666	174
Riding Street	3rd Norfolk	632	176
		4070	905
Royal Artillery, Battn. Guns and Batterys		76	
Artillery Drivers		53	
10th Light Dragoons for Express Duty		13	
3 Troops of Yeomanry Cavalry		156	
10 Companies of Volunteer Infantry		569	
Sea Fencibles, Folkestone, Sandgate		224	
Officers present 26th October		160	
Quarter Masters and Sergeants		247	
Drummers and Trumpeters		122	
Grand Total		5690	

[1] Add MSS. 37842 f. 206.

LORD GRENVILLE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Cleveland Row : December 5 1798

I had not the least idea that, in the circuitous manner in which Cazalès [1] sent his paper, he could expect an answer to it. I am unwilling to do anything to wound or offend an honourable man, who has distinguished himself in the cause of Monarchy and Religion in France. But on the other side, the common *procédés* which are observed in the course of all business of this nature, required that some regular communication should have been made to me of the intention to supersede the Duc D'Harcourt, whom I am known to think well of, and to appoint Cazalès who is unfortunately not less known to entertain the most absurd prejudices against some of the King's Servants, and to have expressed them with the greatest indiscretion.

To this charge, if it had been communicated to me, I should even have thought (without wishing to press on the unfortunate) that the *consent* of the King's Government was, under all the circumstances, fit to be asked, and it certainly would *not* readily have been given.

But when no communication whatever has been made to me about it, I should, by receiving and answering notes from M. Cazalès, be acting very injuriously towards the Duc D'Harcourt, and countenancing that system of double negotiation which I abhor, and which I am truly grieved to see prevails no less at Milan than it did at Paris.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

December 5, 1798

I thought as you do about the answer to Cazalès, while the proceeding was to remain a secret from the Duc

[1] Jacques Antoine Marie de Cazalès (1758–1805), French statesman. He fought in the army of the émigrés against revolutionary France, and for some time lived in England and Switzerland, returning, however, to his own country in 1803.

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 71.

D'Harcourt, and indeed rather understood from you, that upon a reference to him (the Duc D'Harcourt) the answer; if any were given, must be founded.

Since that time, Cazalès, I found, had accepted the office: and as a communication had been made in consequence to the Duc D'Harcourt, I took it for granted that a corresponding one had been made to you.

Undoubtedly they cannot claim to have two Ambassadors, communicating at once with the King's Ministers; and I most heartily wish that they had kept to the one already received. But I should think it would appear like pressing hard upon the situation of the King, if we were to *limit* him in the choice of the person he might wish to employ, provided that no one was proposed to whom there was a very mark'd exception, or were to interfere in any arrangement which was not to bring any new and additional person into a communication with Ministry.—I really do not at all understand what the footing is on which they propose that Cazalès should stand: they certainly do not mean to displace the Duc D'Harcourt; and Cazalès, I take it for granted, does not mean to be, even ostensibly, merely in the situation of Dutheil.

I shall say to Cazalès that, till the Duc D'Harcourt is declared to be recall'd and somebody formally appointed and received in his place; you can have no communication but with him.[1]

Edmund Malone *to* William Windham

December 15

The office of Writer of the *Gazette*, I believe it will be found, has always been in the gift of the Secretary of State for the Home Department. That Secretary is the Keeper of the Signet; and the Writer of the *Gazette* has often been one of the Clerks of the Signet. So the late Mr. Frazer was; and so also Mr. Weston, his prede-

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 73.

cessor in this office, was both Gazeteer, and Clerk of the Signet. They each of them were *Under-Secretaries,* and got the office of Gazetteer, in consequence of their connexion with the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The *Gazette* itself is supposed to be the immediate production of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, or at least emanates from that office ; in consequence of which, alterations are made frequently in the proof-sheets of the *Gazette,* while passing through the press, by orders from that office. Hence all the Volumes of the *Gazettes,* from the beginning in the time of Charles the Second, are preserved in the office of the Secretary for the Home Department. Do not all these circumstances clearly shew, that the appointment of the Writer of the Gazette belongs to him ?

Sir Richard Steele had this office in 1710.
Samuel Buckley had it from 1716 to 1742.
Edward Weston from 1742 to 1770.
Wm. Frazer from 1771 to 1802.

I conceive, he was appointed by Lord Weymouth, when Secretary for the Home Department: but perhaps Captain Frazer can ascertain this. This is all the information I have been able to gain on the subject.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37854 f. 152.

CHAPTER VI

1799

Debates on the Union of Great Britain with Ireland : Windham offered the office of Master of the Mint : The Irish question : Lord Castlereagh's views : Correspondence concerning the French Royalists between Windham, Grenville, and Pitt : Windham on the projected invasion of Holland : A question of patronage : Austrian politicians : Correspondence between Windham and Grenville concerning plans for the ensuing campaign : Dutheil's scheme : British subsidies : Foreign corps in the pay of Great Britain : Correspondence with Grenville, Dundas, Minto, Pitt, &c.

THE second coalition, formed at the end of the previous year, was at once productive of good results. The French were defeated in Germany by the Archduke Charles and in Italy by the Austrians, whom Suvóroff later joined with a Russian army, and took command of. The result was immediately disastrous to the French. In the autumn, however, the coalition broke up owing to the defection of Russia. At home the legislative union with Ireland was being publicly discussed. Windham was much occupied during this year with the French Royalists, with whom he was continually in correspondence. He gave and procured for them all the aid possible, but the result was never encouraging, possibly because the organisation was defective.

GEORGE CANNING *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Downing Street: February 4, 1799

I am glad that you are coming up for Thursday. We shall have two, if not three, days' good debating ; which

is the only good effect that I know of the failure of the Union in Ireland.

If Foster [1] has courage to join the Catholics—the game is up. But I rely on the strength of his prejudices and pledges upon this point.

If we escape this mischief, the Union will succeed next year—or in a Summer Session. Depend upon it.

Pitt is going to write to you about the Mint—which you may remember I mentioned to you some days ago; as likely to be vacated by Sir George Yonge. I suppose you will not take it, though I rather wish for the sake of your ease and comfort that you may. But the reason that I say any thing to you about it now is to take upon myself whatever blame (if any) might otherwise attach to Pitt in your mind for making the suggestion—by assuring you that he has, before he would write to you, obtained a promise from me on your behalf (which you must keep for me) that you will not take the suggestion *ill*—nor conceive it to be meant by him as anything but the sincerest and most disinterested attention to your possible comfort. It does not matter to him, or to any arrangements, whether you accept or refuse the change.

Suppose we dine together at Mrs. Crewe's on Wednesday.

Hang the Cabinet.[2]

Lord Minto [3] *to* William Windham

Rochampton: February 7, 1799

I was very unlucky in leaving town to-day half an hour before your note arriv'd; and it has follow'd me to this place. I would call on you to-morrow, but happen to

[1] John Foster (1740–1828), last Speaker of the Irish House of Parliament, strongly opposed to the Union and Catholic Emancipation; created Baron Oriel 1821.

[2] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 277.

[3] Sir Gilbert Elliot had been created Baron Minto of Minto in October, 1797.

T. Stewardson, pinxt. *W. Ward, sculpt.*

GEORGE CANNING

be deprived of my coachman for a day and must remain at home. Elliot [1] and I have both been lamenting your absence, as questions of the greatest importance have been agitated during the few days of his stay in London. While he was here, Lord Castlereagh [2] wrote to him to say that the leading Catholicks had shewn a disposition to treat ; and he thought it possible to obtain the support of the Catholicks *as a body*, on the single condition of taking off by the articles of the Union their disability to hold certain offices. They consented to leave the test Laws and other Catholic questions untouch'd, trusting in the prospect which the Union offer'd of obtaining more ample satisfaction as the natural consequence of that event. A cabinet was held on this letter the day of Elliot's departure, and no positive resolution was taken. It was only determined that Elliot should immediately return and instruct Lord Castlereagh (and, I presume, Lord Cornwallis [3]) to consult Lord Shannon and other persons of a similar description, and to report their opinions and wishes to England, before any encouragement should be given to the Catholicks on the points stated in Lord Castlereagh's letter. It was in the discussion of these questions that we wished very earnestly for you.

The opposition in Ireland, including, I believe, the opponents of the Union, are understood to intend moving some propositions favourable to the Catholicks, and engaging them by that means to make common cause both against the Union and generally against Government. It would seem, therefore, politick in Government

[1] William Elliot of Wells.

[2] Lord Castlereagh was appointed Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1799. He impressed upon the Cabinet the necessity for an immediate Act of Union between England and Ireland. He was also a strong advocate for a Catholic Emancipation Bill, and he resigned his position when George III. refused to sanction the introduction of such a measure.

[3] Charles Cornwallis, first Marquis Cornwallis, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland, 1798.

to get the start in that course, considering especially that the thing itself is so right, independent of the Policy. But I believe the contrary was determined, until the letter I have mention'd from Lord Castlereagh put the question in a new shape, and in that shape it seems to be committed to the discretion of, I believe, adverse parties. If opposition brings forward any questions in favour of the Catholicks it is determined to resist them vigourously, and, with all Elliot's predilection for such questions, I think he feels the impossibility of letting them redound to the strength and credit of opposition. He is, however, much embarrassed as to his own personal situation ; for although he thinks as a member of Government he cannot avoid rejecting these propositions when moved by opposition, he would nevertheless feel such a vote so repugnant to his opinion and principles that I should think him by no means unlikely to resign, if things should take this course.

You will observe that there is a good deal here that I ought not to know, and therefore I must beg you to recollect my ignorance.

We are here for good and we hope you will come and graze with us now and then. Lady Minto is impatient to know Mrs. Windham, and I am impatient to hear that you are both the better for Bath. Lady Minto dines at Blackheath [1] next Wednesday, and I think it probable you will have a ticket for her benefit, or rather for her first appearance on this Royal theatre.[2]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

May 17, 1799

With respect to an allowance in future of £1000 per month including the service for which £400 per month has hitherto been allowed, my principal objection is,

[1] The Princess of Wales was at this time living at Montagu House, Blackheath, separated from her consort.

[2] Add. MSS. 37852 f. 280.

the smallness of the sum. The Duc D'Harcourt, with the utmost exertion, will not be able to reduce, what has been called the current service; meaning the *Correspondence*, the *Subsistence* and *expenses* of persons occasionally here, and *other matters connected* with these; to less than £300; so as to leave for the aid of the Royalists in Normandy, Brittany, Maine, Poitou, and Anjou, not more than £700 per month.

But in fact the Duc D'Harcourt will be less able to reduce the Current Service, than those in whose hands it has been hitherto; and the consequence, I fear, will be, of mixing the two things together, viz., the Assistance to the Royalists in France, and the expenses of their [sojourn] here; and, putting the whole into the hands of the Duc D'Harcourt, that much too great a portion will be given up, to persons resident here, many of them but very remotely connected with the Royalist cause, and recommended only by that sort of favour, which the Duc D'Harcourt will not always be able, nor always willing to resist. Of the expenses, therefore, of the Current Service, that part of it which consists in a provision for Persons occasionally here, is likely to become greater, rather than less, in the hands of the Duc D'Harcourt, there is another part, which, if left to be managed by him or Dutheil, will be likely to meet with considerable embarrassment; such as French activity and address will be able possibly to surmount, but which will certainly exist much more with respect to them, than if the business were placed in the hands of any English Agent.

The correspondence and Communication with France should be considered as consisting of two parts, one lying in France, the other here; and the English part should clearly be conducted by some English Agent; as involving in it a thousand little details, that can only be settled by communication with persons and offices here. A Dozen letters must perhaps be written, and

half as many departments be put in position to send a man to St. Marcon! There must be application to the Admiralty; an application to the Secretary of state; a letter to the Port Admiral; another to Captain Price; another perhaps to an Agent of Transports at Southampton, not to mention various little matters arising from time to time, for which no certain rule can be prescribed, such, for example, as the providing for Captain Price some place and means of accomodating those who may be detained at St. Marcon, till opportunities occur of forwarding them according to their destination. The incident mentioned in one of the communications inclosed by Lord Grenville from the Duc D'Harcourt, of a suspicion entertained of some of those employed in the correspondence had led to measures, which trifling as they were, could hardly have been effected without the Intervention of some one, conversant with the different offices, and who moreover would have been willing to give his time to that object.

All these details have hitherto been in the hands of Woodford;[1] who, together with that zeal which is necessary to ensure a diligent attention to them, has had a full conviction of the necessity for preserving in the conduct of them a most rigorous economy. Let them be placed, if more convenient, in the hands of any one else (it is wholly indifferent to me) provided they be placed with a person well-affected to the service, and who will fairly give his mind to it. But it must be some one considered as having the confidence of Government, and conversant with our modes of business.

My opinion, upon the whole, is that, for what is called the current service, the saving on £400 per month is not likely to be considerable; But that, whatever the sum may be, it should be put into the hands of our English

[1] Inspector-General of the Foreign forces in the pay of the British Government.

Agent, and be kept separate from those sums, which it may be thought right to transmit through the hands of the Duc D'Harcourt for the assistance of the Royalists.

In the mode proposed for paying off what remains of the former account, it does not appear to me that there is any objection. Perhaps by the time the sums, thereby advanced, shall be exhausted, the question of the Royalists may stand upon a totally different footing. One thing must not be forgot, that all that has been stated in any of the preceding papers, is separate from the expences of sending out Puisaye and his companions (about 40 in number) to Canada, amounting to about £4000, which will be to defray, I conceive, from the Home Department. Upon the subject of this attempt to lay the Foundation of a French Colony in Canada, which may serve as an Asylum to those who might otherwise remain as a charge upon this country, Mr. W[oodford] has had a good deal of conversation with the Duke of Portland, and shall be glad of an opportunity of talking further upon it with Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt.

Endorsement by Lord Grenville

I conceive that this admits of no doubt. It has always appeared to me that this plan was not only wise or humane, but that it would also in the end be a measure of economy.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street, Westminster
June 13, 1799

I am sorry to hear nothing on the subject of the money, a portion of which at least, as is agreed on all hands, ought to be paid to the Royalists.

I saw the arrangement grounded on my letter, which you had proposed: and I sent it back, accompanied with a statement of such alterations as it appeared to

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 103.

me desirable to make in it. Since then I have heard nothing about it. If the money were paid in any form, I should not trouble you any further : But I am afraid the business totally sleeps.

In the mean while, the distress of the parties concerned, here as well as there, is extreme : and the consequences such as you are not aware of it : I mean with respect to what is taking place in the Interior.

A superficial view of the state of the Royalist provinces may lead to the belief that their poverty is the best security for their remaining quiet, as, at present certainly, it is desirable that they should do. But quite the contrary. Their distress is the very thing that sets them in motion ; and in spite of all the exertions of the chiefs, who see as well as other people, that partial movements are useless and ruinous, insurrection seems to be breaking out in many places, in a manner fatal to the parties concerned, and highly prejudicial to the general Interest. This is one of the innumerable instances in which a closer study of the case and the patient, would lead to a treatment perfectly opposite to that which would be adopted upon a more hasty view. The starving system is not, here, that which will best prevent the effects of fever and irritation. The chiefs are in utter despair. They can no longer prevent their people from taking arms, pressed as they are by the requisitions, and without means of subsistance and escape; but by violence. Being unable to restrain them, they have nothing left but to follow them. Such is the representation made long since to me by Motte and others : and confirmed not only by papers, which he has shown me, but by circumstances contained in the accounts from the Prince de Bouillon. We are consulting, therefore, I believe, very ill, even the purpose of sharing these provinces, and saving a useless effusion of blood; in withholding from them the Money, which on other accounts we have agreed ought to be paid them. The

same circumstances will make the delay equally prejudicial to the general cause. You will see by the paper; to which I have referred, what my ideas are on the subject of further remittances; to which I don't know that I have anything to add.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MR. IVES

Park Street, Westminster
June 12, 1799

Mr. Windham presents his Compliments to Mr. Ives. —Mr. Ives cannot be more surprised at the inclosure sent him in Mr. Windham's Name, than Mr. Windham is at Mr. Ives's letter in consequence. The fact is simply this—In the Papers sent some time since from Mr. Ives, was a piece of Coin, wrapped up in a Cover; which, as it did not relate to any thing contained in the papers, Mr. Windham concluded must have been put among them by mistake; at the same time that, from the manner of its being put up, he thought that, for some reason or other, it was wished to be preserved. Recurring to these Papers lately, in consequence of some inquiry, which he had directed to be made as to the business to which they related, he found the piece of Coin; and gave directions for its being returned to the Gentleman from whom it appeared to have been received.

What there is in this, which Mr. Ives or any body can find to resent, or suspect to be intended as offence, he is utterly at a loss to comprehend. He certainly meant nothing but to return to the owner, whoever he might be, a piece of Foreign Coin (it might be a sixpence or any thing else, for aught Mr. Windham knew) which for some reason or another appeared to be intended to be preserved, and which by some mistake had got out of its place. If offence was to be attached to this; Mr. Windham might as well have been offended, at

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 114.

its being sent originally to him; which certainly he never was.

With respect to not answering Mr. Ives's Letter, which is a matter more requiring explanation, Mr. Windham is confident that either in person or by Letter, he returned an answer to the Gentleman, to whose business it related. It was in consequence of an Inquiry as to the state of business, and whether it had been decided or not, that the Papers were recurred to, and the piece of coin again brought to his recollection; the return of which has, so very oddly, appeared to Mr. Ives a matter of offence.

It must be remembered that the business, in which Mr. Windham's interference was solicited, was one to be decided *juridically;* in which it did not appear, what room there was for Interest or favor.

With respect to the piece of dirty Paper, in which the Coin was wrapped up, and to which Mr. Ives adverts, it is certain that nothing specifick was said about it in the directions which Mr. Windham gave for the return of the Coin. Mr. Windham, however, is far from certain that, if he had attended to the circumstance, he should not have given directions for the Paper being returned likewise; as a means, possibly, of ascertaining by what accident the Coin had found its way into the pacquet in question and to whom it belonged.

P.S. It has been observed to Mr. Windham, since writing the above, that the piece of paper above alluded to had upon it the Words "Mr. Ives, No. 13 Bishopsgate Without," and the same circumstance is alluded to, Mr. Windham finds, in Mr. Ives's Letter. Mr. Windham should have been sorry to have overlooked this circumstance, that both points out still more distinctly the propriety of his sending the Coin contained in it and his sending it as he did—if any apology is due, it is for not returning it immediately.

[1] Add. MSS. 37915 f. 83.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* WILLIAM PITT [1]

Park Street: July 16, 1799

The change of things which has brought us back to the same hopes as at the beginning of the War, seems to have brought us likewise to the same errors. We are proceeding equally without regard to those Allies who, if not in the first instance, must in the last, be the most necessary of all: and are letting loose upon the Royalists in the Interior all those whom the successes of the Allies have set aside from combatting upon the Frontiers. The Garrisons of Turin and other places are now about to do the same thing that the Garrisons of Mayence and Valenciennes did at the beginning of the Contest. They are to be employed in Garrisoning Brest and keeping in Order the Royalists of those Provinces. Surely it is necessary that something should be done with a View to this Evil. My Idea is that, in the case of any future Prisoners taken upon Capitulation, one of the conditions should be that they should not serve, either against the Allies, or against any party in France acting in the name of Louis the XVIII.

It is perfectly possible, and most likely, that such a condition will produce no effect in the use that will be made of any Prisoners so surrendered; and that not a man the less will be employed against the Royalists. But the same may be said probably in the case of any conditions made in favor of the Allies. The chief advantage will be in the impression made upon the Royalists; and in its furnishing the most safe and possibly the most efficacious of all modes of manifesting to the well affected in France the sentiments with which the Allies are actuated.

If this opinion should be adopted, you will probably

[1] On the original letter there has been added a query as to whether this letter was not written to Lord Grenville and should not be dated September 15.

think that no time should be lost in communicating an instruction to this effect to Wickham [1] and Lord Minto and others, who may be in the way to dispose the Austrians,—for the Russians, I hope, will need no persuasion,—to adopt this measure. The want of it will produce no small degree of distrust and discouragement. It appears by accounts from all quarters that a considerable tendency to Insurrection is showing itself throughout the whole extent of the Royalist Provinces: it is certain, indeed, that it must be so.—This disposition has never ceased to exist; and, having only been kept down by the strong hand of Military force, is sure to rise the moment that pressure is removed.

Do we mean to leave this spirit wholly unassisted; and while we are seeking and relying upon insurrection every where else, to reject it in the quarter where we are sure to find it in its highest degree of Intensity, and where it can alone prove directly and completely effectual? If we do not, it is high time that means should be taken to co-operate with these dispositions: and that we should not be to seek at the moment when some successful operation on the part of the Royalists may call upon us for immediate assistance.[2]

William Windham *to* William Pitt

July 24, 1799

If the design is really and seriously entertained of directing the War to the coast of France as soon as the Allies shall have entered on the other side, it is very necessary that some preparatory measures for that purpose should be begun without loss of time. I stated once in conversation with you what I urged more at large in a letter to Lord Grenville, that the notion of keeping back the exertions of the Royalists, by leaving

[1] William Wickham (1761–1840), at this time Envoy to the Swiss Cantons and the Russian and Austrian Armies.

[2] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 193.

them without assistance or countenance, was a very mistaken one: and that the only way of preventing the Insurrection from breaking out prematurely, and of acquiring over the Royalists any useful ascendency, was to rescue them from their present state of distress and abandonment; and to give them reason to think that at a proper period you meant to espouse their Cause.

It is plain, at least, that a contrary System has not proved effectual, as the Insurrection seems to be breaking out very generally at this moment.

The Duc D'Harcourt, by the desire of Monsieur has made an application for the means to send into France most of the Chiefs who have been resident for some time here; with a view to their exerting their Influence towards stopping the Insurrection that has already in many parts begun.

If they are to be landed in the place most convenient and desireable, at least in that which they at present desire, a vessel must be ordered on purpose, or an order at least be given for taking them on board some vessel which may be going soon into the Bay.

The Question must likewise be considered whether they should go without some supply of arms and money, and whether any Language may be held to them encouraging them to hope for future assistance.

I should think that the most effectual as well as safest method for that purpose would be a Letter from Lord Grenville to Monsieur.

One measure can hardly be thought doubtful, that of putting a quantity of spare arms and powder on board of all the ships that will go out with Sir J. Warren,[1] with instructions to him to convey it into the Interior by such opportunities as shall appear to him adviseable. Precautions may be taken, if necessary, to give to this proceeding more or less of Secrecy. But at all events,

[1] Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren (1754–1822).

an order must be given; if it is meant that the Thing should be done.

From all that appears respecting the State of Things in France, as well as the probable Progress of the allied Armies, it would have been well that the present armament had in the first instance been sent to the Coast of France, rather than to Holland. I cannot but think that the moment for us to act on the Coast of France is the moment when the Allies shall enter on the other side. I do not, on reflexion, see much ground for the notion that, if the Insurrection of the Royalists should break out before the beginning of the next campaign, they will be liable to be crushed during the time that the armies of the Allies must remain to a certain degree inactive.—In the first place, the Insurrection of the Royalists will in a great measure break out in spite of every thing that can be done to prevent it. It is impossible to suppose that the Armies of the Allies can be advancing towards Lyons, and the Royalist Provinces not be thrown into a State in which their Intentions will be clearly manifested and the Directory be excited to employ against them whatever means shall be in their Power. These means will be greater if the Provinces shall be in a passive state, than if they shall have taken up Arms. The whole force of the Country will be drawn away in the shape of requisitions, and employed to fight against the Allies, instead of co-operating with them. The only possible case in which the Insurrection can be kept back and yet the means of producing it with effect not be finally lost will be, as I conceive, that in which the fears and hostility of the Directory shall be so exactly balanced as that they will be willing to leave the Provinces unmolested, sooner than drive them into immediate resistance. Even this may not be sufficient, because the Impatience and Intemperance of the Royalists may of themselves bring them forward, even tho' the Directory should attempt nothing against

them. The case in itself, however, is sufficiently unlikely,—and if at all events the Royalists are to declare themselves, then I must think that it is of the utmost consequence that we should be ready to support them. I cannot see, either, the Force of that part of the reasoning which supposes that during a part of the year the Armies must be in that state which will admit of the Directory turning their arms against the Royalists so as to disable them from any future exertions. The greater part of Suvóroff's [1] army will not have been harrassed by Service in the Field, whatever they may have been by their march, and, as to Season, it must not be forgot that a winter in the South of France must appear to a Russian something like a summer. At all events, how much of their Force can the Directory direct into the Vendée or even Brittany, with the allied army lyeing so near them as Lyons?

For these reasons I could certainly have wished that the present moment had been reserved for operations, which, if not equally certain to succeed, would, if they had succeeded, have been infinitely more effectual. If we succeed in France, Holland falls, of course; but not *vice versâ*. I question whether the Directory will make any great efforts to defend Holland; partly, to be sure, because they cannot spare the means, but partly also, as I conceive, because they will feel that it goes but a little way in the ultimate Fate of the Republick.

But this Question is decided, and the only questions which remain are, what you will do towards assisting the Royalists in the mean time, a measure equally necessary whether they shall be pushed forward by the course of events into earlier action or whether they shall be kept back till the time proposed,—and, secondly, what security you can take from yourselves that the Army once engaged in Operations in Holland and

[1] Alexander Vasilievich Suvóroff or Suwarrow (1730–1800), Russian Field-Marshal.

Flanders can be brought away to act on the Coast of France.

The assistance to the Royalists can be no other than an Increase of allowance in Money, and supplies of arms, and Powder, to be provided without loss of time and to be conveyed continually from Jersey and St. Marcon and by vessels likely to visit the Coast lower down.

On the prospect of our bringing away our Troops from the Continent, *i.e.*, from Holland or Flanders, you must allow me still to be very incredulous. It is not a matter of Resolution and Determination within ourselves, as I remember you argued and I agreed to in the case of Lord Moira's Army: when the operation is once begun, you are no longer master of its termination. I do not see the advantage either of an Incursion into Flanders; a Country is not gained for being overrun. The Troops must remain, or all that is done is of no effect. Unless the sieges of Breda, Berger, of Tours; Bois le duc, Maestricht, or whatever other Towns may be thought of, can be compleated this year, of which I cannot conceive there is any chance, there is an End of all hopes of bringing away your Troops in time for a Cooperation with Suvóroff in the ensuing campaign.

This; however, is all that remains to be attempted. A Force to be raised by the Enthusiasm of the moment, when operations in France are actually begun, must come too late. The subversion of the Republick is one of those events that must probably be accomplished *uno flatu*. Time; I think, is more against than for us.

If the Irruption of the Allies into France, which now as a military measure seems to hang upon nothing but Massena's retaining his present position, should take place this campaign; then I think the Event to be wished was that the Royalists should come forward, and that the force which we are now going to send elsewhere, should have acted on the Coast of France, as the

best chance both of preventing the Royalists from coming forward, and of enabling them to do so with the best effect, if they either will or must do so; we should in my opinion give them all the succour fairly necessary to put them in a good state of Defence: and for the rest so shape our operations on the Continent as to give us the best Hope of being able, at an early period, to draw away the whole, or a part of our Force.

[P.S.] I understand that orders have been given for some Arms, which I had applied for, for Individuals about to go to France: but what I have above mentioned relates of course to a general Supply of which one Deposit ought to be at St. Marcon, and another at Jersey.[1]

LADY SPENCER *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Wimbledon Park: July 24, 1799

By Lady Clermont I find you have a proper dread of seeing me, and your passing close by Wimbledon Park in your return to Ryegate without calling on me, is a pretty strong additional proof of this. Indeed, you are just now in the situation of a person standing on the edge of a Cold Bath, dreading the odious plunge, approaching, then retreating, then creeping nearer; at last you muster up a hearty resolution, and in you bounce, and there is an end on't. Just so are you feeling and doing by me. But come, shake hands with me, and I promise you shall find the comparison an apt one to the very end. You will find all the pleasurable feel; all the animating glow arising from the friendly greeting of a truly cordial and sincere friend, which attends the moment of shaking one's ears on getting out of the water. Now, this promise don't proceed from your letter, tho' I must confess it was a most admirable one for your purpose. Sweet, soothing and well told, and crying out *patte de Velour* in the slyest way to me—

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 195.

but the gentleness and tameness you shall find, arises wholly from what I hear of Mrs. Windham. As I am convinced it is *you* who are the lucky person, I shall have only to rejoice, which I shall do most unfeignedly, with you at your uncommon good fortune. We are on the wing for Bath. Our dear Friend has a sensation every now and then, which calls loudly for an expedition down there ;—And as we cannot hear of Nelson having taken Buonaparte for 3 weeks[1] at least, we can but go now. Lord St. Vincent's confidence on this subject is so animating, and so catching, *que je me laisse entrainer*, and I am pondering all day long on what will be the best way of conducting myself when Buonaparte is dining at my right hand. Shall I do it in a sincere and a brutal style ? or in a false and a generous one ? Adieu.[2]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

July 30, 1799

Tho' I have thought so much on the affairs of the Royalists, and have urged so strongly the necessity of affording them more effectual assistance than they have hitherto received, I am wholly at a loss when called upon to say in a specifick sum what that assistance should be. The Rule is easy, according to my views on one side " that they ought to have whatever is necessary to give to their exertions the most powerful effect," but how to give them that and no more and how to prevent what is given from being misapplied are questions which I feel it very difficult to settle.

Dutheil[3] has asked for a gross sum of £10,000 and

[1] Nelson was at that time in charge of the blockade of Egypt and Malta in the absence of Lord Keith. Bonaparte was in Egypt, but hearing of the French reverses in Europe he embarked for France on August 22.

[2] Add MSS. 37845 f. 167.

[3] Nicholas François Dutheil (1760–1822), French *émigré*

the arrears of the £1000 per month since November. It does not appear to me that the question of arrears enters much into the consideration. It is not a question of claim or engagements, but of what is necessary in the actual circumstances to render their efforts more effectual. With this view and after a long conversation with Dutheil, which has taken place since writing the above, I am inclined to sanction the application which he now makes (in lieu of the others) of £12,000, to be distributed as by the enclosed Paper No. 4, and to be expected to last till they shall give reason to think that a further advance is necessary.

It must be considered always that the account which I delivered in and which has now been liquidated was calculated only to the 1st November, '98, and that from the length of time which the parties lay out of their money, the application of it may very well in a great measure have been anticipated.

I cannot at present follow very distinctly Dutheil's Statement No. 1, but I know in general that the money proposed for them in my account, of which the last part was paid lately, was not calculated by me originally to last them longer than to the beginning of November. It seems to me that the money now asked is not more than may be conceived to be very advantageously laid out: and with a view to future issues, I should recommend our being furnished with that which Dutheil says is in the hands of Behague,[1] viz.—a detailed account of the application of the money in the Interiour, by which we shall be enabled to judge not only of the propriety of such application and of the Rate at which remittances should be continued, but of the actual state, at every moment, of the Royalist Party,—Dutheil shewed me an account

[1] Jean Pierre Antoine Comte de Behague (1748 ?–1802 ?), French General. He took an active part in organising the French Royalists from England, and in 1799 went to Brittany, prepared to take command, but, Cadoudal declining to retire in his favour, he returned to London,

sufficiently detailed between him and Behague: but what is wanted, and what he seemed a little to hang back upon was the account between Behague and the Royalists. Behague is at present at Edinburgh.

Upon the General question, I wrote to Mr. Pitt some time since, stating my apprehensions that the force with which it is proposed to cooperate with the allies, thro' the medium of the Royalists, if it should ever be applied to that purpose, will not be brought into action till too late. I had stated to him what Dutheil tells me is confirmed by letters from the different Chiefs, the impossibility of keeping back the Insurrection, after the allies shall once have entered France. Were the Royalists ever disposed to remain quiet, and to listen in that respect to the suggestions of their chiefs, the Directory will not let them. The only alternative left them, will be fighting against the Republick or fighting for it. If they do not cooperate with the allies, in the shape of Royalists, they will be compelled to act against them in the shape of Requisition then. I see no force either in the Argument that the Directory will crush the Royalists should they betray themselves too soon, in the interval during which the allies may be compelled to remain to a certain degree inactive, between the two campaigns. The Directory will at all events crush them if they can: and a state of Tranquillity is the only one in which they can effectually crush them, by drawing away the best of their force to serve in the Army. With Suvóroff near Lyons, they cannot detach Troops for that purpose—they were not able to do so even when the Seat of War was upon the Rhine, till the Austrians set their Troops at liberty by entering into an armistice.

I put the Royalist War as certain; therefore, the moment Suvóroff shall enter France, and the only question is whether we shall be ready to support it. I am afraid not, even tho' our Troops shall do no more than accomplish their business in Holland; which, if it

can be accomplished at all, will probably be a very easy task : but if we are to go afterwards into Flanders, there is an end of all hope of seeing any part of that force employed in what the allies will infallibly find the best cooperation for them, a cooperation with the Royalists in the Western Provinces. Our strength in Men and Money will in the mean while, I fear, be exhausted upon objects which will come of themselves, if operations against France are successful ; and will produce but very subordinate and insecure advantages, should those operations fail. I don't at all understand what is proposed by entering Flanders, unless it is intended that the armies should remain there, or should secure a Protection to the Country by the capture of Towns, making part of the ancient Frontier of France. In either case there must be an end of all idea of withdrawing our force to be employed in operations on the Coast.

To return now to the immediate Business. Dutheil applies, as you will see by papers No. 5 and 6, for a Vessel to take a number of Officers to the Morbihan and to have the means at the same time of landing a certain quantity of Arms and Ammunition. A Vessel, I think; cannot with any propriety be refused them, tho' I am afraid there will be a little unwillingness on the part of the Admiralty. Nor can there be any difficulty about a certain quantity of Arms and Powder.—The *Chasse Marée* may be thought to give too much notoriety to the proceeding, as her destination, if loaded at any port, can hardly be kept secret.

Yet upon the collection, if they are to go at all; the Idea of Secrecy must be pretty much given up, and in general, I believe, it will be in vain to think of assisting the Royalists and not attracting upon them the jealousy of the Directory. The security must rather be in making them speedily so strong as that the Directory will not like to begin first.

I had mentioned in my letter to Mr. Pitt that I thought

an early provision of arms ought to be made and a quantity lodged both in Jersey, St. Marcon, and on board all Vessels likely to go into the Bay. Sir J. Warren's vessels would naturally present themselves for that purpose, as also for the conveyance of the Persons mentioned in Dutheil's letter, but I understand that just at this moment, and possibly for some time, Sir J. Warren is with the Channel Fleet.

If you concur in these latter Ideas, I wish you would see to the execution of them, without which I fear nothing will be done. The *Chasse Marée* should be ordered immediately to Portsmouth or Plymouth, unless means exist for supplying her with powder where she is. Application must likewise be made to the Ordnance.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street, Westminster
August 10, 1799

You will see by the enclosed letter of Georges how urgent it is that what I mentioned in my letter the other day should be sent without delay. A M. De Châtillon, a most respectable old Royalist Officer, is happily landed in France, and will, before this time, I hope, have seen Georges : But though the accounts which he will give him will serve as an answer to part of his enquiries, they will not do much to relieve his wants. The arms have been applied for, agreeably I conceive to your directions from the Ordnance, and a Cutter and *Chasse Marée* promised by the Admiralty (I think by the way, it should be a Frigate). But you must authorize Frere[2] to follow up the Demand in both instances : and must enable him to accomplish the harder Task of obtaining from the Treasury the necessary assistance in point of Money.

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 128.

[2] John Hookham Frere (1769–1846), Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

You will see in Georges' letter a confirmation of my apprehension that the Royalists will not have an option as to the time when they must throw off the mask. I fear, if the operations in Switzerland continue to stand still, as they are oblig'd to do at present, it must happen before the Allies will have passed the Frontiers ; and long before we shall be in a state to assist them.

During the time that I was at Walmer, Mr. Pitt was talking of Officers whom he might mention to you as capable of being useful to assist the Insurgents in Brabant. I mentioned such as occurred to me upon the occasion. But I mentioned to him what I wish to repeat to you, that in my own opinion there is a great objection to our sending any officers to the Insurgents of Brabant, or giving them any encouragement to revolt, inasmuch as it will pledge us to support them, and thereby continue the effect which, I think, will be produced so much by this expedition to Holland, of withdrawing our Forces from objects that are in my opinion likely to be so much more decisive.

Though I know I contradict a favourite opinion of yours, I cannot help repeating my apprehensions that this Expedition to Holland will destroy in the bud and before it has come to its proper strength and consistency; an Army that with a little delay would have exceeded anything that we have seen since the first years of the War, and might then have been employed in a better state, if not with more effect, to the objects which have always appeared to me as the only ones which can, in this War, constitute anything like what can be called success.

Of the Troops now sent, and of those that will be sent, a great part are in a state which no Officer would describe as fit for service. On the Subject of pushing our operations into Flanders, I have already, I believe, troubled you, in part, with the objections which I feel to it. With respect to the effect which it is to have in conciliating Austria, we shall be doing, I conceive, with forty thousand

Men what may be done as well by four lines in a dispatch ; and, as a military operation, it will surely be bad economy if, to prevent the Enemy from drawing from thence ten thousand Men, either we or the Austrians are to maintain in that Country an Army of twenty or thirty. Except in one or other of these views, I do not understand in what way the possession of the Netherlands is to be of any use to us. In the mean while, the expence is enormous : and the Force and Money employed there will cripple us for any other operation. As to drawing the Troops away, if they once get entangled in these operations, I put that pretty much out of the question. My only hope from this attempt on Holland is, that the business may possibly be soon settled, and the Country put in a state to maintain itself for the present by its own Forces, and to allow of our Troops being withdrawn for other purposes.[1]

William Windham *to* William Pitt

August 14, 1799

I cannot but think that on the question that we have been discussing, the least that could be said is that the reasons are so balanced as to make it optional in which way it was decided.

There is the analogy of the Victualling Office on one side, and the clear and more appropriate instance of Gibraltar, on the other ; to which I must add that, in the distribution of services, as in the Estimates, and on other occasions, Gibraltar and Minorca have been so classed together as to be considered nearly as one object, and that, excepting Victualling, every other supply to the Army, such as Medical, Hospital and Barrack Stores, have been invariably furnished by the War Office or under its Authority.

The Publick interest in the particular instance is silent ; for it is not proposed that the contract should be made in

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 139.

a way less advantageous to the Publick, in one case than in the other.

I must confess myself wholly of opinion that, previous to the establishment of the Transport Board, the supply of Coals to Minorca would have gone, as a matter of course, in the same channel as that to Gibraltar, and considering that as the Rule to govern the present proceeding, shall be compelled to feel, should another mode be adopted, that the War Office will in my time have been stripped of a piece of Patronage, whether important or not, which did, in propriety, belong to it. I know not that there is anything further to be said. I certainly do not wish anything to be done that shall not be perfectly consistent with the Publick Interest, and with the principles on which a question of this sort ought to be decided.[1]

Lord Grenville *to* William Windham

Private *Dropmore: September* 2, 1799

When I was in town last I discussed a little with Mr. Pitt the question whether, under all the present circumstances, and with the disposition shewn in other parts of France to rise against the Directory, we were in fact doing right to persevere in the system of discouraging the insurrection in the North West Provinces. The result led, I think, to a pretty strong impression in both our minds that the time was now come when we ought, by supplying those Provinces largely with money and arms, to put them in a situation to cooperate with what is going on upon every side of France. Nothing more, however, was done than my desiring Frere to ask from Dutheil a statement of such means as might be required from us for acting on this plan. A squadron in the Bay forms, of course, an essential ingredient in it, and this I, understand,

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 189.

is agreed to at the Admiralty and on the point of being executed. Monsieur expressed to Frere, as I understand, some uneasiness lest this should interfere with our Swiss project on which he appears to have set his heart. I see no reason why it should, supposing that project to turn out to be practicable, but every fresh letter from Vienna throws us back in that business.

I do not know whether you have read Lord Minto's last dispatches. If not, pray read them. You will, I think, agree with me that the gross indecency of the conduct held to Lord Mulgrave,[1] and to the King thro' him, required that we should do and say at least as much as has been done and said on the occasion. My opinion has long been fixed that good words and liberal conduct are both thrown away on Austrian politicians, and that all our measures towards them should be regulated solely by the view of what we think best and most becoming for ourselves. Perhaps, if I had been able to act quite on my own single judgment, I should in the present case have carried the application of this principle yet further than I have done, but I cannot be surprized that those who do not keep their attention constantly and undividedly fixed on this object should be less strongly impressed than I am with the conclusion which the experience of six years has produced in my judgement on the subject.[2]

Lord Grenville *to* William Windham

Dropmore : September 5, 1799

I send you Lord Minto's last dispatches and, when you have read them, I will thank you to return them to the office. Wickham's I keep to work upon to-day, and will send them to you to-morrow or the next day at furthest.

[1] Henry Phipps, first Earl of Mulgrave (1755–1831), sent in 1799 on an abortive mission to the Archduke Charles at Zurich, to arrange concerted operations in Switzerland against the French.

[2] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 148.



J. Jackson, R.A., pinxt. *T. A. Dean, sculpt.*

WILLIAM WYNDHAM, LORD GRENVILLE

I own it seems to me that the moment is come for going much further than you propose in putting forward the Royalists. By profiting by the present pressure of the Directory, the Royalists might establish themselves in force sufficient to defy any attack from the present Government during the winter. If they do not do this, it is in vain to hope that they will be overlooked, Whenever the allied armies take their winter quarters, four or five months will be left open to the Directory for suppressing this spirit in the Vendée, &c., and they will surely do it effectually if the Royalists are not in force to support themselves.

Besides this, if we succeed in Holland we shall have a great disposable force (and possibly at no very distant period) to turn to the various operations that have been proposed. Whether these operations should point towards the Netherlands, or to any, and to what, part of France, and with what immediate object of attack, it is I conceive, now impossible to decide. I am not so wedded to my ideas of advantage in taking into our hands the arrangement of a Counter-Revolution in the Netherlands, as not to see many possible operations on the side of France to which we ought perhaps preferably to look—but if the Royalists are then still *to be* organized and raised, instead of being actually on foot, and in great force, that may decide the question for us.

I shall, however, wait, without taking further steps on this subject till I receive the plan which Dutheil is to give to Frere, and I will then state my ideas not in general, but with reference to the particular things to be done.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

September 6, 1799

Since I sent away my letter of this morning, I have seen Dutheil's plan,—the same, I believe, as you referred

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 152

to. I think it will want a good deal of correction to make it either right in itself or likely to become palatable at the Admiralty.

They will never consent to put any Naval force, in such a degree as he seems to propose, under the command of a Frenchman : nor will officers be easily found who, having the spirit and intelligence necessary for such service, will be willing to be so commanded. I am of opinion also, with all the respect I am apt to entertain for French talents and address, that, for the execution of many services and in most practical operations, there is an unhandiness about them that makes them infinitely less efficient than our people. It is that which keeps them below us—and I hope will long continue to do—in all the practical parts of Naval Service, and serves to counterbalance great advantages which they seem to possess in many of the higher parts of the Profession.

I am persuaded, therefore, that the only way will be to take such officers of our own as shall be well affected to the Service, and not ill-disposed towards the French, and to leave to them to take such Frenchmen on board, Officers or Men, as shall be recommended to them, and as they shall themselves find upon trial to be useful and agreeable to them. A Council of French Officers, with even the semblance of authority, will produce such disgust and confusion as will prevent anything from going as it ought to do.

I much doubt also the utility of this new communication to be established under M. de la Balpierre. M. de la Balpierre is a man of merit and consideration in many respects, but a bit of an *Intriguant*—so much so that, in compliment to those who were employed by Monsieur in the management of these concerns, he was struck off some time since from an allowance of 4 or 5 shillings a day, which he had from the fund of £400 per Month, which you left at my disposal. His object was to supplant the Prince de Bouillon ; and I cannot but think that before

this establishment is commenced, under his separate direction, and at the expence proposed—viz. of £450 per month, independent of other expences—it would be better to try first the addition of such a naval force as is talked of,—merely to act in concert, under an intelligent officer, with that now employed by the Prince de Bouillon.

At all events, I fear the plan of Dutheil is calculated to give to the Frenchmen too much an air of authority to make the Service go on well with our people; and that the establishment of the *Dragons Legers* will give a sort of *Eclat* to the business, more than will be compensated by the addition made to the supply of arms beyond that of the ordinary conveyance.

Till I saw my way further in this, my advice would be to do nothing more than reinforce the means now at the disposal of the Prince de Bouillon, in the manner I have proposed, viz., by allotting a small force to act in concert with him.

[P.S.] I sent Lord Minto's dispatches back the evening I received them: But I am afraid, from Frere's being gone from the office, they were not forwarded to you, as I had intended.

From these dispatches added to those of Wickham, I cannot but recur to suspicions which I have long been tempted to entertain, that Thugut[1] is, somehow or another, upon a footing of understanding with the Directory, and engages to spare the Republick, upon condition of being allowed to preserve his own power, and to satisfy, it may be, an imagined duty, by promoting Austrian interests. He certainly has shewn, as I recollect, at all times, but particularly during this campaign, a great unwillingness to push matters to extremity with them.[2]

[1] Johann Amadeus Francis de Paula, Baron Thugut (1736–1818), Austrian diplomatist and Chancellor, a bitter enemy of the French Revolution. After the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden, December 3, 1800, he retired from public life.

[2] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 154.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street, Westminster
September 6, 1799

It does not appear to me that we disagree much in our ideas respecting the Royalists. I am decidedly of opinion for getting them as early as possible into a state to be ready for action: and I do not apprehend that you would wish them to act, if it can possibly be avoided, till the moment comes of general cooperation. One of my motives, among others, for wishing them to be early prepared, is that they may avoid, if possible, being forced into action before the proper time comes, whatever that may be.

In my interview with Behague yesterday, he shew'd me a large collection of materials, drawn out in a very beautiful manner, and affording a good specimen of French industry and love of embellishment: but I think not much of it very useful. His plans are too vast, and sacrifice too much to regularity. He will allow of no advantage to be derived from the Royalists, unless they are incorporated in a regular Army, and ready to perform their part in a general operation of marching to Paris; whereas it appears to me that a great deal will be done if we deprive the Directory of the use of those Provinces, either as a source of Supply, and still more as a Country in which they can station Troops, otherwise than in large bodies; in this way, besides other advantages, they will serve as a medium of connection between the allied Armies and any troops that we may be able to send in on this side. The operations will certainly unite much more readily if the country interposed is in a state of Royalist insurrection, than if it was to remain at the disposition of the Republick.

An argument at all events for getting these provinces as speedily as possible into a state of defence, is the danger to be apprehended from this dreadful law

respecting the relations of Emigrants. By a letter which Boterel shew'd me yesterday from Brittany of the 22 August, they are already beginning to act upon that law; and the consequence must be that the country, if the Directory persists, must either resist, or lose all its means of resistance; for it is not any prudence or forbearance on the part of the Royalists, that will save them from this dreadful scourge; as it is suspected that the Government even employs people to commit excesses, for the purpose of furnishing a pretext for the enforcing the law in question.

Nothing, therefore, remains for us, but to begin systematically and in earnest, a plan for supplying the Royalists; of which, as I observed in my last letter, Money is not the most urgent part. Arms is the most difficult, and requires to be first attended to. Money to any considerable amount need only be ready against it is wanted; but for both objects you must set your shoulder strongly to the wheel; otherwise we shall be still in that state which you describe, and which I have so often deprecated, of having to look for our means, when the moment is arrived for action.

While these preparations are going on, it will be well to bear in mind the possible necessity of measures of greater extent and difficulty which may be required, should Austria persist in its present Counsels, and either desert the Coalition altogether, or act in a way to afford no assistance towards the real and proper object of the War. I dread the existence of such a case, and feel but little confidence in all that Russia and England can do, though applied in the best manner, and combined with all the discontents of the Interior of France, should Austria have either made its Peace, or wholly withdraw the cooperation of its Armies, for the purpose, I mean, of making any impression on France. Still the thing must be tried; and would become indeed the more necessary, as peace, could any one desire it, would be less possible to be had.

Of course little can be said or thought of, till it shall be seen what shape things are likely to take. But I confess I hardly see the possibility of a plan which I have heard started, and which I should be glad to think practicable, of transferring the whole of Suvóroff's Army to act with us on this side of France. With all the expectation that I have allowed myself to entertain of Cooperation from the discontents of France, and the resources of the Royalist provinces, I feel great distrust, putting other difficulties out of the question, of the possibility of succeeding by operation on this side of France alone, without the aid of an Army on the opposite Frontier. Circumstances, however, may render even that plan practicable, and it is certainly right to be prepared for the possible necessity of having recourse to it.

With respect to operations now going on, I cannot but think that, if we succeed this year in driving the Enemy across the Waal, an event which I should hope might both happen, and happen very speedily, that we had better bound our prospects there, or at all events to what may be done this season : and having establish'd a Government in Holland, such as may maintain itself against any opposition in the Country itself, depend, for the defence of it against external force, on finding for France sufficient employment elsewhere. I should say in general that, if no force could be sent against Holland from France, the Stadtholder's government might stand without the Fortresses : If France was at liberty and disposed to act, the Fortresses could not protect it. I should much doubt whether there was any probable case between.

I shall endeavour to see Dutheil, and learn how far his plan differs from Behague's : So far as Behague indeed can be said to make a regular proposal of any plan. I shall be happy to learn your ideas upon the whole.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 158.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street, Westminster
September 18, 1799

Whatever our views are respecting the Royalists, all proceedings about them must be at a stand, if some new powers are not given to the Ordnance to procure a supply of Arms, of which the amount disposable at present, and for a long while to come, is limited to 10,000. Something must be done also to quicken the zeal of the Admiralty, who refuse to send any Vessel to the Morbihan, upon the ground of danger to be apprehended from the French fleet, "The Sluggard saith there is a Lion in the way." I have not talked again to Lord Spencer, who is gone for a few days to St. Albans. But if such objections are accepted, it will be in vain to hope that any thing can be done. The case of the Ordnance is, as Lord Howe explain'd to me yesterday, that the effect of the deficiency left by the Duke of Richmond [1] still continues to be felt, and that, with all their hands employ'd, they do not expect to get, for a long while, of serviceable arms, more than is necessary to supply the home demand: that, of consequence, the only method is to purchase foreign Arms, which are easily to be had, should they be authorized to send any one to Hamburgh for that purpose. Sir J. Crauford has, I understand, written to say that he has had offers to the same effect, but the most regular way would be, I apprehend, to send some officer on the part of the Ordnance, as was done a year or two ago.

The desperate course already begun by the Court of Vienna, with all the suspicions belonging to it, puts one upon the necessity of new plans and expedients, and calls up the question which I have hitherto hardly been willing to take into contemplation, of what it may be possible

[1] Charles Lennox, third Duke of Richmond and Lennox (1735–1806), had been Master of the Ordnance, except for an interval of a few months in 1783, from 1782 until 1795.

to do by the force of the discontents in the Interior, with the aid only of England and Russia. Many points must, to be sure, be previously settled; viz. the extent to which we will suffer ourselves to be engaged by operations in Holland and in Flanders, and the security that we can have of the continuance of a force even upon the Frontiers of France, so as to prevent the Directory from making any large detachment from the regular armies now employ'd there. If regrets were of any avail, I should now regret the time which we have lost in putting the Royalists into that state of defence which, on every supposition, is agreed to be necessary: and which I fear they will hardly attain, before the Directory, whether it may be desireable or not, will compel them to act.

There seem to be two distinct systems that may be followed for the employment of the Forces existing in the Royalist Provinces: either the Inhabitants may be considered as a mere body of Insurgents, rendering the Country in which they are, useless and difficult to the Directory, and facilitating the operations of regular Armies that may enter France from without, in which case little more would be necessary than to supply them with Arms and such means of Money as might answer occasional and incidental purposes; or they may be considered as a body of People, capable of themselves of furnishing a regular army, and fit to be treated by this Country on the same footing in respect to expence as any power which we might subsidise.

I have never considered them in this way in any thing that I have said upon the subject, because I never saw any prospect of their being so considered by others and was too happy to get such little assistance as might prevent the Cause from absolutely falling to the ground, and the Individuals from perishing. But it is a way in which they may very properly be looked at; and all the Representations that I have heard, from Puisaye's time down to the present, give me reason to think that such a

view of the subject, should we adopt it, or should be driven into it, will not be found to deceive us.

There are certainly many Points of the Coast,—Le Goulet, the Cotentin, a point not far from Brest, &c., of which, with an Army of 20,000 Men, we might be sure to get possession, and in which we might be sure to cover ourselves with an Army of 20 or 30,000 more, before the Enemy could bring any considerable force to act against us. Recollect that at Quiberon the Troops were on shore for eight days before any Enemy whatever appeared : and that the whole collected at last, in circumstances more favourable to the Directory than the present, was only 10,000. I can hardly entertain a doubt that a landing of 20,000 English and Russians, with a *proper Proclamation* and a French Prince, would throw the whole of the West of France into Insurrection ; and give more soldiers than you could know what to do with. Out of these it would not take long to select an army of 20 or 30,000, useful, serviceable, and capable of immediate operations.

I am not checked in this Hope by any slowness of Co-operation that may as yet have appeared in Holland : besides that as yet the question has not by any means been tried. The Dutch are a people from whom the same alacrity is not to be expected. It will be as much as we can fairly look to, if they should declare in our Favor as soon as our superiority shall be clearly ascertained. Whatever is looked to, either as an object purely of Hope, or as connected with any thing that we are to do, it seems to be agreed that the first step to be taken is to supply the Royalists with what is necessary for their defence : and this, as you will perceive, cannot be done unless Measures are taken for providing a supply of Foreign Arms. One word more upon a subject not immediately connected with the above, but very much so in my opinion with the credit and character of the Country.

The Foreign Regiments now in our Service, viz. Marle-

mart, Castries and La Chatre, after having escaped a danger, with which I fear they were threatened, of being stripped of all their Germans in order to recruit the new Battalion of the 60th lately given to Brownrigg [1] (I state the fact not upon any certain authority), are to be sent as I hear to join the Duke of York in Holland ; if this is so, and the Duke, as I likewise hear, means to employ these Troops upon the outposts,—a situation at once implying the greatest Trust, and exposing them to the greatest danger —do we mean to leave them in a State of not being protected by the Laws of War, but to be liable, in case of falling into the Enemy's hands, to be put to death as Rebels ? It seems to me that our having done so heretofore has left no small Reproach upon the Country, which, I hope you will agree with me, ought as much as possible to be done away, by a change of our practice in that respect in future.

[P.S.] Will you send back to the office, as soon as you have done with them, the last dispatches from Lord Minto and from Switzerland. I cannot but think that, with the recall of Lord Minto, the threat should be held out to Vienna of an appeal upon their conduct to all Europe. Surely the grossness of the Falsehood respecting the Causes that compelled, as they said, the evacuation of Switzerland, and the Flagitiousness of the Measure itself, will bring a degree of reproach upon Mr. Nugent which he will not care to face. At all events, the character of Government, good or bad, forms in the present times above all others a great part of their strength or weakness ; and ours can never appear to so much advantage as when set off on the dark background of Austria. The Exposure will deprive Austria, in the last extremity, of some of the means of Mischief, and give to us and Russia some additional means of doing good ! [2]

[1] Colonel Robert Brownrigg (1758–1833), afterwards General Sir Robert Brownrigg, Bart.

[2] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 160.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* HENRY DUNDAS

Park Street: October 2, 1799

With a view to such a supply of Arms and Ammunition as it is now proposed to send to the Royalists, the most effectual course would certainly be to establish a cruizing Squadron, such as has long been talked of, consisting of one or two Ships of the line, besides Frigates, under the command of Sir John Warren.

These ships should be furnished each with a certain quantity (as much as they could stow with perfect convenience) of Spare Arms and Ammunitions, and with instructions to make the Conveyance of these into the Country one of the Objects of their Cruise. A permission, in fact, to Sir John Warren would be all that is necessary. His Zeal would do the rest.

A *Chasse Marée* or two, out of the five we have here, should likewise be attach'd to this Squadron, not only for the purpose of carrying what might not so conveniently be received on board the Ships, but with a view to facilitate the general Service when the Ships approach'd the Coast. It would be right, therefore, that all the *Chasse Marées*, or as many as were worth it, should be put in repair, and such additional hands as were wanted beyond what still remained of their Crews, be supplied from some of the following description of people.

Either from persons who might be brought from time to time from the Coast, and who would be glad to escape in that way from the Requisitions, or from being forced on board the Fleet, or 2^{dy} from some of those now enrolled as Soldiers at the Depôt in the Isle of Wight, or lastly from approved persons among the Prisoners, supposing no danger to exist (as none certainly ought to exist) of a dispute in consequence with the French Commissary.

A Carronade or two, or some other Guns included in the

fitting of the *Chasse Marées*, would add both to their security and utility.

When the Vessels were thus prepared, they should be sent in succession to Portsmouth, where alone, as I understand, the Ordinance can make it convenient to load them, and from thence to be ordered to Plymouth or Falmouth, there to wait the opportunity of Convoy, or the return of the Squadron to which they were attach'd.

Gun-boats have been pointed out as likely to prove useful in landing the Stores, and would probably be found to be so; but I doubt whether any of our Gun-boats sail sufficiently well to be otherwise than an incumbrance to the Squadron when at Sea.

Should it be found advisable, some time hence, to establish a Block House on the Islands of Houat or Hedic, it may then not be inexpedient to have a Gun-boat or two constantly station'd there. The Expense of the Establishment, in point of pay, of a *Chasse Marée*, upon the footing now proposed, you will see by the paper No. 1. inclosed herewith. What I had suggested, and had conceived to be long since adopted, was that they should be taken up by the Navy Board upon Terms not exceeding what is given to other Vessels.

By the Paper No. 2. it would seem that this plan had been adopted, but had ceased afterwards to be acted upon.

No. 3. 4. 5. 6 contain particulars connected with the present Object, but upon which no observation need be made.

The appointing a Cruizing Squadron such as above described, whose principle Rendezvous should be the Bay of Quiberon.

The taking the *Chasse Marées*, with their Crews, into the Service of Government, and the providing Deposits of Arms and Stores at Portsmouth or elsewhere, from which they may be supplied as fast as they shall have found means to land their cargoes: These are the principal

points in a permanent plan for supplying the Royalists on that part of the Coast, which is to the South of the Peninsular of Brest. What is wanted immediately is a Vessel to Convoy down to the Bay of Quiberon, and that part of the Coast called the Morbihan the vessels that are already loaded and whose speedy arrival (in consequence of what had previously been determined on) has been already notified. The Officer who is to have the command is to be instructed to concert with some confidential person, who will go with him, the best means of communicating with the People on the Coast, and of landing his Cargo on the Islands of Houat and Hedic, and to conceal it till an opportunity shall occur of taking it off: or, what is more likely, they may be obliged to request that the Ships should return again after an interval of a certain number of days.

As soon as our fleet is off Brest (should it be thought imprudent to risk any vessels there before) there can certainly be no difficulty in executing the service required. It is to be hoped only that an officer shall be appointed well affected to the Service, and who will not be inclined to create Difficulties either in consequence of a general dislike of the French, or because the Service is not to produce him either Honour or profit.

Nothing further upon the Subject occurs to me at this moment. Should the Success in landing the first Cargoes invite to the Sending of articles of greater Bulk, a Vessel of larger Dimensions than a *Chasse Marée* may become Necessary. One sees what the advantage is of having Cruizers on that part of the Coast, by the very instance of the Capture mentioned in the paper No. 3.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* HENRY DUNDAS

Park Street, Westminster: November 29, 1799

Though it is very probable that this news about Quimper may come to nothing, that the Event may

[1] Add. MSS. 37878 f. 181

either not have taken place or be confined to the release of a few friends of the Royalists who were in Custody there (for I doubt whether all our prisoners had not been before removed), yet it will be wise for us to act as if the news were true ; particularly in respect to measures of more preparations, such as are attended with no expense or risk ; and, if not wanted for this occasion, may be useful on various others, liable at any moment to arise.

Should Quimper actually be in the hands of the Royalists, an opportunity would immediately present itself of communicating with them from the Fleet, and either furnishing them with Succours, such as a Fleet always has it in its power to supply, or of carrying off whatever Stores, and Vessels may happen to be found in the Port.

The latter object, if it should exist, Lord Bridport would perhaps not be inattentive to, unless the general horror in which he holds the Royalists and all their Concerns, should make him even abstain from an object liable to be in some degree advantageous to himself. The other, nothing would induce him to lend himself to, unless express orders for the purpose should be given from hence.

But even in the business of taking possession of any Vessels, which the effect of operations in the Interior should on this or any other occasion put into his hands, Instructions are very necessary, and perhaps more so than in any other case : as by any error of conduct here, not only great advantages may be lost, but the foundations laid for great and lasting evils. It is of the utmost consequence that whatever is done in concert with the Royalists, involving in it the Capture of Vessels, or the destruction of any part of the Naval force of the Country, should be constructed upon the most correct principles, and removed to the utmost distance from any possibility of suspicion.

It is on this side that all their jealousies are awake

and with great reason : For nothing certainly can be more narrow and illiberal, than the feelings which we are apt to have upon that Subject. There cannot be a doubt that, if Lord Bridport should get possession of any Vessels, or have access to Arsenels, belonging to the Enemy, though owing his success wholly to means furnished him by the Royalists, he would have no other idea than that of securing the Vessels as prizes, and disposing of the Stores, considered as Enemy's property, without the least reference to the wishes or wants of his allies.

It is very necessary that provision should be made against the effect of this disposition ; should a case arise (as it may do any moment) when his opinions and feelings in this respect would be put to the test. He should be informed, I think, to what degree assistance to the Royalists enters into the views of Government at this moment, and that as far as was consistant with the safety of the Fleet, and the general purposes of his Cruize, he should contribute to promote the same object ; either by protecting the Frigates now employed in carrying stores to the Morbihan, or by any other means which chance might cause to arise. It would then, I believe, be right to instruct him that any vessel, either taken in a French Port of which the Royalists were in possession, or delivered into his hands by anything like Coöperation from them, or, lastly, offered by the Crew upon those terms, should be taken possession of in the name of the King of France, and be made to hoist its flag accordingly. —If this is not done, the greatest mischiefs will be liable to happen ; and infallibly it will not be done, if express Instructions are not given.—It will never do to wait till the case happens : a month may elapse before the account can be received and an answer sent ; and surely after what we have even lately seen, no one can say what may happen the next moment. *Should* the Royalists be able to go on, nothing is more likely than that they may get possession of L'Orient, and the case will then arise, both

in which the presence of our Fleet will be wanted, and in which they will require to be guided by Instructions such as those which I am wishing you to consider.

Since I began this letter, I have received one from Captain Keats [1] dated on the 23rd off the Isle of [*illegible*] ; he had been in the Bay on the 20th, and was to return to land his Stores on the 28th.—You will see, by what he says, that he is not a Man to give hastily into the belief of things which he wishes to be true : Some Suspicions he has conceived, I hope beyond what the facts require. The cutter to which he alludes had reached the Island on the 11th.—To obviate the effects which Georges apprehends from the offers likely to be made by the Consuls, and which we know in fact from the French papers to be intended ; Monsieur has sent lately a Man of discretion and confidence to whom the Admiralty gave a cutter, and who before this must have set sail. I shall be glad to hear of the Stores being safely landed.[2]

William Windham *to* Lord Minto

October 29, 1799

I am sorry to find that a long letter, which I wrote to you the other day, and which I meant for the present conveyance, has by mistake been sent by the post. Should any one happen to remark that it came from one making a part of what is called the Cabinet, and chuse in consequence to know the contents, they will find, I hope, no secrets of state, but several matters intended only for the perusal of the person to whom the letter was addressed.

I add a word or two now, on the subject of the dispatches, which you will receive at the same time with this.

I cannot say that I declared a decided opinion against

[1] Captain, afterwards Sir, Richard Goodwin Keats (1757–1834).
[2] Add. MSS. 37878 f. 247.

the measures about to be adopted. With the degree of consideration which I had been able to give to the question at the time when a meeting was held upon it, my opinion was in fact not very fully decided. Even now I feel a considerable degree of doubt. But in thinking the matter over, during the two days that have elapsed since the decision was taken, with the addition of some few lights that have been thrown upon it within that time, the Inclination of my mind clearly is not to make the violent effort now proposed, but rather to lye, for the present, upon our oars, waiting the Course of events, and reserving our strength and means for an occasion when they may be exerted with more advantage and with better prospect of success.

The general conception is certainly right, and in perfect conformity to what I have always been contending for, that, if the Republick is ever to be overturned, it must be by a great effort, founded on the coöperation of armies acting from opposite sides of France, and aided by a great insurrection from within. It is professed (I know not with what sincerity) that due weight will be given to this latter part of the plan, viz. that of bringing forward the Royalists. But I fear the former part, or the action of armies from without, cannot be had at the present moment, and in the way in which it is now proposed to be obtained ; and therefore I am unwilling that an effort, which may probably be our last, and which, if it fails, may leave us perfect Bankrupts in mind; if not in money, should be made, when the chances of success seem to me to be so strongly against us. I am sorry, too, that, without a very certain prospect of advantage, so great and so dangerous a sacrifice should be made of the principles that ought to govern the Allies in the present contest, as that which we are about to incur, for the sake of obtaining a more sincere and hearty cooperation from the Court at which you are residing. What this sacrifice will procure with respect to the

immediate object to which it is directed is, I presume, in the greatest degree doubtful. But the great and certain failure of the general plan must arise, I apprehend, from the impossibility of collecting an army equal in numbers to that which is stated as necessary, and from the fact, now I fear but too well established, that such an army, even if it were collected, would be very far from giving the sort of force, which its numbers would seem to indicate. Nothing seems to be better ascertained than that a Russian army, formed as it now is, is not adequate to the task which this plan would assign to it :—That it is not fit, in fact, to be left to act alone, in the presence of a French army of at all equal force.

However difficult, therefore, to say what turn things would take, if we were to withdraw ourselves, for the time, from any forward measures on the Continent, and, throwing ourselves into a state merely defensive, were to husband our exertions for a future period, I cannot but think that such a course of proceeding would be better than to throw away our last stake, involving no small loss of character, on an effort so little promising as that which is now proposed.

Would Austria, if we were to subsidize the thirty thousand Russians, that may now, I suppose, be brought together, consent to add to them such a force of its own, as might make the whole adequate to the defence or recovery of Switzerland, and to put the whole under the conduct of Suvóroff? Would the Emperor of Russia consent to leave his Troops to act in conjunction with the Austrians, though Suvóroff were withdrawn? This latter I should not think likely. In the case of Austria being left entirely to herself, to what degree could she make head against France : and on what terms is it likely that she would be disposed to make peace? Is it likely that, if tolerably successful, or not pressed by great reverses, she would make peace on any terms short of the recovery of Switzerland, either to her own dominion,

or to something like a state of independence? If she should be able to succeed in Switzerland, or find herself capable of contending on tolerably equal terms with France, is it not possible that she might be tempted to go on, for the attainment of the favourite object of Piedmont? During all this time, the existence of an army in this country, placed in a way to menace the coasts of France, and such as we have never yet seen, both in numbers and discipline, would of itself operate as a more powerful diversion than any that the allied powers have derived from all the operations in which our Armies have been employed and consumed, during any preceding part of the War. I should like exceedingly to have your ideas upon all these points, not only on account of the advantages which you may have of judging of them in your present position, but in the same way in which I should be glad of your counsels on any matter of doubt and difficulty, as this is, in circumstances where the opportunities of judging were to be the same. It is uncomfortable that I have hardly any one here with whom I can at once communicate freely, and who has views of the subject, with respect to what is to be wished, that are in perfect conformity to my own.

Though the subject is too large to be well discussed by letter, even if you had time for it, and though so much of the question must be decided before I can hear even of your receipt of this, yet I should be glad, whenever a moment of leisure occurs, to know your opinions on those points, which may enter into the consideration of questions connected with this subject, and which you may not care to state so explicitly in a dispatch.

I must not add anything at present, even though I were aware of any particulars, publick or private, which I might suppose you glad to hear, as both the time presses for sending away my letter, and neither my eyes nor my candle are likely to hold out longer than to enable me to seal and direct it.

November 2. By a very foolish inattention I have let Captain Forster go without my letter. I send this to Yarmouth in the hope of overtaking him. The reason of my omission has been the state of occupation which I have been in, both as to time and thought, in consequence of this Insurrection which has broke out among the Royalists of the West.

You will not suppose that I have promoted it or that it is conformable to my views and wishes. So much otherwise, that I should be glad, at no small sacrifice, to put an end to it; and I have, in consequence, with some small risk of diminishing that hope of success, whatever it may be, that may arise from despair, written to the principal among the Chiefs, hinting the necessity under which they may find themselves of seeking safety rather from treaty or submission, than from resistance.

In the mean time, it is some consolation that those who have the direction of affairs in their hands are fully bent upon giving to the Insurrection, now that it has once taken place, every support that we possibly can. It would be shocking to tell you what the obstructions are which have been made to those remonstrances, which for months past I have never failed to make, for furnishing those supplies to these people, which would rather have restrained than hastened the explosion, and the want of which may now, by possibility, make the whole difference between success and failure.

I wrote yesterday to Lord Grenville, suggesting that, as a forlorn hope, some use might be made of this at Vienna, and, with that view, it might be well to mark to them the light in which we viewed it, and the efforts which we mean to make for its support.

In the present state of things, desperate as it appears to be, from the dispatches from you, &c., which we have just received, there is something, however, which might, if any thing could, determine them to a course which might perhaps at any time have been the best of all,

I mean that of recalling the French from their enterprizes in Italy and Switzerland, in which they can hardly be resisted now by a force directly opposed, by an irruption made into the Body of France itself from the Eastern Bank of the Rhine, in the neighbourhood of Spires and Worms. An Officer of high rank and Estimation in the French service, and well known at Vienna, has a plan for that purpose, and I have suggested to Pitt the propriety of trying at least what its effect might be, if sent at this moment to Vienna.

I meant at the same time that I wrote to you to have written likewise to Lord Mulgrave, a long dispatch from whom I have been reading this morning, with mixed Sensations of pleasure and of Pain. Pray make my remembrances to him.[1]

William Windham *to* William Pitt

Park Street, Westminster
October 30, 1799

Would it not be possible to supply the loss of the Five Thousand Pound in Dollars, intended to have been sent from London, by empowering Captain Keats to take a corresponding number of chests from on board the two late Prizes ? A sum of Money thrown in at this moment, when we are sure there is a good application, may decide the fate of the operations in that Quarter. I should say that a sum far exceeding the five thousand Pounds which it was proposed to add to the 5000*l.* already ordered, should be left to Captain Keats' direction. For God's sake, let us at length exert ourselves to support these People, who, very contrary to other promised Insurgents, rise first, and trust to support afterwards.

We have refused them assistance for years; upon the Plea that assistance was useless, for they were not in force ever to venture to shew themselves. They now do

[1] Add. MSS. 37852 f. 282

shew themselves, and what shall be said if we refuse or neglect to support them? I tremble for the Event, but do not let it be said to be our fault. Delay is Destruction. The Crisis is such that we must count by Hours. Remember that the first great effort of the Royalists for co-operation with this Country in their march to Grenville, was lost by a delay of not more than three Days: and the arrival of the reinforcement at Quiberon, by which the whole of that disaster might have been prevented, by a period still less.

There are Demurs about Arms; because we cannot afford to send them any but foreign Arms:—I wish you to consider in what hands twenty thousand stand of Arms can at this moment be so important as in those, who are to determine whether the Royalist War is to subsist or not in the Western Provinces of France.[1]

William Pitt *to* William Windham

Downing Street: November 1, 1799

I have seen Crewe from the Ordnance. We have settled to send immediately twenty Thousand Arms from the Tower in addition to seven Thousand in Store at Portsmouth; and there is a good prospect of collecting speedily some Thousand more both of Foreign Arms and of those returned from the Militia.[2]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

Park Street, Westminster
November 3, 1799

Bad as the present state of things is, it furnishes no reason for relaxing our endeavours, nor (with respect to operations more immediately dependent on us) for changing their direction. The Royalists, however culpable or unfortunate for having begun so suddenly and

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 208. [2] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 210.

prematurely ; however doomed, I fear, to ultimate and perhaps speedy ruin, must yet be supported to the utmost of our power, and, if we would give to our efforts a chance of success, be supported with all possible promptness and alacrity. The least difference of success or failure in the outset may change the whole face of their affairs and nothing is more obvious than that such success or failure may depend upon the arrival, sooner or later, of a Cargo, or even upon a letter, satisfying them to what extent they may depend upon us, and what measures they may take in consequence.

I allude here particularly to the determination to be taken and the power to be given to them in consequence of trying the effect upon the Republican army of taking into pay those who should join the Royal Standard. *Without* some impressions of that sort, it is difficult to conceive how they should succeed : *with* such an impression, operating even to no great extent, there is no saying what effects may not be produced. The whole tenor of the information which I have at all times received, join'd to opinions and facts occurring in the last communications, strongly favour the belief of the possibility of such an impression : especially if the trial should be made before any reverses have check'd the confidence that might be entertained of the final success of their cause.

With the concurrence of Mr. Pitt, I have thrown out, in a letter to one of the Chiefs, what may encourage them to take that step within moderate bounds, should the necessity of their affairs drive them to the expedient, and the advantages of it appear likely to be important and decisive.—In fact, it is one of those measures which can hardly operate further than as its operations must be wish'd. If it should produce great expence, it must produce proportionate advantage. If I had been writing for myself, I should certainly have made my encouragement much more explicit.

Unfortunately, this indirect permission, whatever operation it may have, is lying at present on board Captain Keats at Portsmouth, and may not reach them, I know not when. It is melancholy to think that nearly the first evidence of our good will, the first sign of life that they will receive from us, will not come till three weeks or a month perhaps after they have been in full insurrection. It is the more necessary that all possible activity should now be used and the evidences of our intentions be the most speedy and decisive.

Mr. Pitt mentioned your idea of recommending Monsieur to repair to Jersey. I doubt only from the consideration of its quickening the exertions of the Directory, before the Royalists shall have got sufficient consistency: yet the effect of such a proclamation as was proposed, I understand, at the same time, may be look'd to as very considerable; and if the proclamation is to be issued there seems to be an end to the objections which might otherwise be felt to placing Monsieur at Jersey. I am to see him to-morrow, and, without directly making the proposal, will endeavour to learn what his own ideas and feelings upon the subject are.

What I had in view principally, in beginning this letter, was to state some ideas growing out of conversations which I have had lately with de la Rosière. By the way, having come over here for the purpose of attending Monsieur, when there was a question of his going to Switzerland, he would be much obliged to you, in case his presence here should be further desired, to say a word to Mr. Walpole,[1] by which he might stand excused to the Government in Portugal.

Combining what I collected of his opinions with such as one may form for oneself, it seems as if the course of events between this and the next campaign (supposing

[1] The Hon. Robert Walpole (1736–1810), a clerk in the Privy Council, afterwards Envoy-Extraordinary and Minister-Plenipotentiary to Portugal.

H. Danloux, pinxt. *P. Audinet, sculpt.*

MONSIEUR CHARLES PHILIPPE,
AFTERWARDS CHARLES X OF FRANCE

that there is to be another campaign,—on the part I mean of the Austrians) would of itself necessarily place the Austrians in that position in which there would be the best chance of making them fall in with our views in the prosecution of the War.

If the Austrians should be unable to make peace, which I cannot but think is likely to be the case; and the French should make a Winter campaign, which, in the event of War continuing, may still more be relied on; the part in which, according to Rosière's opinion, the French ought to make their Irruption is low down upon the Rhine between Coblentz and Mayence. Now this is near the part where, according to the plan which Rosière would form for the new Campaign, the allied Armies ought to enter France; which he thinks ought to be a little above Mayence, by Spires, Worms and Mannheim.

His general plan of campaign rests upon what seems to me the only rational basis, namely, that of standing on the defensive with respect to all distant possessions, and directing all offensive operations against the body of France itself; aided by a Civil War, to be raised where the materials for it shall be found most abundant, and most capable of being used to advantage. In this instance his defensive operations would be in Italy, in the Black Forest and in the Grisons; while his offensive operations, being in fact the only efficacious defence, should be an irruption into France in the quarter above mentioned, aided by a civil war within.

Surely if such a general plan were well pressed upon the Austrians, particularly after they may have been beaten into a temper somewhat more tractable, by their experience during the course of the Winter, the obvious truth of its principles may produce its effect upon their minds, more especially if this Royalist War should be capable of being maintain'd, and they should be taught practically its value by the necessity of looking often to

its assistance. I cannot but think, therefore, that good might arise if, by some contrivance, Rosière might be sent to Vienna to explain and enforce his own plan. I don't recollect for certain whether, at the time it was intended he should go, his journey was put off from any considerations that would create an obstacle to his being listen'd to at present. His name stands high in Europe, and his authority upon a subject of this sort can hardly fail to make some impression. There may be the further recommendation to his plans that it so far agrees with the favourite Project at Vienna as that it brings the chief of their force low down upon the Rhine.

To return to the insurrection in Brittany, everything must depend upon the vigour and promptness of our exertions; it is a state of things that cannot brook the delays of official or diplomatick proceedings; it is a military operation, the fate of which hangs upon hours.

Dutheil inform'd me to-day that, by intercepted accounts from the Agents of the Directory, the Situation of Normandy was such, the temper of the people so strongly Royalist, and the difficulty so great of paying the Republican Troops, that in their opinion, should the Royalists be supplied with Arms and Money, the Province must be lost: He wish'd, therefore, above all things that money should be sent to St. Marcon; but alas! no money is to be had: the Dollars (except those brought in with the Spanish prizes) are all gone to Hamburgh. Surely now is a time when we might have recourse to the measure which I wish'd for long ago, of coining louis at Birmingham. Between Louis XVI and Louis XVIII there can never be any difficulty of evading the law, if there could ever have been any uneasiness on that score, and the apprehension is not now, I conceive, in force, about sending coin out of the Country. At all events, if from any overstrain'd scruple, from any remissness or want of attention, we suffer this insurrection to fall to the ground, when it might by any means have been sup-

ported, there will be no end to our remorse, any more than to the reproach, which must justly attach upon our conduct. Arrangements have, I understand, been made for appointing Cruizing Squadrons; but according to the best judgement I can form, subject of course even in my own mind to further information, the Service will never be properly carried on nor the full benefit be felt of our Naval superiority, till Quiberon is made a Station for the fleet.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* WILLIAM PITT

Park Street: November 18, 1799

It is certainly very right that, upon a question such as that which may soon arise, no decision should be taken hastily, nor without allowing a careful consideration to objections the most repugnant to our wishes and first impressions. But after all that is done, I cannot see any difficulty in rejecting flatly and at once any overtures that may be made in the present moment. It seems to me that there would be ridicule as well as danger in adopting any other course. For some time to come—I should say for a long time—a Government such as the present, dropt from the clouds, or rather starting from underneath the ground, is in no state to offer anything. It cannot answer for its own existence for the next four and twenty hours. Its propositions, for some time to come, should be treated, in my opinion, as something hardly deserving a serious answer; and such, I am persuaded, will be the publick opinion, if we do not leave it to be formed, not by chance, but by something a great deal worse, by the language of those whose business it is to mislead it.

There are certainly occasions on which it may be convenient to wait, and see what course publick opinion will take, when left to itself. It may be a good way, where

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 172.

publick opinion, whether right or wrong, is all that need be cared about, and in the case of a measure indifferent in itself, and having little in view but the popularity of those who may be concerned in it. But it seems to me a most fatal mode of proceeding, in cases where great national interests are at stake : and in which the country claims, I think as a sort of right, to be instructed by those whom it trusts with the management of its affairs. I have always thought that we have followed this course a great deal too much, and that, in consequence of so doing, we have been governing the country, not by our own, nor by the genuine opinions of the country itself, but by the opinions of our Enemies. If both parties would agree to stand fairly aloof, and leave the country to settle its own opinions there might be something said for this mode of proceeding : though I think then, not much : but as it is, however we may hold off, the other side will not ; and the opinions which the country will adopt will be those of the *Morning Chronicle* and the friends of opposition.

As yet even the *Morning Chronicle* does not seem to venture to talk of the usurpation as anything which they conceive the present Government of this Country can be expected to listen to ; they take it for granted that this cannot be consider'd as coming under the description of Governments which we have declared we are ready to treat with ; don't let us be the persons to encourage by our language or our silence a contrary expectation.

One thing surely it would be right to do. Instantly to back our last dispatches by assurances to Austria that no overtures will be listen'd to by us, till we know the result of these communications to them : and in general that we are not disposed to desert the cause if they are not.

Upon the subject of assisting the commotions within; now of all others is the moment when the defections of the Army, the only measure which affords much chance for the Royalists, can be tried with the best hope of success.

I have taken upon me, for want of a better authority, to concert with Nepean [1] for the sending £10,000 more in dollars, in addition to £5000 hitherto sent to the Prince de Bouillon. But some more certain and safe means must be resorted to of supplying them with money, such as a power to them to draw for the pay of all men whom they shew themselves to have under Arms, to a certain amount, suppose 50,000; leaving the extraordinary to be supplied by themselves out of the property which they will get possession of, and contributions which they may raise among themselves.

In the mean while, thought must be had of making the aid of the Fleet subservient to this great purpose, and of preparing the Army for opportunities that may speedily and suddenly open themselves.

I am sorry to find that the placing the Russians at Jersey has already had the effect which I apprehended, and has occasioned the marching into that neighbourhood of part of the Army of Holland.[2]

William Windham *to* Henry Dundas

Park Street, Westminster
November 23, 1799

It was on the 1st or 2nd of October that I wrote to you stating as part of the plans for furnishing succours to the Royalists, that Stores should be sent from Portsmouth to Falmouth, there to form a depot for the supply of the Vessels that should be sent from time to time to the Coast of France. It was some time before the end of the Month that, upon the suggestion of Captain Keats, I proposed that instead of putting the Stores on board the Frigates, which could receive but a small quantity, or into *Chasse Marées*, which would greatly retard the Sailing of the Squadrons, they should be placed on board a

[1] Evan, afterwards Sir Evan, Nepean (1751–1822), Secretary of the Admiralty.

[2] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 216.

Troop Ship, which would be able at once to contain a large quantity, would keep way with the Squadron, and would add to its apparent strength.

You will be sorry to hear that, though we are now on the 23rd November, and though circumstances have happened to render this service so infinitely more pressing and important, no vessel of the description above mentioned is yet appointed.

I do not know that this is the fault of any one, it certainly does not arise from any want of zeal in Nepean ; but I mention the circumstances to show how impossible it is that this service should go on as it ought, if some person, having more power than myself, will not superintend, and interest himself in the execution.

Keats, after all the delays which he has experienced from Weather, and other causes, appears to have sailed finally from Torbay on the 15th Inst. From letters received by a Cutter, that had in the mean while been sent from Plymouth, there is reason to think that he will not be detained on the Coast, that He may therefore be expected back immediately, or even to be already arrived, and that the account he will bring is that the Royalists are at this moment in a state to receive whatever should be sent them.

What a vexatious circumstance it will be, if for want of more activity in making these arrangements, he should not have a single musquet to carry them ; and that, if a westerly wind should set in, such as happened to Keats, when he was about to sail, he should be kept in the same unprovided state for about three weeks.

Consider what the supply of twenty or thirty Stand of Arms may be at this moment ; and what the difference that may be made by a delay of three weeks, or even of ten days : less circumstances than these have determined the fate of battles, and of Wars : and there certainly never was a Crisis, in which time may fairly be presumed to be of more consequence.

I am as little sanguine as most people can be as to the hope that the Royalists will ultimately be able to maintain themselves. But the more or less probability is not in question. We must do all we can; we may see in the present events, what the importance is of being prepared, and what the chances that may fall to those who put themselves in a way to profit by them. Who could have foreseen, that such a Revolution as the present would have come to aid the hopes of what may arise from intestine commotions in France?

[P.S.] The Admiralty is, I believe, now doing what they can to prepare a Vessel of the Sort required. The evil is that the business was not better look'd after from the beginning. We must hope that no inconvenience will arise from it.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* CAPTAIN LUKIN

Park Street, Westminster
December 30, 1799

I send down by this post a letter to General Georges; which, if it should not go with the Admiralty orders, I may perhaps enclose to you. At any rate, it must be considered as one of the letters making part of the object of the mission, and which the Commander must take charge of. I have mentioned in it what may serve as an introduction, should you happen to fall in his way. Don't venture too far on shore, or get yourself into any scrape. Georges is a plain farmer-like man, and very much of that class. He is such a figure as you might see at an audit, but very intelligent and much to be relied on in all ways. The second in command, too, Mercier, is a very excellent, modest young man. They are both well acquainted with Park Street. I don't know whether Captain Keats thinks less favourably of Châtillon. He is not very wise; but as fine, brave, honourable a chevalier as ever was.

[1] Add. MSS. 37878 f. 239.

To save Nepean trouble, I enclose my letter to General Georges to you ; you will take care that it is understood to be a public letter. You will explain also to Captain Legge that Prégent, mentioned in his instructions, will not be sent this time ; but that he will find nearly as good an assistant in M. Penhonet ; and though no order can be sent for Madame Penhonet, I hope your gallantry amongst you will not leave her behind. You may get her, if she is a pretty woman, to teach you French.

Farewell ! Write to me as often as anything occurs.[1]

George Canning *to* William Windham

Downing Street : December 31, 1799

I think I shall hardly feel inclined to move further to-night from dinner here than home to bed ; having travelled *all last night*,—not from choice, as you may suppose, but from not being able to get a bed on the road, I am now so tired that nothing less interesting than the First Consul's Sentimental Letter could keep me awake.

Pray tell Mrs. Crewe that I mean to call on her to-morrow.

I like the tone of every thing that I hear to-day, better than I ever did before. And I am persuaded that the whole game is in our hands now, and that it wants little more than *patience* to play it *well, to the end.*

[1] Windham's "Diary," p. 419.

CHAPTER VII

1800

Sir Edward Pellew : Quiberon Bay : Belle-Isle : Windham offered the position of Treasurer of the Navy : Death of Mrs. Foy : Windham at Bath : Death of Mrs. Coke, of Holkham : Abandonment of the Attack on Belle-Isle : Windham makes the acquaintance of William Cobbett : Windham commanded to Weymouth by the King : The King desires an alteration in the Ministry : He hints to Windham that he would be willing to accept him as First Lord of the Treasury : Windham does not encourage this scheme : The aspect of affairs : Windham complains to Pitt of the interference of the Treasury officials in a matter concerning his department.

PITT'S hopes depended largely upon the French Royalists and the Austrians; but the diplomacy of Bonaparte detached the one and his strategy defeated the other, so that England found herself isolated. Marengo had left Austria beaten. Hohenlinden crushed her, and she was forced to break her treaty with England and make a separate peace with France. Though holding a subordinate position, Windham had won the respect of all who knew him, and no one held him in higher esteem than the King, who, at one time during this year, would gladly have accepted him as Prime Minister.

CAPTAIN LUKIN *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

H.M.S. Thames, Quiberon Bay
January 19, 1800

We sailed from Falmouth on Monday morning last under Sir Edward Pellew[1] in the *Impétueuse* with the

[1] Admiral Sir Edward Pellew (1757–1833), afterwards first Viscount Exmouth.

Cambrian Captain Legge, *Shannon* Captain Porter, *Thames*, and *Adventure* armed with stores and arrived here on Friday Evening. We found riding here Keats with his Squadron : the Ships which compose it you know. I have been only once on board Sir Edward Pellew, where I met Keats. He was so much taken up in making arrangements that I could gather but little from him. You will, by the same vessel that conveys this, receive an official dispatch. I know that the Stores that were in the *Sheerness* are all landed, that Georges (I think Georges) had been on board the *Boadicea*, and that the Squadron had received Fresh Beef once from the Royalists. I got all this in loose conversation only, having had no opportunity of seeing any body owing to its having blown so hard since we arrived as to prevent communication. Penhonet and his Wife came over very comfortably with Legge, who, in his Gallantry, after having been shown that part of your letter, would not give them up to me.—It is quite a shame and reflection upon us Naval men, that we have not made more use of this fine Bay, nothing certainly can be said against it, I am somewhat surprised that the French have not in some degree fortified Houat, which would make the riding here more unpleasant, but certainly would not be of any real inconvenience, which they perceiving are willing to avoid the expense. I shall write you a full account when anything occurs. I have not yet been able to get on shore at Houat.

[P.S.] I have had a little conversation with Sir Edward Pellew since I wrote the first part of my letter. The great fear certainly is that the immense temptations which they are holding out to the Royalists will induce them to conclude a Peace which I am afraid some of the chiefs have an inclination to do. I hope they will remain firm as in justice to England they ought. Mercier [1] has received so many arms and stores that he is rather against

[1] Mercier, a Royalist leader, called "La Vendée," died 1800.

receiving more, as he cannot spare men to escort them to the interior, and Generals of other districts are some of them displeased at his having all the arms, or at least more than they think he ought to have. How can these little jealousies be got the better of ? [1]

CAPTAIN LUKIN *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Plymouth Dock : February 7, 1800

It was so late last night before I reached the shore and I was so busied in getting the ship in all the day that I had not time to write to you to tell you of our return, and of Sir Edward Pellew's having left Quiberon. We have been able, since I have been there, to make no landing. This has been owing to the Republicans having much strengthen'd themselves in the neighbourhood of the Morbihan, and from poor Georges' situation having become so exceedingly critical from the conduct of the other Chiefs, who have absolutely made Peace. This I could hardly bring myself to believe, but Maitland sent Loureux to headquarters, who returned with this intelligence official. Lt. Loureux is unable to explain, or account for, this conduct on the part of Châtillon and D'Aubichamp. He says that the people yet will not lay down their arms, that the spirit exists in its full force, but that it now will be reduced to the old *Chouanry*, as he calls it. Again, whatever might have induced the leaders of this party to make a peace, the name of which is as strong a mark as possible of their growing power and of the fears of Bonaparte, yet I cannot forgive them for having made it without consulting Georges, or at least having an eye to his safety in the treaty. I must fear that he will fall under the pressure of the whole republican force in his district, and that they will wreak their vengeance upon him, and extirpate him. This apparent unfortunate turn of affairs prevented me putting my

[1] Add. MSS. 37912 f. 220.

plan into execution of going to see him which I had in some degree arranged with a man called Jean Maré, a chief of a division under Mercier, However, before it coud be put in execution, they were obliged to go further into the Country, and indeed the risk became too great. I have been reconnoitring Belle-Isle with General Maitland, and I will give you my opinion upon the best mode of attack as far as relates to the navy. I should like to be employed upon that Service, tho' I am too young an officer to have any considerable management in the descent, and I do not think there will be much to execute.[1]

WILLIAM PITT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Private *Downing Street: April* 24, 1800

The King having approved of Mr. Dundas being appointed to the office of Keeper of the Privy Seal of Scotland, he will in consequence resign that of Treasurer of the Navy. I do not know whether you would on the whole prefer the latter situation to that which you now hold; but as it is certainly in some respects more desirable, and is from Practice equally fit to be held with a Seat in the Cabinet, I have thought it right to lay the Circumstance before you for your decision, in preference to any other arrangement which may come under Consideration. Tho' it is probably not a very material Point, I ought to add that, as it would be a considerable Inconvenience to Mr. Dundas to remove from the House in Somerset Place, it is proposed that in future it should be considered as annexed to the office of First Commissioner of India, instead of that of Treasurer of the Navy.

CAPTAIN LUKIN *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

After February, 1800

General Maitland will have told you that I was ordered with him to reconnoitre Belle-Isle. This could not wholly

[1] Add. MSS. 37912 f. 222.

be kept a Secret, from the necessity of producing plans, etc., upon the quarter deck; but everything has been done to do away with the idea of our intended descent, and I think it appears to be pretty well blown over here. If the attempt is to be made according to General Maitland's plans it should be kept the most profound Secret; The first part of the plan is to encamp the necessary number of Men upon Hedic and Houat, the Soil of which Islands is dry, and they are large enough to contain the necessary number, which should be sent in divisions, not all at once; it will then require Twelve cutters, and Luggers, Ten arm'd Transports, and Twenty flat Boats; and if the Brest Fleet is completely taken care of, Six Frigates will be sufficient; or at most a Line Battle Ship, and three or four according to the Enemy's force, at L'Orient and Rochefort. The Bay of Sarzeau is thus the place intended for the principal attack. It is situated one mile from the N. point of the Island on the East Side, and is nine miles from Quiberon Bay going through the Bénéjacq or Teignance, both of which are good passages. In the Bay of Sarzeau there is a small Creek runs up, in which, when we were there, there were a Ship and two Sloops, which grounded every tide. It is [fortified] by two guns upon a high point upon the North side the entrance, and three guns upon a lower point on the other side. On board the 12 Cutters or Luggers (each with a flat boat and a Man of War's six oar'd boat in Tow) should be embarked one thousand sturdy good troops, which should proceed just at dark on the Evening of the day fix'd for the purpose towards Sarzeau, where when arrived just so as not to be discovered from the Bay, they should be put into the boats, and 500 of them be immediately landed; the remaining 500, divided into two partys, should be push'd on Shore in two little Bays not a quarter of a Mile from Sarzeau, and each party following the small gully or Ravine, of which the Island is full, would meet upon the heights and form; the land is of a moderate

elevation and is what Sailors call Table Land, it is about the height of Cromer light. At the exact time that the landing is made at Sarzeau, all the Men of War, as many of the transports as could be spared, with some gun boats (which I forgot to mention) should appear off the S.E. part of the Island, where the landing was effected last time, commence a vigourous cannonade and make an apparent attempt to land. This last detachment should weigh from under Hedic at the same time that the other detachment weighed from the other part of Quiberon ; the first to go through the Bénéjacq or Teignance, the latter thro' the town, which would make the distances to their respective places of destination exactly the same and requiring the same time. They could not, therefore, fail of acting at the same moment, if required. The party landing at Sarzeau and the other Bays, should use no powder whatever till daylight.

I much question whether the two Guns upon the two points at the entrance, could be brought to hit the breach. However, if they could, and if they discovered your coming time enough to beat to Arms etc., you would not get above one discharge before you would be on Shore, and out of their reach. There appears to be no Wall or Breast Work, so that you could scarcely fail of making a secure landing, with little or no loss. At the earliest dawn of day the Transports left under a discreet officer in Quiberon Bay are to push out to land all the remaining troops in the Bays mentioned, of which we should have thus possession before there could be a possibility of their getting Troops round from Palais, four Miles off, to dislodge us. The Enemy would not move anything, of course, till daylight, untill she found out which was the real and most serious point of attack, and in which they would most likely be deceived if the Feint was well made. Palais is afterwards reduceable by Calculations as to the time, force etc. to Engineers.

[P.S.] I am of opinion that the Island cannot be

attacked by day with nearly the same prospect of Success; you must have so much apparatus and give the Enemy such full time to collect their force at the point you meant to make the landing, which could not be hid; then the Bays in themselves are to be defended with the greatest ease, being most of them deep Avenues; so that a field piece at the head and a very few Men, would make a landing impracticable; the Enemy could not be driven from the Shore by Frigates or Gun Boats; The Island in 61 was in fact taken by Beauclerc's Grenadiers; Two hundred of whom got on Shore in a little obscure way by themselves, and kept possession of it some hours before they were assisted.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* CAPTAIN LUKIN

Pall Mall: May 31, 1800

Sad, sad news, my dear William, I have to send you, not of a public, but of a private nature, and such as will try your spirits, and afflict your kind heart, more than anything that has yet befallen you. Your poor sister Mary[2]—never will you see her more!—never more will she welcome your return, rejoice in your success, and gladden the hearts of us all by her gay and amiable manners, and by her kind and virtuous affections! After a long and bad labour, which ended in the death of the child, and after fostering our hopes for some days by an appearance of doing well, she failed all at once, and has left us nothing but to lament the breach thus made in the happiness of the family, to follow her with our regrets, and to console ourselves with the reflection, that she has escaped at least from all the ills of life, and partakes of all the hopes which Revelation holds out to those who do not renounce them by the wickedness of their lives, and by the abdication of all desire and

[1] Add. MSS. 37912 f. 237.

[2] Mary, eldest daughter of the Dean of Wells and Mrs. Lukin, had married a Mr. Foy.

endeavour to recommend themselves to the Divine Mercy.

Your brothers George and Robert, who are in town, and have heard from me, and in part by a letter from Foy, this dreadful news, are preparing to go to your mother at Bath, where she has at least had the consolation of attending Mary in her last moments.

Your father, who, upon the strength of the good accounts which we had received, went down to Rochford, will learn the account from me to-day ; and will fortunately be in the situation where he can be most useful in concerting with Mr. Wright, how he shall break the news to Kitty, and how he shall best console her under the affliction which, I fear, will not fail to shock her very much. Mrs. Windham and I intend to set out to-morrow morning to join your mother at Bath. There is fortunately an adjournement of parliament, which will enable me to go without difficulty ; and Mrs. Windham, as you will imagine, is clearly on the side of our going. What a different visit from what it would have been had poor Mary been there ! What a loss to the future happiness of Felbrigg !

I must not pursue these reflections, nor encourage you to pursue them too much, lest they should relax your ardour in the active service in which you may soon be employed. I almost tremble now at what I have been endeavouring to secure to you relative to the object about which Lord Spencer has written, at my request, to Lord St. Vincent. I could at this moment almost be glad if the application should fail ; but we must go our course, and leave the event to Providence.

God bless you, my dear William. You will give some tears to poor Mary, as I do ; but you must wipe them away, and preserve only an affectionate and tender remembrance of her. *That* she deserved from you, and from all connected with her. Mrs. Windham, if she knew of my writing, would, I am sure, desire her most cordial

and kind remembrances. Let us hear from you whenever you can write. Your mother will be very anxious to hear, as well as yours ever.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

Bath : June 3, 1800

You know probably the melancholy business that has brought us hither. This very morning I have been employed in performing the last sad duties to the memory of poor dear Mrs. Foy, and conveying her remains to the grave. You know, in general, that I had a very lively regard for her. I really loved her as a daughter and not every father has had a daughter attached to him so much, as I believe she was to me. You were not acquainted with all her merits, nor with many captivating parts of understanding and manner that only developed themselves upon nearer and longer acquaintance. Her death has thrown a shade over many parts in the prospects of life that were before full of brightness and hope. As if all was to be melancholy upon our arrival here, the answer I received upon a message sent to enquire after Mrs. Coke,[2] was that she had died a few hours before. I do not mention this loss as coming in competition with the other ; but it involves in it much that one had been in the habit of contemplating with satisfaction, and from which, at different times, part of my own happiness had been derived. Our stay here cannot be long—I fear not longer than Friday or Saturday. There is business in the House which it is necessary that I should attend. I could otherwise spend a week or more here with great satisfaction, with great pleasure indeed, but for the melancholy which the occasion of our coming throws over all one's thoughts. Bath has a charm to me which

[1] Amyot, " Memoir of Windham," pp. 166–8.

[2] Jane (1753–1800), youngest daughter of James Lenox Dutton and sister of the first Baron Sherborne, was the first wife of Thomas William Coke of Holkham, created in 1837 Earl of Leicester.

owes nothing to its condition as a publick place and to which the company, in fact, would be a hindrance. I like the place itself, the idea which it inspires and the recollections which it recalls. It is accordingly on that account, as well as from the greater beauty of the scenery and the greater facility of enjoying it, infinitely pleasanter to one in summer than in winter.

Mrs. Windham is better for the journey, though worse for the strong regret she feels for Mary, whom she was very fond of, and the sympathy which she has for the loss of Mrs. Lukin, who, however, from the extreme anxiety that she had felt about Mrs. Foy, while her fate was in suspense, finds herself now in a state of repose, that, aided by her own strength of mind and habits of piety, enables her to come to the aid of poor Mr. Foy, who, having suffered himself to be before more sanguine, is more struck down with the blow now that it has happened. His conduct has very much confirmed the opinion that we had before conceived of him, and embittered the sense one has of the happiness that he and Mrs. Foy might have enjoyed together. Farewell ![1]

William Windham *to* Earl Spencer

June 25, 1800

I hear that the proverb is verified, that misfortunes do do not come single, and that you have received some bad news at the Admiralty. I conclude it is of the failure of the attempt under Maitland.[2] Will you have the goodness to let me have a line? One is so "supped full of horrors," that a little more or less, bating the loss of individuals, cannot make much difference. I could have wished, however, that we had happened to have stood

[1] The Crewe Papers: Windham Section, p. 48 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

[2] The abandonment of an attack, by Sir Thomas Maitland, on Belle-Isle, occasioned by reports of the great strength of the garrison.

clear of this blast, except by the share we must have in its consequences.

It was at this time that Windham made personal acquaintance with William Cobbett, who, in July, had returned to England from the United States, where, under the name of "Peter Porcupine," he had made a great reputation as a political pamphleteer. Shortly after Cobbett's arrival, Windham invited him to a dinner, on August 7, at which, according to the statesman's Diary, the other guests were Hammond, Canning, Frere, Malone, Pitt, George Ellis, and Stratford Canning.[1] This was the beginning of a political intimacy between Windham and Cobbett, which lasted for some years.

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

St. James' Street: August 1800

Your favour of the 1st instant was not received till late on Saturday evening, or I should sooner have returned you my thanks, and have expressed to you the pleasure with which I accept of your invitation. As my first wish ever has been to merit the commendations of men distinguished for their wisdom and loyalty, for their unshaken attachment to ancient establishments and their unequivocal abhorrence of innovation, I need not say how great is the satisfaction I feel at hearing that my humble efforts are honoured with your admiration.[2]

Windham and his wife were commanded by the King to Weymouth in the middle of August, and there his Majesty had some conversations on political matters with him and Lord Malmesbury, the subject of which only

[1] Afterwards first Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.
[2] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 1.

became definitely known when the Diaries of the latter were published posthumously in 1844.

Extract from Lord Malmesbury's Diary

I was told this evening by Pelham that his Majesty had for a long time been dissatisfied with Pitt's, and particularly with Lord Grenville's, "authoritative manners" towards him, and that an alteration of his Ministry had been often in his mind; that it was with this view he had sent for Windham and myself in August last, to Weymouth; that he meant Windham should be his First Minister, and I have the Seals for the Foreign Department. The ill-success of the Austrians,[1] the proposals brought forward by Pitt, through Otto,[2] perplexed the King, and diverted his attention from his purpose; and Windham also, by his odd and unacquiescent manner, did not encourage his Majesty in his views.[3]

William Windham *to* The Hon. Mrs. Byng

Weymouth: August 22, 1800

Here we are breakfasting at the hotel, and looking out upon the beach where you used to figure, if I mistake not, attended by your Major Yorke and other gallants. Poor Malone, too, who by an unfortunate Irish stare, not at all belonging to his character, lost the favour of a woman who might have made him happy, and probably herself too. We came here on Monday from Wilton, where we stayed a day, and where we found Lord and Lady Bath. The Malmesburys proceeded hither the day after our arrival; and are now gone from here. Our stay is uncertain, owing partly to Cecy's being such a favourite with both Queen and Princesses, that she cannot be parted with, and partly to her having had an attack here of a

[1] Bonaparte had defeated them at Marengo June 14.

[2] Louis Guillaume Otto, Comte de Mosloy (1754–1817), French diplomatist.

[3] Malmesbury, "Diary," iv. 23.

complaint that has been very prevalent, and which has withdrawn her for these two days from all that has been going forward. She is getting well, however, as I should be glad to hear that you are. Your accounts of yourself having for some time past made us both uncomfortable, pray let us know more about you.

Farewell ; I would have written you a long letter if the time would have admitted it.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

Richmond : November 16, 1800

. . . The aspect of affairs is not good ; but there does not appear any immediate prospect of peace (the Blessings of Peace), and that being the case, there is still hope. In war a thousand things may happen, but peace once made, the power of Buonaparte seems certainly fixed, and I know not then how we are to escape. Everything is, however, very bad. One Emperor mad, another weak and pusillanimous. The King of Prussia, governed by narrow, selfish, and short-sighted counsels : no vigour, no energy, no greatness of plan but in the French, and they accordingly govern everything. Nothing is so clear to me, as that a small portion of the soul of Mr. Burke, infused into the counsels of countries, and, among others, of our own, would have rescued the world from this dreadful state long ago.

The deficiency of crops and the consequent scarcity is a most unfortunate business, but rendered much more so by the foolish, intemperate, and highly culpable language talked early in the year by Lord Kenyon.[2] There never was such a state of things. Half the army is employed at this moment in suppressing tumults excited by the judges. They were perfect missionaries of sedition, and, by their foolish good intentions, have done more harm

[1] Windham's "Diary," p. 431.

[2] Lloyd Kenyon, first Baron Kenyon (1732–1802), had succeeded Lord Mansfield in 1788 as Lord Chief Justice of England.

and contributed more to the real service of Jacobinism than twice the number of agents of the corresponding society could have done. I suspect my Lord Kenyon, however, to have been quickened very much in his zeal for the publishing the opinions in question, by the knowledge that they were diametrically opposite to those avowed at all times, and enforced on many occasions in a very marked manner by Mr. Burke.

You are very good in excusing that part of our silence which took place at Weymouth. Though there was much from there that I wished often to write to you about, because I thought that you would like to hear of royal tittle-tattle, yet the life we lived made it almost impossible. You cannot conceive anything so strange and so unsuited, as it would seem, both to me and Mrs. Windham ; yet, we really did not dislike it ; the extreme graciousness of the King and Queen, and the extraordinary amiableness of all the Princesses, made everything but the hurry of it uncommonly pleasing, and has given me an interest about them that marks our visit there as an epoch in one's life. It was not for want of thinking of you—if you could suspect such a thing—that I did not write, for in my rides with His Majesty we had a great deal of conversation about you.[1]

William Windham *to* William Pitt

Park Street, Westminster
December 13, 1800

I have had occasion more than once to remark to you the inconveniences that arise from the irregular and very unceremonious way which the Treasury sometimes has of stepping into different Departments without any previous notice, publick or private, to those who are at the head of them. A very signal instance has happened

[1] The Crewe Papers : Windham Section, p. 51 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

lately, in the case of a man of the name of *Cobb*,[1] who has been writing to everybody for a long while past, stating either directly, or by implication, a charge against me, as having protected a person who, as he says, was guilty of a breach of Contract in the supply of beer to Barracks at Yarmouth.

Whether the letters of this man to the Treasury contain the same mention of me by name as most of those which he has written to other people (some of which, if I mistake not, you have seen) is more than I know: But at all events they contain a charge against a Department which is placed immediately under the Superintendance of the War Office; the charge proceeds from a person who is directly of my appointment; and the object of it, when it comes to be at all intelligible, must be seen to be nothing else than an accusation of me.

In these circumstances the course taken by the Treasury is to require from the Barrack Master General a report of the proceedings: in order that they may be laid before the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, and an opinion formed whether a prosecution ought to be commenced against the person so stated to have been guilty of a breach of contract, I having already given an opinion, though that may not be known, as the question was never asked, that no such reference to the Attorney and Solicitor Generals was necessary.

You will immediately, therefore, perceive that the substance of this proceeding on the part of the Treasury is neither more nor less than an enquiry to be carried on between them, the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, and the Barrack-Department, as to the propriety of my conduct; and for the purpose of ascertaining whether an abuse, falling officially under my cognizance, has been acted upon by me in the way in which it ought to have been.

The first impression under such circumstances would

[1] For Cobb, *see* Windham's letter, March 28, 1797

certainly be to say that I would not suffer myself for an instant to be made the subject of such an inquiry : that the Treasury might, if they thought it proper and fitting so to do, demand explanations of *me*, but that in point of mere official right. However difficult it may be to define precisely such rights, particularly in the case of a jurisdiction so extensive as that of the Treasury, they were wholly unauthorised in proceeding as they had done, in passing me by, and requiring explanations from a person who, in the first instance, ought to consider me as the Authority to whom his report was to be made. In point of propriety the matter admits of no dispute : nothing can be so clear, as that the only proper and decent mode of proceeding would be to apply to the person at the Head of the Department, by whom the affair was cognizable in the first instance, by whom it probably had been considered, and to know from him what had been done upon it : To proceed in any other way is to put such person in the Situation of a Culprit ; and of such a Situation or of anything that has the semblance of it, as I have not been much accustom'd to it, you may easily suppose that I do not feel very patient.

The thing, however, is done ; and this being so, the only course which it seems proper for me to take, is not only to consent, but to require, and claim that the inquiry should now go its full length, and that when General Delancey shall have made his report, which I shall forthwith desire him to do, the same shall be submitted to the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, and their opinion taken upon it.

I cannot think that I have either formed an incorrect view of this Transaction or that, having this view, any terms in which I could speak of it, would be considered as too strong.

I am perfectly willing to hope that it never appeared to you in the light in which I think you must now see it ; it is possible that you may even have acted in this

from motives of intended kindness : But, however that be, it was quite necessary that I should speak my own sentiments about it ; and I am the rather inclined to do so, as deriving from thence a striking proof of the inconveniences which arise from this course of proceeding on the part of the Treasury, to which I have before alluded, and on which as you know I have already had occasion to trouble you in more than one instance.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37842 f. 244.

SECTION V

IN OPPOSITION. 1801–1804

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IN OPPOSITION. 1801–1804

CHAPTER I

1801

The King refuses to sanction the introduction of a measure of Catholic Reform : Pitt thereupon resigns : The King expresses his regret at the loss of Windham's services : Windham's work at the War Office : Addington Prime Minister : The other members of the new Ministry : Charles Philip Yorke succeeds Windham as Secretary-at-War : Preliminaries of Peace : Windham's protest : Cobbett's indignation about the Peace : Windham definitely disassociates himself from Addington : The King disapproves of the terms of the Peace : The debate on the Peace in the House of Commons : Windham makes a great speech on this occasion : Windham and Dr. Laurence assist Cobbett to start *The Political Register.*

WHEN in February 1801 the King refused to sanction the introduction of a measure of Catholic Emancipation, Pitt at once tendered his resignation, and with him retired the Lord Chancellor (Loughborough), Lord Grenville, Lord Spencer, Dundas, and Windham. Pitt consented, however, to remain in office until supplies were voted.

GEORGE III. *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Queen's House: February 9, 1801

However the King may feel hurt at losing so valuable a Man as Mr. Windham from His Service, He cannot but admit that He believes it arises from the purest

intentions, though He may not think them well founded; and, as the former ought first to be looked at, He certainly with great truth assures Mr. Windham that his Retiring shall in no ways diminish in His Majesty the real value He entertains for the upright Character Mr. Windham has ever borne.

GEORGE R.[1]

Windham had done good work at the War Office, where he had devoted much energy to improving the service conditions for the private soldier. He had (as is shown by this Correspondence) differed from some of his colleagues on questions of Foreign policy, though the divergence of views was never so great as to compel him to resign. One of his main objects was the restoration of the House of Bourbon to the throne of France, and to achieve this he was prepared to make heavy sacrifices of men and money. His belief that the Royalists should be subsidised and created into a striking force was sound in theory; that it did not work in practice was due, in the first place, to the fact that he was hampered in obtaining the necessary supplies; and, in the second, to the supineness of those whom he desired to aid.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Park Street, Westminster
February 15, 1801

I don't know whether I expressed with sufficient clearness yesterday the state of my opinion on the two points which made the principal subject of our discussion.

I would forego all the advantages that may be hoped

[1] Add. MSS. 37842 f. 5.

from establishing again a good understanding with Russia, sooner than engage in a negociation so framed as that it must in the end necessarily lead to the surrender of Malta; supposing the French to be expelled from Egypt, and that the Maritime rights of this Country are secured.

And in the case of Denmark, I would acquiesce (if better could not be had) in a positive treaty, form'd of course with all the precision and solemnity that words could give it, for securing to our Fleet a free egress out of the Baltick, without exacting from them (if they much resisted it) the condition of disarming.[1]

Lord Minto *to* William Windham

Vienna: March 6, 1801

I have a very foul conscience with you, but I must not attempt to clean that Augean Stable to-day. In two words, I adhere most heartily and unreservedly to those who have resigned on Catholick Emancipation; and I only wish to be amongst you as soon as possible. I fear, however, there may be a good deal of delay in my return, for I cannot quit my post till I am actually relieved. I have heard nothing distinct on the ground of your late transactions; but I understand in general that you go out on the Catholick question, which is enough to decide me, independent of my personal preference of the men. I am always happy to find myself by your side. I have conceived, on very certain grounds, a very high opinion and esteem for Lord Grenville, and I have long look'd on Pitt as the Atlas of our reeling Globe. I have written somewhat more fully to Lord Grenville and I propose to write a line to Mr. Pitt by next opportunity. Pray shew this line to Elliot.[2]

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 186.

[2] Add. MSS. 37852 f. 304.

On March 14 Addington succeeded Pitt as Prime Minister. The Duke of Portland remained at the Home Office, Lord Eldon became Lord Chancellor, Lord Hawkesbury went to the Foreign Office, and Lord Hobart to the War Office. Lord Westmorland became Lord Privy Seal, Lord St. Vincent First Lord of the Admiralty, and Lord Chatham was appointed in June Master of the Ordnance.

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

March 15, 1801

I am very sorry to say that there is an end of any hope that the Resignations may be recalled, by Pitt's having actually resigned the Exchequer Seal and its having been *given* to Addington—by whom the King's Commands have been signified to me that a Warrant should be prepared for a new Patent for the Board of Treasury. The King has also sent me to-night Yorke's[1] appointment to the War Office, which I shall return to-morrow countersigned. I understood from Dundas that he only wanted to give up the Seals for the decision of the House of Commons upon Lord Hawkesbury's capacity to sit as a third Secretary of State, and that *that* was to take place to-morrow.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* HENRY ADDINGTON

October 1, 1801

I must not omit to thank you for your note, however dreadful the intelligence which it contains.[3]

[1] Charles Philip Yorke (1764–1834), appointed Secretary-at-War in succession to Windham.

[2] Add. MSS. 37845 f. 94.

[3] This intelligence was that the preliminary articles of the Treaty of Amiens between Great Britain, Holland, France, and Spain had been on that day signed in London by Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto on the part of England and of France.

I can have no idea of the measure in question but as the commencement of a career which, by an easy descent, and step by step, but at no very distant period, will conduct the country to a situation where, when it looks at last for its independence, it will find that it is already gone. I have no idea how the effect of this measure is ever to be recover'd; Chance may do much, but, according to any conception I can form, the Country has received its death blow.

You will perceive that I lay but little stress on what may be the particular terms: In fact, with my view of the subject, I am hardly a fit depository of what you have obligingly offer'd to communicate. I ought not to know what is not known very generally.

I lament that you should have been reserved for the instrument of this work.[1]

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Pall Mall: October 7, 1801

From the despair, into which I and my friend Gifford were plunged by the Peace, and by the base disposition which appeared in all ranks of people on Saturday last, I have been, in some measure, recovered by a very favourable change, which has appeared within these three days. Before you read this letter, you will have read the *Porcupine*[1] of Monday. The article therein contained, on the Peace, produced a very great effect as far as it went, and its circulation was very wide indeed. Three or four hundred papers were called for after all the impression was sold off; and, though the same article was widely distributed through the *Heart of Oak* of the same evening, it was thought necessary to republish it yesterday (Tuesday), when, notwithstanding the impression was much above the usual

[1] Add. MSS. 37880 f. 171.

[2] The *Porcupine* was a short-lived newspaper, founded and edited by Cobbett.

number printed, the papers were all sold off, and others still called for. With the article before you, and with these facts, you will be able to judge of the opinions of thinking people on this dangerous measure. I have spoken with many persons, merchants, planters, and gentlemen, and I find the peace, as a matter of *terms* in particular, universally condemned. Even the delirium of the multitude does not prevent them from perceiving the disgrace which these dishonourable terms have brought upon the country; and, I am well persuaded, that, in a very little time, the measure will be as unpopular as it is unwise and disgraceful.

The newspapers (which must never be forgotten when we are speaking of public opinion) are ranged thus: The *True Briton*, and *Sun*, the *Herald*, and the *Times* justify the peace, through thick and thin; and the latter (the *Times*), which has been enlisted by the Foreign Office, extols my Lord Hawkesbury at the expense of Mr. Pitt! This, all things considered, is humourous enough. These four papers, which are not the best possible supports that a cause can have, are opposed by the *Morning Chronicle* (which has retracted its approbation, too hastily bestowed on Friday last), the *Morning Post*, the *Courier*, the *Star*, the *St. James's Chronicle*, and the *Porcupine*. The superiority of force is evidently against the peace (as a matter of terms), and, were there an opposition in parliament such as England has formerly seen, the men who have made this peace would very soon be driven from their places.

A rumour prevails that Mr. Pitt and my Lord Grenville are to come into place again. I cannot believe this; but, unfounded as it may be, it has no small weight in the present discussion, and tends to render the peace still more unpopular than it otherwise would be. Mr. Pitt's city friends (except, perhaps, a few of the elect) deny that he has had any hand in the peace, while his enemies contend that he has, and while we (I mean

J. R. Smith, pinxt. *F. Bartolozzi, R.A., sculpt.*

WILLIAM COBBETT

Gifford and myself) have proof positive of the fact, a fact which we shall boldly state at all times when we think it necessary.

In the *Porcupine* of to-day (Wednesday, 7 October) you will see a letter from a correspondent, composing great part of the main article, which is, I think, worthy of your attention. We do not exactly know who it comes from, but it evidently comes from some member of Opposition, and is a pretty clear indication of the line of conduct which the opposition mean to pursue with respect to the peace, in the ensuing Session. . . .

The ratification of the preliminaries of peace is not yet arrived (4 o'clock), but is hourly expected, and I am informed that a grand illumination is preparing at all the Public Offices. Two Thousand lamps, I am told, are prepared for the War Office and the Horse Guards. The swinish multitude, having nothing better to do, have, all this day long, been assembled, to the amount of three or four thousands, in St. James's Park, waiting for the arrival of the ratification, and for the consequent firing of guns.

I have yet to inform you of what you certainly do not know; to wit, the Article in the *Porcupine* of Monday, which has made so much noise in the world, is attributed *to you;* and thereupon an opinion is formed amongst the silly ones of the city, that you and your ancient colleagues are to form the leading characters in the next winter's opposition.

I shall expect *no answer* to this letter, except a line; when you have leisure, to say that you have received it. —If hares are very plenty on your estates, I would beg leave to ask you for one, when your keeper has more than You want.—While you are absent I shall take the liberty to inform you from time to time of what comes within my knowledge relative to public affairs, taking it for granted that you will tell me when my communications give you more trouble than pleasure.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 12.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* HENRY ADDINGTON

Pall Mall: October 23, 1801

I have found your card on my return to town, inviting me to dine with you on Wednesday.[1] I will not send a formal answer, but state to you in this way that, with the feelings which I have about the late measure, I should not be a fit guest upon such an occasion, nor could, I think, with propriety or comfort, be one of the Company that is likely to be assembled on that day. You will enter, I am sure, very readily into this sentiment, and not think it inconsistent in any degree with those feelings of personal regard with which

I am ever, dear Sir, yours very truly

W. WINDHAM.[2]

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

[illegible] *Pall Mall: October* 20, 1801

I hope you have received the deficient newspapers long before now, as I lost no time in ordering them to be forwarded to you. If you yet want a paper of the 10th, I have one.

The *Porcupine* will convey to you all the political information I am in possession of, except the following, which, perhaps, you have already received from a more authentic quarter.—The King, upon reading the Preliminaries, lifted his hands and eyes to heaven, and, after remaining in that attitude for some moments, dropped his hands upon the paper with a heavy sigh, since which he has not spoken to any living soul about the peace. The Duke of Kent, and the Prince, and all the younger princes, are shocked at the terms of this abominable peace, and, with you, Sir, fully persuaded,

[1] This was the dinner usually given by the Prime Minister at the commencement of a Session to prominent members of his party.

[2] Pellew, "Life of Lord Sidmouth," i. 462.

that the country and the monarchy is exposed to great and almost immediate danger. I am pleased to find, that they are prepared for the worst, and are resolved to defend the crown with their lives.

My Lord Folkestone has authorized me to say, that he reprobates the present peace, and that he shall be glad to have this made known to any other members of the House of Commons, who may be desirous of collecting together those who may agree with him in sentiment, for the purpose of acting more in concert, or for any other honourable and lawful purpose.

It is said that my Lord Grenville and Mr. Dundas will oppose the peace, and I hope it is true. The people in the city are outrageous against Mr. Pitt, whom they accuse of the most abominable insincerity. The Preliminaries were received at Lloyd's Coffee-house with a *dumb holloa*, and I really believe that nine-tenths of the thinking people condemn the peace.

Nevertheless the ministers have the mob on their side, and it is, now-a-days, so much the fashion to humour and to flatter this swinish beast, that very few people *speak out*, and I am much afraid this fashion will prevail in the Parliament. If there were a little courage left in the members of Parliament only, if the whole nation were not become advocates for soup-shops and sunday-schools, there would be some hope; but now there is none. The cant of humanity will drown the united voice of reason, of justice, and of self-preservation.

You have, doubtless, observed that the servile *True Briton* and *Sun* have, at last, thrown off the mask with regard to you? Those who know the influence under which Heriot acts, must be assured that he has received his *instructions* for that purpose. In the *True Briton* of yesterday, they have had recourse to the old exploded misrepresentations of the Jacobins, against which this very *True Briton* has repeatedly defended you! Gifford intends commenting on the article, and I hope he will

not spare them. When the *True Briton*, which receives its daily lesson from the Treasury, trumps up the old story about "cheese-parings" and "candle-ends," it is easy to imagine what are the wishes and intentions of its employers.[1]

On November 1 began a debate in the House of Commons on the preliminaries of peace.[2] The action of the Government was defended by the Prime Minister, Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Castlereagh, Pitt, and Fox, and censured by Thomas Grenville, Lord Temple, Dr. Laurence, and (on November 4) by Windham, who made on this occasion what is generally regarded as his most brilliant oration. "I speak," he said, "from the bottom of my heart, and with the solemnity of a death-bed declaration (a situation much resembling that in which we all stand), when I declare that my honourable friends who, in a moment of rashness and weakness, fatally put their hands to this treaty, have signed the death-warrant of their country. They have given it a blow under which it may linger for a few years, but from which I do not conceive how it is possible for it ever to recover."

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* S. HERRING, *of Norwich*

Pall Mall: November 12, 1801

I have been told, what I can hardly believe, that you are one of a very few, who, because my ideas upon the probable future consequences of the present peace, do not agree with yours, have intimated an intention of withdrawing that support from me, at any ensuing Election,

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 16.

[2] The definitive treaty was subscribed at Amiens, March 27, 1802. France again declared war against England in December of the following year.

which, in other respects, you would have been inclined to give. I shall be sorry for any one, to whom I have previously wished well, who shall place himself in such a situation; because I must think that it will show a most wretched choice of the principles that ought to guide a man, in the exercise of that important right, the Elective Franchise. If you think that I am a man generally unfit for the situation which I occupy; that I am disposed to betray its duties to purposes of my own advantage; that I am apt to be led away from my duty by party-connections; that I do not deal fairly and openly with my Constituents, but profess opinions which I do not believe, and dissemble those that I do; —if any of these things have determined your judgement, there is no disputing the propriety of the change that is represented to have taken place. But if, thinking of me in all respects as you have heretofore done, you mean to vote against me, in favour of you know whom, merely because I am of opinion, in common with nine-tenths of the thinking part of the community, that the present peace is big with the most alarming dangers to the very existence of the Empire; while you, on the other hand, who have hardly considered the question so much as I have, are induced to think well of it, being led perhaps to that opinion more by some immediate, local and personal advantages, which you may hope will result from it, than by any other consideration,— then I must think that you act upon principles less liberal, less enlightened, and less just than I should have ascribed to you; more especially when you know that the choice will lye between me and the triumph of a party, who, in its principal leaders and agitators, is actuated by a perfect hatred to the Constitution and establishments of this country.

After the credit which you had gained, by seeming to adopt a line of politicks different from that on which you had once acted, when Mr. Dundas, with great

propriety and on principles which I was unable to object to, was obliged to set aside your name among the offers for Volunteer Corps, I should be sorry that you relapsed again into the same connections and course of acting, and joined with those who only raise a cry of peace to cover designs of a far different nature.

It is not as a canvasser soliciting your vote, but as a friend having your own satisfaction in view, that I wish to put you upon a careful consideration of the case, and to prevent your coming inadvertently to any decision which may prove hereafter as unsatisfactory to yourself as it would be injurious to those sentiments of esteem and regard with which I have hitherto been,

Yours, &c.,
W. WINDHAM[1]

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

December 1801

The project,[2] now sent you, should be shown to *as few* persons as possible, and those few should be desired not to talk much about it. I am conscious my plan, particularly that part of it which relates to *circulation*; is extremely valuable. I have neither room nor time to speak of that at length ; but, when I have the honour to see you, I think I shall clearly show you that, with such a publication in our hands, we can at any time produce an almost instantaneous impression in every part of the nation, or in those parts only where we wish to produce it.

I promised you the Project to-night ; but, as the night is already "borrowing a little of the morning," I must defer sending it till to-morrow.[3]

[1] Add. MSS. 37880 f. 195.

[2] This project was the *Political Register*, the famous paper published weekly by Cobbett until his death. Windham and Dr. French Laurence assisted him financially to start it ; and for a time, there is no doubt, the ex-Minister also supplied him with early information.

[3] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 19.

DR. CHARLES BURNEY *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Chelsea College: December 20, 1801

I did myself the honour of calling in Pall-Mall yesterday morning, not only to thank you for the copy of your admirable speech [on the preliminaries of peace], but, if you had happened to be at home and at leisure, to have talked it over. It is a terrific and afflicting picture, and, I fear, a very exact portrait!

I had always seen the danger of making peace with France under her present rulers, though not to its whole extent. Yet I often asked myself and others, with all Europe at her feet except this country: in actual possession of half Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Savoy, Piedmont, Lombardy, Genoa, the Ecclesiastical States and revenue at her mercy, as are Naples, Spain, and Portugal as well as Holland: and all this Territory and its inhabitants under the direction of such Miscreants, Regicides, Assassins, Plunderers, Jacobins, Atheists, and Anarchists! "what had we to expect?"

You have told our Countrymen their fault with as much courage, eloquence, and force as Demosthenes did the Athenians. You have taken a wide range in the past, present, and future state of this country and its interests. Your matter is admirably arranged, and so connected that each period generates the next.

When I received your kind remembrance from Mr. Cobbett I was reading Mr. Morier's account of the Campaign in Syria with the Ottoman Army; and am sorry to find the rapid declension of the Turkish Empire, and the insubordination of its armies, of which we have heard so much lately, confirmed by such authority as that of our Ambassador's Secretary at Constantinople, with his name to it. These extensive dominions must fall a prey to the first power that attacks them, whether Russia or France shall begin the work.

The note in Mr. Morier's pamphlet, concerning the Hero Bonaparte, I never could have believed authentic from any other quarter. Our present Ministry, surely, would not have suffered this account to be published, if there was any doubt of its truth; particularly now, during negotiation and conciliation. I can recollect nothing in history equally savage and atrocious with Bonaparte's cruelty to the Turks—and will they forget their Massacres, as the Swiss did the murder of their countrymen at Paris in the beginning of the Revolution? —Jaffa taken by storm, and given to pillage and murder for 12 hours—3500 *innocent* men of the Garrison murdered in cold blood, in the same instant! and to facilitate the escape of the French Army in their retreat from Acre, all their own sick and wounded, that they might not impede his march, were poisoned, *by order of the General!* —" and this (says a Lady who lent me Mr. Morier's book) is the man with whom we are to make peace!" The moment I had devoured your Oration, I sent it to this Lady to encrease her wonder, and confirm her good opinion of the Corsican Hero.

The first time I called at Burlington House after the Peace was divulged, the Duke of Portland made use of your expression: that this peace would only be an *armed Armistice.* The war establishment could be very little diminished, any more than the expence; but such was the clamour for Peace, for provisions, and against new taxes to support a war which, without allies, promised nothing more important against the enemy at home, in another 2 or 3 years' struggle than the last, as we were so out numbered on the continent, that we had never been able to make any impression on France itself in any of our attempts. This did not seem to be the good Duke's own opinions, who hates the French and their diabolical principles as much as every honest Englishman would do, but the cant of pacific clamorers.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37915 f. 186.

CHAPTER II

1802

Canning's Slave Trade Motion : The Treaty of Amiens : Canning's plan for the Opposition in Parliament : Cobbett on the Treaty : The Bull-Baiting Bill : The debate in the House of Commons on the Treaty : Canning's motion on Trinidad : Windham unpopular at Norwich : The Marquis of Buckingham offers to return him for St. Mawes : Windham not returned for Norwich : He considers the question of standing for the county of Norfolk : He is elected member for St. Mawes : Windham at Beaconsfield : The first collected edition of Burke's works : Thomas Amyot.

THE Treaty of Amiens gave a short measure of peace to exhausted Europe. It was vigorously attacked by those who perceived that no peace was possible so long as Bonaparte was ordering the affairs of France. Windham was in the forefront of this opposition, and it was he who led the debate on the peace preliminaries in the House of Commons. The King was at first bitterly opposed to the treaty, which seemed to him, as to many others, to make unjustifiable concessions to the enemy ; but at last he was brought to regard it as unavoidable. Sheridan very aptly described it as "a peace which all men are glad of, but no man proud of."

GEORGE CANNING *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

South Hill : February 26, 1802

It was no fault of mine that I did not see you when I was last in Town. I called at your door—but in vain.

To-morrow I think I have a better chance at the Speaker's Dinner, when I think it not improbable we may be classed together—being equally impatient for the Definitive Treaty—though *I* must not say so.

I wish very much to have some talk with you about my Slave Trade Motion—upon which, *unless* you are in heart a Negro-driver—not a Planter—but a downright African Slave Trader—one who likes the Slave Trade for the Slave Trade's sake,—in short, if you agree with the West Indian Proprietors themselves upon the subject, you cannot choose but agree with me.

I give you joy of the Italian Republick.[1]

GEORGE CANNING *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

South Hill: April 20, 1802

I should like to have half an hour's conversation with you just now. Do you know, I have great doubts whether it would not be wise *not* to bring the Treaty [of Amiens] directly into discussion in the *House of Commons*—at least, not to come to a vote upon it—since the Ministers do not intend to call for any. Do not suppose that this is because I have the slightest doubt as to the impression which may be made by pointing out the gross faults and omissions, the weakness, and baseness, and shuffling and stupidity, that mark this Treaty even beyond the Preliminaries that led to it. But I think people do not want to be convinced of this—that they will not take it *kindly*, but rather otherwise—to have it forced upon their observation—that, if pushed to a division, they will vote for the Treaty with all its imperfections upon its head in spight, and will then consider themselves as pledged in all future time to abide by their recorded opinion, and feel their conduct identified with that of the ministers; whereas if you do not call upon them to give any opinion at all—at the same time that

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 282.

you let them see all the grounds upon which you might fairly do so if you chose—they will feel obliged to you for your forbearance—will acknowledge much more willingly the truth of what is to be said against the Treaty, and on any future occasion when reference is to be made to it as the spring and fountain head of the mischief and degradations of which before this time twelvemonth there will be no disguising the reality, they will feel themselves the less interested in resisting the accusations or in defending what their consistency is no ways engaged to uphold.

This as to people in general, of whom there is scarce an individual who does not in private think and, perhaps, avow nearly what you do—but not one-half of whom would fail to vote against that opinion in the House of Commons, excusing himself to himself and his friends, on the ground of the popularity of peace in general. What, are we to be plunged into a war again to make the peace better?—and lastly, perhaps as much as anything, of the whole being Pitt's work, and, as such, to be supported.

Now as to Pitt himself. He cannot and does not think of this as he did of the Preliminary Treaty. But debate it, and he will, he must, debate as warmly for it. He can take no distinction without seeming to abandon Addington,—and that he will not do. He cannot object to any part of the Peace in public without weakening the grounds upon which he contends Peace upon the whole to be preferable to war,—and *that* he will not do. You may have the advantage of him in argument. But what practical good will that do?—You may point out the inevitable causes of future war, which this precious compact of lasting amity contains, and shew how we must either fight or submit to such things!—but for what good purpose?—The harm this may do is very great. By anticipating in argument cases in which insult is certain, and in which war ought to be the

necessary result, you tempt him to pledge himself in argument against either your conjecture or your inference—or probably both—and then, when you turn out right in the one, he has no refuge but to make you wrong in the other. When your case occurs he will resist the very consequences, which, if it had occurred unforeseen, he would perhaps have been the first to declare unavoidable. There is nothing so impolitic as in the heat of a controversy to put extreme cases to your adversary—if, I mean, you are arguing, not for victory in dispute only, but are looking for practical advantage. It exhausts beforehand the whole chapter of accidents, which, unanticipated, might possibly produce something in your favour.

Leave it possible for Pitt to say, six or eight months hence, that the Preliminaries promised well—but that the Treaty did not come up to them. I do not promise you that he even will say this, but I am firmly persuaded that if you force from him a public approbation of the Treaty, you defer, for at least as many months as have passed since the Debates of October, the chance of his coming to see things—almost as you and I see them.

I am firmly persuaded, too, that many, many people doubt about the Treaty in their own minds, and wait for his *owning* it to satisfy themselves that all is as it should be. In God's name, why should *you* give them that satisfaction? *He* will not, unless you force him to it. Let them doubt on,—and they may see reason some months hence to think that, if called upon, he would not have owned it. They will be wrong—but the effect will be equally salutary. Do not help Addington out of the scrape into which he has blundered himself. Leave Parliament unpledged—and let him never have to say, The Treaty was my work, to be sure, but you all of you approved it. Remark as much as you will—the more the better—upon the cowardice on their part of

leaving such a pledge undemanded. You may do this upon a motion for a Paper, but, having exposed this conduct as it deserves, leave it to work—*recorde quod auctum promas*—when, under new circumstances, such as we need not wait for long, it may be brought forth with advantage.

Tell me how all this strikes you.[1]

GEORGE CANNING *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

South Hill: April 27, 1802

Since I wrote to you, I have seen Lord Grenville; and I think the plan of action, which he tells me had been concerted between you and him, so perfect that I retract every thing in what I wrote to you (if any thing there were) which could be construed as making against it. So debate "about it and about it" as much as you will. To move for papers—to move for taking the Treaty into consideration—all this may be done with great and good effect; but a condemnation of the Treaty, such as would force Pitt into a defence of it, and identify him with the makers of it, is what is of all things to be avoided. I hope you think so. Whether Pitt *will* save us, I do not know. But surely he is the only man that *can*.

I give you joy of the entrance of Lannes into Lisbon, the imprisonment of our captains, &c.—I had rather it should be anybody else—but if it must be Frere, let them hang our minister by way of reparation. We deserve it all: and can bear it all, too.[2]

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

May 8, 1802

The week, which is within a few minutes of ending, has been a week of great political inquiry amongst all ranks of people. I have seen and heard much, and the result of

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 284. [2] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 290.

my observations is that there is no one satisfied with the terms of the Peace, and very few who are not considerably alarmed for its consequences; but that a vast portion of even the sensible part of the people think, that a better peace was not to be obtained by a continuation of the war, which continuation would have been *certain* ruin. It is useless to observe to them that this makes the Peace a peace of *necessity*, a *capitulation*, and that it is in direct contradiction to the declarations of those who have made the peace. The people trouble themselves not with this. They leave the ministers to make out their consistency as they can. They reconcile themselves to the measure thus, and, in the language of Scripture, "rejoice with trembling." It appears to me, therefore, that the discussion of this subject should not go off, without including argument to prove that this is *not* a peace of necessity, particularly as with the contrary opinion is necessarily connected another of most fatal tendency, to wit, that the admirers of the war and its continuation, are, in fact, the authors of our present disgrace. This is the point at which Fox is evidently labouring, in which he is most insidiously and malignantly aided by Wilberforce, who, as you will perceive by last-night's debate, infers from the *present conduct* of Mr. Pitt, contrasted with that of yourself and Lord Grenville, that the continuation of the war was to be imputed to you, and *not* to his Rt. Hon. friend. This is an inference that will be very generally drawn, and, I think, its effects should be warded off.[1]

GEORGE CANNING *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

South Hill: May 23, 1802

I was vexed to receive your letter yesterday, when there was no post to answer it: for I should be sorry that you should remain an hour longer than I could

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 31.

help under so false an impression as you seem to have conceived upon one of the Subjects on which you write to me. I mean the Bull-baiting Bill.[1] The amount of the Conversion of which you have heard is this—that I do not mean to vote upon it again. And that for two reasons;—first, that after the last discussion of the subject, I did learn from authorities which I could not dispute circumstances of cruelty and brutality attendant upon the practice of this (in itself not surprisingly cruel) diversion in Staffordshire, of which I really had no conception, and secondly, that I found Leveson (who is certainly no Puritan) attaching great importance to the carrying of the Bill, as one which his Constituents; and particularly the Magistrates of his County, had been very earnest with him to assist in promoting. This last reason certainly weighs more with me as to my Vote than the other—because, admitting all that might be said or proved of the barbarity of Bull-baiting, I should still be ready in principle to oppose any Parliamentary provision upon such a Subject, exactly on the grounds on which you have argued that point. And the utmost extent to which *this* consideration will carry me in opposition to my former vote, will be to induce me to forbear voting at all. As to the cause of complaint which you think it possible I might suppose myself to have against you for your humanity to butcher's meat—I believe and hope you are yourself the only person to whom I ever uttered it. I am sure *you* would understand me, as I was, to be not in earnest in complaining and I hope I have not been unguarded enough ever to say the same thing to, or before, any body who could be foolish enough to take it otherwise. At all events I am sure I have not done so lately, for since within a few days after the last Debate (now two years ago,

[1] This Bill was thrown out in the House of Commons, chiefly owing to the vigorous opposition of Windham, who spoke in favour of the custom, May 24, 1802. It was not until 1835 that bull-baiting was made illegal in this country.

I think) I do not recollect that the subject has been in my mind. If I had not quite forgotten, I certainly had not thought about it.

Now for *paulo majora.*

I understood your silence exactly as you explain it. Nothing could be better conducted than the whole of the discussion of the Treaty has been in both Houses of Parliament. If I could have wished anything otherwise, it would be perhaps that there should have been no Division—for, though I do not think the smallness of the numbers disheartening, and though, for the sake of two or three names that appear in the List, I am personally very glad that it did take place, I am a little afraid that the comparison of so small a Minority with the greatness of the impression which certainly had been made out of doors may lead people to be ashamed of having been impressed so much, and to bethink themselves whether they have not been misled, or panic-struck without sufficient reason.

At the same time, I console myself that we may trust to the Emperor of the Gauls to keep up at least a considerable degree of doubt upon this question of "whether they may lay aside their fears and apprehensions safely?"—and that there is at least a respite and wakeful interval gained before their sleep of death can be slept in comfort. And perhaps after all it would not have been brave and gentlemanlike to have shirked a division.

I have seen Morpeth since, and Ellis, who are both very proud of the share they had in it. An analysis of the majority, recalling and contrasting the opinions of those who composed it, might do good. I was glad to see that, from whatever cause, Pitt took no part in the Debate. The more he can be kept distinct and separate from the misery and meanness of the present system, the better. He makes it very difficult indeed not to lump him amongst them. This one act (if silence

can be called an act) is the only thing that he has done to help those who are trying to do him service. Cobbett, I see, remarks it, and very judiciously. I hope he will not seek an opportunity of falling upon Pitt—though I confess he has no reason (no *private* reason, I mean) to abstain. But that new line would split the very few that are together still more. I do not know a dozen and a half persons—of which two thirds certainly think Pitt the only instrument that can be worked with. The higher he is held (on principles much better than he pretends to) the more chance there seems to me to be that he and those principles should some day or other be brought together. This is the object, and I hope will be in a great measure the effect of the Dinner. The Statue I quite agree with you in thinking an unnecessary and unlucky project—though very unluckily for myself I did not think enough about it to send to countermand my subscription, which I had trusted to another person's discretion, in time. Of my agreement with you as to Burke, I cannot give you a stronger proof than by telling you that I had within this month talked with Pitt, and with Lord Grenville (separately), about a project that I had in my head, of moving for a monument to him. Pitt said (which was all that I asked of him) that he would not oppose it. And *now* he certainly could not—but I am not sure on the other hand that there would not *now* be an additional awkwardness in executing the project—or at least in *my* doing it. Lord Grenville I had desired to think it over, and give me his opinion—and I have not since had an opportunity of seeing him. I meant to have talked to you about it the first time that we met, and will still. But I am less sanguine than I was in the hope of its being very generally approved. God knows, it ought to be.

There remains only to speak of Trinidad. My motion comes on next Thursday. I do not ask you to attend (even supposing your present uncomfortable feelings and

embarrassment to have subsided a little), because I would much rather you should be absent, than oppose me. But yet I think you would *not* oppose me. The ground which I chiefly rest upon is not the abolitionist, anti-negro-baiting ground of which, I know, you are afraid,—but simply this :—That, in the present state of the Colonies, we ought to look for *strength* rather than for rapid augmentation of wealth—that we have our choice whether to make Trinidad a new sugar-growing, negro-driving colony, productive indeed, but weak, and exposed, and inviting attack in proportion—or to create there a place of military strength, a fortress for the defence of our other Colonies ; and to lay the foundation of a new system of colonization for future military purposes. I think I can prove this. I may be mistaken : but if I go *near* to prove it, you will not be against our making the trial.—Observe, however, that I state this to you for your own particular information only. Do not betray me to the Enemy. I had rather they should come prepared only to hunt negroes.—In addition to this, I think I can shew an unnecessary waste of human (*i.e.*, negro) life in the sugar-Settlement of Trinidad, at which the most cold-blooded panegyrist of Exports and Imports ought to hesitate. But this is merely *subsidiary*. The argument upon which I should rely *with you*, is the other. And whether I convince you or not, I can assure you, and do most solemnly, that I am in my conscience convinced myself of the truth of what I contend for. This sometimes is the best chance for convincing others.[1]

William Windham *to a* Norwich Constituent

Pall Mall : June 6, 1802

I have received your letter, and, in return for the offer which you so *handsomely* make of serving me *upon condition* that I will serve you, by procuring, as I under-

[1] Add. MSS. 37844 f. 292.

stand it, for Mr. Forster the appointment which he has been soliciting under the Charterhouse, I take the first opportunity of informing you that, having actually obtained that provision for Mr. Forster, and waiting only till the appointment should be made out, I have, in consequence of this letter of yours, actually written to recall my application; and to desire Mr. Pitt to bestow the appointment upon somebody else, not being willing that what I had obtained from motives of sheer good will and compassion, having been even ignorant at the time whether Mr. Forster was even a voter for Norwich, should be wrung from me as matter of bargain and sale. You will, therefore, dispose of your votes as you think fit, as I, certainly, shall not seek to gain them by a promise of service which I no longer mean to perform.[1]

Windham's popularity with his constituents at Norwich had long been on the decline, and it was feared that he would not secure re-election. As early as December, 1801, the Marquis of Buckingham offered him a retreat at St. Mawes, in case of his being rejected at Norwich; an offer which Windham gratefully accepted. Another offer was also made to him shortly before the General Election, as the following letter shows.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* ——

Norwich: June 18, 1802

Your letter, without date, reached me to-day. Luckily; though in the thick of the contest, our canvas, after ten days' continued work; has finished *here* this morning; so that in the interval between this and Yarmouth; whither we are going in a few hours, I am enabled to read and to answer your letter.

I can recollect no one to whom your offer, tempting as it is, would be an object. I must abide my chance here,

[1] Add. MSS. 37908 f. 305.

and do not think it a bad one, except as to expence: but that will be so heavy that I cannot afford even so small a sum as you mention, but must avail myself of the opportunity that had been very kindly provided some time ago.

Oxford I have long since considered as nearly hopeless, though I shall continue to put myself in the way of it.[1]

All that system and organization and malice and activity and Jacobinism and puritanism can do against us here it is doing, but I think upon the whole that we shall prevail against it.

[P.S.] There is a sad business at Yarmouth, where the dissenters, headed by Lord St. Vincent, are to prevail, and which will leave *nudum latus*. This arrangement, which is not yet declared, I have just learnt.[2]

The General Election was fixed for July, and when the canvassing began, Windham's prospects did not appear hopeless.

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Pall Mall: June 26, 1802

I have the very great pleasure to hear that things are, at Norwich, better than might have been expected. I sincerely hope, for the sake of our country, that your constituents are not so totally void of loyalty and of shame as to vote in any very considerable number for your opponents.[3]

At the Election Windham lost by the narrow majority of sixty votes the seat he had held for eighteen years. "You will have heard of the Jacobin triumph at Norwich," Thomas Grenville wrote to Lord Grenville, from Stowe,

[1] Windham had, in the previous year, made some inquiries as to the possibility of his being returned for the University.

[2] Add. MSS. 37880 f. 292. [3] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 41.

on July 8. "Windham speaks vaguely to my brother of the possible chance of the County for him, but I consider that suggestion as having no solid ground, and therefore am glad that he has found refuge in the peaceable port of St. Mawes, where his Constituents though less numerous will, however, be less troublesome. The Election there probably took place yesterday." [1]

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Stowe: July 8, 1802

If I did not always feel sorry for everything that could disturb you, I should be almost tempted to rejoice at your delivery from the eternal hot water in which your Norwich pursuits have kept you for so long. The only political tenet to which your St. Mawes electors will bind you is the belief that the Pilchard is the best of all possible fish, which, as long as you are not obliged to taste it, you may undertake for their sake to believe. Our friend Arthur Young has been there for some days; and the day of election was fixed for yesterday (Wednesday), so that I verily hope and believe that you will not have the slightest trouble on that chapter. I could not easily delay the day of election at St. Mawes longer, and the inconvenience of a new election would have been so small, in case you had succeeded at Norwich, that I determined to recommend you without waiting for the result of that contest.

As to the County, I fear that many difficulties may now occur to prevent your election, which might not have been in your way on a former occasion. And indeed health and money are both very idly employed when sacrificed to a popular election. Be content then, I beg you, to sit for St. Mawes, in the full persuasion that, in the course of very long and old regards, you could

[1] Fortescue MSS. vii. 99.

not have obliged me more than by allowing me to contribute to your health and ease.

I expect to hear from Young or to see him on Saturday; but as soon as I know the result of Wednesday at St. Mawes (on which there cannot be a doubt), I will apprise you of your election.[1]

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Pall Mall: July 9, 1802

I need not attempt to describe to you my feelings upon the receipt of the news from Norwich. I was prepared for it, both by my own apprehensions and by your letter; but that preparation was not sufficient to arm me completely against the blow. Your mortification must be tolerably great; but it can hardly surpass what was felt by me and Mrs. Cobbett; and as to poor Gifford, he is absolutely crazy about it. I love and honour him, at all times, but at times like these his heart overflows with goodness of that sort which endears him to me in a manner that I can hardly describe.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

Beaconsfield: September 21, 1802

I have behaved very ill in not writing to you. I meant to have made it up by a long letter from here; but I must now write only a short one, and I must write that speedily, in order to make it answer to its date; for I am going from here immediately after breakfast, and the summons for breakfast may be expected every minute. I must not stop, therefore, to dwell on the circumstance which presses upon me, however, very strongly, that I am writing in the study and from the very table, from whence so many great things have sprung, which will long continue to excite the admiration of mankind, but of which the writer is to be seen no more.

[1] Add. MSS. 37881 f. 3.

[2] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 43.



Sir Joshua Reynolds, pinxt.

WILLIAM WINDHAM

We arrived here on Friday last, three days ago. Mrs. Windham, with her sister who had come with her, left us the next day to proceed to Binfield. I am going back to-day to London, meaning from thence, as soon as I can, to join her at Binfield. I am sorry that there is no mention in all this of Crewe Hall. I fear it is impossible, I really should have liked it of all things, and perfectly pine (whenever the thought occurs) for an excursion that should take me for a time out of London ideas, and revive in my mind, if possible, something of the enjoyment which arises from a succession of pleasant objects, unmixed with anxieties for the future, or gloomy reflections on the state of things, and the conditions annexed to our existence here. Perhaps, with greater diligence after my first return to London from Norfolk, the thing might have been possible (though I hardly think it), but the heat of London, without being absolutely disagreeable in the instant, made me languid, more than I was quite aware of at the time, and retarded whatever depended on my own exertion. Another cause of confinement I had which did not depend on myself, and which, unfortunately, will oblige me to remain there a fortnight or more during the course of the next month. This alone, therefore, you see, would render it hardly possible for me to effect the pleasant plan which you proposed.

Our visitors here at present consist only of Laurence,[1] who, though employed in getting out some more of the *works*, is doing nothing about the life. He complains bitterly of Walker King, who, he says, will not assist him, even in writing a letter. I suppose there may be some foundation for this—in a charitable way—that there may be faults on both sides. When I first came, Colonel Cuppage was here; but he went yesterday.

[1] Dr. French Laurence and Walker King (afterwards Bishop of Rochester) were joint editors of the first collected edition of Burke's works.

Laurence and I dined yesterday at Dropmore, where was Lady Camelford and Mrs. Holroyd. T. Grenville was expected, who has returned, as you know possibly, from his Welsh tour, and has been at Althorp. Deep politicks! but I am afraid nothing there can save us. We appear to me every day to be more past help, while people in general are enjoying themselves, as if nothing was the matter. "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

You receive Cobbett, I hope. He is a sort of weekly dream. You will have liked, I take it for granted, some of his late papers; and not the least, his letters of last Saturday to Fox. I had been at first like the other dupes, and had not thought much of this journey of Fox's; but I now fully adopt Cobbett's suspicion.

WIMBLEDON, *September* 25. Two changes of place have taken place since my former date. The scene has shifted first to London, and now to Wimbledon. In my way to London, soon after I had done writing the above, I called at Bulstrode, where I found Lord Charles Spencer, and his son, and Lady Elizabeth, and Dr. Burney. Lady Mary I did not see, and forgot to enquire after. Very possibly she was not up. With the Duke I had a little private conversation, and found him very reasonably impressed with the situation of the country. In London I have seen or heard of nothing to tell you of, except it be Mr. Woodford's fire, which has not destroyed his house indeed, but has his stables, and occasioned great mischief in his furniture. The loss is very heavy, probably 1000*l.* or 1200*l.*, even without his being restored by a sum of that amount to all that he had before. Such at least was his impression when he had spoke to me of his loss, and when he bore it with great magnanimity. I am here pretty much in my way to Binfield. Grenville and I rode down to dinner. I shall ride back to town before breakfast to-morrow. Return to dinner or in the evening, and the next day (Monday) proceed to

Binfield. We have here, besides Lord and Lady Spencer, only Lady Lucan and Lady Anne. I have determined to make sure of my letter to you, and have therefore come out after tea to finish it. As we were coming out of town we met and had some talk with Sheridan. Even he cannot pretend to justify Fox's visit.[1]

William Windham *to* Thomas Amyot[2]

Pall Mall: September 7, 1802

I should certainly like to be seated for Norwich, if I could be so by the mere decision of a committee without the necessity of a new election: but that being, I conclude, out of the question, you may consider me as out of the question in any measures which you may have to settle in the business which makes the subject of your letter. The only interest which I shall ever have again in a Norwich Election will be that of wishing well to any candidate put up by our friends. When I troubled you formerly about a Poll Book, I meant the city poll, which I have never had yet. Pray have the goodness to desire Mr. Fletcher to send me on also a copy of the Squibs; &c., which likewise I never have had. I look with horror every day at a large packet of printed letters which have been lying I know not how long without having been sent off, till the very business to which they relate will almost be forgot. I hope the maxim of *bis dat qui cito dat* does not apply to thanks as well as other things. The exertions of the Election, joined with some other causes seem to have left me without exertion. It shall not be so long, however. I hope to begin to-morrow.[3]

[1] The Crewe Papers: Windham Section, p. 56 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

[2] Thomas Amyot (1775–1850), a Norwich attorney, became in this year Windham's election agent, and subsequently he transacted much of Windham's business at Norwich. In 1806, when the statesman again took office, Amyot became his private secretary. In 1812 Amyot published a selection of Windham's speeches, prefaced by a memoir.

[3] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 18.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* ——

Pall Mall: November 3, 1802

I cannot regret my not having had an opportunity of speaking to you at the Levee this Morning, because the subject of this communication is in fact much fitter for a letter than for conversation. It is in this way, what correctly it ought to be, *unilateral*, in which I may speak to you, without hearing anything in return and without the means of conjecturing even how my communication is received.

In the present dreadful crisis of our affairs, great caution must, to be sure, be used not to do wrong, but great firmness must likewise be exerted, in executing, in spite of smaller risks and objections, whatever shall finally appear to be right. The position in which we stand is, I conclude, that of persons who withhold the execution of a treaty upon the ground that what has been done since by the opposite party would be reason sufficient to justify a War, and must, *a fortiori*, justify us in not fulfilling conditions which, as it now appears, would be turned to uses contrary to those intended at the time of the Treaty.

Upon this principle I conceive it is (and a very sufficient one certainly I should consider it) that we refuse, if such is the fact, to surrender the Cape and Malta. Nothing could be more dreadful than to put into the hands of the Enemy means which they now shew to all the World that they would turn instantly to our destruction; and nothing more to be guarded against than the being deluded by an appearance of concession, of which the design should only be to get those objects from us. The principle being what is here supposed, it is a difference of form only (and woe betide us if, in our present circumstances, and in the present state of the World, we are bound by forms at the expence of substance) that exists between the refusal to surrender a place which

is in our hands, and the prevention of the delivery of a place which is to come from some third party. You will easily perceive that what I am looking to is that which I have always considered as the most important of all our concessions, that which really gives to France nothing less than the command of two Continents,— the possession of Louisiana.[1] Four thousand men, sent at this time, would prevent the cession of Louisiana. The very cruizing, possibly, of Admiral Mitchell's fleet may prevent these Continents from passing into the hands of France, and instantly have the effect, and in the most advantageous way, of securing one of them to ourselves. The one which I am now alluding to is North America, whose counsels and good wishes would probably be completely engaged to us, by such an act of rescue, as, in the contrary case, they must inevitably and infallibly go to France. I say nothing of the importance of New Orleans, according to the detail of its present opulence and means, far different from the representations given of it, not very creditably, by the Master of the Rolls. Its importance, even in these respects, is only to be consider'd with a view to its influence on the two Continents, and in that way, be its establishments more or less, its consequence is supreme: the great object is to keep it out of the hands of France, and the manner of taking possession of it should be such as to prove as much as possible to the World at Large, and particularly to America, that this, and this only, is our purpose. That the fur Trade will probably be lost to us by the loss of Louisiana, is really such a petty consideration that it is not worth even this mention of it. It is really a point on which may turn the fate of the world, and the decision must of course be immediate. Halifax, the Bermudas, Jamaica may among them

[1] By the Treaty of Aranjuez (March 21, 1801) Louisiana had been ceded to France by Spain. In spite of the clause giving Spain the right of pre-emption, Bonaparte sold it in the spring of 1803 to the United States of America for 80,000,000 francs.

probably yield as many troops as may be necessary. That such a step may be construed by France into Hostilities, and lead to an immediate rupture, I do not at all dissemble; But better that a rupture should come with these things in our hands, than come, as it infallibly will, when they shall have gone to augment the power of our Enemy.

You will easily conceive that, thinking as I do about the present state of things, and about the importance of the object here in question, I could not have justified myself in suppressing these ideas, even to persons to whom I had less friendly dispositions than those which you will know to be entertained by, &c.

[P.S.] I ought not to have omitted in the above suggestion the great use that may be made of Bowley, the Indian Chief—a man of a great and capacious mind, and full of attachment to this country. There are prejudices against him in some of the offices, but I believe very unjust and erroneous ones. My conviction has been, for a long while past, confirmed from various quarters, that he is a man very much to be cultivated—

When I have named above 4000 troops, I am by no means sure that so many are necessary, particularly with the assistance of Bowley.[1]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

Pall Mall: November 8, 1802

I have wished much for the conversation which you propose, and with a view at once to convenience and satisfaction, to have made the occasion of it a visit to you at Dropmore. But I am set fast unfortunately by the necessity of an operation of no importance or danger which, not being capable well of being deferred till Parliament shall break up, must take place now lest I should be still confined when Parliament meets. I must trust, therefore, for communication upon those most

[1] Add. MSS. 37881 f. 15.

anxious subjects to the medium of your brother, unless you should chance to be in town for a day, or I should find the necessity of confining myself ends sooner than is supposed.

I have as yet no idea of the course to be pursued (nor is it easy in so varying a state of things) other than to give a lecture to the *country* upon the nature of its situation, the errors of its former opinions and conduct, and the necessity of its preparing itself, not physically but in spirit, in a frame and temper of mind, for a more dreadful struggle than any that it has ever yet experienced. As to the Ministers, it really seems, besides that it is bad taste always to indulge in triumph, that they are not mark sufficient; the shot must fly over their heads. Indeed, I am much of Cobbett's opinion that, unless a spirit gets up in the country, preceding a change of Ministry, and independent, therefore, of that which a mere change of Ministry might give, it is of no great consequence who the Ministers are. They may retard our fate, but they will never finally prevent it. Elliot is come from Scotland, and is, like myself, very anxious for concert and communication.[1]

Lord Nelson *to* William Windham

Merton: November 20, 1802

The present occasion is the only one which has offered of my being able to situate your friend Mr. Colman's son, and the offer, as I have it, is at your service for him or any other Lad that you choose to recommend; it is a fact, although I can hardly believe it, that I am unable to send a Lad to Sea; the refusals I receive from the Admiralty filling up every vacancy astonish me, but you know, my dear Sir, my readiness to do any thing you wish me, and that I am,

Your old friend and faithful humble servant,

Nelson and Bronte.[2]

[1] Fortescue MSS. vii. 124.

[2] Add. MSS. 37881 f. 22.

LORD NELSON *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Merton: December 2, 1802

Your note of November 30 I only got this moment. The situation is yours, and I shall write to Captain Page to beg him to receive Mr. Colman whenever he comes to the ship. In this trifle I can only shew you my readiness to oblige you, was my power great enough to do any thing worthy of serving any friend of yours, being always your faithful old friend

NELSON AND BRONTE.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37881 f. 26.

CHAPTER III

1803

A portrait of Windham to be painted for St. Andrew's Hall, Norwich : Lawrence and Hoppner : War declared against France : Correspondence between Windham and Yorke concerning the coast-defences : Martello Towers and Block Houses : The Prince of Wales and active service : Coast defences : Cromer : Yarmouth : The fear of foreign invasion.

AFTER Windham was defeated at the Norwich election of 1802, some of his friends in that city raised a subscription for a portrait of him to be painted and hung in St. Andrew's Hall. Thomas Lawrence was the artist selected, and the following letters show the difficulty that was experienced in inducing him to fulfil the task he had undertaken.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall : April 2, 1803

I had tried, before I received your letter, every means in my power to induce Lawrence to try to complete the picture so as to be in time for its admission this year; and offered to sit every day and for as many hours as he should like. But he assured me that he could not risk his reputation on a picture so executed, and that it was in vain for him to make the attempt. If he, who had been already employed in painting me, could not do so, I could hardly look for greater expedition from any one else ; and Hoppner [1] I knew was unable through health to employ many hours at one sitting. This being the case

[1] John Hoppner, R.A. (1758–1810).

I have foreborne to give him a final answer about the picture, but have left him to suppose that the matter still waited for a decision at Norwich.

Hoppner, whose picture at first was less approved, has *whipped in* so well towards the end that I cannot but suspect, myself, that his is the best likeness ; and such is now the judgement of many persons who thought otherwise at first. I wish the time admitted of taking the opinion of my Norwich [friends] upon the two pictures as they will appear at the Exhibition : though probably for six one way there would be half a dozen the other. Hoppner is, too, I am afraid, rather the best artist ; at least he is more in the Sir Joshua School. I have received all your packets, by the Coach as well as by the Post, and had not forgot the business of the frame.

No news yet about peace or war. Buonaparte's policy and our weakness and want of preparation will probably give us a little respite—just sufficient to make the blow when it comes fall more fatally.[1]

William Windham *to* Thomas Amyot

Pall Mall : April 21, 1803

The picture is finally adjudged to Lawrence, for whom I have been waiting for some time, but who will begin upon it to-morrow. He prefers the original situation proposed, as well on account of the larger width which that will admit, as on account of the light. With a south sun the picture, he thinks, will for a great part of the day not be visible.

Upon the subject of engravers, his opinion differs in so far from that of many others that he should prefer a stroke engraver to one in Mezzotinto, supposing both to be in their utmost perfection, but he confines this idea of excellence to Sharpe,[2] who is out of the question, not

[1] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 42.
[2] William Sharpe (1749–1824), engraver.

merely on account of his Jacobinical principles, but of the price he would ask and the time he would require. To anyone but him he should prefer a Mezzotinto engraver; and Hoppner has told me of one to whom he has entrusted the picture which he (Hoppner) has been doing of me, who, besides his other recommendations, has that of being in some way, I understand, connected with Norwich. His name is Say. Lawrence did not know him, but has promised to make enquiry about him and to see some of his works. . . .

There is one satisfaction attending the choice made of Lawrence, that he was very desirous of the picture and, I believe, sincerely, from the hope that he will do himself credit by it, that is to say, as a picture on which he was willing to employ his best pains. . . .

Politicks within this last week or two will have acquired an additional interest, by the sort of underplot that has been going on. But after all this was only an underplot and of very little comparative value, unless so far as it might have affected the final catastrophe of the peace.[1]

William Windham *to* Thomas Lawrence

[*Undated*]

Mr. Windham presents his compliments to Mr. Lawrence. He is exceedingly sorry that Mr. Lawrence's engagements have occasioned so great delay in the execution of the picture, for which Mr. Windham (as he early informed Mr. Lawrence) was willing to sit from day to day, knowing the absolute necessity to him of its being completed; so as to arrive and be fix'd up at Norwich by the 19th or 20th of next month and in consequence to be sent off from London not later than the 14th or 15th.

Mr. Windham was indeed extremely desirous, for a purpose, which he explained to Mr. Lawrence, that it should be sent to Norwich much earlier : but that purpose,

[1] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 44.

though important, was not of such perfect necessity as the other.

As Mr. Lawrence has been unable, in the course of more than a month, to give Mr. Windham more than five regular sittings; and has now been obliged with the exception only of the inconvenient hour of nine in the morning on Monday last to intermit the sittings for a whole week; Mr. Windham feels in despair of his being able to complete the picture in time; particularly as the period which was long looked forward to is now arrived; when the course of parliamentary business must necessarily create some interruptions on the part of Mr; Windham. He must, therefore, however unwillingly; relinquish the hopes of being painted by Mr. Lawrence; unless he can from this time proceed upon the picture without interruption, beginning with to-morrow and Friday (for probably on Saturday and certainly on Monday Mr. Windham will not be able to sit), and continuing from thence with no greater delay than parliamentary business may unavoidably create. He is sorry to be under the necessity of requesting Mr. Lawrence's answer upon this in the course of the morning; the case being one, as he must immediately perceive, which does not admit of being left in suspense.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: May 17, 1803

A great ferment is, I conclude, excited by the sort of assurance which we seem to have now, that war must take place. I say *sort of assurance,* for I can hardly yet persuade myself that something of a hope in the minds of the ministers is not still in reserve. This, at least, one may venture to say, that, unless the Country

[1] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 59.

be made fully sensible of its danger and bestir itself in a way far different from what it does at present, the War can lead to nothing but disgrace and ruin, producing consequences nearly as fatal as even peace itself would have done. Nothing can be a greater mistake than to suppose that those who deplored the Peace of Amiens must, therefore, rejoice in the recommencement of war.[1] One of the reasons for deploring the peace was the foreseeing that war, whenever it should take place again, must recommence in circumstances of immense disadvantage. Still greater must those disadvantages be if the Country return to war with no adequate feeling of its situation, and, in consequence, with no disposition to make those efforts and to submit to those privations which can only give it a chance of success. This only I feel certain of, that we must soon have perished in peace; and this effect at least may result from war begun even as this seems likely to be, that it may stop the progress of the ruin which was before coming fast upon us. Whatever the feeling and temper of the nation may be, our means of resistance are certainly greater than they were likely to be at a later period; including always in the estimate of the decrease of our means, the rapidly increasing power of France. When people compare the circumstances in which war is to be begun, with those in which it might have been continued a year and a half ago, they will begin perhaps to suspect that those who advised them to continue war then, were not altogether in the wrong. They certainly cannot complain that the experiment of the peace has failed in consequence of any interruption from those who originally declared against it. They have the full blessings of their own Counsels.[2]

[1] As foreseen by Windham and others, the Peace of Amiens had been merely experimental. Whitworth, the British Minister at Paris, having presented an ultimatum, left on May 12, and the war that must inevitably follow the unpopular treaty was formally declared six days later.

[2] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 51.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Pall Mall: July 29, 1803

In letters from Norfolk I hear sad reports of supineness and apathy, and, in some degree, of disaffection of that sort which I have always apprehended, which shows itself not in open treason or sedition, but in a great relaxation of zeal and loyalty. Ten years of such language as Messrs. Sheridan and Tierney,[1] the new allies of Ministry, have talked will have produced more mischief in that way than their support of their present friends, not in their vigour but in their want of vigour, is likely to do good.[2]

CHARLES PHILIP YORKE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Private *Charles Street: October* 6, 1803

I have only time to acknowledge your letter of the 4th, which has just been received. I think the Communication of so much importance that I shall immediately circulate it to the Admiralty and Military Departments, to which I presume you will have no objection, as it is certainly of a publick nature.

You have been in Office in very difficult times, and know the embarrassments of Government upon many of these points. Certainly they never were greater than at present, tho' our Land Force (exclusive of all Yeomanry and Volunteers) is at this day very little short of 130,000 men in Great Britain, including Artillery. Arms are much wanted, but I hope everything is doing and will be done to fill up the void; in the mean time the people must be encouraged to take pikes, and to bring forward their Fowling pieces and other Arms in aid.

Allow me to say that what is necessary to be done in the side of *Cromer* and Mundesley appears not difficult

[1] George Tierney (1761–1830), statesman and political writer.
[2] Fortescue MSS. vii. 180.

to be performed by the neighbourhood under the influence of the Lieutenancy and Gentlemen of consequence.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* CHARLES PHILIP YORKE

Audley End, Saffron Walden
October 8, 1803

Your letter of the 6th which has found me at this place (whither I came yesterday for the purpose of passing a day or two with Mrs. Windham) will send me back sooner even than I had intended, or at least as soon that I may not miss the arrival of any officer who may be sent to examine the coast in the parts which I have mentioned.

The defence of the coast in those parts is, indeed, an object very little considerable, compared with anything but the expence at which it may be attained : but this is so small that I conceive that there is hardly any chance which it would not be worth while purchasing at that price. Small, however, as it is, whether estimated in money or in labour, it is more than will come within the competence either of mere individuals or even of a Court of Lieutenancy. The latter, indeed, will not touch the object at all ; and I should despair of my powers with the people of Cromer, even with the aid of the Naval Officer stationed there, to prevail upon them to sacrifice their time, their money, or their convenience merely upon suggestions of mine, and for purposes which, after all, cannot be accomplished without some aid which Government only can give. They think too, and not unreasonably, that these are objects of general interest which ought to fall upon the Country at large, and not upon their little local funds, already over-charged with demands that cannot otherwise be provided for. All that can be done by Contribution in kind, and by care to manage every thing in the most economical way, shall be attempted. The whole, indeed, in respect to expence must be a mere

[1] Add. MSS. 37881 f. 260.

trifle. The only question is whether it can be made effectual to its purpose without expecting from the mere force of the Country more than it will be able to perform.

The readiness with which you have listened to suggestions, such as they are, in respect to objects with which I am more immediately connected, encourages me to touch upon one or two others, more remote in local Situation, though not much more so, even in that respect. From Yarmouth southwards, particularly from Lowestoft to Southwold, from Southwold to Aldeborough, and from thence to a part of the Coast where, from a difference in the form of the Shores, the defence should assume perhaps a different character (and be entrusted more to those means, which, however, in my former letter I mentioned had not a little while ago been brought into their places), there is an extent of beach on which a disembarkation is easy in many states of the Weather, and at almost all times of the tide, and where, notwithstanding, from the want of any Bay or Roadstead, no Naval Force can be stationary. On the land, too, no force of troops can be ready to attack an enemy at the moment of landing, as the great body of the troops in the Eastern district cannot readily pass beyond the Ipswich River. It surely seems that, upon such a line of coast, Towers and Blockhouses might be placed with great advantage, erected at such distances as that the enemy could not anywhere land without being exposed to a cross fire of a few heavy guns, which must be able to do him infinite mischief, to retard greatly his disembarkation, and to make it extremely difficult for him to land horses or Artillery. These Towers might be of the same construction, I presume, as those well known on the Coast of Spain, or as that which produced such signal effect in the last War, the famous Martello Tower in Corsica. Either these or Block-houses might easily, I apprehend, be so constructed as to resist for a long while the uncertain aim of guns fired afloat

from Vessels affected by every motion of the Sea, and would either of them be proof against any attack from Musquetry, so that the Enemy, even if they should succeed in getting on Shore and landing their field pieces, might not be disposed to stay for the mere purpose of getting possession of the Guns, which these small Forts would contain, and which would be of little use to them, or for making prisoners of the men. A Block-house, by being let a few feet into the ground and surrounded by a deep ditch, might be a very difficult fortress to take, either by Canon, or Musquetry : in the mean while that its powers of annoyance would be prodigious against a line of Vessels bumping upon the beach and engaged in the operation of landing guns and horses. If the Enemy have no guns, the Men and Guns in the Block-houses will at least be perfectly secure, and after having done considerable mischief and killed great numbers of the Enemy; may be safe spectators of their marching away with diminish'd means and less confidence to be encountered by the body of our Army.

I believe, if you direct enquiry to be made of Captain Edge, the Naval Officer at Aldeborough, a man apparently of good judgement and experience, you will not find him adverse to these ideas. For want of such means, the Enemy landing on this part of the Coast, which he may either choose deliberately or be compelled by circumstances to make use of, will effect his disembarkation without impediment, and proceed for a long way before he meets with any resistance, a circumstance in itself, as I should conceive, highly disadvantageous.

I should have mentioned that the little fort at Aldeborough, which I remember many years ago, and which has lately begun to be put in repair, though it was not completed some weeks ago, is calculated to do but little good; and must be abandon'd, after firing a few rounds, should the Enemy make Aldeborough a place of landing.

I recollect nothing further at present with which I

would wish to trouble you. No apology will, I am persuaded, be thought necessary for what I have already offer'd. While I am discharging a duty for myself, I shall be rendering, I am sure, an acceptable service to you, if I can be the means of any measure being adopted, conducive to the general interest and safety.[1]

William Windham *to* William Cobbett

Audley End : September 13, 1803

Since the date of my last letter from this place I have had the *Register*, which I think an excellent one. The article about the Prince of Wales is admirable : so is the discussion about the war. A little inconclusiveness in one of the arguments about the Prince of Wales (that in which it is said that, if the acceptance of his service would not have been an honour, there could be no honour in his making, which I think does not follow) is of no consequence, and would hardly even weaken the effect of the passage, where a smart turn rather than a convincing argument might be supposed to be the object : But in the others any error of position or reasoning is more to be attended to.

I doubt whether your opinion is quite correctly placed, and stands on a perfectly right footing, on the question of offensive and defensive war. What you say is perfectly true as to the present war : But I doubt whether, generally speaking, it is not rather to be said that Wars are offensive or defensive by the mode of their being carried on, than by the end which they have in view. At least, if it is not so, defensive wars cannot be much a subject of blame. Taking things upon their largest view, considering the end of ends, wars ought to be defensive. It would be difficult to show that any others were legitimate. Accordingly, the last war, even if it had been conducted as I think it ought to have been, would have been strictly

[1] Add. MSS. 37881 f. 262.

defensive. But this would not have prevented its being perfectly offensive and in the highest degree in all its operation. Either, therefore, we must confess that wars are offensive and defensive according to the general tenour of their immediate objects, and not according to their ultimate ends, or we must cease to give a preference to offensive wars. In the present instance the war is defensive on our part, and in the bad sense of that word, because the principal operation of the war is of that description; and it is not the little paltry offensive operations, which the writer whom you are combating advises to be carried on, that can change its nature in that respect. Even in my view of the question, the War must be offensive or not according to its principal operation; and the principal operation in the present war must clearly be allowed to be the defence of the country. A besieged War could be said not to be in a state of defensive hostilities, because the garrison occasionally make a sally: nor Great Britain, while closely besieged herself, because part of her forces might during the time be making some trifling attack in the West Indies. With this distinction in your mind, if you adopt it, you will easily get back in a future paper, and recover your balance from any little slip, should there have been any such, which you may be thought to have made in the present.

I expect to leave this place to-morrow, and shall proceed then through the Essex district, on my way to Norfolk. It is a certain fact, which I believe I had not room to mention in my last letter, that to the moment no distribution of arms has been made, beyond those which the original volunteer corps had, in this maritime and most exposed country. It is only within these two days that arms to the amount of their actual numbers have been promised them. This you may state, avoiding only the particular date of this last promise or any thing that shall have the air of special information: the general fact must, of course, be notorious. There are at this time no

volunteer corps armed, but those of the old establishment: and it is only now that to the rest arms have been even promised.

To-morrow I shall leave this to proceed through some of the principal points of the district on my way to Norfolk —A letter sent to-morrow directed to the Marquis of Buckingham's, Gosfield Hall, should you have anything particular to communicate, will reach me probably before I set out in the morning, or directed to the Post Office, Colchester, will meet me in the course of the day. After that Norwich will be the best place.[1]

William Windham *to* Charles Philip Yorke

Felbrigg: October 4, 1803

Though I do not like, in writing to you, to relinquish the forms of private and friendly communication, there is nothing in this letter which may not be consider'd as publick and which I should not equally address to any other person in your situation. There is at the same time nothing that calls for an answer. I have no official capacity to entitle me to a correspondence with the Secretary of State, nor is the purpose of my writing such as to make me wish that you should be at the trouble of writing in return. My end is answered if the two or three suggestions which I have to offer should be taken into consideration and receive such further attention as they may be found to require.

I always vindicate Government against the complaints which many here are naturally enough led to make, at our being left in this County without any regular troops, by which I mean, with the exception of only one regiment of Militia, without other Troops than Yeomanry and Volunteers. I am perfectly in favor of the System which goes to the concentrating of our Forces, and of relinquishing the defence of some parts for the sake of others more essential; but, in proportion as this System

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 ff. 90–91.

is adopted, we ought to be furnished with the means of doing what we can for ourselves, by which I would wish to convey not only the being furnished with Arms, of which we are at present almost wholly destitute, but our being assisted with certain other precautionary measures without which our Arms, I fear, will be but of little avail.

Let me state first what is of least importance.

In the neighbourhood where I live, from Cromer Eastward and Westward, there is a range of sandy cliff for an extent (including both directions) of at least 15 miles, and with small intervals for a much greater distance, which are at present in most parts incapable of being ascended, and with a little labour—the mere digging of a few men—might be rendered so almost universally. It is not perhaps that, after all that could be done, numberless places would not be found where, with a little pains, men might still reach the Summit, but they would be such as would only admit of their getting up individually and in a way that must expose them to instant defeat, were those who should be patrolling the top tolerably numerous and vigilant, and ready to execute with reasonable boldness a service not attended with any very great danger.

About ten miles of this range of Cliff I have myself examined very carefully, viz., for about three miles to the West and seven to the East of Cromer, and can answer for its being, with the exception of Cromer itself, of the sort which I have described ; the rest of the distance I have reason to believe is the same. The two great openings in this continued range are Cromer, which I have mentioned, and Mundesley, two small towns which you will see mark'd in the map. There is, indeed, in each of these two places, a cliff, but in both, and particularly at Cromer, so low and so easy of ascent for a space, at Cromer, of at least 500 yards, that it would be utterly in vain, with such force as we could collect,

even were it all armed, to attempt to oppose the ascent of an Enemy who should land on the Beach in any tolerable numbers; I mean to the amount of even a Thousand men. The same may be nearly said of Mundesley, though the opening there, being more confined, is more capable of being defended.

The question is of doing something to put these two places in some state of defence, and, when that was done, of taking such other slight precautions as would prevent almost the possibility of an ascent in any other part, for the distance which I have described, that is for at least 15 miles, and possibly for considerably more.

At Cromer there is at present a Battery which has been newly constructed in the room of one erected, I believe, during the American War, and which has fallen into decay, and the same guns, I believe, as were there at that time, viz., three or four Eighteen Pounder. The Battery is only in part finish'd, there having been neither Platform nor Carriages when I was there the other day; but were it ever so complete, it could not, from its position, answer any other purpose than that of protecting Vessels which might seek refuge under it, from the pursuit of Privateers. Its guns do not bear upon the Beach, and could do nothing therefore (or certainly not what was sufficient) to prevent an Enemy from landing. If Cromer, therefore, is to be defended it must be by other means, and these means (of which it must be for an Engineer or some other tolerably intelligent officer finally to judge) would be, I believe, far from considerable, according to such opinion as I should form. A few yards of embankment of thickness sufficient to resist a shot from Gunboats, about twice that extent of pallisades, the destroying all but one or two of the paths, which are now made for the accommodation of the Bathers, and which might be set aside without the least inconvenience, but which it will not be in the power of any one, armed with no Professional or Official authority, to prevail

upon the people to give up. These, with the aid of a small Battery, formed even from part of the very guns now on the spot but placed in a situation more adapted for the present purpose, would, as I should conceive, put Cromer into a state in which the mere exertions of the Armed Inhabitants and Sea Fencibles, were there a moderate time to collect them, might prevent the ascent of an Enemy, even though their numbers should be something not inconsiderable. Were similar means and of a less extent, adopted at Mundesley, the object I should conceive, might be attained, which I have above described, namely, that of preventing an Entry into the Country for a length of Coast of not less than 20 miles, particularly if the whole were aided by a small Corps of Flying Artillery, such as were stationed in this neighbourhood during the late War, and which would not seem too much to expect in a County so much exposed and left so entirely in other respects to its own resources. The four or six pounders now at Norwich are the only force, I believe, of that description at this time in the County.

Whether the objects here pointed out are worth the means by which it is proposed to effect them, and whether the means themselves would be sufficient to answer their purpose, are questions that must be left to better judges than myself, but this you must reckon upon, that in the present state of things, as there is nothing in the nature of the Coast to prevent an Enemy from landing where he pleases, so there is nothing to prevent him, when landed, however inconsiderable his numbers, from marching where he pleases, in spite of any force now existing or that can be expected to exist in this County.

This consideration leads to the other object, which I proposed to mention and of which the importance constitutes whatever is most deserving of attention in the suggestions which I have already offer'd. The object here spoken of is Yarmouth. The importance

of Yarmouth and the defenceless state in which it seems at present to be, is that which renders it so material that the Enemy, on landing, should not be at liberty to proceed without impediment in whatever direction he might think proper. The common opinion which seems to possess every one's mind, that Yarmouth is safe on account of the Naval force station'd there, is certainly founded on reasoning that is inconclusive. If Yarmouth is to be attempted, the attempt will certainly be made by land, and why it should not be so attempted I profess myself to be wholly at a loss to comprehend.

I have already stated that bating that which must render all our internal preparations unnecessary, namely, our means of blocking the Enemy in his Ports, there is nothing to prevent him from landing on any part of this Coast that he pleases, and that, if once landed, there is nothing to prevent his marching to whatever place he pleases, including Yarmouth among the number. At Yarmouth and near it there are Five Batteries and Forty-two pieces of Artillery, most of them of large Calibre, viz.: 18, 24 and 32 Pounders; but from the position of these Batteries, from the ditches being most part filled up with sand, and from four out of the five being open behind, they afford not the least protection to the town from sea, while they themselves from the Canon which they contain, would afford to the Enemy the most complete command of the Roads, there being even a Furnace, as I understand, ready to their hands for preparing hot Balls. If it should be determined, therefore, that nothing should be done for the reparation of these Batteries and for the defence of the Town, the next best thing would certainly be to destroy what remains of the Battery, and to remove the guns. But as far as I might venture an opinion, by much the most proper course would be to defend the Town, for which, as I conceive, little more would be necessary than to repair part of the present Batteries, and with the supernumerary guns to

furnish another Battery which might be so placed as to render the approach to the town on the only side on which it is accessible, extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible.—A Naval Force of Gun boats might be combined with these means, so as to render any attempt on the part of the Enemy still less likely to succeed, particularly as he would not probably be provided with any train, however small, of battering Canon. The notion that if an Enemy were to land in these parts, his object must be Norwich, seems to me as little founded as it is that if Yarmouth were to be attacked, it must be attacked on the side of the Sea. Norwich would be, in fact, of little or no consequence to the Enemy, and Yarmouth of the greatest—so great indeed that, excepting Portsmouth, Plymouth, and London, hardly any can be conceived to be greater. I should apprehend that; next to Yarmouth, Lynn might be the object in these parts most look'd to by the Enemy; and I can see no reason why, if they have Vessels to spare, as they certainly will have now, they should not send out two Armaments of Six or Seven Thousand Men each, one to march towards Yarmouth, and the other with equal facility to take possession of Lynn. There certainly does not appear against either one or the other any other security than the difficulty for the Enemy of escaping from their Ports, for there is in general no difficulty in landing on any part of this beach and not more difficulty after that of marching to and taking possession of either of the objects in question.

These are the principal circumstances of the situation of this County, with which I have thought it right that you should be made acquainted. The general backwardness of our preparations and want of means of defence I forbear to dwell upon, both because I conceive they are already known to you, and are in part such as cannot be remedied.

P.S. You are aware, I presume, that upon the Coast

of Essex, none of the proposed Naval means of defence were a little while ago arrived at their Stations. I understand too from good authority that upon this Coast many means of Naval defence might be employed, more than have been resorted to, and that between what are called Haseborough (Happisborough) Sands and the Main, Ships even of the largest size, viz., First Rate Men of War, might lie as safely as in Yarmouth Roads. [1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* WILLIAM COBBETT

Audley End
October 9, 1803

The best account I can give you of the employment of my time, and the best excuse for having done nothing of what I had intended is to send you the enclosed copies of two letters which I wrote lately to Mr. Yorke; and which will at the same time give you some idea of the state of our county, and of the foresight and vigilance of our Governors. By a letter from Mr. Yorke of the 6th, I find they mean to pay immediate attention to what I have said about Yarmouth. To the other object of the defence of the line of coast, they answer by that most foolish and most shabby wish, which I have heard of on other occasions, that it may be done by the county itself. By a letter to-day from Mr. Woodford, I find that an officer has been sent to Yarmouth, and by another letter received here from Harwich, the Enemy are said to be actually embarking. In short, if we are saved, it must be providence, or fortune, that saves us, for such a mass of folly, ignorance and weakness as we have to defend us, contrasted to the wisdom, talents, ability and energy by which we shall be attacked, leaves really, upon any rational calculation; our destruction almost inevitable.

My life since I saw you has been almost a continual

[1] Add. MSS. 37881 f. 253.

journey, for besides the circuit I took through the Eastern district, I have been, since I got into Norfolk, in a continued course of going backwards and forwards, to attend County-meetings, and promote whatever little disposition there has appeared in the county to exert itself. The last thing was to prevail upon the Justices assembled at the Sessions, to come to some Resolutions; which I was quite surprized at their adopting, to the effect of what is contained in my first letter to Mr. Yorke. As they begin now, though too late, to be a little alarmed, they become much more tractable and docile. From there, *i.e.*, from the meeting at the Sessions, I set off to this place, in order to pass a couple of days with Mrs. Windham; but shall hasten back to Norfolk, in case Mr. Yorke, in consequence of my letter to-day, *i.e.*, of the 8th, should send any one to examine the coast in my neighbourhood. Perhaps the view to Yarmouth alone would be a reason for my going back; but otherwise, were nothing done in either of the respects which I have mentioned, I should feel the state of Norfolk so desperate as to render it unnecessary for any one to stay there; and London would then be the place most satisfactory. Your letter inclosing the Newspapers I received as I was quitting my own house, and till yesterday, when I was employed, among other things, in writing my letter to Mr. Yorke, have never been in a situation in which I could sit down to work upon them. I will try to do it in the remainder of to-day; or will delay my going till the day after to-morrow; but I have really another business, which I have foolishly neglected, but must delay no longer which is to prepare a duplicate of my Will, for in the confusion likely to ensue; I do not like to trust to a single copy.

The thought of all this business is a reason for not enlarging on the thousand topics that present themselves; but I cannot forbear saying how much I like the *Register* of to-Day. Their clan has got deeper wounds than ever, and such as He can never entirely recover of; and the

Summary of Politics is hardly less valuable. About the Depreciation of paper, on which I received your letter, I am altogether at a loss to know what can be done. Mr. Woodford thinks the Bank should pay in cash, in order to save the cash from being taken at one great hawl, and Buonaparte be the only money-holder in the country.—To what a state have our British besotted counsels and conduct reduced us! Oh! how if you had heard at our meeting of Justices the representative of one of the first families of the County, one who values himself as being of the true Patrician race, the descendant of one of the Champions of Agincourt, one who wanted, when he got his peerage to take the title of Agincourt, if you heard him deprecating the mention of the dangerous state of Yarmouth, because it conveyed a reflexion on the Ministers, you would have been tempted to exclaim, as I remember to have done once with respect to this same person (Lord Wodehouse), "what worms creep from the bodies of these dead heroes"! Your correspondent, Augon, should attend more to the actual character of our provincial gentry and men of high birth, before he pushes quite so far the principles that he lays down upon the subject. The fact certainly is, that notions of high birth seem to be used as often to support men under a sense of their own meanness, as they do to inspire them with a character which should render such a support unnecessary. They seem to think they have a sort of claim of credit, and may be as shabby as they please in virtue of the high qualities which they ascribe to their ancestors. Your Country Gentleman of the present day is apt to be a very stupid and spiritless creature.

These letters to Mr. Yorke I will be obliged to you to keep, till you may have convenient opportunity of returning them.—There is no objection to stating the contents to any of our friends, though as he has manifested a disposition to attend to their suggestions, I would proclaim the having written it. The substance must be publick enough,

as it is contained in the Resolutions which I mentioned, and which, though not inserted in the County paper, must of course be generally known.

I was sorry that you were provoked by some reflections in the *Morning Chronicle* to seem to countenance the attacks on Granville. They have shown themselves to be very foolish things in all ways : but promised originally to be quite in the spirit of the present Ministry, and not quite unlike part of that of the last.—A further objection to the bombardment of Granville was that a great part of the inhabitants were Royalists.

The first delivery of arms to the county of Norfolk took place on the 1st of this month, except perhaps a few at Yarmouth, and which were not attended with accoutrements. The delivery of arms, here, is not yet complete. It was promised when I was here last, almost three weeks ago.—The same in Suffolk :—no delivery, when I was there.—Where there are no arms, of course there has been no ammunition, so that in the most essential part of training by the Loading and firing, and firing with ball, almost the whole body of the Volunteers is to this moment altogether unpractised. In Norfolk the signals not yet arranged, nor the signal posts completed—The whole force in Norfolk, exclusive of Volunteers. One Regiment of Militia, four six pounders, and two Howitzers.—In this state of preparation are we going to meet such an invasion as that with which we are now threatened.—God grant us a good delivery !

What sort of situation have you thought of for yourself in the Army ? It is a matter of some consideration,—and, in fact, whether you cannot be otherwise better employed. I should wish that we could be somewhere together.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 95.

CHAPTER IV

1804

Rumour of a coalition between Addington and Pitt : Report of immediate invasion of England : Conference between Windham and Fox : Hoppner's portrait of Windham : Pitt's scheme for the Volunteers : The King ill again : A *communique* concerning the Grenville party and Fox : The dwindling majority of the Ministry : Pitt invited to form a Ministry : The King refuses to admit Fox to office : He refuses also to permit the introduction of a measure of Catholic Emancipation : Pitt becomes Prime Minister : The members of the Cabinet : A bill against boxing and bull-baiting : Cobbett on Windham's future political career : Sir Francis Burdett : Cobbett on the political situation : Correspondence between Windham and Fox : Fox will not serve under Pitt : Fox on Cobbett : Napoleon and the Emperor Francis : The course of the War : "The Parish Bill."

TOWARDS the end of January the King's health again gave cause for anxiety ; but within a few weeks he was well enough "to perform any act of government." Pitt again became Prime Minister, and he inspired the Third Coalition against France, comprising Austria, Russia, and Sweden. Bonaparte had been declared Emperor on May 18. A few weeks previously he had said : "In the present position of Europe all my thoughts are directed towards England." On his birthday (August 15), seated on a throne, he reviewed the "Army of England," collected at Boulogne.

During the Session of 1803–4 the conditions under which the war was waged caused dissensions in the Cabinet, and it was thought that the Prime Minister would endeavour to strengthen the Government by

endeavouring to enlist the support of Pitt and his followers.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: January 1, 1804

Upon the subject of Coalitions, on which so much appears now, in the way of discussion, and on which you say there is so much anxiety in various quarters, I will write more another time; unless indeed, as I expect, I shall have an opportunity soon of talking with you, having settled at present, in consequence of these increasing reports of immediate invasion, to come in the course of the week into Norfolk. Writing or speaking, however, I can tell you nothing in respect to fact, as I know no more of any form of coalition, actually begun or projected, than is known to all the world. All that I can do is to point out the odd inconsistency of persons who, while they are declaiming continually against party and exhorting people to forget their former differences and to unite for the general interest, are ready to fall with all possible violence upon those who take the first step in obedience to that call. This inconsistency indeed is so obvious that it hardly seems to require being pointed out. Do they mean only to say that you ought to unite with those with whom you are already united? This would seem to be an exhortation not very necessary. And if you are to go beyond that, is the union to be with those with whom, disagreeing formerly, you now agree, or are you to take for your associates those with whom you agreed formerly, but now disagree? The nature of the thing seems to admit no other choice.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: January 5, 1804

With respect to Coalitions, I am sorry that opinions take the turn which you describe; for though nothing

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 58.

has been either said or done on that subject, that I know of, between any of the parties, such is evidently the point to which they seem in a certain degree to tend, and to which it is most devoutly to be wished that they should tend. What upon earth is it that people would have, or are wishing for? Is it desirable that such a man as Mr. Fox, powerful as he will be in spite of all that can be done to prevent it, should for ever adhere to a system of politicks in which those who are supposed to mean the good of the country cannot join him? If he does not adhere to such a system, that is, if he has either been taught by experience that his system is wrong, or rather, putting all change on his part out of the question (which is the truer way), if on the questions of the present moment he thinks as one would wish him, is one not to co-operate with him, is one not to concert, to communicate with him, for giving effect to the opinions thus held in common? Upon what principle of common sense, or of common honesty, is this to be refused? Or how is the state ever to be served, or publick business ever to be carried on, if this is not the case? Men who have once differed upon any great question, must continue to differ for ever; till, in the course of not many years, no two men of any consideration will be found whom it will be possible to put together; and then that will happen which does happen, that a party will be formed out of all the underlings of all parties, whose oppositions have been just as great, and whose coalitions therefore must be just as monstrous, according to the phrase used, but of whom nobody complains, because neither their junctions nor oppositions have been matters that people have much troubled themselves about. But the way in which I wish people to satisfy themselves upon this subject is, by endeavouring to state their objections. They will find, I think, a confirmation of the opinion which they wish to confute, in the impossibility which they will be under of shewing it to be wrong. At least, it is fair to

ask that the accusation should be distinctly stated, before an attempt is made at defence. If Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, myself, &c.; should agree upon any question or measure, what is there immoral or wrong in our communicating, and concerting together, upon the best means of carrying it into effect? I might add, though it is not necessary, what is there that should make such an agreement, upon many points, either impossible or very unlikely? The agreement I am speaking of;—the concert in consequence may from a thousand causes be sufficiently unlikely, and those causes, perhaps, far less creditable to the parties than their union would be.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* JAMES WYATT

Pall Mall: January 12, 1804

I do not like even yet to quit the stile of friendly communication, though I must confess that my patience is nearly exhausted: a person has some right to feel impatient, who at the end of some seven or eight years (I believe I might say ten) is going into the Country with the certainty of finding the principal rooms in his House[2] near uninhabitable, because he has not been able to obtain from you what would not be the work of a couple of hours: the dissatisfaction may reasonably be stronger, because my late applications have been, not that you would at all events do what was required, but that you would either complete the design or tell me at once that you would not do so: this application I must now renew, suggesting to your consideration that the plea of this being your way, and that you treat every one else so, is really not sufficient to justify a mode of proceeding so remote from all that is expected and all that is observed by the rest of the world. If I receive a letter from you saying that you will without delay complete the design, I will repeat to you in detail what I have before stated of the

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 59.

[2] Felbrigg Hall, Windham's residence in Norfolk.

manner in which I would wish to have it done : If you say that you cannot do it, I shall then apply to some one else, but a letter I must beg to receive.[1]

William Windham *to* Charles James Fox

February 2, 1804

If you can name any hour to-morrow or next day when you shall be at home and can receive me, I shall be glad to call, and talk over points on which I am happy to think that we are agreed, and which, I hope, will lay the foundation of a more extensive and permanent agreement.

After an interval of twelve years or more, for such I am afraid it is, there must be thus much of ceremony, before former habits can be resumed, but in all that relates to personal regards and feelings, things will be found, I trust, as exactly in their places, as in the case of the Prince who had dipped his head in water in the Arabian tale.[2]

William Windham *to* Thomas Amyot

March 3, 1804

The dimensions of the picture [3] are 8 ft. 2 in. by 5 ft. 2 in. Upon these the frame maker may proceed. The picture will be completed and sent down almost immediately ; but Hoppner says he shall cry if it cannot be sent up so as to be in the Exhibition. He considers it to be one of the best pictures he ever painted. To effect this the picture would require to be returned by the first of this month. I do not know whether the thing is practicable. In one case, I suppose, it will be so, viz. that of their refusing to let it be put up. . . .

[1] Add. MSS. 37915 f. 272. [2] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 223.

[3] The portrait of Windham for St. Andrew's Hall, Norwich, was eventually painted, not by Lawrence, but by Hoppner.

A. Heckel, pinxt. *J. Young, sculpt.*

CHARLES JAMES FOX

The paragraph,[1] I see, is already inserted, so that my correction which I think would have made it better is too late.

What are the opinions at Norwich on the other points of the day? Mr. Pitt's plans for rendering permanent the Volunteer system; and throwing the whole force of the country into that channel is little short of absolute ruin. I really see nothing in it but the annihilation of all regular force, and the renewal of such a catastrophe as took place in the days of William the Conqueror. While everybody seems to be taken up by the Regency; &c., this is the danger which preys most upon my mind.

Enclosure

It is now understood that a coalition of Mr. Windham and of those who are called the Grenville party, with Mr. Fox and his friends has neither taken place nor appears to have been in agitation. All that seems to subsist between them is an agreement to co-operate in their opposition to the present ministry; and, which necessarily results from a concurrence of opinion concerning the character and measures of the Ministers, and from the conviction held by both parties, that to act in conformity with this opinion is a duty imposed on them by a regard to the interests of their country in the present most important and alarming crisis. I am well assured that should this agreement take place, it will not include, nor, indeed, does it at all seem to require from the parties, any compromise of their opinions on questions unconnected with the objects immediately in view. It will, however; include in the prosecution of measures of the highest temporary importance, an Union of persons of the first consideration as well in point of rank and talents as with regard to their real influence in the Country.[2]

[1] *See* the Enclosure below.
[2] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 157

JOHN HOPPNER *to* THOMAS AMYOT

April 1804

The Portrait of Mr. Windham left town, for Norwich, on Saturday—and as every care has been taken in the Packing, and mode of conveyance, I may reasonably hope that you will receive it safe. Should any dust adhere to the Picture, it may easily be removed with water and a sponge—feathers are still better than a sponge.

That the Picture may meet your approbation and that of the subscribers, is the ardent wish of, Sir,[1]

Yours, etc.

JOHN HOPPNER

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: April 19, 1804

The late division[2] has, I suppose, set the Politician at Norwich a-speculating as well as the Politicians here. The opinion of the learned seems to be (I am not one of the learned) that the fate of the Ministry is pretty much decided, not of course by the mere effect of that division, but by the causes that led to it. I suppose the fact may be so, that; bating the respite which they get by the present state of the King's health; they can hardly hope to stand long. Then will come the question of what is to succeed them; and to this I am far from professing to be able to give an answer. I think I have a guess and that guess is not favourable to an arrangement of which I am likely to make part.[3]

The Government's majority steadily dwindling, Addington tried to effect a union with Pitt. Failing in this, he resigned on April 26. The King then visited

[1] Add. MSS. 37915 f. 278.

[2] On the Irish Militia Bill on April 11, when the measure was carried only by 128 to 107 votes.

[3] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 165.

Pitt to suggest a plan for a new administration; and Pitt asked for permission, before doing so, to confer with Fox and Grenville. To this the King declined to accede; and in his turn declared that he would not admit Fox to office, and demanded a pledge against Catholic Emancipation; with which measure Grenville was associated. Later he consented to accept Grenville and his friends; but expressed himself as willing to incur the risk of Civil War rather than accept Fox as a Minister. Fox accepted the situation, and generously begged his followers to serve under Pitt; which; however, was a proposal in which they declined to concur. Eventually Pitt formed a Cabinet, in which Lord Eldon remained Lord Chancellor, the Duke of Portland President of the Council, and Lord Westmorland Lord Privy Seal, while Lord Hawkesbury,[1] who had been at the Foreign Office, became Home Secretary, being succeeded by Lord Harrowby.[2] Lord Camden became Secretary for War and the Colonies; and Lord Melville [3] went to the Admiralty.

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Duke Street: May 2, 1804

There is a bill before the House of Commons which, under disguise, is intended to eradicate *boxing*, *bull-baiting*, and everything that Mr. Bowles, or his coadjutor, Mr. Perceval, chooses to call a *misdemeanour*. I have not time to communicate what I wish to say; but I have the Bill here, and, if you will be so good as to call any time to-day or to-morrow, I will point out the danger. There

[1] Robert Banks Jenkinson, Baron Hawkesbury (1770–1828), succeeded his father as (second) Earl of Liverpool 1808. He was Home Secretary 1804–1806 and again 1807–1809, Secretary for War 1809–1812, and Prime Minister 1812–1827

[2] Dudley Ryder, second Baron Harrowby (1762–1847), created Earl of Harrowby 1809

[3] Henry Dundas, created Viscount Melville of Melville 1802.

is no time to be lost ; because I dare say that this Bill, which goes to the rearing of puritanism into a system, would, if you did not lay hold of it, pass unnoticed.— Pray give my respects to Mrs. Windham and remind her that, when you sat upon the opposition bench with *four* or, indeed, *three* others, I told her, that you three would swell into three hundred, or else the country would be enslaved. In a short time I shall see you, 1st, a minister ; or, 2nd, a member of a numerous opposition of which you will be one of the leaders ; or, 3rd, at the head of another little band of half a dozen ; and, if the first cannot be obtained upon the terms that I have in view, I would much rather see you in the last. The prospect of a change has caused universal joy amongst that same base rabble, both in high and low life, who, but the other day, were cursing you for your opposition, without which opposition the change never would have been produced.[1]

William Windham *to* Thomas Amyot

Beaconsfield : September 25, 1804

Cobbett is not so mad as he is thought at Norwich, though I wish that, in his endeavours to right all parties, he had not talked of our former differences in a way to imply that it was a mere question of forget and forgive in which there were faults on both sides. There is nothing in those differences that for our part I can at all condemn, or say that I should not wish repeated were the thing to do over again ; though I am equally anxious with him that the case should not recur, and am meanwhile perfectly ready to put away all memory of them. I cannot think that we were less in the right or our opponents less in the wrong than ever I did ; but there is no reason in keeping alive that recollection, when the case no longer subsists for acting upon it.

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 119.

Sir Francis Burdett [1] I really believe to be more of a weak enthusiast than of an ill-intentioned man; and as he will have considerable influence, whether we like it or not, it is not without its advantage to encourage him whenever he is disposed to do well, and to rescue him from more dangerous connections. The Horne-Tookites, and others of that stamp, complain of him as a deserter from them: He should not, therefore, be too violently rejected by those who are of better sentiments. It is impossible not to perceive a most marked change in his conduct now, as compared with what it was on the former election: and, what Cobbett has so well remarked on, the part he has taken in respect to the volunteers is really a [*illegible*] of positive merit.[2]

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Duke Street: November 16, 1804

You will see to-morrow, that I have been writing upon these rumours that are afloat, and industriously circulated by the ministerialists, relative to the renewal of the coalition project; which project, if it were attempted to be put in execution, would, I am fully persuaded, surpass in ridiculousness, and very far surpass in mischief, the projects of cars and of catamarans.—I have been, as you will see, compelled to break off abruptly, as I was proceeding to show what I should anticipate as the unavoidable consequences. The first of which would be the shaking of Mr. Fox's influence amongst what one may call the popular part of the nation, who now look towards him and those who act with him as their last foundation for hope.

Mr. Pitt's system, by which I mean the whole of that set of principles and sort of measures, whereby he has so long governed, and whereby, or not at all, he must continue to govern; this system is worn out, and with

[1] Sir Francis Burdett (1770–1844). [2] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 188.

it, the spirit of the people, as well with regard to military glory as with regard to domestic liberty. To the jealousy and watchfulness, which formerly existed as to these things, has succeeded a torpid and almost a brutal indifference ; and, if the mass is ever again to be animated by anything worthy of the name of patriotism, it must be by a total change, and entire renovation, which implies an utter destruction, of the system so long and so pertinaciously adhered to.—But is this to be effected by a junction with him who was the author and who will, to the last moment of his ability, be the supporter of that system ? I am sure you will answer in the negative.—Out of such a coalition as was proposed last spring (it was in March, when I believe from my soul that men are to the full as mad as hares) would arise one of three cases : *first ;* a breaking up of the ministry, which would leave Mr. Pitt in power, having with him a part of his present opponents, sending the rest back to the opposition benches, deprived of a considerable portion of their political reputation, and with their lips, in a great measure, sealed. This general system they could not attack with very perfect consistency, having, under the actual circumstances, given it their support, or at least their countenance ; and, indeed, countenance is, to all intents and purposes, support. With many of his particular measures they would be strangely and ridiculously hampered ; and, in short, would be a set of poor creatures compared to what they now are. Thus the destructive system would go on with less interruption than ever ; it would seek new resources in sacrifices of the Aristocracy and the Church : new and unthought-of laws and regulations would be invented to prop it ; every vestige of our ancient rights and usages would vanish ; the very ideas of political and civil liberty would be effaced from our minds ; and, in a time much shorter than, at first sight, would appear probable, we should tender our necks to the yoke of either foreign or domestic

slavery with as much good manners as my father's old mare used to tender her neck to the collar.—*Second;* Mr. Pitt and his friends would get out, leaving the affairs of the nation to Mr. Fox, yourself, I shall suppose, and all those to whom we now look for political salvation. And *what* affairs, good god! what a bequest would he make you! Your difficulties would increase daily and hourly: he would still be strong: he would always have a certain number of persons closely and firmly attached to him: every day would afford him matter whereon to ground his attacks. Failures of every sort, from whatever causes, always create discontent: all the embarrassments of the nation, of whatever sort, would, by his partizans, and, indeed, by the people at large, soon be ascribed to his being out of place: he would insist upon the goodness of his system, and attribute all the misfortunes of the country to your bad management, in which he would be most boisterously backed by all the numerous swarm of traders of every description.

I am not disappointed, that most people think my notions about the paper-money somewhat of the alarmist description; but, can any man look at the state of Ireland in this respect, can any one consider the quantity of paper now afloat all over the empire, can he at the same time look back upon the fate of such issues in other countries, and then say that he apprehends not very great dangers, tremendous shocks, from the effect upon prices, upon fixed incomes, upon contracts, and, indeed, upon everything immediately and deeply affecting the great mass of the people? I have betted you a guinea, you know, Sir, that the quartern loaf will sell for 30 pennyworth of paper-money before the month of November next. I will bet another, that if the paper-money exist so long, it will sell for five shillings' worth of that money in three years from this day. I may be mistaken; but do not appearances back my opinion? And can any one contemplate the prospect before us without dreading

the idea of being regarded as the author, or in part the author, of the approaching troubles and calamities? The fault would, most assuredly, not be fairly imputable to you: but, fair or foul, it would be imputed to whomsoever should hold the helm at the time; and your principal accuser would not fail to lay all the sins of his system upon you. If, indeed, you were now to take the helm from his hands, and, as I have frequently taken the liberty to suggest to you, were to begin your administration, not with anything vengeful or harsh against him, but with a strict inquiry into, and an ample and simple exposition of, the affairs of the nation; then, indeed, you would have none of the sins of his system to answer for; then you might at once set about the good work of renovating the spirit of the nation; then should I hope once more to see my country great and glorious; then should I be cheered with the prospect of being able to say to my sons, "I leave England to you as I found it, do you do the same by your children." This, speaking of sublunary things, I can, as I often have to you, most sincerely declare to be the first wish of my heart, and the very thought of it now almost brings tears of joy from my eyes as the boys are playing round the table.—*Third;* this coalition administration would hang together for some considerable time: suppose for two, or three, or four years. It might, and would, excite confidence abroad, if not counteracted by events and opinions at home. But here, let affairs abroad go almost how they will, events are rolling on towards the disgrace and overthrow of Mr. Pitt's system; and, as to changing the system while he is a minister, the thing is quite out of the question. You would, then, at the very best, be fighting against time. You might retard the hour of convulsion; but, in my opinion, would only render it more dreadful when it came. The popular voice, which by such a coalition with Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox would lose, would be soon raised in favour of some other. At first, indeed,

there would be a dead calm amongst all classes. But events would again set the waves in motion ; and, as the coalition would have utterly discredited the Foxites, and, along with them and you, the Aristocracy also, the people, when again put in motion, as they would be by events, would seek new leaders : new leaders would not be wanting : the very refuse amongst politicians would then become the favourites of the people : a new race of uncouth but bold orators and statesmen would step forward, and would triumph over you all, and the only question with one is, whether they would not triumph over the *monarchy* also. God knows, whether in spite of everything, this must not at last be the case ; but, if we mean to endeavour to prevent it, or to prevent the subjugation of the country, I am fully persuaded, that a ministry such as the ministers' people are recommending is the very thing that will completely defeat our efforts.—All *personal* considerations I have left out of sight. The circumstance of Mr. Fox's coming, at last, under Mr. Pitt, and that too, without the possibility of doing anything but assist in prolonging the system which he has always condemned ! And yourself too !—But I have already made this letter long enough ; and therefore I conclude with my most hearty prayer, that you may all keep steadily on, till you obtain the sole possession of that power, which, in your hands, might rescue us from our dangers and our disgrace.[1]

Charles James Fox *to* William Windham

South Hill : November 18, 1804

I received your first letter just as I was leaving Woburn yesterday, and your second with its inclosure is just sent to me from thence. First, as to the first, as the lawyers say. I think there is scarce a word in it to which I do not entirely subscribe. Speaking of the new system

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 149.

of Government, I should perhaps say these last *forty*, instead of twenty, years; but the general effect on the manners and character of the Nation, being of course produced gradually, is, of course, of a later date, and I may allow the Child to be twenty years younger than the parent. I am as thoroughly convinced as you or Cobbett can be that, till there be a revolution (do not take fright at the word) in the system and principles of the Government, and till such a change shall have produced its correspondent effect on the genius of the People, we can never hope to be what we were, or by any means to be *upon the whole* equal to the French, and, therefore, whatever change of Ministry has been, is now, or may hereafter be, projected, my preliminary question is this,—Is it of a Nature to be in fact, and to be generally understood to be, really and *bonâ fide* a Change ? a Change not of names only but of Character ?

If the Negotiations last May had gone on, my principal object would have been to insist upon all such points, both with respect to Men and Measures, as should have given the new administration that colour and appearance ; and my great reason for agreeing with you in deprecating what was called success was a conviction I felt that Pitt would have exerted himself to give it an appearance of an opposite Nature.

The only point (a moral one which it is by no means now necessary to discuss) on which I differ from you is on the question why should I *love* the Country still ? I am as angry with it as you can be, and have occasionally strong feelings of indignation and contempt, but, after all, such as it is, it is our business to serve it as in the case of near Relations whom we feel bound to treat with kindness though we not much esteem them.

Now to the practical Point. I think any coalition with Pitt would be mischief most mischievous, but I think there is no danger of it ; and I think the better way in point of policy for the purpose of preventing any class

of our friends from joining him, is rather to shew that there is no possibility of our uniting upon any *proper terms* than to profess at once a determination against such a union on any terms.

Now as to your second letter and its inclosure. I agree with all that Cobbett says, and he may rest secure that coming in under Mr. Pitt is as much out of the question with me or, if possible, more so than ever. Whether I could have brought my mind to be Secretary of State, he being 1st Lord of the Treasury, last Spring, I do not know, as it never came to the point. I rather think I *should*, but then there must have been guards and ballances of various kinds to make at least an appearance of Equality, and I have now the authority of his own insolent and foolish Speech to justify me in the most flat negative; for you remember he told us that the office he held was from its nature and general opinion that of the *Head* of the Administration. When, therefore, I have said (as I did to Moira [1]) that before we can negotiate with Pitt, things must be brought back to where they were at the time of the poor Doctor's Defeat, I have always meant that there must be a consultation about *forming* a new Ministry, not about supporting or acceding to the present, and I have added that in such a consultation there are matters which I would have conceded then, that I would not *now*. But, depend upon it, this is all idle reasoning as to anything that is likely or even possible to happen. Pitt will never make a strong united ministry for two reasons, first, he could not if he would, and, next, he would not if he could.

I think Grey was right in his ideas of the possible good consequences of a really strong Government; but where he and others with him erred was in the belief that through the means of Pitt, a Government of such a description could be formed.—I am very happy to hear his

[1] Francis Rawdon-Hastings, second Earl of Moira (1754–1826), created Marquis of Hastings 1817.

intrigues have ended in nothing, but mind that except from you I have heard nothing about them since I left town last Tuesday. At all events, believe me we are quite safe from what you very justly apprehend to be the worst of evils, and an event is likely to happen (as I hear from good authority) which will put it still more out of the question. I mean a petition from the Irish Catholicks which, notwithstanding all Nepean's remonstrances to them, I am told will certainly be presented to both Houses of Parliament at the opening of the Session. On this men must take their parts, and the line of Separation will be strongly marked and intelligibly too (which is a great point) to the understanding of all Men.

I shall go from hence to town, on Thursday for one night and then Home. If you are still in town I hope we shall meet during my short stay. Fitzpatrick is coming here to-day and I will keep Cobbett's paper to shew him, and then return it to you.[1]

Charles James Fox *to* William Windham

St. Ann's Hill: November 24, 1804

I return you Cobbett's letter. He is certainly an extraordinary Man and, if any good is ever to be done, may be most powerfully instrumental in bringing it about. I suggest he pushes his notions concerning depreciation of money too far, though they are by no means without foundation. I have seen so much of the *extreme* bad harvest this year, that I am satisfied that a very great proportion of the rise of Corn, &c., is owing to that most obvious Cause, nay, that it must have risen still higher if there had not been an unusual stock in the Country. I have no doubt of his principles on these subjects being right, and I think it probable (not certain, mind) that what he thinks *has* happened *will* happen.

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 227.

In short, my opinion is that much, if not all, depends on the Banks continuing to be sparing in their Issues, a sad dependance ! you will say, and I admit ; but yet in this, as in other cases, the whole Evil of exorbitant Power will not appear while the Use of it is moderate. I mention this subject the rather, because I am informed Cobbett has rather fatigued his Readers by dwelling too much upon it. However, I think his speculation about increasing dearness of Bread is good, and shall not be at all surprised to see the Loaf at nearly 2*s*. within a few months.

You will probably have heard before this that Moira is returned to Scotland, and the whole intrigue has had the success you and I wished it. The Prince's message by Moira to Pitt was, that having seen his Majesty he begged leave to decline accepting any military command which it might be in contemplation to propose to him, and, in short, that all Intercourse was over. I am afraid he added, that still, if Mr. Pitt had any specified and distinct proposition to make, he was willing to hear and consider it. I had rather this had not been said, but I do not think it material, and I firmly believe all danger is over for the present. It is possible some dispute may arise between the King and the Prince very soon, concerning the little Princess, but the Prince intends to be quite firm. Pitt will in that case be put to a great difficulty, for the King will possibly wish to take her against the Prince's consent, which can hardly be done without Parliament ; and to bring such a question on, in his weak state, and still more in his Master's weak state, must I think be destruction to him in every view.

I still think a Catholick petition will be presented, but there is some doubt, as it is in a manner referred to a Committee consisting of Lord Fingall and others. If *they* persuade the Catholicks to delay, it will, I think, have the worst possible effect ; for the immediate inference in the mind of the great body of them will be

that their only resource is in the French, O'Connor, &c. Parliament does not meet till the 19th of January at soonest, which is all the better. Whenever it does meet, I think Pitt's Bill ought to have no respite or reprieve, for nothing will contribute more to lower him personally than to gibbet it with every mark of contempt, and, without any feeling of rancour, I confess that for the publick good I feel that to be a great object. If I am not misinformed, the subject on which People are most inclined to laugh at him is that of his military plans. His fondness for his own Corps, etc., and for drilling, which, though Sheridan so solemnly forbad us to laugh, must always be more or less ridiculous, has much contributed to this, and then the Cars and other nonsense have come in aid. In short, if I had any remains of the taste I once had for Debate and Parliamentary Contest; I should look forward to the Session with great pleasure.

Viewing things in a more enlarged way, and asking myself what is to be done to restore the Country, I have no pleasure. But I can truly and safely say that I know no more likely course to give it a Chance of Recovery than that which we are pursuing, first by opening the eyes of the People as far as we can to the mischiefs which have resulted from the vicious systems of our late Government, and next by raising up and maintaining a Party who, if ever they should gain the power, will be led as well by Passion as by Judgment, by spirit of Party no less than by Patriotism; to pursue a system wholly different from that of their predecessors. Is it too much to charge upon the system of this Reign, that the errours of it, to use a mild term (the corrupt Servility of it, as I should term it,) have lost first America, then Europe, and that, if persevered in, Ireland must be the next Sacrifice? How soon England itself will follow is a matter of Speculation on which there may be different opinions.— If you write, direct always to Arlington Street, as I am going again from hence.

P.S. I forgot in my last to take notice of what you say about the mischief of suffering to disperse a Party now so happily united. The whole course of my life and the tenour of my sentiments may answer for me that I should think such a dispersion the greatest of all Evils, and would make greater efforts to prevent it than for any other object whatever; but I am happy to say that I see no danger of the sort at present; and this circumstance, notwithstanding so many gloomy appearances, makes me think better of Publick affairs than for many years past. Perhaps the extreme personal satisfaction and comfort that this sort of union and reunion gives me makes me set a higher value on it in a publick view than it may intrinsically merit, but to me it is everything.

[P.P.S.] Since I wrote yesterday I learn that the Catholick Petition is certain.[1]

THOMAS GRENVILLE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Charles Street: November 29, 1804

Altho' I find by a note from Sheridan that he is ordered to invite you to meet Lord Grenville and me at dinner at Carleton House to-day, I write this line to ensure your doing so, in case Sheridan, not finding you at home, has left no message for you. You are expected at the *small house next to Carleton House at six.*

I return you the strange communication which appears to be so little in the course of English life that I scarce know how to comment upon it. A private letter with a confidential communication made to one person getting irregularly into the hands of a third, can never in my judgement furnish to that third person any right whatever of demanding any explanation of what is contained in such a letter; and where it is further remarked that the opinion expressed by you is one derived from official

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 231.

information and expressed with reference to your official situation, the impropriety of your saying anything on that subject is in my view insuperable. If I were to criticise your answer it would only be by observing that I should have made this latter circumstance a more prominent feature in my reply than you have done in yours; but perhaps if the correspondence is renewed you will think it right to rest more upon this circumstance, because I do really think it among the first duties of office to allow of no private or individual question whatever of the discharge of publick and official functions.

This is my opinion shortly on the brief which you have sent me, but as you return to town to-day, we can talk it over more at leisure.[1]

Charles James Fox *to* William Windham

St. Ann's Hill: Christmas Day, 1804

I received yesterday your letter and the paper accompanying it. It appears to me, as I believe it does to you, that it is impossible from personal motives to decline speaking our mind at some time or other on Lord Wellesley's[2] abominable conduct, but I would delay it as long as circumstances will permit. As to your friend, the Editor, I dare say the story you heard of him is false but I own from what I have seen I have no favourable opinion of his talents. Perhaps I am a little prejudiced by his giving so much into the vulgar abuse of Bonaparte; the *Corsican Usurper* and still more the *soi-disant* Emperor, the *mock* Emperor, and the like disgust me to the greatest degree and appear to me highly disgraceful to the country. Besides too, *They* should not throw stones whose houses are made of glass, *The crazy King, old mad George*, would be just as polite, and, as wicked persons would say, rather better founded.

Add. MSS. 37847 f. 214.

[2] Richard Colley Wellesley, Marquis Wellesley (1760–1842) Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in India, 1797–1805

J. Hoppner, R.A., pinxt. *C. Turner, sculpt.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE

My conjecture to which you refer was made on the supposition that the letter to Bourienne[1] was genuine, which I cannot think it was. The want of a name to it, and the negative fact of there having been no rejoicings at Boulogne, satisfy me that there was no Armistice at the time mentioned in the letter, and as to the Proclamation it would only prove that Bonaparte had given a very exaggerated account of the victory which he certainly *did* obtain on the 2nd. I still incline to think that the allies gained an advantage on the 4th; but of the extent and importance of that advantage, till one hears more details, it is impossible to form any judgement. But here we come to a point on which I cannot agree to what seems to be your opinion, viz., that in such case it would be unwise for the Emperor Francis to treat or to make peace. Remember what you said at Dropmore very justly, that, whatever the terms might be, it was far better to treat with the last Event in your favour than otherwise, for the plainest of all reasons, because in such a case you *do* treat in the fair sense of the word, in the other you submit, or at any rate will have the appearance of so doing. I think if I had the misfortune of being the Emperor's Counsellor at this moment I should most certainly advise peace, if it could be had in any other than the harshest terms. You say, tho' great means remain to Bonaparte, great prospects also open to the Allies; but how stands the Emperor? If the Allies are successful, he may in the course of time (draining and exhausting all the while what remains to him of territory) regain a great part, or if you will the whole of his territory. If the Allies are beat, he will be as much an Exile from his Dominions as Louis XVIII. Nor, even if Fortune should hereafter turn, and the Allies restore him to his throne, would his restoration probably be complete.

[1] Louis Antoine Fauvelet de Bourrienne (1769–1834), French diplomatist, the schoolfellow and friend of Bonaparte. In 1814 he embraced the Royal cause, and during the Hundred Days accompanied Louis XVIII to Ghent.

The King of Prussia would expect to be in some way *indemnified for the past*, and would probably have Prussian objects, just as the Emperor had Austrian objects, and Lord Melville British objects, in the restoration of the Bourbons. On the other hand (you will observe I am always speaking on the supposition of the Allies having gained considerable advantage over Bonaparte in Moravia), Bonaparte would probably not be very severe with him at this moment and would restore him much the greater part of his Dominions. We are not, however, in the unfortunate situation of Ministers to the Emperor but in the advantageous one (in this respect I mean) of Members of the English Opposition; and surely there can be no doubt but our business is, not to give unavailing counsel to Austria, but to show the bad conduct of our own Ministers in having by their counsel and, as I should guess, also by their importunity brought Austria to the necessity of choosing between the two Evils, above stated. We may differ about which is the greater Evil, but that Evils, aye, and most enormous Evils, belong to either of the courses between which the Emperor is obliged to choose cannot be surely denied. I can hardly credit the Archduke's being at Klagenfurt. If from Laybach he had made so sharp a turn, for it is a right angle, surely Massena, whose Bulletin is dated from Laybach, would have mentioned it. Cobbett's argument is, I think, good to all practical purposes. It does not, indeed, prove that Massena's army is superior to the Archduke's but surely it proves that it is not much inferior, for had that been the case, however bent the Archduke might have been on Retreat, he would have stopped to crush Massena; an object of more importance than any he was likely to accomplish by the speed of his homeward marches.

I have a great curiosity to know whether what you say of the General as well as the Army wishing for action is meant of the Duke of Brunswick, and whether you

learn it from good authority. My general notion of the Duke of Brunswick's good sense and prudence leads me much to doubt. As for Hohenlowe, he is, I am told, as stupid a fellow as any in all Germany. Without pretending to the second sight I told you of in W. Scott's ballad, where *you* see triumphs or at least obstructions and annoyance to Bonaparte, *I* see the probable destruction of the Elector of Hesse, the possible invasion of Saxony, the dismemberment of the King of Prussia's western Territories, and, finally, the establishment of the French Empire in Europe.—As to resistance *here* you and I agree pretty well, the resistance I hope for is on water not on land.—You have, no doubt, observed among the other symptoms of the total conquest of the Austrian Countries that they even forbid all arming in Bohemia, and in Hungary have relinquished all notions of Armies *en masse*, and, in effect, of all resistance whatever.—This I admit would probably change upon a victory or two on the part of the Allies, but I am only speaking of the present dreadful situation of the Emperor.—By the way, the words in which volunteering is prohibited in Bohemia are curious and applicable enough to our Volunteers "They will only increase, says the Proclamation, the calamities of War."

P.S. Do you mean by it being *agreed* that the Parish Bill[1] is as you describe it, that it is agreed by Pitt and his friends? At any rate we must not let him get quietly out of it.[2]

[1] By the provisions of the Additional Force Bill (nicknamed the "Parish Bill"), introduced in June by Pitt, the recruiting was to be effected by Parish Officers. Windham spoke against this measure on June 5 and June 19. It became law, but was repealed by Windham soon after he returned to office in 1806.

[2] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 235.

CHAPTER V

1805

Addington goes to the House of Lords : Death of Lord Rosslyn : The impeachment of Lord Melville : Windham proposes to offer himself as a candidate for the parliamentary representation of Oxford University : Windham and the Catholic claims : The feeling of the University against him : Windham on the Catholic question : Correspondence between Windham and Fox : The King's health : France and Austria : Windham refutes charges of inconsistency : The capitulation of Ulm : Correspondence between Windham, Grenville, and Grey.

WINDHAM was much occupied with the projected ministerial combination. It seemed as if his party must soon be called to the helm of affairs, but Windham was not anxious to take office, enjoying the greater liberty of opposition.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

Pall Mall: January 6, 1805

You are such a dear " Jack Falstaff " and so pleasant a " Robin Goodfellow " that it is impossible not to do what you desire, and I wish only I could do so more satisfactorily.

What you would like would be, I conclude, a general statement of how and about it, and what is thought, and what is to become of this new coalition. What shape it is to take is as yet, or was yesterday at least, a perfect secret.

But a word that dropped from an Addingtonian whom I met yesterday as I was coming home would lead me to think, contrary to what I had expected previously,

that the son of Lord Chatham's family physician [1] will submit to take the blue riband and a peerage.[2] I give him this description, not as considering it to be any reproach to him; but as a further proof of what the peerage has become of late years, and under Mr. Pitt's governance ; the idea of pension, which has been talked of, must, I conceive, be out of the question.

The peerage will be, there can be no doubt, what Mr. Pitt wishes for him. I should have thought Addington would have stuck to the House of Commons. Yorke, Bragge, Riley, must, I suppose, have situations. So much as to arrangements. I can speak with more certainty as to impressions. That of the publick seems, I think, almost universally to be disapprobation in some shape or another, even perhaps among the followers, except so far as they feel it to be an accession of present strength, but all seem to think it a degradation in some sort of Mr. Pitt. It is certain that Mr. Pitt made the first move, in a letter written directly to Mr. Addington. From hence there is an affectation among the higher Pittites to say that the King had nothing to do with it ; but the King's subsequent language and manner, as well as everything else, makes that impossible.

Addington will infallibly be the Minister of the King's confidence. For my own individual impression, and I suppose for that of others on our side, I like it much ; it makes the game clear and neat. The division of parties and politics is made as it ought to be : Mr. Pitt and the persons of his creation, pure and unmixed, on one side, and all the rest of the public men on the other. We have all the authors and actors in the Peace of Amiens now together, and so I hope they will continue till the great crash comes, which may make things set off again upon new principles. This, I think, is as much as can reasonably be expected on public matters. For private—Mrs.

[1] Anthony Addington (1713–1790).
[2] Henry Addington was created Viscount Sidmouth, January 12, 1805.

Windham and I are both very sorry for the death of Lord Rosslyn,[1] who, whatever faults might belong to him, was a friendly, kindly-disposed man, and one whom I liked to associate with. He had an enjoyment of life that imparted enjoyment to others, as well as a variety of knowledge and experience that rendered his conversation interesting and instructive. His death will be felt by our Duke—as you call him—with whom he had been in perfect health a few hours only before his death, and who is, I fear, himself very far from being so well as one could wish. I hope there is no truth in the report of his going to have a pension. . . .[2]

William Windham *to* Captain Lukin

March 9, 1805

You will have probably guessed, from the result of the proceedings of last night, that there will be no further call for applications to Lord Melville, whose office of First Lord of the Admiralty, is at this moment in all likelihood at an end.[3] Though one may be sorry for him personally, as one may in the case of a malefactor going to execution, yet one can never regret, for long together, at the termination of power raised by such means as his and employed in such a way. It is a severe reverse, but a most merited one and absolutely necessary, if the Government and Parliament were to hope to retain any character. It is a separate piece of good fortune that the Admiralty is to be taken out of hands that would soon have given us a Scotch navy.[4]

[1] Alexander Wedderburn, first Earl of Rosslyn (1733–1805), Lord Chancellor 1793–1801.

[2] The Crewe Papers: Windham Section, p. 62 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

[3] Henry Dundas, first Viscount Melville (1739–1811), was shortly after this impeached for malversation; he resigned the office of First Lord of the Admiralty on April 8. In the following year he was found guilty of negligence, but acquitted on the graver charge.

[4] Windham's "Diary," p. 449.

CHARLES JAMES FOX *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

April 17, 1805

I think Cobbett is quite right and that nothing can be more essential than a Yorkshire Meeting. The Meeting in that County certainly gave the tone for us in the year 1780 and against us in the year 1784. It is our turn now, and I think with reasonably good management that it will do. There is no occasion for Violence, but the language of the Address, or Petition, as it may be, should be, if possible, decisive, lest the very many who will join against their wills should have a colour for explaining the words away and contending that the object is attained when perhaps a little or nothing shall have been done. I cannot conceive how Lord Melville's friends can talk big after Pitt's express declaration that of *him* there was an end, but if they do so publickly, so much the better. I think our old acquaintance, Canning, ought not to be spared, and that the retaining and protecting Wilson is a point that should be urged substantively both indoors and out. To protect and retain in office one who refuses, for fear of criminating himself, to give his *Employers* information relative to the management of their affairs is surely highly criminal. That the Commissioners are the Representatives or authorized Agents of the Publick, his Employers, cannot be denied. Pray consider this, for it appears to me to be a very strong part of the case, and if it be not set right, it must be a great obstruction to all future inquiries.

I have not yet heard of a new 1st Lord of the Admiralty.[1]

CHARLES JAMES FOX *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Arlington Street: May 1, 1805

I will certainly try to get the Duke of Brunswick to let me off, and I dare say he will. I am clear it is best I should

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 239.

not go. I do assure you on the other business I am not, even in the smallest degree, influenced by the consideration you suppose. That which is my opinion now has invariably been my opinion for the last four years. I should not have come into this Parliament (which it is not affectation to say that I did very reluctantly), if it had not been in consideration of the Catholick Question, the putting off of which from Session to Session has been, as those who knew my way of thinking at these periods can witness, a constant source of uneasiness and self dissatisfaction for me. I cannot alter my opinion, tho' I may yield to that of others. But to make me yield there must be a greater concurrence of opinion against me than I think appears at present.[1]

On the strength of the rumour that Sir William Scott, the member for Oxford University, was about to be created a peer, Windham thought of standing for the vacant seat.

Before formally offering himself as candidate, however, he sent his nephew, Robert Lukin, to discover how the leading spirits of the University felt about the matter. Lukin's letters, written early in July, were discouraging, and it is doubtful, even if Scott had at this time gone to the House of Lords, whether Windham would have thought it worth while to come forward. If he had done so, he would, of course, have had many staunch supporters; but there is no doubt that he would have been vigorously, and, in some cases, bitterly, opposed as a supporter of Catholic Emancipation.

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 241

ROBERT LUKIN *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Magdalen College: July 2, 1805

I commenced my operations early this morning (having sent your letter to Doctor Hughes overnight) with a call upon Mr. Phillpotts [1]—whom I am sorry to say I found adverse. He founded his reasons for not being able to vote for you, upon the Conduct which the University had taken on the Catholic Question—observing that as the University had petitioned, it could not consistently bring in a Member who had opposed, and would still probably oppose, that Petition. This he maintained was a very general Sentiment. He told me very *confidentially*, and I think his feelings on this occasion are guided by it, that Lord Eldon (his Uncle) had been mentioned as Chancellor for the University, in the event of the Duke of Portland's Death—and, as he would stand probably in opposition to Lord Grenville, his strength would be derived from his being an Opposer instead of a Supporter of the Catholic Question. This view is, therefore, a sort of tie upon Phillpotts not to support anyone who is favourable to the Catholic Question. . . .

I next saw Dr. Hughes. He is evidently under the influence of Terror. He is fearful, as Dr. Hall says, that his political Consequence in the University should be hurt, in the case of failure. He is just in that state that it would be a great relief to him, were he to hear that you had relinquished all Intentions of standing. Notwithstanding this, he will act, and with effect too, if only roused a little.

I dined with Dr. Hall to-day. He has been extremely civil and communicative. He thinks that Merton will be with you, but does not seem to wish that you should avail yourself of Sir John Hippisley's Interest—It will do more harm than good. It is difficult to ascertain what

[1] Henry Phillpotts (1778–1869), Fellow of Magdalen College; Bishop of Exeter, 1830.

Christ Church will do—probably remain very still. Dr. Hall thinks the Dean would be more influenced by the Duke of Portland than the Prince of Wales. If the Duke of Portland is sufficiently recovered to write, Dr. White should perhaps be written to, though that does not press. Dr. Parr, if you understand him to be with you, should undoubtedly be urged to influence many here who look up to him.

Upon the whole Dr. Hall says that, however the Catholic Question may have prejudiced your Interest here, and it certainly has done so, still there is a powerful Party in the University for you.[1]

Robert Lukin *to* William Windham

July 3, 1805

There is, I understand, to be a Meeting at Queen's today, for the purpose of determining whether Mr. Richards[2] is to be brought forward. Much depends on this—for if he should stand, his Canvas will materially interfere with yours.

I am sorry to say that Mr. Thorpe has just communicated to me an unfavourable circumstance, namely, that the Master of University will not vote for you. He says he will not interfere with the College, but that he cannot give his Personal Vote. There is an awkwardness in this—as properly, I conceive, he should nominate you. I find Mr. Heber[3] has canvassed very generally, and, I fear, Dr. Hall is not correct in saying that he has thereby hurt himself—I think He is much more formidable than Mr. Dickinson—He has a very extensive acquaintance in the University—embracing, from his standing, all from 50 years of age down to 25—Trinity College is friendly to him. . . .

[1] Add. MSS. 37913 f. 93.

[2] Richard Richards (1752–1823), Baron of the Exchequer 1814, in which year he was knighted; Lord Chief Baron 1817.

[3] Richard Heber (1773–1833), bibliophile.

I have wholly abstained from personal canvas, but the moment it should appear that the sense of the University is sufficiently favourable to make it advisable for you to stand, no time must in that case be lost in making the most active canvas with Individuals.

Dr. Parsons of Balliol is violently against us. He is said to have drawn up the Petition—and is certainly an active Enemy. I have seen Dr. Hughes again to-day. He is yet doubtful, whether it will do—He says he cannot see his way in any one College as he could wish—and I so far agree with him as to be of opinion that, in those Colleges whose Heads may declare for you, many Votes have already been obtained for Mr. Heber. Indeed the State of Society here, as well as in other places, is much altered; The Junior Fellows by no means universally follow the Head and Senior Fellows.

Dr. Cooke is certainly very friendly, but I am told he will not be able to carry many of the Fellows—It might be well to make him aware that some interest in opposition to his has been at work. I am inclined to think that it is in *this* that the Catholic Question will be most felt. Many of the Fellows will make it a ground for voting in opposition to the wishes of the Head of their College.[1]

Robert Lukin *to* William Windham

July 4, 1805

The result of the College Meeting at Queen's is—that the Provost should write to Mr. Richards declaring the readiness of the College to support him. I am, upon the whole, of opinion that Mr. Richards will not come forward, and am quite sure that he and you cannot both stand—his Interest will cross yours particularly. This is Dr. Routh's opinion—So that in my last conversation with him, I observed that we ought to consider the state of things, as if Mr. Richards had declined—for that if Mr. Richards

[1] Add. MSS. 37913 f. 95.

were to persist in offering himself, it would be necessary for you to have some communication with him. In case you should want an Introduction to him, I dare say Dr. Laurence knows him, as being an eminent Chancery Pleader.

Phillpotts has refused the Headship of Hertford, indeed, it is understood to go begging—but in other respects you are quite right about him—He is a decided Enemy, if not an active one.

The only consideration that makes me less sanguine than you, is that we may be led to count the Heads of Colleges, without the Bodies. Dr. Marlowe, whose troops are well disciplined says he expects to have difficulty with them. Our President trusts there will not be many exceptions in Magdalene College, but some we know there will be. The same in Pembroke, as Dr. Laurence informs me—upon whom I called this morning. I cannot find where the Prince's Interest can be used with effect: It must be used here with much care. I hope the Duke of Clarence has written to Dr. Cole. I have not seen him, as he has been out of Oxford and is not expected back 'till to-day.[1]

Charles James Fox *to* William Windham

St. Ann's Hill: July 5, 1805

I hear Sir William [Scott] is certainly to have his Peerage (his close attendance was not for nothing), and that you stand for the University. I do not know that I have the smallest influence with any one Vote, but, if you should hear that I have, pray let me know, that I may apply immediately. I have done all that occurred to me by writing to Lord Holland,[2] who possibly may have influence with one or two chance Persons.

[1] Add. MSS. 37913 f. 97.

[2] Henry Richard Vassall Fox, third Baron Holland (1773–1840), the nephew of Charles James Fox, and the author of "Memoirs of the Whig Party."

I hear, too, that the Doctor has resigned in earnest; if there is not a reconciliation, the consequence will be an attempt at negociation, which, however, I think must fail; I should be inclined to the old *touch not, taste not;* but I doubt whether that will do for these times. But we may insist (and I think all our true friends will support us in it) that the preliminary step to forming any strong or comprehensive Administration must be the annihilation of the present with all its rubbish, at least the hypothetical annihilation of it during the time of treating. Supposing this obtained, which I think not likely, we may surely proceed to insist that, after what has passed, Pitt should not be the ostensible Head of any Ministry in which we are to bear a part. If we adhere to these points it will probably have the same effect as if we stipulated for his Exclusion, and the effect will be produced with more credit to our Moderation. But suppose the worst (I mean what you and I should think the worst), and that he should agree to what we might deem a fair proposal, surely, with the means we have of different kinds, we need not be afraid of not having the power to do whatever may be fit to be done. Whether anything, whether even the most prudent counsels adopted by the best, strongest Government can do much towards saving the Country is another question, and one upon which neither you nor I are among the sanguine; but we must always play great games as well as small on the supposition that the game is not irrecoverably lost, for if it be, it is of no moment what we do. As to ourselves, if we are steady to the points I have mentioned I think we are safe.[1]

EDMUND MALONE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Cheltenham: July 5, 1805

I was just going to write to you when I received Mrs. Windham's letter, in consequence of having seen Mr.

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 245.

Welch as he passed through this town a few days ago. He said his principal reason for keeping his name on the books at All Souls' was that he might be of service to you, if on a vacancy you should think of being a Candidate for Oxford. I will write to him this morning (he lives about 25 miles from hence, near Worcester), and I am sure he will exert himself very warmly for you in that college, which, I understand, has, next to Christ Church, the greatest weight in the election. I wonder you did not mention this matter to me before I left London, as I have understood a good while that Sir William Scott was to be a peer. I wish'd him joy on it, before I left town, and he acquiesced, as far as silence goes. Not having heard you talk *lately* of Oxford, the matter had somehow slipped out of my mind, till Mr. Welch mentioned the subject to me.[1]

ROBERT LUKIN *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Oxford : July 5, 1805

I learn to-day that the Dean of Christ Church is particularly hostile. He has said that you shall not have a Vote from his College. Unfavourable accounts from Wadham. Dr. Wills is too ill to be written to; but I think you know Mr. Davies who was of that College, but who now resides somewhere in the Country. He may be of service. Dr. Hughes is going to Town and will call upon you. I think of setting off to-morrow. Lincoln is likely to be with you, and Exeter in part. All against us at Trinity. Are you sufficiently well acquainted with the Bishop of Winchester to get at New College through him? My Father has, I have no doubt, written to Dr. Holmes: who can do much in New College if he is willing.

There is a Mr. Beresford at Merton and he has much influence there.

[1] Add. MSS. 37854 f. 159.

I have no doubt but Dr. Hughes will be sufficiently active, when his Mind is satisfied that there is a fair chance of your succeeding—He is slack at present, from being unsettled in his opinion.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* SIR JOHN COXE HIPPISLEY

Pall Mall: July 6, 1805

Though I agree with you that it would be very desirable to have a sort of abridged statement of the views which guided me in the Catholic question, yet I know not how such a thing is now to be done, or, if done, what use could be now made of it. Had I spoke indeed at the time I ought and have printed afterwards what I had said, I might both have given a true statement of my sentiments and have obviated such as were otherwise; but any thing now said would only have the appearance of corking up a statement with a view to a present purpose.

The short argument is that in this, as in other cases, you must choose between opposite dangers, and that the danger to be apprehended from leaving the Catholics of Ireland in their present state, is greater that any that can be supposed to arise in whatever length of time, out of the increase of their present privileges.—If the Church is necessary to the State (as it is), the State must be acknowledged to be equally necessary to the Church: and what is to become of the Church of England should England itself be lost? or how shall England be maintained if the French should get a permanent footing in Ireland? The condition of Ireland is, for the greater part of its population, that of a sort of semi-barbarism, which not only keeps that Country in a depressed state, deprived for the greater part of those advantages which nature seems to have intended for it, but renders it in the present circumstances of the world a source of continued and imminent danger to us. This depressed and

[1] Add. MSS. 37913 *f.* 99.

disordered state seems to have been altogether produced by the system of laws and government adopted originally perhaps necessarily, but since continued unnecessarily—with respect to the Catholics. Without converting them, the only operation of these laws has been to brutalize and barbarize them, rendering them at the same time our enemies. Of these laws the greater part have during the present reign been repealed: and upon the same principle, as also with a view to convey to the Catholics the real and practical benefit of what has already been done for them, it would be right in my opinion to repeal the remainder: the danger of such repeal even at any period the most distant, I cannot persuade myself to be any at all.—If the Church of England is ever to be overturned, or undermined, it will not be by the Catholics, but by Sects of a far different description, or by persons of no Religion whatever.

This is the shortest statement which I can give in respect to argument on the merits of the *question*. But the more immediate consideration in the present view is that which relates to the merits of the person. Can any one suppose, looking even at the mere names of those who supported what are called the Catholic Claims, that to support those claims and to be indifferent to, or careless about, the interest of the Church are one and the same thing? Was the Government that proposed and carried the Union (having in view those very claims) of a description to warrant such a notion? Above all others was Mr. Burke of this description, Mr. Burke who has rendered more service to the Church and the Monarchy than all the Politicians of our time put together, and who yet was at all times and to the last moment the most strenuous advocate for the repeal of the Catholic laws? with respect even to myself, can it seem otherwise than quite whimsical to me, to hear myself doubted in that respect, or to think that after being turned out of Norwich as an enemy to the Dissenters, I should

now be in danger of being rejected at Oxford as not sufficiently friendly to the Church? Surely those who can adopt such notions are not persons whom I could reclaim by anything that I could say.

As to the supposed inconsistency in the University of electing a man who differs from them on a particular point, and even upon that not as to the end but the means, it must depend undoubtedly on the importance which they attach to the point, and on the probability of its recurring in the same Shape in future: but it will certainly be pushing their adherence to their opinions a great way, if, on account of such a separate and special difference, they should reject a man, who otherwise they thought upon the experience of now a good number of years and of many great and trying occasions to be a fit depository of their interests.

This seems to be the substance of what could be said in any discussion upon the subject. They are topics undoubtedly which may be urged by friends, but their efficacy may well be doubted on any one to whom they do not occur of themselves. I can as little hope that I have suggested to you anything but what you yourself will already have said many times over. It is your own desire that must be my excuse for having tried you and myself by writing so much as I have. Everything I hear promises very favourably, bating only the advantage that has been gained by an earlier start.[1]

Charles James Fox *to* William Windham

St. Ann's Hill: July 12, 1805

I have received yours of yesterday and will write this day to Lord Oxford, though I am not very confident of success there. I hope, as you do, that our friend Sir William [Scott] will not have his Peerage, and that his close attendance and voting through thick and thin will not avail him. I know nothing of the Treachery to

[1] Add. MSS. 37909 f. 52.

which you allude, nor even to what quarter it is imputed, but my curiosity must, I suppose, wait at present. I send you a letter from Guilford. Holland, who was here on Wednesday, told me the Dean of Christ Church is not so adverse as we had supposed, and that he means to take no part in influencing the votes of his College.

I rather argue from Pitt's having filled up the places that he does *not* mean to negotiate; for though Lord Castlereagh certainly comes under the description of disposeable force, I think he would not have brought him forward just now unless he had intended him for permanent Duty, not indeed that he can think anything wanting to perfect him in Discipline.

At the same time I learn from authority which I credit that Pitt has gained the King's consent to make proposals for a comprehensive Administration without any exclusion, and why he should seek such consent if he did not mean to make use of it, is not obvious. Perhaps his notion of a fair proposition is that he should remain where he is, with Hawkesbury and Castlereagh Secretaries of State; for I hear they are the two Persons on whom his friends state him principally to rely. A good modest proposal this, and so ridiculous on the face of it, that it would be almost as good for us as no Proposition at all, though I adhere to my opinion that none at all is best. I find the Addingtonians are quite ready for open war, and I think they should be encouraged. Their publick ground, I mean that of Pitt's systematick protection of Delinquents and defence of Jobs, is certainly good, and from an odd concurrence of circumstances they are stronger than any one could suppose such Men to be.[1]

Charles James Fox *to* William Windham

St. Ann's Hill: August 30, 1805

I have no objection to writing to F. Honeywood and will do it either this post or the next.—What the

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 247.

French Fleets are about I know not, but I own I can hardly conceive their being able so to manage as to gain even a momentary command of the Channel.[1] If they cannot, I retain my disregard of the Flotilla, but if they were to land I should go full as far as you in my apprehensions. It is *possible*, as you say, that we may do better than others but I think the probability is that, for a time at least, we shall do much worse, and that, whether London or Portsmouth be the object, the Enemy will compass it. That there is too much physical force in the Country for us to submit to absolute and final subjugation, I still hope and believe, but the contention would be ruin in the common acceptation of the Word. In short, long life to the Herring Pond and Wooden Walls which, I think, will certainly save us from immediate, tho' not from ultimate, Destruction.

With regard to everything connected with Military management, Canals, Fortifications, Martello Towers, disposal of Armies and choice of Commanders, I believe we grow every day worse instead of mending. In the midst of our enormous expenses in this way, I am told Plymouth (because, I suppose, it is so far from Boulogne) is left quite defenceless, and would be as easy a prey to the Enemy now as it would have been to d'Orvilliers in the American War if he had landed. I am very glad you mean to attack them on these grounds, and if you can make the tour you mention with Crauford, I have no doubt you will get excellent materials.—In the midst of these speculations I am told the King is again ill, and there are circumstances that seem to confirm the truth of my information. If it should be so, it will be well worth considering whether we ought not to act in the vigourous

[1] Villeneuve had returned from the West Indies with the combined French and Spanish fleets; but instead of attacking Lord Cornwallis' fleet off Brest as instructed by Bonaparte and gaining temporary command of the Channel, he sailed for Cadiz, where he was to go only in the event of defeat. When he eventually left Cadiz it was to meet Nelson at Trafalgar.

manner which the circumstances of the country call for, and insist on an immediate appointment of a Regent. I feel quite clear that we ought not to be so delicate as we have been on former occasions. Many things were done *during* the last Illness which tend to subvert all the principles of monarchical Government, and, after the Illness was supposed to be over, we know that the King was in such a state (occasionally, at least) as to render him wholly incompetent. We ought not again to suffer such things without an attempt to prevent them.

The next question will be, in what *mode* we ought to act, and here occurs a considerable difficulty. Parliament stands prorogued till October 15, I believe, or thereabouts. If the time of Meeting were more distant, it would perhaps be right for the Prince of Wales to take some extraordinary measure through the means of the Privy Council for convoking it sooner; at least such would be my advice; but as it is, allowing some time for the fact being ascertained, some more for the measures to be taken with the Privy Council, and some, of course, for the convening of the Houses of Parliament, the Meeting would be so little forwarded, that it would hardly be worth while to risque so strong a measure and one which by some would be called Usurpation. On the other hand, the Interval between this time and the Meeting of Parliament, if we only consider its length, and, much more taking into our view the circumstances of all sorts now pending, is dreadful. At any rate the moment the fact is ascertained, ought not the Prince to make the first Movement, and to urge the Privy Council to such preparations as would enable it to lay a case immediately before Parliament, in order that a Government should be appointed with as little delay as possible? Pray consider these things, for tho' the Event may not happen, it is surely fit for us to be prepared in our minds at least as well with respect to what our own conduct ought to be as in the advice which we are to give to his Royal

Highness. I am much mistaken, indeed, if the Country will not be ready to follow us in any measure that tends to prevent a long interruption of Government in the present circumstances.

Now, as to your personal views, I see no reason why you should not keep your present seat as long as it is convenient to you and especially till a Dissolution, but I will attend to your wish and facilitate your obtaining another if it is in my power. With respect to Bridgewater I should think with some money, and the interests which we had against us last time, but which it is presumed would now be for us, the prospect would be very favourable, but I do not yet know what are Howarth's intentions, who went down on the last vacancy, and who of course must be consulted. I will enquire, as also concerning any other places that may suit you.[1]

Charles James Fox *to* William Windham

St. Ann's Hill: September 6, 1805

I am much obliged to you indeed, my dear Windham, for your letter which makes me much less uneasy than I should have been without it. I understood that the attack some time ago was bilious, though supposed to have been occasioned by a bad Cold. Dr. Higgins has been uniformly of opinion that there was no danger, and, though I know nothing of him or of his Reputation, I should think, on general principles, that it is very unlikely, that a Country Physician should pronounce such a Patient as Fitzwilliam to be out of danger unless he has very good grounds to go upon. The sending for a Physician from London is no proof of his being thought materially worse or of any alteration in Higgins' opinion, as I know it was the wish of Lord Fitzwilliam and of Milton to send for one even if he had continued mending. I cannot help, therefore, flattering myself to the greatest

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 256.

degree. What you say of the value of his life is true in every respect, but I feel in this case so much on the account of private friendship and affection that all other considerations are absorbed in this. Our acquaintance is now of forty nine years standing and our friendship uninterrupted, cultivated constantly on his side by kindnesses and obligations of the most essential nature.[1]

CHARLES JAMES FOX *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

St. Ann's Hill: September 11, 1805

Many thanks for your letter, which contains many particulars about Fitzwilliam that I was not apprised of. The Result of the account seems to be that there is no danger at present, and how soon and how perfectly he may regain strength is what time only can show, nor on such a subject is the Conjecture even of the ablest Physician of much value.

Publick affairs are bad indeed, and the fate of Austria particularly seems to be ἐπὶ ξυροῦ, if ever that expression was applicable. I am sorry to find you think again, even in the slightest degree, of the Bourbons: if they are taken up by these People the only use that they will even think of making of them (indeed, their Writers avow it) is to enable themselves to make a better peace with Bonaparte; and perhaps better Men than they would be obliged, I fear, to do the same. What you say of the Russians, as well as of the English, being ill qualified for giving advice to Austria is but too true, and yet one would think that the situation in which France would stand if Austria were subdued was sufficiently alarming to make us think twice before we advise her to risk her existence in a doubtful contest.

I go to Holland House Saturday and return on Sunday. If you could call while I am there we could talk over these matters. I like Cobbett's last very much indeed.

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 260.

I am told that Pitt certainly goes to Weymouth the end of this week, so the mischief, if it is to come, will come quickly. I am still sanguine tho' the conversations I daily hear of alarm me a little.[1]

CHARLES JAMES FOX *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

September 29, 1805

I did not get your letter till my return hither from Sussex on Friday, and it was then too late for the post. My opinion is that there is little or no chance of a Dissolution, but then it is only opinion—I have no intelligence on the subject. My notion is, first, that Pitt will not be so closely pushed in the *present* Parliament as some Persons imagine, 2dly, that he will rather lose than gain by a new Parliament. The Odium incurred by a Dissolution would, I believe, too, be considerable, especially as it could not be denied the sole motive must be the personal interest of the Minister.

The Papers between the Austrians and the French are very curious, but it is not papers but battles that will now be looked to. I cannot bring myself to think that any good will come out of the present state of things, and, in case events should be unfavourable, the bad is uncalculable.

My paper speaks of the junction of Bavaria; but I suppose what they call junction is only a submission to the first Army that has appeared in their Country.

Pitt has been now some days returned from Weymouth, and I am again sanguine in my hope that no overture will be made, though the more I think of it, the more I am persuaded that the difficulty of rejection would not have been very great. Indeed, I never thought it to be so great as you did, but great or little it is best to have avoided it altogether, and this, I think, is the general opinion of our friends.[2]

[1] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 262.

[2] Add. MSS. 37843 f. 264.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: October 7, 1805

I have requested Mr. Lukin who leaves Town for Norwich to-night (and was very near having his offer accepted of staying to-morrow and taking me with him) to get you and my friends on the subject of the givings out which you mention by an assurance that there is not a word of truth in them.

It is neither true that anything to this effect was said by me to Mr. Coke, nor that the fact itself is so. What are the opinions which they suppose me to have changed?

That the French Revolution was not a system of liberty nor much conducive to the happiness of mankind? I should have thought that all the world was now pretty much of this way of thinking! That if not opposed and destroyed, it threatened to over run the earth? All that we are now suffering and fearing may be pretty good evidence that this opinion was not very erroneous. Is it that I was wrong in thinking that peace would not save us, and in condemning in consequence the favourite and dear peace of Amiens? Whatever may be thought of the renewal of the War, which I, perhaps, did not think the most judiciously managed, yet nobody surely will say that our condition was likely to be very good, or the progress of French dominion soon to have stopt, had the peace continued. The same may be remarked of the former war. Who shall pretend to say that the Progress of the French Revolution would have been less rapid or less dangerous had Great Britain never joined in opposing it, or had no opposition been made to it at all? Such an opinion certainly derives no countenance from the facts, which prove incontestably that the French Revolution did not need to be provoked to become mischievous—that the aggressions were not the consequence of the resistance, but the resistance of the aggressions. Of the conduct of the former, was it that which I am supposed now to

condemn? The fact may be perfectly true, but is no proof of change of opinion, as I cannot condemn it now more than I did during the whole time it was carrying on, or than it was at all times condemned by Mr. Burke. It would be very odd if I were to take to changing my opinions now, when those who formerly opposed them, might be supposed to be most convinced of their truth.

With respect to the letter alluded to, it was written to Mr. Coke in consequence of hearing of the uncommonly kind exertions which he was making to serve me in my views on Oxford, and was answered by him in a letter of equal kindness; but as to politicks there was nothing on either side. It is very possible that I might have said, for I have no recollection of the particulars, that I lamented the differences which had separated me from those for whom I had so much personal regard, or something to that effect: which some blundering friend of his (for I am sure Mr. Coke never conceived such an idea) may have construed into a renunciation of my former opinions. But even this must have happened among reporters at second hand. No one, however confused or inaccurate, could have made such a mistake if he had read the letter. At least it is very odd if I should have written in a way to convey an opinion so little in my thoughts at the time and so totally contrary to the facts.[1]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

Pall Mall: October 8, 1805

At the moment at which I write, being just about to get into my chaise, I can say nothing about public affairs; if indeed I had anything particular to say. For domestic politics, I think it is pretty clear now that we shall have for the present neither overture nor dissolution. Overture I think will not come at all, at least without some great

[1] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 206.

change. But dissolution is still thought by many likely to happen, if any favourable event calculated to make much impression should take place.

What chance there is of any event of that sort I hardly allow myself to conjecture. My fears outweigh my hopes. In the meanwhile, I cannot by any means reconcile my mind to that part of the Austrian declaration which disclaims all interference in the internal concerns of France, though I am afraid it is the part which will be the most popular. I can understand perfectly why they should have said nothing upon the subject. I might, myself, easily have been persuaded that such was the best course. But why they should cast away the hope of such means of interference even in their own minds, and still less why they should publicly renounce such hope, I cannot at all see. In the meanwhile, I think I see great prejudice that may attend their so doing.

Some have thought that this Declaration will not at all fetter their conduct, should any favourable opportunities present themselves; but, if it does not, it will, I think, injure their reputation, in spite of any interpretation which would confine the meaning of it to their mere views in commencing the war, as distinguished from what they might do in the course of it.[1]

William Windham *to* Thomas Amyot

October 24, 1805

Mr. Lukin, if you saw him, will have told you how very near I was accompanying him and the Dean of Wells to the Sessions; and I may further add that, even after they were gone, so intent was I on making a visit to Norfolk, that I did not give up the intention, but would, if possible, have followed them. I was prevented by a very disagreeable, but very urgent and insurmountable reason.

The letter which I sent you at that time, however hastily

[1] Fortescue MSS. vii. 308/9.

written (and perhaps not the less so on that account), will have satisfied you that I have not left my friends in the lurch by renouncing opinions which I had long maintained with them. I have no wish to dwell upon former differences, with respect to those with whom I am now acting; but our present agreement, and still less the good-will that I may feel towards many of them, implies no abatement of opinion on the points on which we were formerly opposed to each other; and least on our side, though it may reasonably be hoped, without the hope of being invidiously urged, that the same is not the case on theirs.

The present state of things; and a more formidable one cannot well be conceived, bears good testimony to the truth of all the opinions for which we have formerly contended. Had Louis the Eighteenth been lodged in one of the King's palaces, and received with all the honours due to his rank and situation, and had a system of policy corresponding with that Measure been adopted by this country, the King's daughter might not have been at this time under the humiliating necessity of doing the honours of her house and table to Buonaparte.[1]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

Sonning, near Reading
November 3, 1805

I had thought of driving over to you to-morrow to dinner, on the chance of your being at Dropmore, and of returning the next morning; but I believe it will be better to beg you to let me have a line merely to say whether I may be pretty sure of finding you during the course of the present week, and at the beginning of the next, as, in that case, I shall shape my course from here so as to enable me to spend the day with you.

In great calamities and dangers men flock together, even

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 75.

where the distress is such as to leave no hopes of relief from any combination of counsels or exertions, and where the only effect of the meeting will be to express to each other their sense of the common danger. Disastrous as events have certainly been, there will be a hope that all is not yet lost, nay, that much may possibly be gained, if the remains of Mack's army have not actually surrendered, and he himself become a prisoner. It is that last incident of the piece, that finishing stroke, of the general himself being captured—"Romeo banished"—that seems to extinguish all chance of recovery; not, probably, on account of the value of the general himself, but by the evidence which it contains of the state to which things must have been reduced. There seems still to be a ray of hope that this may not be true, and then not only something but perhaps a great deal may be hoped. On this however it is in vain to enlarge. I send this off in a hurry in the hope that you may be able to favour me with a line by return of Post. Soon as I may hope to see you, many things, bad at least if not good, may be expected to happen.[1]

Lord Grenville *to* William Windham

Dropmore: November 5, 1805

I shall certainly be here all the time you mention, and I need not say I shall, on every account, be happy to see you when it best suits you to come. I wish it had been this morning, as you had proposed, because you would have found both my Brothers here, and I am very sure your coming would have induced them to prolong their stay. They left me only an hour ago, and I have but just now received your letter.

You will have seen that, contrary to what is usually the case, the calamity very much exceeds the first reports

[1] Fortescue MSS. vii. 310.

of it.[1] One's mind is lost in astonishment and apprehension, when one looks at what has happened, and what is still to be expected. An army of 100,000 men, reckoned the best troops in Europe, totally destroyed in three weeks, without (as far as yet appears) sustaining any one considerable action, and 36,000 of them capitulating on a bare statement of the position occupied by their Enemy, are events that really confound one's imagination. And yet even this is, I am afraid, only the beginning of misfortunes. The situation of the Archduke's Army in particular seems quite desperate, unless he has had the means of retreating in time, which the account of the affair of Verona,[2] if true, puts out of the question.

The only remaining hope seems to rest on Prussia. Knowing nothing of the grounds or motives of the unexpected vigour lately shewn at Berlin, I cannot reason much on what is now to be looked to from that quarter : but, after all I remember, I cannot look with much confidence for effectual assistance there. Yet such a confidence must, I apprehend, exist in other quarters, and be much relied on there, since the plan of sending a British force to Hanover is persisted in, and that, too, at a season when our escape by Sea from such an immense superiority of force as an Austrian peace might pour back upon us, might be cut off by the frost, and no other resource be left to us but the protection of Prussia.

As to our internal situation we must now fairly say to the Country that they must rely on themselves alone.

Spem si quam accitis et totam habuistis in armis Ponite—spes sibi quisque—and can one avoid adding—*sed haec quam angusta videtis.* Even the last resource to which I had looked, with more sanguine hopes than many entertained, that of rallying the exertions of the Country round one common centre of union, seems to be, to say the

[1] The capitulation of Ulm, October 22. The news did not reach London until November 2.

[2] At the battle of Caldiero, October 30, 1805, Masséna defeated the Archduke Charles.

least, as far off as it ever was, and we are plunging into a sea of hitherto unthought-of difficulties, with little hope that our internal divisions will leave us the fair use even of that measure of activity and vigour, whatever it may be, that the Country still possesses.

These croakings may be allowed to the first impressions of such a calamity. Time and reflection may suggest topics of confidence which I have hitherto looked for in vain. I wish you may see the whole in a favourable point of view, but at all events it will be a great satisfaction to me to talk the subject over with you both as it relates to our situation and our conduct.[1]

Lord Grey *to* William Windham

Howick: December 13, 1805

I am sure Fox cannot fear less than you do the power of France, or think differently with respect to Bonaparte's ambition. He may think, for I have not heard from him for a long time, that the Continental war is more likely to destroy all future means of resistance than to set any limit to his power. Peace, therefore, must be his wish and mine. But it must not be inferred from this that we abandon all future resistance. If such a Peace is proposed to us we have no choice but war. But if a Peace can be obtained which shall afford a chance of preserving what remains of power on the Continent, particularly the power of Prussia, from further reduction, I have no hesitation in saying that I think such a Peace would be preferable to a continuance of the war with all its present prospects. In answer to your question whether it is probable that Bonaparte's plans of universal Empire will stop of themselves, I must propose another. If the destruction of Austria is completed and Prussia involved in her ruin; what then will stop them? We come, then, to a question of terms, and upon this is it

[1] Add. MSS. 37846 f. 210.

T. Phillips, R.A. pinxt. *C. Turner, sculpt.*

CHARLES, SECOND EARL GREY

impossible we should agree; or at least that we should agree on this point that some proposal should have been made in answer to Bonaparte's offer, before Austria, by a direct aggression, risked all the consequences that have so fatally ensued?

It is not easy, either from the French or German accounts, to form any satisfactory opinion of the detail of the operations of the armies. But the result speaks too surely in favour of the French, and it seems to me probable that before the meeting of Parliament all questions respecting Continental alliances will be decided for us. Upon that which has hitherto proved so unfortunate, much information will be necessary. I participate in all your suspicions of its having been ill-formed; and I cannot conceive any justification of the march into Bavaria of an army formed for the avowed purpose of supporting a pacific negotiation; before any proposal had been made. I hope we shall agree. Separate columns under one command may do very well. But the case is different with separate armies, and I cannot help fearing from what you say that we shall give Pitt the advantage, one of the greatest I think possessed by Bonaparte, of being one against three or four.

I was very sorry for Belcher's defeat, tho' I do not know why I should prefer him to the Chicken, except that he has lost an eye. I admire the Chicken's generosity, and I hope Cobbett who is so warm an advocate of the good cause, will not neglect the ace that is to be made of it.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 240.

SECTION VI

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR AND THE COLONIES

1806—MARCH 1807

SECTION VI

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR AND THE COLONIES

1806–March 1807

The Death of Pitt : The nation pays Pitt's debts : Dr. French Laurence : "All the Talents" Ministry : Windham becomes Secretary of State for War and the Colonies : Cobbett's grievance : Lady Anne Barnard : Windham's Army Bill : Admiral Sir Sidney Smith : Cobbett's breach with Windham : The King's observations upon the proposed new Army Bill : Windham proposes that Sir J. C. Hippisley shall be made a Privy Councillor : Lord Grenville's objections : Windham's rejoinder : Alterations in the Army Bill : A question of patronage : Windham and Coke are returned to Parliament as Members for the County of Norfolk : They are unseated under the Treating Acts : Windham is elected for New Romney : Censure of Sir Sidney Smith : Death of Fox : A scheme for the formation of a new Ministry : Lord Grenville suggests that Windham shall accept a peerage : Windham's refusal : He tenders his resignation : This is not accepted : The new Ministry formed : John Britton : The Princess of Wales : "The Delicate Investigation" : Her Royal Highness exonerated by the Commissioners on the serious charges : A Cabinet minute on the subject : The difficulty of Windham's position in this matter : His friendship with her Royal Highness : He writes a statement to be appended to the minute : Windham's correspondence on the subject with Lord Grenville.

THE previous year had seen Nelson's victory at Trafalgar, followed by the defeat of the Austrians and the collapse of the third coalition. The failure of his plans crushed Pitt, and his death in January of this year broke up the Ministry. A new administration was formed by Lord Grenville. This was called by the Opposition

the Ministry of "All the Talents" in derision of one of its supporters who said that the members of it contained "all the talents, wisdom, and ability of the country."

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: January 22, 1806

As one of the happy consequences of our blessed system of printing debates, I am described to-day in one of the papers which I have seen, the famous *Morning Star,* as having talked a language the reverse of that which I did talk, and which was alone conformable to the Sentiments existing in my mind. In none of the papers, as I am told, am I made to express myself in terms so strong as those which I actually used.—The history is that having been forced by the occupation of our bench to sit more under the gallery than is desirable and having spoke, moreover, in a lower tone than usual, owing perhaps to a little emotion, the reporters in the gallery could only hear what I said very imperfectly, and supplied what was wanting very much according to their own fancy. You may be perfectly assured that what I said was of a sort perfectly to satisfy every friend of Mr. Pitt: and that I am very anxious to have understood, as nothing could have been so base and ungenerous and so perfectly averse to the purpose of my speaking at all, as the saying of any thing ungracious of him in the circumstances in which he was supposed to be and unhappily was.[1] I am sorry to say that all hope of recovery is entirely out of the question, if he should be alive even at this instant. As I expressed myself yesterday, the extinction of such great talents and powers is a very awful and affecting event, even in the minds of those whose lot it may have been to have been most constantly opposed to them. I think, moreover, that it

[1] Pitt was lying dangerously ill when the speech was made; he died on January 23.

would have been infinitely more advantageous that the principles of his Government should have been combated and condemned, as finally I think they would have been, in his lifetime.

What will come of this it is difficult to say : but I hear that his Majesty will contend for his principle of having a ministry of his own naming, till the question will be settled by Buonaparte.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: January 23, 1806

The event which has been for some time certain and has now taken place, among other greater changes must make a change in the representation of Cambridge ; and two candidates have already started ; to either of whom I should have most anxiously wished success, in the absence of the other. These are Lord Henry Petty and Lord Althorp, son of Lord Spencer. In the question between the two, I am compelled, both by my close connection with Lord Spencer and my great regard individually for Lord Althorp, to decide for the latter, and accordingly shall use all the interest which I may possess in his favour. I don't know who there is in Norwich that I may have any influence with, but if there should be any with whom my wishes could be of any weight, I will beg you if you should have an opportunity, to say that they go in favour of Lord Althorp.

I shall be very glad to write to them if you think I can do so with any prospect of success.

Nothing is yet known or was not half an hour ago, of the course that things are likely to take with respect to the formation of a ministry. I should be much less solicitous on the point than I am, if on this another point did not depend, namely, the having an Army. An army is at this moment the first concern of the country; not

[1] Add MSS. 37906 f. 220.

necessarily for the purpose of war, but equally so for the purpose of peace. That is the best ministry which will best succeed in putting the country in a good state of defence.

If I did not conceive that our ideas upon the subject were better than those likely otherwise to be adopted, and that our measures, whatever they may be, respecting Ireland, would be better, I should be quite as well satisfied to remain in our present situation as to change it.[1]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

Pall Mall: January 28, 1806

I need not say how much pain it has given me to be obliged to resist what I knew to be so anxiously your wishes, and that for a purpose sufficiently disagreeable to myself. But you know as well as anybody what it is to adhere to principle in opposition to every other consideration, and, though differing in the application, will readily see that if I thought Mr. Pitt's political life, with all his talents and all his virtues, had not been beneficial to the country, it was impossible for me to concur in a vote decreeing to him the highest national honours. I am vexed not a little that, among many things forgot or ill-said, I omitted what I had fully intended to do, that is to anticipate what is meant to [be] proposed respecting the debts,[2] and to concur in what I understand is already done respecting Lady Hester Stanhope and her brothers. I had stated my opinions, however, upon those points to various people. Anything personal to Mr. Pitt, anything not involving a judgment on the general effect of his political life, I could concur in with the greatest pleasure.[3]

[1] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 223.

[2] An address to the Crown concerning the payment by the country of Pitt's debts. Windham supported this motion.

[3] Fortescue MSS. VII. 345/6.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* DR. FRENCH LAURENCE

Pall Mall: February 1, 1806

I write you a few lines, for little other purpose than that of giving vent to my uneasiness,—uneasiness conceived from the worst of all causes,—a sense of self-condemnation. My conduct in having suffered you to be sacrificed, by coming into office without securing to you the object which, in every view,[1] you ought to have had, and which is now gone for ever, and with hardly a possibility of replacing it, is something for which you may pardon me, but for which I never can pardon myself. It renders me contemptible in my own eyes.

That it did not proceed from any views or feelings of self-interest, or any want of solicitude about yours, may render the transaction less disgraceful in one way, namely, as to the motive, but aggravates it as to the weakness and folly.

My only chance of recovering my own estimation is that the present negociation may break off, and nothing shall then induce me to be a party to the renewal of it, without a stipulation which shall guard me against the reproach which I have now to make to myself.[2]

The negotiations were not broken off. Grenville formed an Administration in which Lord Erskine was Lord Chancellor, Fox Foreign Secretary, Lord Spencer Home Secretary, and Windham Secretary for War and the Colonies. Ministers received the seals on February 5.

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Upper Brook Street: February 10, 1806

When you are ready to bestow an hour upon my notions relative upon *the army*, I will carry them, or

[1] It had been generally expected that Dr. Laurence would be offered a post in the new Administration.

[2] Add. MSS. 37883 f. 35.

rather, *send* them to you. And, here, it may as well be laid down as a rule that, while you are a minister (which, I hope, will be many, many years) *I* shall never intrude upon your time by personal application to you, upon any occasion whatever. Your time is now too precious to be spent in *parler pour parler;* and be assured that I shall never feel any pain from your having none of it to bestow upon conversations with me. There are many amongst those of the new opposition, as it was called, who *never* noticed me, personally. They did not, I dare say, dream that I cared so little about it; and that when I saw them *fête*ing the pretender, Glutz, that I looked on them with pity for the weakness of their preference, rather than with envy towards Glutz. It is quite natural and just for a man to like those by whom he is liked personally; and, assuredly, I do not like the persons here alluded to the better for their coldness towards me; but this is a consideration which will never have any weight with me in the performance of that which I look upon as my public duty. From the Foxites I have met with personal civility and kindness, such as never appeared at all in the conduct of the Grenvilles; and therefore I like them better; and therefore to them, if I had any favour to ask, I should certainly address myself; but I have, at present, none to ask; and, at any rate, this feeling never shall influence me in the performance of what I consider as my duty. I have said all this in order to lay bare to you the state of my mind upon the score of personal considerations; and in order to convince you that it is upon deliberate reflection that I have now pointed out that which I think will be the proper mode of communication between us, if, at any time, you should think it advisable to communicate with me; and, if you never should, you will soon be convinced that I shall attribute your determination to any thing rather than a want of friendship towards myself, of which friendship I have experienced so many proofs. To your *office*

I will, on no account, go. I foresee many reasons against that, particularly the *possibility* of exciting in the Grenvilles certain suspicions that ought not, for harmony's sake, to exist.

As to appointments I know nothing, except with regard to those of the *cabinet.* If Lord Auckland be at the Post-office, and particularly if *Freeling*[1] *remain,* much of what I hoped from the new ministry, *very much,* I shall be disappointed in. This old slave of the Pitt faction is the worst of its slaves. The most dangerous, because, by far, very far indeed, the most powerful. He has a complete control over the exportation of periodical works. He has the appointment of an active and powerful political partizan in *every town* in the kingdom. His patronage to the press, his powers of suppression or of circulation, his more than a battalion of clerks and runners, his facility of influencing and of directing popular assemblies in London : all these give to Freeling a degree of power that ought not to remain in such hands. If it does, it will, to me, be an earnest of no good. This office should be committed to the hands of some steady, staunch adherent of the present ministry ; and I know of no one who is half so fit for it as O'Bryan. He is the very man of all men for the office ; and it would be hard indeed, were his usefulness to Mr. Fox to be an obstacle ; for, indeed, where could he be a hundredth part so useful to him ? And, besides, it is the very office which would, without any invidious appearance, enable him to continue to be useful to him in *all manner of ways.*—But, whoever may be the successor, Freeling ought to be removed. I have *proved* him to have been guilty of " a gross violation of the law " ; and I have now at hand all the means of proving Lord Auckland to have been his protector therein.—If he remain, Mr. Plummer of Hertfordshire I

[1] Francis Freeling (1764–1836), Secretary to the Post Office, with whom Cobbett had serious disagreements some time earlier Freeling was created baronet 1828.

hold engaged to me to bring the matter forward ; if he be removed, this will be avoided. But I feel myself, in common with the other persons concerned in the press, as being most cruelly oppressed by this man's use of his power ; his illegal power ; and that I should endeavour to obtain redress is perfectly natural ; in which endeavour I shall be joined by more than 200 printers and newsmen.—This is, in all probability, the only request, upon a subject like this, that I shall ever presume to trouble you with ; and, if even this should be refused, the refusal will in no wise diminish that respect and attachment with which I remain, &c.[1]

LADY ANNE BARNARD[2] *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

25 *Brooke Street : February* 12, 1806

To take up my pen in *Solicitation* to *you* seems so strange to it that if it wanders and blots a little do not impute it to a want of respect for the Secretary of State. And yet I believe that it may have solicited before ! If it did, it was not attended to ; let it be more fortunate *this time*, Windham, and let me owe you an obligation in what is now become my most interesting quarter, in the person of Mr. Barnard, who you are a good deal indebted to, as he has saved you the weary task of making amends by attentions for other wants that I believe you had no power over. —*Mais " Ils sont passé ces jours des " pleurs.* Let us now talk of the present tense in all its emproved sense both to you and to me.—I wish you joy of your new department and can most safely say that I hope you will all long enjoy your situations unmolested by party and dispute ; as a man as yet belonging to *no party*, let me place my Husband under your protection. With satisfaction he accepted the Honorable banishment which usher'd him into a life of business *in Africa :* my old

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 211.

[2] Lady Anne Lindsay (1750–1825), author of " Auld Robin Gray," married in 1793 Andrew, son of Thomas Barnard, Bishop of Limerick.

acquaintance with Lord M[acartney] [1] (which you knew of) produced to me that offer of a situation to my husband; you also knew that between six and seven years was passed there [2] by us; and I may venture to refer you to Lord Macartney for the Testimony, whether Mr. Barnard was not equally approved of for his conduct as he was adored by the natives for his conciliatory manners. Tho' he had a leave of absence in his pocket to come home after the first three years, he staid on to guard the interests of the colony when Sir George Yonge's [3] foolish conduct renderd his interference of importance, tho' on the other hand his father's foolish match at home hung over his head, which terminated at last in the loss of the greatest part of his fortune thro' the influence of the new wife. The peace taking place at last, which you did not approve of and which the event shew'd you to be right for reprobating, Mr. Barnard, of course, lost his situation. On his return home he was complimented by the ministers for his good conduct and individually each assured him that he should be speedily provided for; but as Mr. Barnard is not a man to push his own interests with importunity, and as he was not in parliament, consequently no party man, from that time to the present his pretensions have remain'd *allowed*, but unattended to, which I the less regret now, as it renders him a man who can in no respect be offensive to those who are at the Head of publick affairs. To ask your patronage to him in general is perhaps enough.—To ask it on such grounds as are most naturally pointed out is perhaps better.—Should the Cape be ours once more, and did no very powerfull Interest, which you could not refuse, step before him, I would venture to say that *no governor* you could choose

[1] George, first Earl Macartney (1737–1806), Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, 1796–8.

[2] Andrew Barnard (died 1807) was appointed Colonial Secretary to Lord Macartney in 1796.

[3] Sir George Yonge in 1799 resigned the office of Master of the Mint to become Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. He was relieved of his office on account of maladministration in 1801.

from amongst the *untry'd* ones who may Solicit you; would be likely to make as good an one as Mr. Barnard.—To this my ambition points for him,—but at the same time if that should not be attainable, let me at least *Lean* to your friendship not to supercede him in his own office as Colonial Secretary for any new person.—A life of *Business* is to him *become a life of pleasure*, and wherever he can be happy I am ready to go.—I should prefer staying at home if any elegible appointment of *business* united with emolument was given to Mr. Barnard but if he is not so fortunate as to obtain that soon, like Lord Cornwallis I am ready to lay my bones down at the foot of the Table Mountain if my duty calls me there, and it is mine to accompany him as governor's wife, or Secretary's wife (whichever you please to make me) as the whole study of his life is to make me happy.

Pardon a letter of so much Egotism—I can't well help it—let Cecy [1] see it, that her kind heart may be my *allied army* on which I can better depend for *co-operation* than on Austrians or Prussians. If you keep it amongst your letters of solicitation, scratch out the first paragraph for the sake of prudence. I add no more than my Blessing on you in your new calling and the assurance that I ever am

Affectionately yours
ANNE BARNARD.

[P.S.] Mr. Barnard mentioned to me his intentions of waiting on you yesterday—I begged him to allow me to write a few lines to you first—but I have not read this letter to him, tho' he knows its purport.[2]

ADMIRAL SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

"*Pompée*," *Plymouth: February* 12, 1806

I cannot leave England, though in the act of weighing for that purpose, without giving you a proof of adherence

[1] Mrs. Windham. [2] Add. MSS. 37916 f. 7.

by expressing how much I am gratified at finding you again in the ministry, and particularly so, at seeing *you* at the head of the department directing the operations of the War in which we are so honourably engaged.

I am anxious to receive your instructions in continuation of those under which I am acting from Lord Castlereagh, copies of which I presume Mr. Cooke [1] will furnish you.

Called upon by Lord Nelson (in consequence, as he told me, of his suggestion to Mr. Pitt in which he agreed), and offer'd the command of his inshore squadron in the Mediterranean, with full powers to act as circumstances might render practicable in attacking the enemy in their own harbours, and in their coast *communications* both by *sea* and *land*, I accepted this honourable post and the *Pompée* was selected to bear my flag. Mr. Congreve's rockets [2] and Mr. Francis' submarine exploding carcasses; with twelve double galleys like the South Sea canoes, calculated for rowing, sailing and landing field-pieces and infantry in a surf, were annexed to my command for this sort of amphibious service. Ten light six pounders and ten light three pounders on a very simple and good principle introduced by Mr. Roebuck, were begun and must by this time be finished. The Navy Board received the Admiralty order for the construction of ten double galleys larger than those at Dover; these are in train. The *Atalanta* cutter was bought as a laboratory store vessel: the *Nile* cutter was purchased to be commanded by Mr. Johnson, the crew to be selected by him from among the smugglers on the coast, who are allowed additional pay to induce them to relinquish their trade, which is so injurious to the revenue. Emissaries were sent to the enemy's coast to get intelligence of the movements in the enemy's ports—

[1] Edward Cooke (1755–1820), a friend of Castlereagh's, subsequently Under-Secretary for War.

[2] William Congreve (1772–1828), an official in the Royal Laboratory, invented the rocket named after him; succeeded his father as (second) baronet 1814.

and a certain sum, £30,000, was imprested to me by the First Lord of the Admiralty's order to the Comptroller of the Navy. All this is in train and can be set in motion by the fiat of government through Lord Collingwood, my present commander-in-chief, to whom I was directed to explain all that passed in Downing Street, when Lord Nelson, Mr. Francis, Mr. Congreve and myself attended at Lord Castlereagh's office and met Mr. Pitt. I have referr'd to Lord Grenville to know if my destination is to be turned into simply blocking Cadiz or, what is worse, being blockaded by Spanish Gunboats in Gibraltar, where we have not enough to cope with them. Surely Lord Nelson's death ought not to operate so disadvantageously to us as to change our system into a simple and passive one of defence, when active offensive operations towards destroying the enemy's *means of annoying us and our allies* are so much more efficacious to that end. I need not expatiate on this head to you. We have worked together under that system, and have together lamented the counteraction of official difficulties at home, which are obstacles far more insurmountable than anything the enemy can do to oppose us. I will hope these will no longer exist, and I anxiously wait your answer to this to know whether I am to expect to be set at liberty and enabled *to go to work:* if not, anybody that likes the jog trot System (and there are many) may as well take my station, for they would do better in it than one who does not like it. I am on the point of sailing, as the wind, though not fair, is moderate enough to enable me to make way to the westward. Any letter sent to the Admiralty, to Admiral Young,[1] Port-Admiral here, or under cover to Mr. Chamberlayne, our agent for packets at Lisbon, by the Falmouth mail will reach me, *via* Gibraltar.

I shall soon be in a climate more congenial to my health than this. I feel the cold weather enough to be anxious to get nearer the sun. I reckon myself, however, to be

[1] Admiral Sir William Young (1751–1821).

in better working order than I was last year. If you will mention any particular point of information you wish from the southward, I have means of obtaining, furnished me by my host of *Rouen* through General Willot, who has still the means of getting information from the South of France. He is going to Lisbon and from thence to America to quit the political carreer altogether, as promising little in his opinion. I cannot help thinking times will come when French generals will have to rally round opposite standards in the immense Empire of which *France* (properly so called) is beginning to be a small part. Knowing Bonaparte as I know him, I can easily imagine his thirst to realise a *speculation manquée* on Constantinople and the route to India. He cannot fail to find it increase on being nearer to the capital of the Eastern Empire than he is to his own. He will be surrounded by *Polish* adventurers and *Venetian* navigators of the Black Sea, who will suggest plans of shutting the Russians out of the Mediterranean, attacking Sebastopol, &c. These he will propose in a dictatorial style to the Porte, backed by his submissive slave Austria, and, in case of their refusal, he will send his Egyptian renegado comrade Menon with an army to garrison Byzantium and the Dardanelles, while his Venetian flotilla creeps along the coast of the Morea and carries sailors to man the Turkish fleet, by way of balancing his loss at Trafalgar. All this he can do if he is not counteracted. It would be play for any body to prevent it *at first;* it will be a giant's labour to eradicate them from the Hellespont and Bosphorus, if they once establish themselves there. I dare say I shall be looked to for the Herculean labour when the difficulties of it *are found*; but I trust, after the manner in which my brother and I have been flouted and thwarted that I shall not be expected to volunteer my services under the direction of any person totally ignorant of Turkey or any one that may have acquired the knowledge they may have by travelling the road explored and beaten flat

for them by our labour. My conviction that I shall have to go higher up the Mediterranean than Gibraltar at any rate, to counteract French armaments destined eastward, occasioned me to accept the offer of a French commissary, whose name is enclosed, to correspond with me from Toulon, by such means as he should find when he got there, in a cypher he has settled with me. He is one of those my brother and I saved from the Bagnio at Constantinople ; he has no confidence in him or any of his stamp nor do I place any more than taking my chance of his keeping his word, he being to be paid according to the value of what information he sends and his punctuality. Lord Castlereagh got him a fat post from the transport office to go to Bath to get him clear of the others at Winchester. A renewal of the same for a month would keep him still clear of them, and then, if you approve of this scheme, his release as a noncombattant with any others of that description would enable him to go to Toulon and we might have a chance of his being a check to the intelligence obtained from other quarters and the others would act as a check on his.—I reckon Wilmot to have better means than anybody in the south, but Party men mix all their intelligence with speculations in favour of their party and think of them only.[1]

William Cobbett *to* William Windham

Botley : February 23, 1806

I have just received a letter from Mr. Wright, stating the substance of a communication from you, intended to be made to me, in order to save you the trouble of writing a letter to the same purport. The man who brings the letters to this Village does not stay here above half an hour. He is now gone back to Southampton, and was indeed gone before my arrival here, which was not half an hour ago ; but such is the impression upon my mind pro-

[1] Add. MSS. 37852 f. 119.

duced by the letter of Wright that I cannot help sending off something to-night, in the hope that, by the means of a parcel sent to Wright by the mail coach, it may have the good fortune to reach you to-morrow. I propose setting off back again to-morrow, or on Tuesday; but I cannot lay my head down upon the pillow until I have given an expression to those feelings, with which my mind is impressed.

As to the *Plan*,[1] as it was submitted to your wisdom, to your superior understanding and judgement, I leave it entirely to you; reserving to myself the right of stating, in my *Register*, the reasons whereon I could have desired to see the whole of this plan adopted. I regret that you should have thought it necessary to say that there was "no intention *to deprive me of the merit* of the suggestion." I am not aware that any part of my conduct has been calculated to cause a belief, either that I was likely to entertain such a suspicion, or that I should be anxious to appropriate to myself any such merit. In communicating the plan I had no other view than that of rendering a service to the country, and of saving you some little trouble; and in the note which I, in great haste and too great carelessness perhaps, wrote to you on Friday evening, I really only meant to get the plan back as an article for the *Register*, upon the supposition, which I sincerely entertained, that, upon the whole, it had been thought to be of no use. I no less sincerely rejoice to find that you approve of some parts, at least, of the plan. Of course it remains with you, and with my anxious wish to see it adopted.

The other parts of your communication give me great pain; because, though Wright merely repeats what was said to him, there is, so running through the whole of his language and his manner, such an evident appearance

[1] Windham's Bill for improving the Military Establishment of the country by a system of seven years' service, etc., which he introduced in the House of Commons on April 3.

of sorrow that, when I consider his personal regard for me, his profound respect for you, and his pride at having been occasionally the channel between us, I cannot help concluding that the impression upon his mind was that, on account of the article relative to Lord Grenville, I had incurred your serious displeasure. The existence of this truth would, whatever and however momentary might be the cause, have deeply affected me, whose chief pride it has been to endeavour to further your views, and whose almost sole consolation has been the possessing of your countenance and your friendship. What, then, must be my feelings, when, upon a deliberate consideration of all I have said with respect to Lord Grenville, and even after having heard your sentiments upon the subject, I cannot think myself justified, either in justice or in policy, to retract one word of what I have said, or so to act in future as if I had fallen into error ; being fully convinced, that all I have said is perfectly true, and perfectly proper to be said. The question relating to the Auditorship is open to the judgement of the world. With regard to the fact on the point of talents, that is matter of mere opinion ; and, as to the motive for stating it, I will not disguise, either to you or to the world, that it was to begin preparing the public mind for a watchfulness over him, for a hesitation in applauding his measures relative to finance and other matters ; and this, because, I think, I clearly perceive; from the manner in which he has begun, and from the retention of so many of the Pitt sect about him and in every department within the reach of his influence, an intention, by no means equivocally indicated, to preserve, in spirit at least, the accursed system which I hope to see annihilated, and which, if not annihilated, I am fully persuaded will annihilate the liberties of the people first, and next the independence of the country. Besides, Sir, there really does appear to me, and I cannot help saying it, something like inconsistency in attaching any degree of importance to my promulgated opinions, at

the very time that my opinions communicated in private seem to be looked upon as entirely unworthy of notice; an instance of which last is strikingly afforded in the fate of my application with regard to Freeling.[1] I have proved this man to have been guilty of a gross violation of the law; I have proved him to be the oppressor of myself and of every man connected with the press and not of the Pitt faction or race; you and Lord Grenville and every one else must know that we have long and patiently laboured under the tyranny of this man's partial execution of his most important office, and now, when we had a right to expect redress, or at least relief, must it not be thought galling to meet with a refusal, or with silence and neglect ten thousand times more humiliating than a refusal? My application was made upon public and perfectly fair and honourable grounds. I asked for nothing but common justice for myself and others; I asked for relief from oppression exercised by the most wicked of the Pitt agents; and, if I asked for benefit in the new appointments, it was in favour of a man most eminently entitled to it, on the ground of his public services, services, in the oversetting of the Pitts, surpassed by those of no one man in the kingdom. But, leaving all these circumstances out of the question, supposing that, upon the mere ground of my own pretensions, I had asked for the dismission of Freeling for the sole purpose of making way for a person of my recommending, was this request too high for me? Was it above the level of my fair pretensions? Was the making of it a mark of presumption that merited no other answer than that of significant silence? Perhaps it was. I do not say that it was not. I do not say that I have not overrated the value of my talents and my services and my political friendship; but this I do say, that, if this object was above the worth of my friendship, my hostility (supposing me to have discovered it) must be far too

[1] *See* vol. ii, p. 287 of this work.

contemptible to be worthy of notice. I have mentioned this instance, Sir, merely as an illustration of my meaning, and as a specimen of those thoughts which have been passing through my mind, begging leave to add, however, that by nothing of this sort have I been, or will I suffer myself to be, influenced in anything that I have said, or shall say, of the characters of the ministry, or of the nature or the tendency of their measures.

Wright states that you appeared extremely vexed at the prevalence, or supposed prevalence of an opinion that "all the most *violent* parts" of the *Register* were either written or suggested by you; and that this fact had been corroborated by the observation of Mr. Amyot. Without wishing to detract in the smallest degree from the critical judgment of Mr. Amyot, I must confess, that I am vain enough to think that, having so long been obliged to listen to the cant of the most despicable of our opponents, he has mistaken *strength* for *violence*; and I must further confess myself proud enough to hope that, from having my writings imputed to him, no man's character has ever suffered an injury. You will, moreover, I am sure, do me the justice to allow, that I have neglected nothing calculated to remove every such impression; and, in this way, I am ready to do anything further that you may think necessary.

In conclusion, I have only time to beg you to excuse the slovenliness of this letter; that you will, as you peruse it, bear in mind the haste and the other circumstances under which it has been written; and that you will, above all things, believe that I cherish the hope, always amongst the dearest to my heart, that I shall still be thought worthy of your friendship.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 218.

WILLIAM COBBETT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Parson's Green: March 9, 1806

Your letter of yesterday, which Mr. Wright has just brought me hither, imperiously demanding an answer from me, I will just observe, first, as to the statement relative to Mr. Penn and Freeling, contained in your letter of the 6th instant, it left my feelings as well as my opinion upon the subject just what they were at the date of the letter which I last troubled you with from Botley; and, in adverting to the proposed removal of Freeling, I shall dismiss that subject for ever with observing that I wish with all my heart that Lord Grenville may never be "guilty of baseness" greater than that which would have been visible in a measure so pertinaciously recommended by me; to which I will add an expression of my utter astonishment that, in your opinion, the having been an over-active, zealous, and officious partizan of the Pitt administration, is, and ought to be, a ground whereon to claim protection from the person at the head of a ministry of which you form a part.

In answer to your letter of yesterday, I beseech you to dismiss from your mind the idea, if there it be, that the acknowledgement you have now made was at all necessary; for, though I am now by no means anxious to prevent a diminution of that gratitude which you so explicitly avow, justice to myself calls upon me to declare that, in nothing which was said at the close of the *Register* referred to, was an allusion made to you; but that I had in my mind, generally, the haughty and arrogant family who are now famishing to swallow up the state, and, particularly, the most haughty and arrogant of them (Temple), who had, I had heard, been so foolish and so insolent as to speak of me in a manner which called aloud for the declaration that I made.

Upon a survey of all that has passed since the change of ministry, I perceive little that now remains to be said.

The causes of my dissatisfaction, other than those stated in print, have been freely stated to you; and, as to the private part of this statement, it has been made by way of defence rather than from complaint. Had there been no remonstrance as to my publications, I should not have condescended to complain of neglect; but, as it became necessary to speak upon the subject, it behoved me to speak out, and to say that which I will now repeat in one short sentence; namely, that, when I consider what I have done and what I am able to do, and when I compare the treatment of myself with that which is experienced by such men as—who shall I say? Craufurd, or Elliot, for instance; when I thus consider and thus compare, conscious superiority beats at my breast, and bids me turn from such treatment with disdain.

For myself I not only *ask nothing*, but I took the earliest possible opportunity of apprizing you of my resolution to *accept of nothing;* and this, too, upon such grounds as must have put you quite at your ease upon my account. You may well know that my wife had a brother and a father in the army, both of them fair objects of promotion; you knew that I had expressed, formerly, an anxiety to see them promoted; and you would be at no loss to perceive how grateful it must have been to me to be the cause of their promotion. Yet, even here, one of the points nearest to my heart, I forbore to awaken your recollection. I never should have attempted to do it and do it now only because the time for its having effect is for ever past. What I asked, was asked upon grounds purely public and disinterested; and the refusal, especially when joined with the avowed motive and the manner, gave rise to those feelings which I have expressed to you, which I still entertain, and of which, unless experience should prove a great teacher of humility, I shall never divest myself. In my public conduct, however, I shall, I hope, always have virtue enough to prevent these feelings from having, towards any one, a very powerful effect, and, with

regard to you, my heart very much deceives me if I shall not always act under the impression of those sentiments; which I expressed at the close of my last letter, and with which I remain,

Sir,

Your most humble and most obdt. sert.,

WM. COBBETT.[1]

GEORGE III. *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Windsor Castle: March 29, 1806

The King cannot conceal the serious concern with which He has received Mr. Windham's Proposal for establishing throughout the Army a limited Period of Service, and before He sanctions such a Measure, He thinks it necessary to make a few Observations upon it which He trusts will have due weight with His Cabinet.

His Majesty must, in Times like the present, deprecate the Idea of any Innovation which affects in so material a degree the Constitution and the entire System of so important a Branch of the Administration, and cannot but recommend that the greatest Caution should be observed in trying Experiments, which may wholly fail in their Success. While the Operation of such Experiments must be lasting, the Effects, when once adopted, however pernicious they may prove, cannot be removed, and may possibly be productive of the greatest Inconvenience to the Country and of the most serious Checks to the effective State and Discipline of the Army, which, at no former period, had acquired so great a degree of excellence, and in which the acknowledged Amendment has resulted from the persevering Attention of many Years.

When such Uncertainty is placed in Competition with a State of progressive Improvement which is generally admitted, His Majesty considers it the Duty of His

[1] Add. MSS. 37853 f. 225.

Ministers to pause before they adopt a Measure which may endanger the future Existence of the State and cannot hereafter be recalled.

The King laments that Mr. Windham has not, in the Adoption and the Prosecution of this Plan, paid some regard to the Objections stated by the Commander-in-Chief, supported, as His Majesty is well aware they have been, by the Concurrent Opinions and Arguments of the Generality of those Officers, whose acknowledged Talents and Reputation, whose long Experience, active Service in various Ranks and Climates, and whose trust and Zealous Attachment to the Army and to their Country, constitute Claims to consideration which ought not, upon this Occasion, to be set aside.

It appears very doubtful whether the proposed Measure will have the expected Influence on the Mind of that description of Man who enters into the Army; but it cannot be denied that it is Calculated to weaken materially the Principles of Attachment and Respect for His Officer; which has hitherto marked the Character and Conduct of the British Regular Soldier, that Sense of Duty which arises from finding that He has decidedly and exclusively devoted Himself to the Service of His Country in a Line of Life to which alone He can look for future support as the Reward of faithful Services: for a short Period of Service must progressively destroy Ties, which have hitherto been strengthened by its Duration, and must naturally produce a degree of Uneasiness very detrimental to Discipline and proportionally destructive of the Influence of the Officer. This Observation is confirmed by experience of the Comparative Authority which the Officers of Regular Regiments and those of the Militia possess over their respective Men.

His Majesty considers it unnecessary to touch upon the incalculable Inconveniences which must result to every Arrangement for distant and Colonial Service from the Measure; they are obvious, and unfortunately, so far from

Rosenberg, delt. *Stadler, sculpt*

GEORGE III. IN THE 74TH YEAR OF HIS AGE

offering a prospect of Diminution in the progress of the System, they must continually increase.

In this Respect there is no Analogy between the service of this Country and that of Foreign Powers, whose Military Constitution has often been adduced as an Argument in Support of a Limitation in the Period of Inlistment; and in many other points of view the System is as little applicable.—In Foreign Countries, when the Approach of War, or any other sudden Emergency, requires a Considerable Increase of the Military Establishment, the Sovereign may enforce the Inlistment of any required Proportion of the Population, and may again call for the Services of every Man who had been discharged and had retired to his Home at the expiration of the period for which he had been engaged; the Augmentation of the Army is consequently instantaneous and no degree of uncertainty attaches to it.—The Constitution of this Country offers no such Resource for the Augmentation of its regular Force; a Peace of short Continuance may cause a Reduction in the Army, which may deprive the Country of its Means of Defence, and these cannot again be produced at the, perhaps unexpected, altho' too probable Renewal of Hostilities, whilst any Attempt to enforce a Continuance of the Services of these Men whose Period is expiring may cause Discontent and Mutiny, of which the Consequences may be fatal to the very Existence of the Country.—It must be further observed that even in the Services where a limited Period is established; it has been found necessary not to allow of the Expiration of it in Time of War, and a Reference to the last Militia list will point out the Inconvenience which has, during War, resulted, even in that Description of Force, from the very Measure which is now submitted with a view to the greater efficiency of the Regular Army.—His Majesty, therefore; cannot but take it for granted that in the Measure which is now proposed, it is not intended that the Service of any Soldier shall be suffered to expire

in time of War, and that in this Respect at least, the extreme Inconvenience which would result from the Necessity of removing Regiments, or a considerable Proportion of them, from distant Possessions has been adverted to.

Admitting that, as in the present Instance the Proposal is not meant to affect that actual Proportion of the Army whose Service is unlimited, it shall not weaken the existing Means of Defence, it will nevertheless produce to a greater extent than ever a Distinction of Service, of which the Inconveniences have already been at times so seriously felt, and which has caused in many Instances comparisons of relative Situation and consequent discontent and uneasiness in the Mind of the private Soldier.

The King has thus stated a few of the many Objections which have occurred to Him; but He must observe that, although He considers that part of Mr. Windham's Plan which proposes a Limitation in the Period of Service to be pregnant with the most serious Evils, and calculated to create Difficulties which can in no degree be counterbalanced by its expected and very uncertain Advantages; it is by no Means His Intention to embarrass His Ministers by withholding His Acquiescence in the Measure; if, after considering these Objections, they shall still persist in venturing to undertake one so doubtful and hazardous. —At the same time, whilst His Majesty declares that; from the Anxiety which He shall ever feel for the Welfare and Prosperity of His People, He will be foremost in rejoycing in the Success of any Measure which may be brought forward as conducive to that essential Object, He desires His Ministers will remember, if they should be disappointed in their expectation of the Advantages which they conceive to be connected with the present Measure, that He had stated His Objections and Doubts when it was proposed.

The King does not object to an Increase of the Allowance to the Out-Pensioners of Chelsea, to some Increases

to the Pay of the Subaltern Officers of the Army, as well as those of higher Rank in Cases where it may seem necessary; and He equally agrees to the proposed Augmentation of the Pensions to the Widows of Officers, and of the Allowance on the Compassionate List.

His Majesty further acquiesces in the Proposal for increasing the Pay of the Soldier at stated Periods, and to his enjoying the Contingent Advantages which are specified on his succeeding to Chelsea; but His Majesty considers that, in either case, whether the Service be for Life or limited, fourteen years is too short a period to authorize His retiring upon His Pension or a Transfer to a Veteran Battalion, unless the Soldier shall, after such period, prove unfit for more active Service; nor indeed does the King think that, in allowing him to retire upon a Pension of One Shilling per day after Twenty One Years Service, the Country should be precluded from calling upon him for further exertions, if capable of them and they should prove necessary.

With a view to the Augmentation of the Regular Army, the King cannot object to the Proposal that the Militia should gradually revert to its original Establishment, and that it should hereafter be allowed universally to volunteer for the Line; but, upon this Occasion, His Majesty considers it due to the Militia to state His Opinion of the Respectability of that description of Force and His Sense of the zealous and important Service which it has rendered during four Successive Wars, in the latter of which particularly, adverting to the relative Situation of France, it has proved a Means of Security which no other Resource could have provided at periods of sudden Emergency. If, therefore, this force is to be kept up at all, the King thinks that it should be placed upon a respectable and efficient footing.

His Majesty will receive with pleasure any Proposal which may tend to a Reduction in the expence of the Volunteer System and to render it more efficient towards

the Defence and Security of the Country, and He is confident that it is unnecessary for Him to point out to His Ministers how desirable it is that, in any arrangement which regards the Volunteers, they should be cautious of giving Disgust to those Individuals who have come forward from Motives of Zeal and Attachment to their Country and not from Considerations of personal Interest.

The King approves of the Proposal for training a part of the Population of the Country upon the Basis of the Levy in Mass Act.

His Majesty cannot conclude without expressing a hope that the additional Advantages held out to the Private Soldiers, the Augmentation which may be expected from a partial Reduction of the Militia and Volunteers, and the Benefits which, it is thought, will result from the Operation of the Levy in Mass Act, will effectually tend to the Accomplishment of the great Object in view, without having recourse to a Measure which His Majesty has already stated to be in His Opinion so Objectionable and so dangerous, and which, although repeatedly agitated, has so often been abandoned upon mature Consideration of the Difficulties which attach to it.

GEORGE R.[1]

LORD GRENVILLE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Camelford House: April 16, 1806

I hope I need not *say* (but that my whole conduct has *proved*) how many motives I feel for seconding to the best of my power any object for which you are as anxious as you seem to be on this subject.[2]

But you must allow me to say to you fairly that I have not yet had to propose to the King any one thing to which my own judgment is so decidedly adverse as it is to this: and that I cannot help asking myself what grounds can

[1] Add. MSS. 37842 f. 20.

[2] The appointment of Sir John Coxe Hippisley as a Privy Councillor.

be found to justify to myself, and much more to him, a request which is totally unprecedented, and which appears to me so very inconvenient to his Service.

It is proposed to create a new precedent of bringing into the Privy Council a person without any official claim, and in whose behalf you yourself now state nothing but a considerable fortune and a general zeal for the King's Service.

This has never yet been done in England. It had been done in Ireland, and with so much inconvenience that, as you will know, one of the special instructions that the Duke of Bedford [1] carries out with him is that he should positively resist every such application. How can we require him to do this in Ireland, alledging a general principle to which we have bound him, if we ourselves, a fortnight after his departure, break thro' that same principle, not in Ireland where it has often been violated; but in England where it never has ?

Then consider next, if the rule is to be violated now for the first time, is the person in question the first, or nearly the first, of the class who ought to be thus introduced into the Council ? How many Peers are there of the first rank in the Country, how many commoners of much older families, much larger fortunes, all of pretensions in every possible shape superior to his ? And what line is to be taken as to all these ? You cannot, I am sure, wonder (if you will only candidly reflect on the multiplied inconvenience which such a step would bring upon the Government generally, and upon myself individually) that I must desire to converse with you again, and seriously, on the subject, before I do a thing where the gratification to the individual, be his merits what they may, bears no proportion to the trouble and mischief to which we are to subject ourselves. Now as to Lord Auckland.—I do not wish to set up his opinions or wishes in opposition to

[1] John Russell, sixth Duke of Bedford (1766–1839), Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland 1806–7.

yours. There is no comparison of the sort, and you cannot suspect me of making it. But I owe to Lord Auckland, as to every other person joined in office with us, the common attentions due to the station which I have proposed it to him to occupy, and, if you could for a moment place yourself in his situation, I would ask you what you would feel, placed at the head of the Board of Trade, to have had a fresh person brought there without even the civility of a previous intimation, giving him the opportunity of stating personal objections, if any such he has, against the individual to be joined in official habits and daily intercourse with him.

This however is not the main point.—It relates only to the *mode* of doing the thing, and I have no reason to think that Lord Auckland has any such objections. My difficulties are to the substance, and *that* I must talk over with you again before I can take any step in it.[1]

William Windham *to* Lord Grenville

May 15, 1806

I must return to the charge upon the subject of my friend Hippisley, especially after what you said of consulting the wishes of Lord Auckland.

I really cannot consent that the wishes of Lord Auckland, or any one, are to have anything to do in this : even [if] it had not been a point settled ; and as to the King, after the many *gulps* that he has taken, the peerages, the Earldoms, the Baronetcies, the Jobs without number, that he has swallowed, it will be very odd if he should be choked at last by the appointing a person who is a Baronet; a member of Parliament, a man of near on £10,000 a year, honourably acquired, and of very marked qualifications for the situation in question, to a seat at the Committee of Council. It must be great want of

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 51.

skill in the hand that administers the dose; and which I put therefore entirely out of the question.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* GEORGE III.

May 29, 1806

Mr. Windham, having been misled in the information which he received respecting Your Majesty's intention of being in town yesterday, was deprived of that opportunity of submitting to Your Majesty an alteration which it has been proposed to introduce into the Military Plan formerly laid before Your Majesty,[2] and which, it is hoped, will remove part of the objection which, as Your Majesty's servants found to their extreme grief, was entertained by Your Majesty against that Measure.

It is now proposed that, with Your Majesty's approbation, the right of prolonging the soldier's service in case of War should be extended to a period of not less than two or three years, whereby it is hoped that the danger to be apprehended from a sudden discharge of soldiers during war will be so much diminished as to be no longer an object of uneasiness.

Mr. Windham would, moreover, humbly suggest that, in conformity to an opinion seeming to be entertained by Your Majesty, the allowance to be given to soldiers after 14 years' service might; in any regulations which Your Majesty should think fit to lay down, be changed from sixpence to fourpence a day, which, at the same time that it might contribute to give a general impression of the advantages attached to the condition of a soldier's life, would not be sufficient to draw from the service men who had in prospect the much higher pension which would accrue after seven more years, making the last for which their service would be required.

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 57.

[2] A proposal in the House of Commons on May 30 to introduce a clause for Limited Service in the annual Mutiny Bill.

It will be a subject of inexpressible consolation to Mr. Windham if, by these alterations and others which may at all times be introduced, the Measure should appear hereafter to Your Majesty less liable to objection than it is to be feared that hitherto it has done.[1]

GEORGE III. *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Windsor Castle: May 30, 1806

The King cannot but approve of any Alterations in the proposed Military Plan now depending before Parliament which tend to lengthen the Period of Service, and His Majesty will ever view with pleasure any thing that can amend it, although He has reluctantly acquiesced in the Change of a System with which He was Himself perfectly satisfied.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

June 16, 1806

I have been prevented by various causes from writing to you on the subject of the Agency to the Cape: but principally by the wish of informing myself more particularly of the circumstances of the case, which I must regret that I had not sooner enquired into.

My note, to which you refer, certainly implied that upon that as well as upon every point of patronage, I should be happy to consider your general wants of the Government, and to bend myself, whenever I could, to your wishes. More than this, as far as I can recollect, was not said in respect even to the appointment itself, and still less was said as implying any doubt as to the right, on which, after the best enquiry and consideration, I cannot find that any doubt is to be entertained. The transition, therefore, you must allow was rather quick from this state of things to the disposal of the place, and the disposal of it

[1] Add. MSS. 37842 f. 33. [2] Add. MSS. 37842 f. 35.

as of a place regularly and properly in the disposal of the Treasury.

The loss of the place is to me a very serious consideration, as it deprives me of the only means within the compass of my own patronage of providing for some for whom I am particularly anxious, and who could not be benefited by any appointment which I might have to offer abroad. But the question of right is that to which I attach still greater consequence, because it involves considerations which, if not absolutely points of honour and duty, are not without effect on the character of the person who happens to be concerned in them. It is not pleasant to stand recorded in an office as the Chief in whose time patronage was lost to the office, which had never been called in question during the time of any of his predecessors. The reason ought to be strong that can supersede, in cases of this sort, a practice long continued, and it seems to me that reason here, instead of opposing, is so perfectly on the side of practice that I cannot but flatter myself you must have been led from the beginning into some entirely wrong view of the case.

The plain and broad distinction is between Agents appointed and paid here to transact the business of Colonies, for which there are parliamentary grants, and Agents appointed and paid abroad, and paid out of the Revenues of the Colonies; to transact their business with the various departments of Government in cases where there are no parliamentary grants. The former class of agents have, as was natural, always been appointed by the Treasury :—the latter have as naturally and, I believe, as constantly, been appointed by the Colonial Governments. The question between the Treasury and the Colonial department here, with respect to these latter agents, if any question could arise, would not be who should appoint, but who should recommend. They have neither of them any right of appointing at all ; and accordingly, in the case of those Settlements where there

are Assemblies, neither the one nor the other have any share in the procuring the nomination. But in those cases where the Government resides in a Single Person, or is confined to a number who owe their appointment, more or less, to a Department here, there the influence of that department finds its way, and the appointment is substantially made at home, tho' formally by the Government upon the spot. Nothing can prove this more decisively than the form of proceeding now proposed, by which I am desired to write a letter to the present Government of the Cape reciting that an agent is necessary for transacting various business of the Colony in this Country, and requesting that he will appoint the person recommended to him for that office. This has been the invariable course, and with such a course established, it seems impossible to say that the Agency of the Cape is in the nomination of the Treasury, otherwise than as the same might be said of every appointment under every department of Government.

It can as little be said that the nomination of these Agents (*i.e.*, the recommendation of them to the several Colonial Governments) has in fact been in the Treasury, though it may have formally passed through this Office. The enclosed list contains the names of all the Persons, five in number, who now hold situations of the sort in question, some of whom have been appointed more than once, and all of whom will be found by those who know their connections, to have been the nominations of Persons who were at the head of the Colonial department. If a doubt could arise in the case of Huskisson,[1] who was equally protected by Lord Melville and Mr. Pitt, that consideration would, on the other hand, do away the idea of any management having been necessary on the part of Lord Melville to secure the appointment to Huskisson as to a Friend of his own, and the date of his first appointment, as well as the testimony of those perfectly ac-

[1] A former Agent at the Cape.

quainted with the transaction, would equally prove that in the form of the proceeding there was no view to the object of rendering the appointment compatible with a seat in Parliament. The form, in fact, is no other than that which it is proposed to follow now, and which has been followed in all former instances.

I am really, therefore, and seriously, at a loss to conceive on what ground this supposed right of nomination on the part of the Treasury can be made to rest : unless, as I said, in the same way in which it may be made to apply to the present or any other appointment thro' this and every other department. It certainly has not been acted upon for a period of now several years, and for a succession of not less than five Secretaries. It has not been shewn that it was ever acted upon ; but if it should, I must lament that, after so long an interval, it should just have been revived in my time.

I say this without the least suspicion of any want on your part of the kindest and most friendly feelings towards me, but with a view only to what must necessarily be the effect, namely, that of exhibiting me in the situation in which I cannot consent to stand, of yielding from weakness or facility, or from whatever other cause, what no one had ever obtained, or appears even to have asked from my predecessors.

It is sufficiently distressing to me to part with the present nomination, valuable as it would have been to me for the reasons I have stated : But tho', by a progress not now necessary to be traced, that proceeding is gone to an extent from which it may not be capable of being easily recalled, I cannot consent to the completion of it, either in the way proposed, or in any other, unless it shall be clearly understood that, in so doing, *I* establish no precedent, either against the Office or myself, with respect to any future appointment of the same sort.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 87.

THE BISHOP OF NORWICH[1] *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Norwich: September 1, 1806

The University of Oxford can, in my opinion, never elect any man as their representative in Parliament who is, in every point of view, so well qualified as yourself. I have most certainly always thought, and I always said, this, and had I a hundred votes, they should be at your service. With respect to the canvass, which is unfortunately going on in the county of Norfolk, my professional situation and some peculiar circumstances (with the nature of which it is not worth while to trouble you) make it advisable for me not to take any part, notwithstanding my personal regard for Mr. Coke, the obligations I am under to him, and the very high respect which I have for his character. As far as you are concerned, allow me to say, and I say it with great truth, that, if eminent talents and unblemished integrity be passports to success, you cannot fail of it.[2] My eldest son hath a vote, and more than a month since he promised, I know, to support Mr. Coke in the first instance and afterwards to assist Mr. Wodehouse, who is connected with my family. It was not then known that Sir Jacob Astley intended to decline the contest. What part my son would have taken, had he been acquainted with your design of offering yourself a candidate, I really do not know, but I do know that he agrees with me in thinking very highly of you.[3]

[1] Henry Bathurst (1744–1837); appointed Bishop of Norwich in 1805.

[2] At the General Election in October 1806, Windham and Coke offered themselves for the County of Norfolk, and after six days' polling secured election. They were unseated under the Treating Acts for "two-pennyworth of bribery" which they had never committed. Windham was then returned for the Borough of New Romney.

[3] Windham's "Diary," p. 463.

LORD GRENVILLE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Private *September* 9, 1806

I certainly have every reason to agree with you in the wish of making the censure on Sir Sidney Smith as mild as possible, nor would I on any account urge you to a decision on the subject before you have given yourself time to consider the papers before us, which, I am sorry to say, are such as to have impressed my mind with the absolute necessity, on grounds of public duty, of our expressing a decided, tho' mild, disapprobation of the following points:

1. His having, without the concurrence of the King's Minister in Sicily, accepted a commission from that Government.

2. His having taken upon himself the command or direction (call it which we will) of an insurrection in Calabria destined to co-operate with a body of British troops under the command of a British General, in whom that direction ought, as far as it was fit to be assumed by any British officer, *exclusively* to have been vested.

And, 3rdly, this issuing and acting under the proclamation of the Court of Sicily, such as we have actually received, and are not therefore at liberty to doubt of its existence; or of its having been directly remonstrated against by the King's Minister in Sicily.

All these facts appear to be but too well established by Elliot's letter to Fox, by the copy of Sir Sidney's letters inclosed in that to Fox, and by the copy of the proclamation itself, transmitted to Lord Howick by Lord Collingwood.

But the censure may certainly be so worded as to attach only on the facts *supposing them to be such as they now appear.*

In point of form, there can, I think, be no doubt that this, which is matter of general and political direction, ought to

issue from the Secretary of State thro' the Admiralty, and not from the latter in the first instance.[1]

LORD GRENVILLE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Downing Street: September 19, 1806

When I mentioned to you a short time since the idea of your taking a peerage; I did it only in order to learn what your own sentiments were on the subject; and with the fullest desire that the question should be decided entirely by your wishes. Having expressed this feeling to you, and having learnt from you that your disposition was to decline the suggestion; I hope you will give me credit for the real pain which I feel from being obliged once more to bring the same idea under your consideration. I can with the greatest truth assure you that I do it with extreme reluctance; and those with whom I have communicated on the subject can bear me witness how anxiously I have laboured to find some suggestion that might relieve me from that necessity, and at the same time afford a reasonable prospect of forming some practicable frame of Government under our present difficulties. I have consulted with almost every one of our colleagues and it is with their concurrence, particularly with that of Lord Howick; Lord Sidmouth, Lord Spencer, and Lord Moira, that I now send you the inclosed statement which contains our united opinions on this interesting subject; and for myself I beg to assure you with the utmost sincerity that, if we are unable to obtain your concurrence to this proposal, I must abandon all hope of being able to offer to the King any plan for the formation of a Government out of the present materials. It was not untill I had ascertained the impossibility of doing this; that I could find myself at liberty to press upon you this proposal after you had declined it, but, being convinced that the fact is so, it is a duty which I owe no less to yourself than to the rest of our friends to state it; as it is.

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 111.

Statement referred to in the above Letter

In the state in which the Administration is placed by Mr. Fox's death,[1] the following arrangement is on the fullest consideration judged to afford the only practicable means of carrying on a Government composed of the same parties as at present.

Lord Howick	Foreign Seals with the lead in the House of Commons.
Mr. Grenville	Home do.
Lord Spencer	Admiralty.
Lord Fitzwilliam	Cabinet, but desires to retire from office.
Lord Sidmouth	Lord President.
Lord Holland	Privy Seal.
Mr. Tierney and Mr. Bragge	India Board and Mint.
Mr. Whitbread	Secretary at War, as soon as that office can be vacated by some professional office for General Fitzpatrick.

This arrangement rests for its foundation on the decided conviction of all the persons who are parties to it, that there is an indispensable necessity of placing Lord Howick and Mr. Grenville in the situation of Secretaries of State : and on the fullest persuasion that neither the just weight of the respective parties composing the Government, nor the fair benefit of their mutual co-operation, can be obtained under any distribution of office in which that object is not provided for. The subject has been repeatedly considered in this view, and every possible suggestion carefully examined, and it is on the deliberate result of that examination that this point is stated as absolutely indispensable to the formation of a Government to be composed of the present materials.

[1] Charles James Fox died September 13, 1806.

One only difficulty obstructs the immediate adoption of this plan ; and it is one, for the solution of which they are compelled to have recourse to the assistance and friendship of Mr. Windham. By the Civil List Act three Secretaries of State cannot sit together in the House of Commons. The removal of Lord Howick into the House of Lords will be so great an Evil, that no idea can be entertained of anticipating its necessary occurrence : that of Mr. Grenville is equally out of the question, as either of these steps would in the present moment defeat the sole object which renders these appointments necessary in the judgement of those by whom this subject has been so fully considered.

It is known to all the persons who are parties to this statement that a Peerage is not considered by Mr. Windham as an object desirable to himself. It is not, therefore, in that view that they can renew the suggestion which they understand to have already been made to him on that head. His known sentiments on this subject led them on the contrary to use every possible endeavour to frame some arrangement which might have put that proposal out of view. The whole time of the persons concerned and their whole attention has been occupied with this object : and the final decision has been postponed for it from day to day until nothing can now be suggested which has not been repeatedly reconsidered and until further delay is no longer practicable.

In this state it is that, with the greatest reluctance, they feel themselves obliged to recur to the same idea, as the only one by which the otherwise insurmountable difficulties in the way of any arrangement can be removed ; and they are compelled to ask from Mr. Windham's friendship whether he will not consent to it, not as an object in any way personally agreeable to himself, but as the greatest accommodation which can be afforded to those with whom he is connected in Government, and as the only means by which that Government can possibly

continue to subsist after the irreparable loss it has now sustained.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Arlington Street: September 19, 1806

Since Lord Sidmouth left me, at which time I had not received your letter and paper, I have been employed in some business not admitting of delay, relative to orders about troops, &c.

You will easily believe how much pain it gives me to resist a request urged on the score of so many publick and so many private considerations, the latter being of a sort to weigh with me quite as much in the present instance as the former. But there are points so deeply involving all one's future comforts and prospects, that no claims either of private friendship, which I beg you to feel assured is not wanting on this occasion, or of political duty can fairly call upon one to give up.

I am sorry to say that the present is one of them. If the question rested merely on my own private happiness, I am afraid it would not be possible for me to consent. But I feel that I should be making a sacrifice of credit, as well as of comfort, and that no explanation which could possibly be given, could put the transaction upon a footing on which I should stand as well in future, either in my own esteem, or in that of the publick.

One of the first points wanting is the conviction that the measure was necessary for any object of public benefit.

I cannot see what end could be answered by my removal to the House of Peers that would not equally be answered by my withdrawing altogether from an official situation, and I have not a hesitation in saying which of the two I should prefer. I must freely say, moreover, that I do not see what great advantage would be obtained by either

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 119.

arrangement. The whole difference seems to be, the more direct effect which your Brother[1] would have, as a representative of you, speaking in the situation of Secretary of State or in that of head of the Board of Control. Nothing has happened to make your weight less in the House of Commons than it was before.

On the contrary, as far as sides in the Government are to be considered, which happily they never yet have been, the immense deduction made recently from one side would naturally have the effect of throwing an additional preponderance into the other. The motive, therefore, does not seem to me to exist, and at all events would apply only to situations which are far distant, and of which for my own part I have never discovered the smallest trace.

But giving to this motive all the weight that could by possibility belong to it, and far more than I can persuade myself it possesses, I must, I fear, still say that, much as I would do from personal friendship to you, anxious as I am for the interests of the Administration, I cannot consent to a step so contrary to my most settled opinions, so destructive of all my private satisfaction, and so injurious, as I am convinced it would prove, to my general estimation in the Country.

With all deference to the authority of those whose opinions you quote, and with whose wishes as well as opinions I should be disposed to comply as much as with almost any that could be adduced, I must still remain incredulous in a great degree to the necessity of any step at all, but clearly convinced, as in a matter merely personal, that there is no way in which the difficulty would not be solved more satisfactorily to me than in the one proposed.[2]

[1] Thomas Grenville.

[2] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 125. Windham persisted in his refusal of a peerage and retained his office. Lord Howick succeeded Fox as Foreign Minister, and Thomas Grenville went to the Admiralty.

JOHN BRITTON [1] *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Tavistock Place, Russell Square, London
December 8, 1806

In my tour thro' Norfolk last Autumn, it was my intention to have paid my personal respects to you, and viewed your Seat for the purpose of describing the same in the Topographical Account of the County which I am preparing for the press. Illness and bad weather, however, compelled me to leave Norfolk much sooner than I intended, and I am now reduced to the alternative of soliciting some Topographical information from you respecting Felbrigg—or must adopt the matter, with conciseness—and variation, of some preceding writers. This I cannot but sincerely regret :—and have only to hope that you will have the goodness to favor me with such historical and descriptive account of your Seat, &c., as you may wish to see perpetuated in a popular literary work. It may not be irrelevant to apprize you that 3500 copies of our work are sold.[2]

One of the most troublesome matters with which the Ministry of "All the Talents" had to deal was the question of the Princess of Wales. The Princess had certainly behaved indiscreetly after her separation from the Prince, and her quondam friend, and neighbour at Blackheath, Lady Douglas, had brought matters to a head by uttering certain charges against her. The depositions of Lady Douglas could not be ignored, and a committee was appointed to make a "Delicate Investigation." The Commissioners (Lords Erskine, Spencer, Grenville, and Ellenborough) issued their report on July 14, 1806, and completely exonerated

[1] John Britton (1771–1857), author of "Beauties of Wiltshire," "Architectural Beauties of England and Great Britain," &c.
[2] Add. MSS. 37916 f. 59.

her Royal Highness from the more serious charges, but commented unkindly upon her indiscretion. In her defence on October 2 the Princess wrote, or caused Spencer Perceval to write for her, an eloquent letter to the King, demanding to be received at Court. No answer being forthcoming, on December 8 her Royal Highness wrote again, somewhat more peremptorily. The matter was serious, and the Cabinet, which had for some time had the matter under consideration, at last sent the King a Minute.[1]

Downing Street: December 23, 1806

Present :—The Lord Chancellor, Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Earl Fitzwilliam, Earl Spencer, Earl of Moira, Viscount Howick, Lord Henry Petty, Lord Grenville, Lord Ellenborough, Mr. Secretary Windham, Mr. Grenville.

Your Majesty's confidential Servants, in humble obedience to your Majesty's pleasure communicated to them thro' the Lord Chancellor that they should take into their consideration the whole of the proceedings connected with the enquiry which had been in the first instance entrusted to the Lord Chancellor, Earl Spencer, Lord Grenville and Lord Ellenborough, and with the most dutiful regard to the intimation which your Majesty at the same time condescended to make to them of the necessity of acting with the utmost care and caution in a matter of so delicate a nature, have perused and weighed with the most serious attention every part of the proceedings connected with that enquiry, and, however deeply they may regret the pain which any degree of delay in this subject may have occasioned to the feelings of Her Royal Highness, it is humbly submitted that they might have incurred the

[1] The whole story has recently been told in Melville's, "An Injured Queen," but the following documents are not included in that work.

GEORGE, PRINCE OF WALES
From a Hitherto Unpublished Pencil Drawing by John Smart, Jnr. (1807)
Presented by the Prince of Wales to the Hon. Mrs. Richard Walpole
In the Collection of Mr. Thomas Vade Walpole

blame of inattention to those feelings in other respects, if, under the succession of distressing events which have lately occurred to Her Royal Highness, any thing like precipitation had been shewn on their part, even if the grave and important nature of the subject under their consideration, and your Majesty's express commands, had not demanded the most careful deliberation.

Your Majesty's Servants feel themselves called upon to express to your Majesty that they find no ground to question the legal competence and sufficiency of the authority under which the Oath taken by the several witnesses examined in the course of that investigation was administered to them—That they cannot discover any just cause of complaint against the four Lords to whom this enquiry was entrusted, because, in a proceeding which from its nature was necessarily carried on merely *ex parte*, they did not think fit to call upon Her Royal Highness to suggest any thing in explanation or contradiction of the matter into which your Majesty had directed them to make such preliminary enquiries as were necessary in order to enable your Majesty to decide whether any and what further steps should be taken upon it—nor do they understand upon what pretence the Law Advisers of Her Royal Highness have thought fit to state that those Lords, when they had, as it is alleged, satisfied themselves of the falsehood of the principal charge and of the absence of all legal and substantive offence, had considered themselves empowered to proceed in the examination of the particulars of private Life, and to report upon the proprieties of domestic conduct, and the decorum of private behaviour ; it appearing on the very face of the papers that no such distinct enquiry was ever instituted, but that the enquiry carried on by those Lords proceeded throughout from its commencement to its close upon the whole of the matter still depending before them, as that which might eventually be made the subject of Legal Trial : and that

all the points to which their examinations were at any time directed were immediately connected either with the substantive charges then under their consideration or with the credit of the testimony upon which the accusation rested.

Those of your Majesty's confidential Servants who were not parties to that enquiry feel it their duty to represent to your Majesty that they concur with the four Lords above mentioned in the several conclusions which they drew from the evidence before them. And your Majesty's Confidential Servants, after the fullest consideration of the observations and affidavits brought forward by Her Royal Highness' legal Advisers, agree in the opinions submitted to your Majesty in the original report of the four Lords. In the present stage of the business they feel it their duty humbly to submit to your Majesty that, upon a mature and deliberate view of this most important subject in all its parts and bearings, it is their opinion that the facts of this case do not warrant their advising that any further step should be taken in the business by your Majesty's Government, or any other proceedings instituted upon it, except such only as your Majesty's Law Servants may on reference to them think fit to recommend for the prosecution of Lady Douglas on those parts of her evidence which may appear to them to be justly liable thereto.

Your Majesty's Servants observe that the Statement which has been offered to your Majesty on behalf of Her Royal Highness concludes with a prayer "That your Majesty would restore to Her Royal Highness the blessings of your gracious presence and confirm to Her by your own gracious words your Majesty's satisfactory conviction of Her Innocence."

Your Majesty's Servants humbly submit that whatever personal declarations your Majesty may be pleased to make to Her Royal Highness must be considered as depending solely on your Majesty's own feelings and

persuasion on the result of all that has passed in a matter so immediately connected with the Honour, Comfort or Decorum of your Majesty's Royal Family in the more private relations of domestic Life. The degree of intercourse and access to your Majesty's Person, to which your Majesty may be graciously pleased to admit any member of your Royal House, is also a point on which your Majesty's Servants feel themselves not properly competent to advise, and therefore they think themselves bound with dutiful humility to forbear to offer any opinion or recommendation thereupon.[1]

This Minute placed Windham in a difficult position. He was a friend of the Princess, and a not infrequent visitor to Blackheath, as numerous entries in his Diary testify. Of her innocence he had apparently no doubts; for, though he abstained from going to her during the "Delicate Investigation," and the Cabinet deliberations, as soon as these were over he and his wife were again to be found among her guests. In the circumstances, he could not accept the Minute without qualification, and he made a separate statement to be appended to it.

December 24, 1806

Though I concur perfectly in what I conceive to be the opinion of the Cabinet, that, in the whole of the Evidence which has been adduced against Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales, nothing is found as affecting Her Royal Highness, which can be a fit Subject for any legal proceeding, and that, with a view to the manifestation of His Majesty's personal sentiments or Domestick feelings towards any part of the Royal Family, there is no advice which His Majesty's Confidential Servants can at this moment presume to offer to His Majesty; yet

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 156.

I am compelled to state my concurrence on these points in a Separate Minute, because, in the Minute which has been adopted, the opinion of the Cabinet on the Specifick charge originally brought against Her Royal Highness is not distinctly set forth, but only convey'd by reference to the Report of the Commission, and that I cannot assume, without the risk of interpreting the Report in a sense different possibly from that which it may be intended to bear, that the opinion so convey'd is precisely the same with that which I am anxious to express; namely, that the charge originally brought against Her Royal Highness, is as to part directly disproved; and as to the remainder rests on evidence which cannot entitle it to the smallest credit.

I am further compelled to separate the statement of my opinion from that of the opinions of the Cabinet because; among the conclusions of the Commissioners; which the Cabinet adopts, there is one which appears to give to the evidence of Bidgood and others; on a point not immediately connected with the original and specifick charge against Her Royal Highness, a degree of authority which I cannot consider it as possessing.[1]

LORD GRENVILLE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Downing Street: December 24, 1806

I do not think your interpretation of our Minute would be admitted as correct by any of those that acceded to it.

Perhaps it would be better if your own ideas could be expressed without endeavouring to explain ours, as; in a matter where so much difficulty occurred to us in wording our own opinion, it can hardly be expected that a person not concurring in it should explain it in different words equally to our satisfaction.

You will observe that your Minute represents us at

[1] Add. MSS. 37842 f. 47.

the same moment as considering the evidence against Her Royal Highness as wholly unworthy of credit, and yet as attaching to a part of it a credit which it does not deserve.

The Lord Chancellor will not forward the Minute till to-morrow night. There would, therefore, be time for you to make any alteration you may think fit in yours. I do not see that the form requires any.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GRENVILLE

December 25, 1806

I cannot at all agree that the Minute which I sent you is liable to the objection which you state.

It can be of no consequence (except to myself) to what degree I may mistake the opinions of others, if the paper containing those opinions is present to speak for itself, and if nothing is said to make it supposed that the interpretation given to it is founded on any admission of the parties. In the present case words were purposely introduced to guard against any such supposition. The expression is "the conclusions which I conceive to be contained, either expressly or by implication, &c.," by which is surely conveyed that I am speaking my own conceptions and not anything for which I have the authority of others.

It is not easy, in fact, to conceive how, in the circumstances of the case, any Minute can be drawn, founded as this is on some degree of dissent from a preceding Minute, without some reference either to what that Minute is supposed to contain or to what it is supposed not to contain.

In either case the misconception may be the same, but in either case it must seem innocent, if care is taken to exclude the idea of any assent from the parties, and if the paper is at hand to speak its own language.

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 173.

These observations apply to the contradiction which you suppose to exist between the opinions which I have thus ascribed to the papers. If the opinions which I have thus supposed are in either part erroneously stated, the contradiction resulting from them, if any there is, will fall only on myself.

But, as in fact I do not conceive them to be erroneously stated, so I do not think that, even as they stand, there is any contradiction between them.

By the original charge, I mean evidently the charge originally exhibited by Sir John and Lady Douglas. I do not recollect, at this moment, whether the evidence of Bidgood enters that charge at all, or (what would be further necessary) in a manner adverse to the Princess. If it should not, there is an end of the question. But if it should, there would not, I think, be any contradiction in saying of Bidgood's evidence on this part of the charge, that it was, with the rest on the same part of the charge, wholly undeserving of credit, and on another point giving to it the degree of credit which the Report has allowed it.

The supposed contradiction seems to arise from the ambiguity of the word *evidence*, by which is sometimes meant the testimony and sometimes the Witness. Of a witness it could not be said, except in very particular circumstances, that he was deserving of credit on one point and not deserving of it on another. But in respect of testimony there does not seem the same difficulty. The testimony of the best witness in the world may, in certain cases, be entitled to no credit whatever, as if he speaks under a certain liability of error, or under an interest so strong and upon points so doubtful as to overrule the principle on which his veracity could be relied on.

After all, the expression, "wholly undeserving of credit," has, if I am not greatly mistaken, either been already applied in the Report, or been proposed more

than once to be applied, in the Minute, to the very evidence here in question; that is, to the evidence on the charge of the pregnancy and the delivery: so that if Bidgood's evidence was there included, and in a manner adverse to the Princess, the contradiction here supposed either has or would have been incurred.[1]

March 22, 1807

Though I cannot approve of the whole of the above Minute in its present form, yet I wish to be understood as concurring in that part of it which relates to the imputations so unbecomingly cast upon His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and in that part also which expresses the opinion that, in notifying to His Majesty the information which had reached him respecting Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales, His Royal Highness had acted with the most perfect and evident propriety.

I think it necessary to add that, after having perused the papers last submitted to our consideration, I see no reason to retract or vary any part of the advice already offered to His Majesty by His confidential servants, as expressed in the communication humbly recommended by them to be made by His Majesty to Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales.

SIDMOUTH.

I concur with Lord Sidmouth in thinking it necessary to declare that I adhere to the advice before given to His Majesty respecting Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales. I concur in all other respects with the opinions contained in his Minute.

W. WINDHAM.

[1] Add. MSS. 37847, f. 175.

SECTION VII

LAST YEARS

April 1807–June 1810

SECTION VII

LAST YEARS. April 1807–June 1810

The expedition against Copenhagen : Windham's growing distaste for political life : Puisaye : Windham unwell : He goes to Bath to recuperate : Sir John Moore in Spain : The capitulation of Madrid : The Spaniards defeated by the French at Tudela : A description of Bath in 1809 : Windham begins to sigh for the House of Commons : The Battle of Coruña : The death of Sir John Moore : Windham on the plan of campaign : William Hazlitt : The Battle of Wagram : The Walcheren Expedition ; The case of Sir James Cockburn ; The Battle of Talavera: Windham on boxing : Windham alarmed lest the Ministry should go out, and he be expected to return to office: The clamour against the Walcheren expedition : Ministerial negotiations : Windham's confession of political faith: The resignation of the Duke of Portland: Spencer Perceval becomes Prime Minister : He makes overtures to the Grenville party : Correspondence between Windham, Grey, Thomas Grenville, Lord Grenville, and Spencer Perceval : The O.P. riots : Windham speaks in Parliament on the Walcheren expedition : Windham injures his hip when assisting at a fire : An operation necessary : Last days : His last letter : Death.

IN March 1807 the "All the Talents" Ministry retired on the question of Catholic Emancipation, and was succeeded by an administration of which the Duke of Portland was the head, and Lord Hawkesbury (who in the next year succeeded to the Earldom of Liverpool), Canning, and Lord Castlereagh, Secretaries of State.

William Windham *to* Captain Lukin

Pall Mall: September 5, 1807

I have a choice opportunity of writing to you in the return of Mr. Hoppner, from whom I received the latest, and at the same time, the earliest intelligence of

you.—Your letter up to the 16th did not reach me till after he had called, and given me an account of you as late as the 23rd. I feel very doubtful and very anxious as to the result of your operations,[1] though Hoppner seems to think that the whole will be settled by the time that he returns. If it should, the cause must be either the want of provisions and water, or that the inhabitants cannot submit to the injury to be done to the town ; for the works seem to be such as must, for a considerable time, enable a force, however weak, to hold out against a strong one. But success itself will bring with it no satisfaction. I cannot feel that the accomplishment of all we look for is an equivalent either for the risk that will have been run, or for the certain discredit that we shall have incurred, and ill-will that we shall have excited. Buonaparte's designs upon England will not turn upon his having or not [having] the Danish fleet. Our proceedings in the case of Portugal (though such as I never ceased to regret from the moment almost of my having consented to them) were not within a thousand degrees so exceptionable as these ; and they ended, accordingly, in a way which produced neither reproach nor ill-will. Had the worst happened, our conduct could not well have been charged as having anything in it unjustifiable or irregular.

Let me recollect, upon this occasion, to obviate an impression which you may have received from circumstances which I heard only by a fortunate accident, in respect to a point where I should be sorry to have my opinion mistaken. —— told me of his having met you at sea, and of having shown you the machine with which he was provided for blowing up ships. I was sorry to find that, from his account of the orders under which he acted, you might have been led into the belief that it was by my directions that the machine in question was put on board his vessel. Quite the contrary ;—it was in

[1] Captain Lukin was employed in the expedition sent against Copenhagen.

direct opposition to my opinion. I deprecate such a mode of warfare as bad in itself, and one by which we should have much more to lose than to gain.

Farewell. You will let us hear from you at your leisure. When the fleet returns, we will endeavour to join you off Cromer, or at Yarmouth.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Felbrigg, Norfolk: December 12, 1807

This residence at Felbrigg, though I have not from circumstances made it so comfortable as it ought to have been, has still increased my indisposition to publick exertion, and I shrink from the prospect of returning to Parliamentary duty, much more to that of office. I am at times inclined to wish that I had accepted an offer which you know was pressed upon me,[2] that I might better have indulged the inclination which I feel for retirement without wholly losing my hold on publick life. —As to what you talked of in a former letter of leading the House of Commons, it is a situation which I have no reason to think will ever be offered me, but which infallibly I would never accept. Had I ever wished the situation, I should not have been so well satisfied at being put aside on the former occasion; but I early took an opportunity of removing any difficulty upon that subject by putting myself out of the question.

Mrs. Windham and I only just returned from Holkham, having left this on Monday and having in the meantime passed two nights with Mr. and Mrs. Rishton[3] and attended the Ball at Lynn. Lady Anson[4] went and Mr. Coke's

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 92.

[2] The peerage offered him by Lord Grenville.

[3] Martin ffolkes Rishton and his wife, the step-daughter of Dr. Charles Burney. They settled near Lynn.

[4] Anne Coke, daughter of Thomas William Coke of Holkham, Norfolk, married Thomas Anson of Shugborough, created Viscount Anson. Their daughter Anne subsequently became the second wife of Archibald John Primrose, fourth Earl of Rosebery.

niece, Miss Blackwell, with another Lady of the Holkham party, viz., Lady Ponsonby ; but Mr. Coke was prevented by an accident—a shock in attempting to jump over a ditch—of which he is considered now as recovering fast, but which had at first the most menacing appearance and about the effects of which I cannot even now feel quite at ease.[1]

LORD CASTLEREAGH *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Most secret *Brighton : December* 30, 1807

Many thanks for your letter, and for your kind Indulgence in dispensing with an Answer, to which I feel myself no longer entitled, altho' I am still in the habit of making use of an Amanuensis.

I trust Monsieur Prégent and his Companions are before this time arrived at their place of destination. I gave orders for their dispatch ten days since. If there has been any material delay on this subject, it has arisen from Monsieur de Puisaye's precipitancy in confiding to them Instructions which were not previously communicated to me, and which were not of a description which, when subsequently communicated, I could acquiesce in being a Party to. This necessarily led to the detention of the Parties when on the moment of embarking from Jersey for the coast.

As you allow me to communicate confidentially with you on this Subject, I have no hesitation in expressing to you my Regret that Monsieur de Puisaye does not manage his own Feelings and those of his Countrymen with a little more Forbearance at the present moment. If he expects to lead a party, he ought to adjourn over the Composition of Acrimonious Memoirs to a future time. He has by his Intemperance raised up a Nest of Hornets amongst his Countrymen which worry and torment us, and many of them will be resentful enough

[1] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 284.

to counteract his Projects even by betraying him at Paris.

As far as I have seen of Monsieur de Puisaye, he appears to me to be a Man of very considerable capacity, much Zeal and Talent for conducting systematically a business of the nature entrusted to him. I have no reason to doubt either his Principle or Honour; but certainly think him deficient both in prudence, and in the Spirit of Conciliation. By attempting to go too fast, he has retarded his own purpose, and, I am convinced, has produced a Fermentation amongst the French Party here, which makes it extremely difficult to make any Progress at the present moment without being exposed to a degree of Observation which must embarrass all our Movements.

When I have the pleasure of seeing you in Town, I shall be happy to converse further with you on the Subject.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Felbrigg: January 6, 1808

The time for returning to town comes now dreadfully near, and finds me, as I am sorry to say is too apt to be the case, very much unprepared for it.

" Unhouselled, unanointed, &c.," I have been sinking fast in idleness, and have been worse, in fact, from not having been quite well;—not so much unwell, indeed, as annoyed by a course of medicine.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Pall Mall: October 21, 1808

I am still here, and still confined to my house, though likely I hope soon to be released. There is nothing indeed that either now or for some time past should prevent my

[1] Add. MSS. 37887 f, 192.
[2] Amyot, " Memoir of Windham," p. 95.

going out, but the fear of disturbing a course of recovery that seems to be going on well, and of which one of the means might be, the avoiding motion and exposure to cold. I have dislodged the complaint from my back, and have no remains but in the leg and thigh on one side ; these, however, though inconsiderable, make me walk worse than before, while the medicines I am taking, and the confinement I am enduring, render me, for the time, less well in general health. The fineness of the day has tempted me for the first time to take a turn upon the leads at the back of the house ; but I do not find that I make much hand (I should rather perhaps say much *foot*) in walking, while the air has not done me half so much good as I should have found in Hudson's garden.

You will come up with a grand stock of health after these long holidays. I must have recourse to some expedient of the same sort, as soon as I am at liberty ; but whether in Spain, in Norfolk, or elsewhere, I do not as yet know.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Bath : January 2, 1809

I ought to have thanked you long since for all your kind communications, and cannot take a better opportunity of repairing my neglect, than when I have just received two additional ones, those of the 28th and of the 31st ; They have come together and both slower than they ought in consequence of my removal to this place, which I thought I should have quitted to-day on my road through London to Norfolk, but where I am set fast, with no great distress however, by an opinion that what I have considered only as remains of rheumatism is a species of malady which it is not safe to neglect, though in the present stage of it, it will probably give way

[1] Amyot, " Memoir of Windham," p. 98.

to the means which this place so eminently supplies. I may explain at once indeed to you what the nature of my ailment is, by saying that it is the same in a lower degree with Cutlers. Upon seeing by chance a treatise of Dr. Falconer on the Ischias, I was struck with the resemblance of the symptoms, and, upon applying to him, found him decidedly of opinion that the complaint is what my symptoms indicate. I am engaged, therefore, in a regular course of bathing, which will take me probably till near the meeting of Parliament. Mrs. Windham and Miss Forrest, who joined us about ten days ago, have staid behind at Wells but will follow as soon as I have provided a lodging and can go over and fetch them.

In answer to Mrs. Amyot's enquiry I may say that they are both the better for their excursion and Miss Forrest most strikingly so. When the latter shall have had an opportunity of drinking the waters about which she has a strong fancy, I calculate that she will return in such health and gaiety that we shall have nothing at the Stamp-office but balls and parties. Mrs. Windham's powers in walking up hills at Wells, will have been of great prejudice, I fear, to my Ischias, before I knew that such exertion was hurtful.—I hope Mrs. Amyot, without having stirred from Downing Street, will find herself not less well.

Your intelligence about Moore's purpose of advancing,[1] which I hear with great pleasure, confirms Lord Liverpool's account (who is in the adjoining rooms), which he gave me this morning. I have heard lately some very interesting accounts both from Spain and from those who have been there : and the result of them is to teach me great distrust of what we may hear unfavourable to the Spaniards, both from our generals and from our armies. We are a sad people either to judge or communicate

[1] General Sir John Moore (1761–1809), Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in Spain, advanced from Lisbon to Coruña. The battle of Coruña took place on January 16th

with foreigners, and unless our army can strike some great stroke, which they will hardly do without some great risk, their presence will have done more harm than good. The best part of the account in your letter of the 31st is the advance of Moore after he had heard of the success of the French at Madrid. This success at Madrid with the character which the inhabitants seem to have manifested, may possibly be to Buonaparte[1] the very reverse of an advantage.

It is a point too, that from pride and passion he may be suspected to have committed an error. The part in which the greatest error seems chargeable upon our counsels here, is that of the Eastern coast of Spain. I have seen officers who were with our squadron in that quarter and witnessed the conduct of the Spaniards at Tudela.[2] Nothing could exceed the ardour shown by the people nor the means which the country afforded. It never can be right that no assistance was furnished on this side from Sicily; which it might have been worth while even to abandon for the sake of what might have been done by that army in Catalonia. You were telling me when I was in London of what my opinion had been respecting operations from hence on the Northern coast; and which I had almost forgot.

I found a confirmation of the fact of my having entertained these operations in a letter which I had begun; but left unfinished, to Lord Mulgrave.[3]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* MRS. CREWE

Bath: January 21, 1809

When I met Mr. Hinchcliff at the door of the playhouse a fortnight ago; my intention was to have written to you the next day, so as to have had the merit at least of forestalling any account which you would be likely to

[1] Madrid capitulated to the French, December 4, 1808.
[2] Where they were defeated by the French.
[3] Add MSS. 37906 f. 325.

receive from them. But so it had been my intention to write to you at any moment during the last three months, yet the weeks and the months elapsed without any letter being written. I will not incur such another reproach in the present instance, but act while the purpose is yet warm in my mind, and before anything can interfere to prevent me from carrying it into execution.

You will see where I am by the date, and here I am liable to be detained for I know not how much longer, for I do not like to go till I shall have got rid of the complaint that first caused me to stop here, and I cannot feel sure that the waters have as yet had any effect. What I am trying them for is a mere local complaint, the remains of which I have had since August last, and which I had latterly neglected, considering it as mere rheumatism, but which they tell me is now, at least if it was not before, of a different description, and such as, though slight at present, may, if not now stopt, lead to I know not what consequences. It was not on this account that we came originally into this part of the world. I came to Bath to see a sick connection of mine, and thence went on to make a visit, long-talked of, to the Dean of Wells. It was on our return from thence that I took the opinion of a physician here (your countryman, Dr. Falconer), to whom I was led by a treatise of his that fell accidentally into my hands, and he pronounced the sentence under which I am now despairing. All that I do is to bathe and abstain from walking, for, though I have various other maladies, I must defer the cure of them till I shall get in the way of persons whom for those purposes I like better than any one whom I can well consult here.

In the meanwhile the campaign is begun in Parliament, and I am receiving the reports here without being a partaker in the action. It has so rarely happened to me to be absent on the day of the meeting of Parliament, or, indeed, during any part of the sittings, that I hardly know myself in my new situation. Till the battle was

actually begun and the sound had reached us, I felt very composed, and perhaps even comfortable, at being exempt from the necessity of taking any part ; but since the arrival of the papers to-day I feel a little uneasy and restless, like an old dragoon horse at the sound of a trumpet. On the very evening of the meeting I was at a ball at the rooms, for though I am directed not to walk, I have nothing to make me incapable of the amusement of a ball, in which I am not expected to be one of the dancers.

If I did, in fact, receive but little amusement it was alas ! not that I was either sick or past the amusement of balls, but that balls at Bath are no longer what they used to be. We have a house at the end of the Parade, the last but one in Pierrepont Street ; but with carriages driving past the door, piles of dirt where there used to be gardens, and the Parades—the scenes heretofore of elegance and fashion—a miserable waste, dilapidated and deserted, and bearing all the marks of decay and speedy extinction. It is Lord Manners, I find, who is the proprietor of the land and the author of the grand plan which is to put an end to all the comforts and conveniences of Bath as a place of resort for invalids. You cannot conceive what a spite I feel, not against all those who were accessory to the change which has been made in Bath, for that was in the course of things, but against the wanton endeavours that have been used for this purpose, and dictated by all sorts of paltry motives.

In lieu of Rooms, which exist (I apprehend) no longer, and of private parties, which I feel no inclination to go to, we have the Lukin family, who came with us to Bath when we left them, and have now taken a house within a few doors of us on the Parade. Miss Forrest, too, is with Mrs. Windham. I think you cannot do better, though Mrs. Hinchcliff and her daughter are gone, than take us in your way to London. There seems but little likelihood of my getting away before the time of your coming, at least if I am to regulate my stay by the

progress of my recovery, and not by the necessity of attending some debate from which I should be sorry to be absent. If you take your abode upon the Parade you may have for your next-door neighbour the same that you have in London (Sir J. Hippisley), who has a house there, to which he comes backwards and forwards, on account, I am sorry to say, of his third daughter, who has sustained a serious injury in her back of a nature to create great anxiety, though not to exclude reasonable hopes of recovery.

Upon publick affairs it is in vain to begin, nor should I be disposed to say a word if it was not for a doubt in your letter about the propriety on the part of the Spaniards of setting up as the head of their cause Ferdinand VII. I am sorry to find that the Jacobin language, which has been heard upon that point, and which has now, I perceive, met with an organ in the House, should have made such progress as to have reached into the palatinate and to have disturbed the faith of its good and loyal inhabitants. You may be assured that there is no more pestilent doctrine than that which would reproach the Spaniards for not having corrected what are called abuses.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* ROBERT LUKIN

Bath: January 22, 1809

I thank you for your letter and your enquiries. I am capable enough of going to London, and to the House, or any where else, but I am unwilling to carry away with me a complaint, when I am on the only spot where an easy cure may be hoped for. I begin, however, to be a little impatient. The *Clangor Tubarum* in the House of Commons, as heard through the reports of the newspapers, makes me rather restless and agitated, and uneasy at not being in the battle. I am not prepared to go the length of saying that there has been no case in which

[1] The Crewe Papers: Windham Section, p. 66 ("Miscellanies" of the Philobiblon Society, vol. ix.).

troops in the interior might be employed with advantage, though I have always seen great inconvenience likely to attend the measure, and have inclined rather to the course of keeping up a continual alarm upon the coast, and assisting the efforts of the inhabitants by occasional and desultory descents.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Bath: January 23, 1809

I shall look with anxiety for the chance of a letter from you to-morrow, though with little hope that it will bring any mitigation of the dreadful news[2] we have received here to-day and which to you is even yet perhaps only on its way. Moore killed, Baird[3] with his arm and part of his shoulder carried away, ninety officers killed and wounded, and a loss of men proportionate to a loss of that amount in officers. Such are the particulars which our intelligence contains, and which stands upon authority which leaves but little room to hope that the statement may be much exaggerated. Such news is not, indeed, the worst that could have been received or than might even have been apprehended, but it is of the very worst sort.

It is fatal in every view under which it can be considered, particularly if it is to have that further disastrous aspect which is ascribed to it of being the last exhibition which we are to make of ourselves in the Peninsula. Though I felt always most strongly the dangers and other disadvantages to which we exposed ourselves by sending an army into the interior, and though it would seem at first view that we have tried that measure in a way the most exceptionable, yet I cannot concur in the censure so broadly laid down by Lord Grenville and from which I am happy to have expressed my dissent, before I had

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 101.

[2] The death of Moore at the battle of Coruña, January 16.

[3] General Sir David Baird (1757–1829), Moore's second-in-command at Coruña, where he was severely wounded

learnt from you, how ill it had been by many people received. It was sure indeed to be so and, therefore, I wonder that Lord Grenville should have laid it down in a manner so broad and general and without those reserves which are necessary both to make it true as well as to obtain a reception for it among persons possessed by such opposite sentiments and who could not fail to be at once disappointed and mortified by it. . . .

I am I think a little better and am anxious not to be longer absent, though I don't know what may be in my power. Mrs. Windham and Miss Forrest both better. The latter particularly so. All well I hope with you.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Bath: January 26, 1809

I have received your letter to-day, and, but for the interruption of the post, should have had it yesterday. General Hope's letter is felt, I conclude, by everybody to be a very excellent one. I had before been satisfied by the account of officers who had been at Coruña at the time, that the victory was one which Buonaparte could not conceal, and would establish a new proof of the superiority of our troops in any contest in which their qualities could be fairly tried. This is a great consolation in the midst of all that we have to lament, both in the result of our operations, and in the way of individual loss.

I know not what to say about my return. My complaint is very little, but I cannot say that it shows much disposition to go away. I shall take a new opinion to-morrow.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* ROBERT LUKIN

Bath: January 27, 1809

What you say of the late operations I think very likely to be well grounded. I have found by officers whom I

[1] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 328.
[2] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 103.

have seen here, that there is a good deal of disposition to blame the manner in which the Army has been conducted. Some caution must be used in listening to such opinions, on account of the ill-humour that is apt to be excited among persons unsuccessful, and who have been subjected to considerable privations; and further, possibly, because a part of those privations may have been the consequence of great, though necessary, strictness in that respect, on the part of the Commander-in-Chief. After all allowances, however, I can very well conceive that the game might have been played better. Great glory has, at least, been acquired by us, which Buonaparte will not be able altogether to conceal, and which seems to have left upon the army a delightful impression of their own superiority.[1]

WILLIAM HAZLITT *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Winterslow, near Salisbury
February 15, 1809

I take the liberty to offer to your notice the enclosed Prospectus.[2] I have no other excuse to make for this intrusion than that I believe the design of the work is such as may meet with your approbation, and the natural wish of every one that what has employed many years of his life and many anxious thoughts may not be entirely lost. My principal view in it would be to chastise the presumption of modern philosophy. The advocates of this system, however, by an exclusive and constant claim to the privilege of reason, have so completely satisfied themselves, and so very nearly persuaded others to believe that they are the only rational persons in the world, that any attempt to disprove their doctrines is looked upon as

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 104.

[2] A prospectus of "'Proposals for Publishing . . . a History of English Philosophy.' By the Author of 'An Essay on the Principles of Human Action' and 'An Abridgment of the Light of Nature Pursued.'"

flying in the face of reason itself and an attack upon first principles.

An attempt like the present must, therefore, I believe, fail of success, without some particular support; and my object in soliciting the names of a few persons distinguished for liberal knowledge, and elevated powers of mind, as subscribers to the work, was to shew that an opposition to the fashionable paradoxes was not the same thing as formally declaring one's-self on the side of ignorance and error. I know of no name, Sir, that would contribute to this end more than your own; the permission to make use of which would be thankfully and proudly acknowledged by,

Sir,

Your obedient, very humble servant,

W. HAZLITT.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* CAPTAIN LUKIN

Beaconsfield: July 23, 1809

I hold to my purpose of going to the Assizes, and shall accordingly leave this for town to-morrow. Terrible news this from Germany,[2] though the learned in London, I understand, at least those about the offices, do not consider the battle was one of those decisive ones that leaves nothing to be afterwards hoped. There is nothing to me in the event that at all comes unexpectedly, however it may be to be lamented. The most discouraging consideration is the dreadful inferiority of talents that there appears always to be on the side of the Austrians. Why is Buonaparte to be able to pass the Danube before the Archduke is apprised of what he is about? I cannot think that this would have happened the other way. Our expedition[3] I conceive to be a most injudicious one,

[1] Add. MSS. 37916 f. 146.

[2] The battle of Wagram, July 6, in which Napoleon beat the Austrians under Archduke Charles

[3] The Walcheren Expedition, which totally failed.

whatever be the event. My idea is that the whole should have been sent to Spain, so as not to leave Buonaparte, when he has settled the Austrian business, to begin, as he did last year, on the banks of the Ebro, but to have driven the whole of the French force out of the peninsula. With a view, even to a respite from invasion, the total clearance of Spain would have been of more importance than the destruction of all the vessels and arsenals in the Scheldt, should we even accomplish that object. If I had been tempted to any other object, it would have been with a view to remote and contingent consequences, the capture of Belleisle, the troops being to proceed afterwards to Spain.

I have written to Hudson, to state my intention of being at the Assizes and to know whether he could give me a bed.

[P.S.] My cold is better ; but another of the poor men who were hurt at the fire at Frederick North's [1] (one of them is dead) is, I fear, in a bad way. They went into the house not only after I had left it, but after I was gone home.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS [3]

Felbrigg : August 6, 1809

I don't know how I can better bring forward the subject which I wish to submit to you than by begging you to compare the enclosed copy of a letter of mine to His Royal Highness the late Commander-in-chief with papers that will be furnished you by Colonel Gordon and by stating that the delay that took place in obtaining His Royal Highness' decision was owing to accidents which prevented my bringing the matter finally before him, till

[1] *See* vol. ii. p. 369 of this work.

[2] Windham's " Diary," p. 493.

[3] General Sir David Dundas (1735–1820), became Commander-in-Chief after the compulsory retirement from that office of the Duke of York, March 18, 1809. He held this position until May 1811, when the Duke of York was reappointed by the Prince Regent.

the commencement of the late proceedings in the House of Commons put a stop necessarily to the renewal of any such application.

The general outline of the case is that an Officer (Sir James Cockburn) has been put out of the Service; not by sentence of a Court Martial, nor by a decision of any kind, not even by the exercise of His Majesty's undoubted prerogative of dismissing any Officer without reason assigned, but by a mere mistake, and by a mistake not chargeable upon the party affected either directly or indirectly.

Directly, Sir James Cockburn could have nothing to do with it, the whole transaction having both originated and terminated during his absence from the Kingdom; and without his knowing anything of the matter, till he was told that he was out of the Army.

No one had any authority to act for him; nor from the nature of the case could have. And those who did act for him, in circumstances which the papers will explain; shew plainly that the putting him out of the Army was never for a moment in their thoughts.

No consent, therefore; either express or implied, was given either by him or by any one on his behalf: and, if a confusion took place and a mistake arose of it, that confusion was created solely by the act of others, having in view their own purposes, and cannot be made to operate against Sir James Cockburn, who, neither by himself, nor instructively by any of his friends, was endeavouring to do anything but to carry into effect, fairly and honourably, the Duke of York's order, without the least view to any indirect advantage. If the proceeding was bstructed in its regular progress it was by the act of others, and by those who were in the end thereby unduly benefited.

That last remark, namely, that Sir James Cockburn had nothing to gain, is important, because, to a careless and uninformed reader of one of the letters; it might

seem as if Mr. J. C. (the clergyman) had been attempting to gain for his brother a price beyond the regulation: but you will perceive at once that the price paid for the majority, whether greater or less, would make no difference to Sir James Cockburn, who was to receive in any case nothing but that which he had actually received from Major Orde, and what he was about to receive from Major Marriot, when the interruption took place on the part of Captain Verelets (?) and his friends.

The only possible ground, therefore, on which redress could be refused, is that which, it is admitted, must sometimes be put, namely, the time that has elapsed since the injury was done. But I must submit to you that the objection on the score of time (always a plea to be resorted to with reluctance) is applicable only to cases where the means of redress no longer subsist, or where the merits of the case are no longer capable of the same proof, or where a limitation becomes necessary as a general rule; with a view to quiet litigation, and to ensure to possessors a period when their titles may be established.

It will be seen that none of these considerations, or others connected with them, apply to the present instance: and therefore I venture to promise myself that the mere continuance for some time of what was originally wrong; and the delay of redress for what cannot be denied to have been a cruel injury, will not be considered by you as a reason why redress should be still refused, particularly when it is considered what the amount of the hardship is, to an officer who had served long and who had no intention whatever to quit the Service, and of what evil example it is to say that an injury done to an Officer by those in power, though unintentional on their part, nor brought on by any act, direct or indirect; on his, can yet receive no redress.[1]

[1] Add. MSS. 37888 f. 179.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* A. HUDSON, *of Norwich*

Felbrigg : August 17, 1809

You have rejoiced no doubt in the new proof, contained in the last Gazette, that the supposed superiority of the French arms, so arrogantly assumed and so meanly acquiesced in for some years past, vanishes before British troops. Though the late victory [1] should produce nothing more (as I fear it will not) than a confirmation of this proof, I don't know that it is too dearly purchased. Had our expedition gone to Spain, are there not grounds for believing that we might have driven the French out of the Peninsula ? Such an achievement would have been a great thing, even though it should have been found impossible, after their complete success elsewhere, to prevent them from returning. I hope our troops at Flushing will either succeed or withdraw before Buonaparte comes to efface the impression of what has hitherto been done, by some signal victory over them.

A smart contest this between Maddox and Richman ! Why are we to boast so much of the *native* valour of our troops, as shewn at Talavera, at Vimeira, and at Maida, yet to discourage all the practices and habits which tend to keep alive the same sentiments and feelings ? The sentiments that filled the minds of the three thousand spectators who attended the two pugilists, were just the same in kind as those which inspired the higher combatants on the occasions before enumerated. It is the circumstance only in which they are displayed, that makes the difference.

He that the world subdued, had been
But the best wrestler on the green.

There is no sense in the answer always made to this; " Are no men brave but boxers ? " Bravery is found in

[1] The battle of Talavera, at which Wellington and Cuesta defeated the French under Marshal Victor.

all habits, classes, circumstances, and conditions. But have habits and institutions of one sort no tendency to form it, more than of another? Longevity is found in persons of habits the most opposite; but are not certain habits more favourable to it than others? The courage does not arise from mere boxing, from the mere beating or being beat;—but from the sentiments excited by the contemplation and cultivation of such practices. Will it make no difference in the mass of a people, whether their amusements are all of a pacific, pleasurable, and effeminate nature, or whether they are of a sort that calls forth a continued admiration of prowess and hardihood? But when I get on these topicks, I never know how to stop; so I will send my best respects to Mrs. Hudson and have done.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* GENERAL SIR DAVID DUNDAS

September 6, 1809

I know very well that persons in official situations cannot undertake to carry on a controversy with those who apply to them or to argue beyond a certain extent the grounds of the decisions they come to. I wish only to state, after thanking you for the manner in which your decision has been communicated, that I cannot acquiesce in its justice, nor abandon the hope that you will not consider it as final. It is impossible for me to relinquish the purpose of prosecuting, in every way that I may find possible, the claim of Sir James Cockburn, as long as the rejection of it is made to rest on nothing but the part taken by his brother, the student in Divinity, and the length of time during which justice has been denied him. Besides that his brother's acts could only by a very strong construction be considered as his, his brother shews, by the very letters cited, that he never harboured the thought of putting him out of the army, nor had any

[1] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 110

other view, direct or indirect, but that of carrying into execution the Duke of York's orders, and in the very way that His Royal Highness had prescribed. He had no indirect or bye-view to his brother's interest of any sort.

It is obvious that the measure was carried in the way it was by the management of persons having influence at that time at Head Quarters, and the only question is, whether, when an officer, being at the time abroad, has by such means been put out of the Service, to say the least of it, by mistake,—he is to be continued out, lest his re-instatement should put an Officer over the heads of others (who ought, in fact, never to have been otherwise than over their heads, being only restored to his original situation), and who, when there, only produced to the *greater part* of those below him the same effect as is produced every day by the advancement of Officers out of their turn by purchase or otherwise.

I say the *greater part*, because I am aware that an Officer, promoted by favour or purchase, is not placed before any of those of the rank to which he is promoted; but he is before all others.

I do not expect or wish that you should be at the trouble of answering this; but I cannot but hope that you will allow your attention to be directed to the considerations here suggested, as well as to what was formerly urged, in case the matter should in any way be again brought before you.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Felbrigg: September 16, 1809

Thank you very much for your information, though it is far from presenting a prospect to me that I can contemplate with any feelings of pleasure. I have not virtue enough to wish the ministers out, at the risk of being one of those who may be called upon to succeed them. While the

[1] Add. MSS. 37888 f. 182.

change was said to be only partial, I felt sufficiently at my ease, but the way in which your informant supposes it to take place, an offer to one of some sort or another I take it for granted must be made. Mrs. Windham, as you will readily conclude, is already in terrors about it, though I have not said a word to her more than the mere general presumption: and I assure you I am hardly more pleased than she :—it is one of the things that one neither knows how to accept or decline. If I could always be as well as I am here, if Downing Street were in Felbrigg, or a dozen miles from London, I should think much less about it; but the being called upon to read and to write, to consider and to decide, when one is exhausted and worn down, has something in it, that hardly any advantages or gratifications can repay: and I am afraid the inabilities in point of health and strength are not got better even in the two years that have elapsed since I was last in the situation —my hope must be that your intelligence, as you are rather inclined to suspect, is unfounded; and thus the question will not arise; though I have my misgivings; and partly from the progress which I understand is making in the Catholick question and the alarms which I have heard the Ministers have received on that account. If it should be found that the measure must be submitted to, it will not be unnatural that an entire new Ministry should be called in, composed of men entirely friendly to it.

The clamours of the country against the Walcheren Expedition are, as the clamours of the country are sure always to be, perfectly wrong in their immediate grounds and reasonings, however they may be accidentally right in their result—the Ministers deserve to be abused, but not for the reason for which the publick abuse them. The grand fault was that which was quite independent of the event, the sending, therefore, anywhere but to Spain. We have now defeat or miscarriage everywhere, and a mortality, I fear, in both armies that will be

dreadful. My favourite, Lord Wellington, does not seem to have shewn much ability or judgement at least in the conduct of the campaign, whatever he may have done in the battle. Lord Strangford's [1] merits or demerits I have not had the means of judging of. There are some of his colleagues, I should suspect, who will not be backward to charge him with the blame.

A slight hurt which I got here in riding, and which threw me into a course of poultice and plaster, retarded so much my return to Town that it was determined between Mrs. Windham and me that I should stay over the sessions, at which I am sorry to think she is not likely to join me on account of Miss Byng's [2] marriage,—I in the meanwhile living a most wholesome life and in many respects a very pleasant and useful one, pleasant as I can recur to pursuits long laid aside (and very ill calculated to prepare me for a return to official life) and useful as I am getting things into order both within doors and without.[3]

William Windham *to* Thomas Amyot

Felbrigg: September 20, 1809

I say nothing all this while of the intelligence of the day. I lie trembling in my hole, waiting what shall befall me. The habits of life here are not a good preparation for a return to office, though the health is;—but even that has a little failed in the present instance; for, though I am considerably above my rate of London health, I am, from accident, not quite up to that which residence here ought to have given me.[4]

[1] Percy Clinton Sydney Smyth, sixth Viscount Strangford (1780–1855), British Ambassador at Lisbon.

[2] Lucy Juliana, youngest daughter of the Hon. John Byng (afterwards fifth Viscount Torrington), and a niece of Mrs. Windham, married Sir John Morris, Bart., October 5, 1809.

[3] Add. MSS. 37906 f. 344.

[4] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 113.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* LORD GREY [1]

Felbrigg : September 29, 1809

I have just received your letter from Alnwick, unluckily on a night when there is no London Post. I lose no time, however, in saying that I concur entirely in what you have done, both in the substance and in the mode. Nothing can be clearer than that the proposal could not be acceded to, and it is equally clear that in that case it would have been improper to go to Town. The letter, too, seems to be all that you require : it gives a decided refusal in terms as civil as was practicable and in a manner perfectly respectful to the King.

I had received, by chance, immediate information of the letter having been sent to you, tho' with a very erroneous account (not pretending, indeed, to be certain) of its contents, which were made to contain conditions still less admissible than the actual ones, and which I knew you would not hesitate a moment to reject. I felt no impatience, therefore, to hasten my return to Town, hoping, I am afraid, that nothing further would happen, and thinking at any rate that the time at which I must otherwise go, would be soon enough for any consultation at which I might be wanted.

The prospect is, I must confess, sufficiently appalling, and when presented suddenly to a person who has been living some time in the country, settling his affairs, preparing his comforts, following his own fancies and considering only *qua ratione queas traducere leniter ævum*, might well inspire the sentiment which I have above confessed of hoping that the whole might end in nothing.

It is difficult, indeed, to say what good we could do, if we had the affair all in our own hands. Much service may

[1] Charles Grey, Viscount Howick (1764–1845), succeeded his father in 1807 as (second) Earl Grey, afterwards Prime Minister 1831–34. The first paragraph in this letter is explained in Thomas Grenville's letter to Windham which follows.

undoubtedly be rendered by an upright and well disposed Ministry, by a just distribution of patronage, by encouraging merit, and by repressing intrigue and presumption, by producing a great deal of individual good and improving all the efficient departments of the State, not to mention the benefit of the example; but I am not sure that we should be better in that respect than our neighbours, and for great and beneficial measures I know not what they are to be.

External good there is none to be done, now that Spain is lost, as it must be,[1] I fear, in the general loss of Europe. I know not what means of acting externally remain, unless it be in settling disputes with America, which, I suppose, would be settled without us, and in which we must take care not to have errors of our own by overshooting the mark, or in making Peace with France. If it be a right measure, others may do it as well, and as well have the responsibility of it as we.

For internal measures there may be some little yet to be done in repairing part of the mischief which Castlereagh and the Duke of York have committed upon our Military System. Part, as I have often told them, can never be repaired—being the destruction of confidence, which is no more to be restored than lost virginity. With all the Stypticks one can use we shall never be able to give anything in future but one of Mr. Windsor's maidenheads. I was proceeding to complete that System, when I found so much opposition as would have ended probably in my going out, if the matter had not been settled by the removal of us all. It may be as well here to say, that if I should be again put in that situation (and without it I do not think I could consent to come in), I must stipulate for the revival of the Office of Inspector General, about which Lord Grenville had conceived the most erroneous opinions, and which was suppressed by Lord Castlereagh

[1] Wellington had been forced to retire into Portugal, and the outloo in the Peninsula was gloomy in the extreme.

without any saving, as I believe, to the publick worth speaking of, only for the same reason for which it might have been suppressed with us, namely, in compliance with the views and wishes of the Duke of York. With the aid of this Office, and Lord Rosslyn[1] at the head of it, which was what I proposed, I feel confident that I could place the recruiting once more upon such a footing as would do away with all necessity for such measures as the Local Militia, which, independent of its other evils, costs the country directly or by its immediate consequences, not less than three millions a year. Something, therefore, is to be done in this department, and more possibly and of more importance in Ireland, tho' I am not clear that we ought to proceed at once to the great work of what is called Catholic emancipation.

For the rest, the great thing that is wanted is resistance to the strides that are making, in concurrence with the general tendency of things throughout the world, to turn the country into a democracy. I say the general course of things, because such is the tendency even upon the continent, tho' it is restrained and kept down by the strong hand of Buonaparte; and this is just the alternative to which the world is now brought in virtue of the fine doctrines that have been taught, and of the means which exist for circulating them (and which Whitbread by the way would increase), namely, that of having no Government, or a Government of absolute force. Formerly there was something intermediate, viz., authority and the respect which one class of men and one rank of society was willing to pay another; but that being by various means done away, partly by a general change in the condition of things, and partly upon the plea that men would, as no doubt they often did, abuse it, there is nothing left *but* absolute power, if we would have any government at all, or would not live, as few would be willing to do, in a

[1] General Sir James St. Clair Erskine, second Earl of Rosslyn (1762–1837).

continued succession of revolutions. I am afraid this is the state to which the world is fast tending.

I do not see, therefore, what great work there is for us to do in Office, but to fight with firmness and moderation against this tendency in the affairs of the country; to prevent at least the evil from growing, if we cannot restore the country to that deplorable state, as it would now be called, in which it was till within these last thirty or forty years. For this purpose we must endeavour to restrain the intolerable licentiousness of the press, particularly as directed against the two Houses of Parliament, not by altering the laws, which cannot by their nature be much altered, and ought not, perhaps, to be so at all, but by obtaining by degrees a better administration of them, which if it be not lost past recovery already, will infallibly become so by a little longer disuse.

If we are not disposed, or are not able, to effect something of this sort, I see little good that we can do by coming into office, and little that can tempt anyone to the acceptance of it; and it may be a great question whether we should not do better to reserve our strength, increased in some respects by that very reserve, till things shall be in a state when a government for such purposes shall be still more distinctly called for.

It will be well, at least, if such should be the course into which we should be unavoidably driven: for it may not be possible to take that course of ourselves, if the Government should be offered upon certain terms.

The opinion, however, that such a course, if formed of itself, might be best, must be my excuse for wishing, as I fear I do, that they may be able to patch up a Ministry somehow or another, tho' I do not very well see how, and not be obliged for the persons to vacate the ground for us.

As matters stand at present, I shall be at Norwich for the Sessions on the 3rd and in London on the 7th or 8th; but I can easily hasten my progress, should you have been brought to town by anything new, and anything

arise in which a more general communication with friends is desirable. I hope you have been well. I have latterly not been quite, though only very slightly otherwise.[1]

THOMAS GRENVILLE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

Cleveland Place: September 30, 1809

The solitude of Boconnoc was suddenly invaded on Monday last by a Messenger with a letter from Perceval,[2] of which my brother has desired me to send you a copy as well as copies of the other papers which have passed upon this subject, and, as he is a good deal pressed with business, he begs that you will receive them at my hand instead of his; in truth they speak for themselves and require little or no comment.

There is something so ambiguous in Perceval's use of the phrases "the King's commands" and "the King's pleasure," that my brother was at first inclined not to interpret it into an order from His Majesty to come to town, and it appears that Lord Grey did actually so interpret it; but my brother, upon reflection, thought that, if he did not come, he should probably be accused of disobeying the King's orders, and he, therefore, arrived in town and wrote to Perceval precisely in the same tone and sentiments in which Lord Grey had written from Howick.

I think you will agree in approving the two answers, for, whatever distinction Perceval may attempt to make, the offer in truth was no other than an offer from the present Ministers still holding their offices, to communicate upon the extension of the Government by the admission of others to it, and you will see that, comically enough, he rests this offer only on the ground of the Duke of Portland's

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 270.

[2] The Duke of Portland resigned the office of Prime Minister, and at the same time Canning retired from the Foreign Office, and Lord Castlereagh from the War Office. Perceval succeeded the Duke of Portland as head of the Administration, and the other offices were filled respectively by Lords Wellesley and Liverpool.



G. F. Joseph, A.R.A., pinxt. *C. Turner, sculpt.*

SPENCER PERCEVAL

retirement, and mentions Canning's and Castlereagh's resignations only incidentally. All whom I have seen since I came to town are of one and the same opinion as to the impossibility of our negotiating with this Government, as long as it continues to be a government, and I have no doubt that such likewise are your sentiments, tho' you was at too great a distance to let us learn them. The Prince is exceedingly gracious, and highly approves all that has been done. What they will now do next to bolster up their remnant of administration, I cannot foresee. If they are not stout enough to go on, they will resign ; and that will produce new discussion, but the little one hears leads one to think that they will try some new device of the Duke of Richmond and Lord Wellesley or the Sidmouths or all together.

The continental war is recommenced, which is, I suppose, the death-blow to Austria or to the wretched King of Prussia.

My brother is going to Dropmore, whither I hope almost immediately to follow him.

Enclosure No. 1

SPENCER PERCEVAL *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Windsor : September 23, 1809

The Duke of Portland having signified to His Majesty his intention of retiring from His Majesty's service, in consequence of the state of His Grace's health, His Majesty has authorised Lord Liverpool, in conjunction with myself, to communicate with your Lordship and Lord Grey for the purpose of forming an extended and combined Administration.

I hope, therefore, that your Lordship, in consequence of this comunication, will come to Town, in order that as little time as possible may be lost in forwarding this important object, and that you will have the goodness to inform me of your arrival.

I am also to acquaint your Lordship that I have received His Majesty's commands to make a similar communication to Lord Grey of His Majesty's pleasure.

I think it proper to add for your Lordship's information that Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Secretary Canning have intimated their intentions to resign their offices.

Enclosure No. 2

LORD GRENVILLE *to* SPENCER PERCEVAL

Boconnoc: September 25, 1809

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter of the 23rd Inst., and understanding it as an Official signification of His Majesty's pleasure for my attendance in Town, I shall lose no time in repairing thither in humble obedience to His Majesty's commands.

I must beg leave to defer till my arrival all observations on the other matters to which your letter relates.

Enclosure No. 3

LORD GRENVILLE *to* SPENCER PERCEVAL

Camelford House: September 29, 1809

Having last night arrived here, in humble obedience to His Majesty's commands, I think it now my duty to lose no time in expressing to you the necessity under which I feel myself of declining the communication proposed in your letter, being satisfied that it would not, under the circumstances there mentioned, be productive of any public advantage.

I trust I need not say that this opinion is neither founded in any sentiment of personal hostility, nor in a desire of unnecessarily prolonging political differences.

To compose, not to inflame, the divisions of the Empire has always been my anxious wish, and is now more than ever the duty of every loyal subject. But my accession to the existing Administration could, I am confident, in

no respect contribute to this object : nor could it, I think, be considered in any other light than as a dereliction of public principle.

This answer, which I must have given to any such proposal, if made while this Government was yet entire, cannot be varied by the retreat of some of its Members.

My objections are not personal ; they apply to the principle of the Government itself, and to the circumstances which attended its appointment.

I have now, therefore, only to request that you will do me the honour of submitting in the most respectful terms these my humble opinions to His Majesty ; accompanied by the dutiful and sincere assurance of my earnest desire at all times to testify by all such means as are in my power, my unvaried zeal for His Majesty's service.

Enclosure No. 4

SPENCER PERCEVAL *to* LORD GRENVILLE

Downing Street : September 29, 1809

I lost no time in communicating to Lord Liverpool your Lordship's letter of this day.

It is with great concern that we have learnt from it that your Lordship feels yourself under the necessity of declining the communication which I had the honor to propose.

In proposing to your Lordship and Lord Grey, under His Majesty's authority, to communicate with Lord Liverpool and myself, not for the accession of your Lordship to the present Administration, but for the purpose of forming a combined and extended Administration, no idea existed in our minds of the necessity of any dereliction of public principle on either side.

Your Lordship may rest assured that, in communicating to His Majesty the necessity under which you feel yourself of declining the communication which I had the honour to propose to your Lordship, I will do every

justice to the respectful terms and to the dutiful and sincere assurance of your Lordship's unvaried zeal for His Majesty's service with which the expressions of that necessity was accompanied.

I cannot conclude without expressing the satisfaction of Lord Liverpool and myself at your Lordship's assurance that the failure of this proposal is not to be ascribed to any sentiment of personal hostility.

Enclosure No. 5

LORD GREY *to* SPENCER PERCEVAL

Howick: September 26, 1809

I have this evening had the honour of receiving your letter of the 23rd informing me that in consequence of the Duke of Portland's intention of retiring from His Majesty's service, His Majesty had authorised you in conjunction with the Earl of Liverpool to communicate with Lord Grenville and myself for the purpose of forming an extended and combined Administration, and expressing a hope that in consequence of this communication I would go to Town in order that as little time as possible may be lost in forwarding this important object.

Had His Majesty been pleased to signify that he had any commands for me personally, I should not have lost a moment in shewing my duty and obedience by a prompt attendance on His Royal pleasure.

But when it is proposed to me to communicate with His Majesty's present Ministers for the purpose of forming a combined Administration with them, I feel that I should be wanting in duty to His Majesty and in fairness to them, if I did not frankly and at once declare that such an union is with respect to me, under the present circumstances, impossible.

This being the answer I find myself under the necessity of giving, my appearance in London could be of no advantage, and might possibly at a moment like the present be attended with some inconvenience.

I have thought it better to request that you will lay my duty at the feet of His Majesty, humbly entreating him not to attribute to any want of attachment to his Royal Person or to diminished zeal for His service my declining a communication, which, on the terms proposed, could lead to no useful result, and which might be of serious detriment to the country, if, in consequence of a less decisive answer from me, any farther delay should take place in the formation of a settled Government.[1]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Felbrigg: October 2, 1809

I have had letters, with copies of the correspondence, both from Lord Grey and Lord Grenville. I should think that the Ministers will contrive to go on, and I cannot but hope it; for in the other event, I am sure I don't know what is to be done. I was enumerating, in my answer to Lord Grey, all that I thought could be looked to in that case, and the amount was very limited, and frightfully difficult. . . .

I feel but little stomach to return to office, unless I can have *carte blanche* as to my military plans;[2] and even then the whole is so *bc-devilled*, that there is no restoring things to their original state.[3]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* THOMAS AMYOT

Beaconsfield: December 18, 1809

I have been here for some days, and have just been joined by Mrs. Windham, who left London to-day. We are on our way to Bristol, and must lose no time, as Mr. ——, who is here, insists on my being in London during the second week of next month. I shall come very

[1] Add. MSS. 37847 f. 233.

[2] Windham's seven years' enlistment plan had been abandoned during the previous year.

[3] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 114.

reluctantly, having during this recess indulged myself so much in other pursuits, and contracted by one means or another, so strong a dislike to the politics of the times, that I am by no means in a frame of mind favourable for the commencement of a parliamentary session. The air of the country, however, will do something, if not to dispose me more to business, at least to render me more capable of it. One of the events that tend to create a great impatience of all public concerns, is this disgraceful and mischievous triumph of the O.P.'s, and the humiliating submission of the managers.[1] Their conduct is quite unaccountable, unless they have secret information that the juries at the Sessions would follow the example of Mr. Clifford's jury; and even then the sacrifice of Brandon is something so scandalous, that no consideration of interest can excuse it. I am the more alive, I suppose, to this defeat of the managers, because I see it as a rehearsal of what is meant for higher performers; the managers being the government; the new prices, the taxes; Brandon, myself, perhaps; and the O.P.'s exactly the same description of persons as at present. There is one difference I hope;—that I shall never come on, like poor Brandon, with an apology. In all other respects, it seems to me to present but too sure a presage of the fate of the country, contemptible as the thing is in itself.[2]

EDMUND MALONE *to* WILLIAM WINDHAM

January 30, 1810

I cannot refrain from thanking you, in the name of the people of England, for your admirable speech,[3] which I

[1] When J. P. Kemble opened the new Covent Garden Theatre on September 18, 1809, he raised the prices of admission. There was a serious riot, which continued night after night until December 16, when the O(ld) P(rices) were restored.

[2] Amyot, "Memoir of Windham," p. 115.

[3] Windham on January 26, 1810, had spoken in the House of Commons on the Walcheren Expedition.

have just finished and which, I am confident, reflects the opinions of every honest and judicious man in the kingdom, tho' very few of them could enforce or illustrate these topicks as you have done. But I am quite provoked at its being printed on such a small meagre type, to which Mr. Budd, your publisher, is used, from its being employed in Cobbett's vile publications. I have no doubt a second edition will be soon called for, and would strongly recommend its being printed in quite a different manner, in what is called a pica letter, and in a page not nearly so crowded. It ought to make 60 or 70 pages, instead of 40; and would be read by the greater part with much more satisfaction. I was delighted particularly with your observations on Colonel Wardle and Sir Francis Burdett.

In your note on the former of these gentlemen (for I must venture to nibble at two or three words as usual), there is an admirably worked up passage, which yet is somewhat clouded by a very long parenthesis, which always makes the member of the sentence that immediately follows it appear very awkward. . . .[1]

Pray, what is the precise notion of a *still-room*, and why is it so called? I imagine it is a housekeeper's room, where China and stores are kept. You will hardly believe that I never once heard the word, till I heard it used by a lady, a few months ago. It is not in Johnson; nor in Mason's Supplement; nor is it known in the whole *ci-devant* kingdom of Ireland.[2]

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* CAPTAIN LUKIN

Pall Mall: May 7, 1810

I am sorry to tell you sentence is just pronounced on me of a very severe operation (no trifling one, as to pain, at least), the consequence of a hurt which I got at Mr. North's fire. Of this, however, you must say nothing.[3]

[1] Malone proceeded to offer a number of suggestions by which the speech might be improved.

[2] Add. MSS. 37854 f. 166.

[3] Windham's "Diary," p. 504.

During the next few days Windham put his affairs in order.[1] He went for a walk on May 12, and was annoyed that he found out too late there had been an administration of the Sacrament that morning at seven o'clock at St. James', "which would just have suited me, as, besides the privacy, I could have gone there before I took any physic." The next day he went to the Charterhouse, of which he was a Governor, where his old Friend, Fisher, the Master, administered the Sacrament. On that day, too, anxious to spare his wife anxiety, he took her to Beaconsfield on a visit to Mrs. Burke, with whom he left her on a plea of business.

WILLIAM WINDHAM *to* COLONEL HARVEY, *of Catton, in Norfolk*

Pall Mall: May 16, 1810

I would very gladly attend the business which you mention, and with every disposition to find the merits such as you describe, but I am afraid I must to-morrow go through an operation which will disable me from attendance in the house till long after the business in question will be decided, as well as others which, without disparagement to yours, I should have been still more anxious to attend to. If our reformers carry their madness and folly now or in any subsequent year, there is an end, be assured, of the stability of this constitution, and we shall fall from confusion to confusion till we are either sunk into complete revolutionary anarchy, or are settled

[1] By his will Windham left everything to his widow for life, and, at her death, to Captain (afterwards Vice-Admiral) Lukin, the eldest son of the Dean of Wells (the statesman's half-brother), provided he would assume the name and arms of Windham. On the death of Mrs. Windham in 1824. Lukin accepted the conditions and came into possession of Felbrigg. From him it passed to his eldest son, William Howe-Windham (1802–1854), and then to his grandson, William Frederick Windham, who died in 1866. The last mentioned sold the family estate.

under Bonaparte. We shall probably enjoy the blessings of both ;—and after the taste of the former, namely of republican and revolutionary anarchy, or government as they will call it, there are many who will think even a government like Bonaparte's a blessing.

These are my first sentiments ;—I may also say my last and dying sentiments, for though the operation itself which I am about to submit to, is not a dangerous one, there cannot be so great pain, as must, I fear, be gone through, without some danger. It is, as far as I should collect, something of the same sort as that which poor John Gurney [1] underwent and fell a victim to.

I had thought at one time to defer it till I might have entered my last protest against such madness, and have tried what I could do to satisfy men's minds that it was madness. But I found so long a delay could not be incurred ; so I must only hope the best for the country and for myself.[2]

When Windham, on July 8, 1809, was returning to Pall Mall, about midnight, from the house of a friend, he saw a house on fire in Conduit Street. The burning house was but a few doors from that of his friend, Frederick North, who had a valuable library. With the aid of two or three men, Windham removed most of the books before the flames reached the building. The incident is briefly recorded in the Diary. " Refused Berry's carriage, and got drenched. Fire at North's. Not home till a little before four. Should have broken open presses."

This bald entry would have been sufficient, but for the unhappy results of an injury that Windham sustained at the time. While removing some heavy books he had fallen and bruised his hip. As he felt little or no

[1] The Quaker banker of Earlham Hall, Norwich.
[2] Amyot, " Memoir of Windham," p. 123.

pain he thought nothing of it. Presently, however, a tumour formed in the part affected, and he sought medical advice. Such remedies as were given were ineffectual, and on May 6 he called in the eminent surgeon, Henry Cline, who said an operation was imperative. Windham then consulted six other physicians, and as four supported Cline he agreed to submit to the knife.

The operation was performed by Cline on May 17, but, though it was successful, Windham never recovered from the shock. On the night of June 3, when the surgeon in attendance, Dr. Lynn, moved him into a comfortable position, "I thank you; this is the last trouble I shall give you," he said. "You fight the battle well, but it will not do." Soon after he fell asleep, and, in the presence of his wife, expired on the following morning with so little pain that it was scarcely perceived when he drew his last breath. On June 8 his body was conveyed to the family vault at Felbrigg, the funeral, in accordance with his expressed desire, being conducted in private. In the church his widow placed a memorial brass, bearing the following inscription:

Sacred to the Memory of the Right Honourable William Windham, of Felbrigge, in this County. Born the 14th of May, O.S. 1750, Died the 4th of June, N.S. 1810. He was the only son of William Windham, esqre., by Sarah, relict of Robert Lukin, esqre. He married in 1798 Cecilia, third daughter of the late Commodore Forrest; who erects this Monument in grateful and tender remembrance of him. During a period of twenty-six years he distinguished himself in Parliament by his eloquence and talents; and was repeatedly called to the highest offices of the State. His views and councils were directed more to raising the glory than increasing the wealth of his country. He

was above all things anxious to preserve untainted the National Character, and even those National Manners which long habit had associated with that character. As a Statesman, he laboured to exalt the courage, to improve the comforts, and ennoble the profession of a Soldier: As an individual, he exhibited a model of those qualities which denote the most accomplished and enlightened mind. Frank, generous, unassuming, intrepid, compassionate, and pious, he was so highly respected, even by those from whom he most differed in opinion, that, tho' much of his life had passed in political contention, he was accompanied to the grave by the sincere and unqualified regret of his Sovereign and his Country.

THE END

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

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